JUDGMENT V. Verma, Member.—The first mentioned bunch of petitions (Sr. Nos. 1 to 26) are all complaints filed under section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against the Shimla Development Authority relating to the allotment of plots/flats/independent houses being developed/constructed or in the process of development or construction under the Self Financing or partly Self Financing Schemes undertaken by the said statutory authority In Shimla. The miscellaneous applications from Sr. Nos 27 to 34 have been filed under sections 25 and/or 27 of the Consumer Protection Act praying for execution of the order passed in this jurisdiction in favour of the applicants named above against the Shimla Development Authority In all these cases, objection in regard to the jurisdictional competence of the Commission have been raised on the part of the respondent S. D. A. and decision thereon is insisted upon before the merits of each case are gone into and adjudicated upon by the Commission. 2. In regard to the applications seeking execution of the orders already passed by this Commission, let it be noted that the Respondent, S. D. A, did not go in appeal against the original orders, compliance wherewith is now prayed for through the said applications. (Sr. Nos. 27 to 34). The learned Counsel for the respondent claims that issue of juris diction even if not raised at the initial stage or even if raised and decided against the respondent can still be raised at the stage of execution of a decree if it is shown that it was passed by a court that lacked inherent, jurisdiction. In that context he invited our attention to Hira Lal Mool Chand Joshi v. Barote Raman Lal, (1993) (2) SCC 458 and Charangi Lal Sirilal Goanka v. Jasjeet Singh and others, 1993) 2 SCC 507. Since these applications have been tagged with original complaints in which in any case we are making final orders in regard to the competence of the complainants to maintain complaints under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short, the Act, 1986) and about jurisdiction of the Commission to entertain them, we see no particular cull to go into the issue spelled out above and accordingly leave that question open to be considered and decided as and when any necessity arises. 3. 3. Likewise, the point as to whether or not interest can be awarded by the Commission in terms of section 14 of the Act, 1986, we do not consider relevant to the threshold question of jurisdiction presently before us and so leave this too open to be answered at appropriate time. 4. The very first submission made on behalf of the respondent authority is "that the complainants before the Commission are neither consumer nor is the S. D. A. rendering any service as defined in section 2 of the Act. Stress was laid on an amendment carried out to the definition of "service" through an Ordinance No. 24 of 1993 whereby "housing construction" as well has been included amongst the various activities and facilities already enumerated therein, in order to press the point that earlier such an activity was outside the scope of the Act Another point made is centered on section 17 read in the light of the amendment carried out also per the above Ordinance whereby the minimum monetary jurisdiction of the State Commission has been raised from Rs one lakh to five lakhs. 5. We do not consider it worth-while to reproduce in verbatim the definition of the terms mentioned above. About the interpretation thereof we would revert if necessary after we have first considered the effect of authorities cited before us which are referred to and discussed hereafter. Has the Commission lost jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaints whose value happens to be less than Rs. 5 lakhs, even though these have been admitted and proceeded with prior to coming to the force of the above law from the 18th June, 1993 ? The question may be discussed although the point obviously does not require any elaborate and in-depth probe. The above amendment has not been made effective from any back date. In other words, it is prospective in effect. Before the said amendment, section 17 (a) (I) read as under :— "17. Jurisdiction of the State Commission.—Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have jurisdiction,— (a) to entertain— (i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and a compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees one lakh but does not exceed rupees ten lakhs." The amendment has substituted the words "one lakh" and "ten lakhs" with words "five lakhs and 20 lakhs". Otherwise it leaves the section untouched. Otherwise it leaves the section untouched. From a plain reading it is manifest that the litmus test of monetary jurisdiction is to be applied at the time of entertainment of a complaint and not at every subsequent stage till the final outcome. Besides, as held in AIR 1953 SC 221, the right of appeal from the decision of an inferior court to a superior court becomes vested in party when proceedings are first initiated in and before a decision is given by the inferior court, unless this vested right has been taken away by express enactment or necessary intendment, which the instant enactment does not do. Therefore, the complainants before us cannot be deprived of this substantive right. 6. In support of his other contention, the learned Counsel has referred us to the judgment of the National Commission in Mrs Laxmiben Laxmichand Shah v. Mrs Sakerben Kanji Chandan, (1992) Comp LJ 177, (NCDRC). In this case the "complainant entered into a contract for the hiring of a flat on a monthly tenancy basis. It was alleged that the respondents landlords had neglected and refused to provide most of the amenities which were agreed under the contract and, therefore, the complainant and the members of her family had suffered mental agony, ill health, etc. The National Commission dismissed the petition and held that the arrangement between the complainant and the respondents was only one of lease of immovable property and the default or omission on the part of the respondents which was complained of were in relation to their obligations under the said contract relating to lease of immovable property. The Commission observed that such a grievance would not fall within the scope of the Consumer Protection Act since there was no hiring of service for consideration so as to entitle the complainant to claim the status of a "consumer". Without labouring the point, it is evident that this authority fails to come to the aid of the respondent. The complainants before us are not leasses of immovable property and the S. D. A. cannot claim the status of landlord vis-a-vis the complainants who have not entered in lease of tenancy with it. Without labouring the point, it is evident that this authority fails to come to the aid of the respondent. The complainants before us are not leasses of immovable property and the S. D. A. cannot claim the status of landlord vis-a-vis the complainants who have not entered in lease of tenancy with it. On the contrary, the Shimla Development Authority, a creation of Himachal Pradesh Town and Country Planning Act, 1977, launched various Self Financing Schemes for residential complex in New Shimla and through press advertisements invited applications for allotment of certain number of flats, single storey independent houses, developed plots of different types/sizes and larger undeveloped plots on 99 years lease hold basis with financial participation of persons intending to purchase on such terms and conditions as were laid down in the brochure that accompanied each application form. 7. Our attention has been invited also to Delip Bapat and another v. Panchvati Co-op. Housing Society limited, CLR 1993 (1) Housing 3, as also to Gr. Capt. D. W. Chauhan v. Air Force Naval Housing Board, CLR 1993 (1) Housing 7 and General Co-operative Group—Housing Society Ltd. v. J. K. Cement Works and another, II (1992) CPJ 486 (NC). We are afraid the learned Counsels efforts have been in vain. The ratio none of these cases fits the facts and circumstances of the instant complaints. In Delip Bapats case (supra), National Commission has held the complaint as not a case of consumer dispute under the Act, because the right forum for a member of a Co-operative Society to agitate his grievance is the Co-operative Court under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. Besides, the facts of that case bear no resemblance to the facts in the instant complaints. Group Capt. Chauhan s (supra) complaint against Air Force Naval Housing Board was held not to be maintainable on two grounds ; one, the complaint was stale- and, barred by limitation and secondly because "the activities of the Board (Opposite party) are only for the welfare and benefit of serving and retired members of the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force without earning any profits". On the contrary in the nature of complaints we are concerned, it is a matter of record that the S, D. A. is reserving certain percentage of the cost recoverable from the allottees as departmental charges and profits as well. On the contrary in the nature of complaints we are concerned, it is a matter of record that the S, D. A. is reserving certain percentage of the cost recoverable from the allottees as departmental charges and profits as well. Moreover, the aims and objects of these two authorities are poles apart. (II) 1992 (CPJ 486 NC) relates to a complaint in regard to alleged breach of contract committed by the respondent in relation to supply of a specific quantity of cement that was allegedly agreed upon between complainant and respondent. It was this background that the National Commission had declined to entertain the appeal against the decision of the State Commission, Delhi dismissing the complaint In that case it was a bare and simple contract of the supply of specific quantity of cement and there was no element of hiring of service for consideration unlike in the instant complaints. The question posed in Shri P. K. Kuriakose and others v. Air Force Naval Housing Board, I (1992) CPJ 319, was whether a complaint lies under the Act against the Housing Board who is rendering service to its members free of charge i. e. on "no loss and profit basis". The Delhi State Com missions answer to it was in the negative. " In order the bring out the divergence in these two situations we consider it instructive to reproduce paragraph 10 of the Delhi Commissions order ; it reads :— "10. We have examined the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations (Bye Laws) of the Air Force Naval Housing Board. The information contained therein reinforced with the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the respondents, makes it abundantly clear that the service rendered by the Board is service without consideration. It is more in the nature of a welfare activity undertaken by the Board for the service personnel and families of deceased service personnel of the Air Force and Navy on "No loss No Profit basis". Section 2, sub-section (o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 stipulates that rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service is not covered by the term "service" as defined in the Consumer Protection Act. The Board has no interest in the houses got constructed by it for the benefit of the service personnel of the Air Force and the Navy. Board is not the owner. The Board has no interest in the houses got constructed by it for the benefit of the service personnel of the Air Force and the Navy. Board is not the owner. We are unable to accept this contention that the activity of the Board compares favourable with the D. D. A. s activity in executing their Self Financing Housing Scheme on the grounds that while D, D, A. charges certain percentage towards the service, the Board does not. The service rendered by the Board is free of charge. The complaint is not maintainable and as such it is dismissed." As already said, the S D. A. like the D. D. A. as in the above cited case charges certain percentage towards the service. Hence the respondent cannot claim parity with the Air Force Housing Board to oust the jurisdiction of this Commission and the competence of the complainants to come before the Commission claiming relief under the Act. 8. Now reverting to the question as to whether the S. D. A. is rendering the service and the allottees of plots/flats/independent houses are consumers competent to invoke the provisions of the Act, 1986, suffice to refer to the judgments within this jurisdiction, In the order dated the 30th May, 1990 in Original Petition No. 1 of 1990 (Dr. S. K. Ahluwalia v. The Secretary-cum-Chief Engineer, H. P. Housing Board), this Commission had adopted the reasoning given by the National Commission in U P. Avas Avam Vikash Parishad v. Garima Shukla and others, to repel the contention of the respondent that the services rendered by the respondent Board do not fall within the definition of "service given under section 2 (o) of the Act, 1986. Incidentally, the respondent Board went in appeal to the National Commission but did not succeed on this point. The above ratio in our view applies with equal force in the case of S. D. A. which statutory authority is constituted with aims and objects similar to that of Himachal Pradesh Housing Board. 9. In original complaint No. 9 of 1991 (R. D. Soni v S. D. A.) the Central question before State Commission was whether the complainant (an Allottee) of a L. I. G. flat Type A is a consumer as defined under section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986". 9. In original complaint No. 9 of 1991 (R. D. Soni v S. D. A.) the Central question before State Commission was whether the complainant (an Allottee) of a L. I. G. flat Type A is a consumer as defined under section 2 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986". After discussions, the Commission answered the question in the affirmative as would be observed from para 5 of the said order dated the 2-1-1992 :— "5. The expression consumer has been defined in section 2 (1) (d) of the Act. It reads as follow?:— Consumer means any person who,— (i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised or under any system of deferred payment and include any user of such goods other than the person who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does include a person who obtains such goods for re-sale or for any commercial purpose ; or (ii) hires any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the pen who hires the services for consideration paid promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person. A complainant who had agreed to buy a flat for a consideration which was paid under the system of deferred payment as per the terms of the brochure, falls within the definition of the beneficiary entitled to avail the services of the respondents and he is thus s consumer. Hence this contention being meritless, is rejected." 10. The National Commission had occasions to reiterate the view as contained in V. P. Avas Avam Vikash Parishad, (1) 1991 CPJ 7, followed in Dr S. K Ahluwalia and R D. Sonis case, (2) (1992) CPJ 437. 11. Finally whether the Commission is bond by its earlier decision on question of law or whether it can deviate therefrom and even over rule the same, is the point to be faced. 11. Finally whether the Commission is bond by its earlier decision on question of law or whether it can deviate therefrom and even over rule the same, is the point to be faced. Our view is that we consider ourselves bound by your own decision on pure question of law. In holding this view we are indebted to the exhaustive and authoritative dissertation on the subject by Haryana State Commission that forms part of its order in S. D O. AEE City Division. Hissar v. Hotel Pulki, Hisar, (1992) CPJ 672. 12. Concluding, we hold that the Act, 1986 applies to the respondent, S. D. A. ; that in allotting plots/flats/independent houses etc., under various Self Financing or partly self-financing schemes, it performs service’ for consideration within the meaning of section 2 (1) (o) and that for any "deficiency" in service 2 (1) (g) a complaint 2 (1) (c) can be filed under section 12/18 of the Act by any allottee of a plot/flat/independent house in his capacity as a consumer 2 (1) (d) hiring as he does the services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised. This Commission, thus, does not have the jurisdiction under the Act, 1986 to adjudicate upon the complaints/petitions referred to above. Announced on this 25th day of August, 1993. Preliminary objection answered accordingly.