Judgment : While A.A.O.No.270 of 1983 is against the fair order and decretal order in I.A.No.966 of 1983, A.A.O.No.271 of 1983 is against the fair order and decretal order in I.A.No.3211 of 1982 in O.S.No.415 of 1982on the file of learned Subordinate Judge, Pondicherry. 2. On 112. 1992 when the appeals came on list there was no representation by respondents. So arguments of the appellants’ counsel alone were heard. On the next hearing date, the appeal was adjourned at the request of counsel for respondents. Next time both sides wanted adjournment. On 21. 1993 there was no representation for the appellants. Learned counsel for the respondents represented that the first respondent Govindam-mal had ceased to have any interest in the case and so the counsel would contact the client and report. However, during the subsequent hearing on 21. 1993 there was no representation by both sides. On 2. 1993 one more adjournment was granted at the instance of learned counsel for respondents. On 12. 1993 there was no representation by respondents. Appellants’ counsel alone was present. So the appeal was posted for passing of orders on 12. 1993. On that day both sides were absent. So judgment was reserved. 3. The appellants in A.A.O.No.270 of 1983 are respondents 1 and 3 to 5 in I.A.No.966 of 1983. That application was by the present 1st respondent plaintiff Govindammal under O.40, Rule 1 and Sec.151, C.P.C. for the appointment of a Receiver to take possession of the suit properties and administer the same as directed by the Court pending disposal of the suit. She stated in her affidavit that her father-in-law Sadasiva had a life interest in the suit properties while her husband Virapattira Odear and his brothers owned the vested remainder. Her husband died on 210. 1970. On the death of Sadasiva she has become a co-sharer as heir to her husband along with appellants and second respondent herein who are the brothers of her husband. And appellants and second respondent have committed act of waste by cutting the trees in suit fields. That petition was resisted by the present appellants on the ground that plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit and she has not paid the necessary court-fee. She has also not impleaded proper parties to the action. As she has remarried, she has no right, title or interest over the properties. That petition was resisted by the present appellants on the ground that plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit and she has not paid the necessary court-fee. She has also not impleaded proper parties to the action. As she has remarried, she has no right, title or interest over the properties. The landed properties are in possession of the tenant and the appointment of a receiver will affect the statutory rights of the tenant. 4. The trial court passed an order on these lines: "In view of the Commissioner’s report and the allegations made therein, this Court considered necessary to appoint a Receiver for the suit property. Therefore, Mr.K.Parasuraman, Advocate is appointed as the Receiver for the above purpose." Virtually it is a non-speaking order. Even if the Commissioner’s report discloses any grounds for the appointment of a Receiver, the trial court should have stated those factors, discussed them and arrived at a finding. It is obvious that the learned Subordinate Judge has not gone into the provisions of O.40, Rule 1, C.P.C., even once and understood the same before passing the order of appointment of a Receiver. 5. Under O.40, Rule 1, C.P.C., where it appears to the court to be just and convenient, the court may by order, (a) appoint a receiver of any properly, whether before or after decree; (b) remove any person from the possession or custody of the property; (c) commit the same to the possession, custody or management of the receiver, and (d) confer upon the receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits and for the realization, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits, and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of these powers as the Court thinks fit. In Krish-naswamy v. Thangavelu, A.I.R. 1955 Mad 430, P.N.Ramaswami, J. has enumerated the five requirements embodied in the words ‘just and convenient" in O.40, Rule 1 to be fulfilled by the facts of the case. These five requirements are: .(1) The appointment of a receiver pending a suit is a matter resting in the discretion of the court. .(2) The court should not appoint a receiver except upon proof by the plaintiff that prima facie he has a very excellent chance of succeeding in the suit. These five requirements are: .(1) The appointment of a receiver pending a suit is a matter resting in the discretion of the court. .(2) The court should not appoint a receiver except upon proof by the plaintiff that prima facie he has a very excellent chance of succeeding in the suit. .(3) Not only must the plaintiff show a case of adverse and conflicting claims to property, but, he must show some emergency or danger or loss demanding immediate action and of his own right he must be reasonably clear and free from doubt. The element of danger is an important consideration. .(4) An order appointing a receiver will not be made where it has the effect of depriving a defendant of ‘de facto’ possession since that might cause irreparable wrong. It would be different where the property is shown to be ‘in medio’, that is to say, in the enjoyment of no one, and .(5) The Court, on the application made for the appointment of a receiver, looks to the conduct of the party who makes the application and will usually refuse to interfere unless his conduct has been free from blame. 6. The affidavit in support of the application sworn by the respondent Govindammal narrates these incidents as grounds for appointment of a receiver: (1) Defendants have wilfully cut more than 25 mango trees and 50 coconut trees. (2) They have divided the land into plots and they are selling to third parties. One of the purchasers is constructing house. Because of the construction, the land has become unfit for agricultural purpose. (3) The defendants have removed the fence around the land. (4) The defendants are removing the beams, rafters, windows, doors and pillars of quality teak from the building in the suit land and selling them. The appellants have denied these allegations in their counter. The Commissioner states in his report that nearly 70 coconut trees are standing on the boundaries of the first item. There is ragi crop in a major portion of this first item. The remaining portion is lying vacant. The second item is a coconut grove. There are plantain trees in one acre. In another portion there are 550 coconut trees, 55 mango trees, 5 tamarind trees, 16 poovar-asu trees, 20 velikathan trees and 2 neem trees. Besides there is one dead mango tree. The remaining portion is lying vacant. The second item is a coconut grove. There are plantain trees in one acre. In another portion there are 550 coconut trees, 55 mango trees, 5 tamarind trees, 16 poovar-asu trees, 20 velikathan trees and 2 neem trees. Besides there is one dead mango tree. It is not the report of the Commissioner that there is any indication regarding the cutting of the abovesaid variety of trees. His report only reads that on the eastern side casuarina trees could have been cut and removed one month prior to his visit. He does not say what he observed. It is not known on what basis he has come to this conclusion. The report is silent as to whether any stumps of such trees or any remnants of those trees are available. 7. The report of the Commissioner further states that in the south eastern corner there is a room like structure with old foundation. There is a new extension and the fence around the suit property is not in good condition. In the second item ‘B’ schedule some of the bath room tiles have been removed. In the kitchen the roof has fallen down in a corner. The house was not whitewashed for the past four years. The compound wall is not in good condition. Some wooden pillars arestanding in the veranda without any support to the building. His report nowhere states that there was any evidence relating to removal of windows, doors and other fixtures from the building. The Commissioner instead of reporting what he has observed, has chosen to record what he learnt on enquiry. This is beyond the scope of the commission warrant issued to him. So we find that the Commissioner’s report does not support the claim of the 1st respondent for the appointment of a receiver. 8. The appointment of a receiver is recognised as one of the harshest remedies which the law provides for the enforcement of rights and is allowable only in extreme cases and in circumstances where the interest of the person seeking the appointment of a receiver is exposed to manifest peril. 8. The appointment of a receiver is recognised as one of the harshest remedies which the law provides for the enforcement of rights and is allowable only in extreme cases and in circumstances where the interest of the person seeking the appointment of a receiver is exposed to manifest peril. Therefore, this exceedingly delicate and responsible duty has to be discharged by the court with the utmost caution and only when the five requirements embodied in the words ‘just and convenient’ in O.40, Rule 1, C.P.C. are fulfilled by the facts of the case under consideration. The appointment of a receiver is made to preserve the property pending litigation to decide the rights of the parties or to prevent the scramble among those entitled. It is necessary to allege and prove some peril to the property. The court by taking possession of the property at the instance of the plaintiff may be doing irreparable wrong to the defendant. If the plaintiff should eventually fail in establishing his right against the defendant, the court may by its interim interference cause mischief to the defendant for which the subsequent restoration of the property may offer no adequate compensation. It is true that the court has got absolute discretion in the matter of appointment of receiver. But the discretion cannot be exercised in an arbitrary and in an unreasonable manner. It has to be exercised cautiously, judicially and according to well established legal principles. While so, it is evident that the order of the trial court appointing a receiver is unsustainable. 1. A.No.3211 of 1982 isan application by the said plaintiff Govindammal to restrain the defendants by means of an injunction from alienating the suit properties or entering into any transaction with any third party relating to them. The injunction is sought on the ground that in order to defraud her rigits, defendants are trying to sell away the properties. The present appellants resisted the action contending that the petition was not maintainable. The second defendant Veerappan had no objection for the issuance of an injunction order. Holding that the counsel for the respondents 1,3 to 5 in that application admitted their preparation for alienation, the trial court issued the order. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that the plaintiff is at best only a co-sharer and there cannot be a total prohibition of alienation. Holding that the counsel for the respondents 1,3 to 5 in that application admitted their preparation for alienation, the trial court issued the order. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants pointed out that the plaintiff is at best only a co-sharer and there cannot be a total prohibition of alienation. Before ever injunction is granted, it must be established that the petitioner has prima facie title to the property. The balance of convenience has to be ascertained. Besides, the suit is one for partition and separate possession of 1/6 share of the plaintiff in the property of her deceased husband. Any alienation pending suit could only be subject to the result of the litigation. Equities could always be worked out during final decree proceedings. While so, the impugned order of injunction cannot be sustained. 11. In the result, both the appeals are allowed and the orders and decretal orders in I.A.Nos.3211 of 1982 and 966 of 1983 are set aside. Those applications are dismissed. No costs.