R.K. Manisana, J.— This appeal arises from a judgment of a Single Judge made on 5.11.92 in Civil Rule No. 476 of 1989 [1993 (l)GLJ 13]. The facts leading to the writ petition are, in brief, as follows. The Silchar Collegiate School is a recognised institution run by a private body. The petitioner was initially appointed as te nporary teacher in the school with effect from 1.4.76. later, as the Vice Principal temporarily with effect from 1.1.83. The petitioner was confirmed as Assista it Teacher with effect from 1.4 88. Thereafter, by a resolution dated 4.2 89 of the Managing Committee of the school, the petitioner was reverted from the post of the Vice Principal to his substantive post of the Assistant Teacher with effect from 6.2 89, and Smti Ratna De was promoted as the Assistant Headmistress purely on temporary basis. Thereafter, notice dated 4.2.89 was issued by the Management reverting the petitioner to the post of Assistant Teacher and appointing Ratna De as the Assistant Headmistress. Against the reversion from the post of Vice Principal, the petitioner submitted a representation to the Inspector of Schools, Cachar. The Inspector of Schools, vide letter dated 17.2.89, forwarded the representa­tion to the Secretary of the Managing Committee for point wise comment on the representation, and directed the Secretary not to give effect to the notice dated 4.-.89. But the Management did not obey the direction of the Inspector. In the writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the notice dated 4.2.89. 2. The learned Single Judge has held that the petitioner was reverted from the post of Vice Principal to his substantive post of Assistant Teacher in violation of the rules of natural justice and that the school is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for the management did not object to the application of the Assam Aided Higher Secondary High and Middle School Management Rules, 1976 ( Rules' for short), and "apart from public duty to be performed by the Managing Committee there is interference by the Government agencies, namely, the Inspector of Schools, under relevant rules". The learned Judge quashed the impugned notice and directed the Managing Committee to reinstate the petitioner as the Vice Principal and granted consequential reliefs mentioned in the judgment. Hence this appeal by the Management. 3. Mr. DK Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the appellant, has made the following submissions. The learned Judge quashed the impugned notice and directed the Managing Committee to reinstate the petitioner as the Vice Principal and granted consequential reliefs mentioned in the judgment. Hence this appeal by the Management. 3. Mr. DK Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the appellant, has made the following submissions. First, the Inspector of Schools has no control over the teachers as the school is purely a private institution run by a private body, secondly, the school or its management is not subject to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Thirdly, there was no violation of principles of natural justice, while reverting the petitioner from the post of Vice Principal to the Assistant Teacher. 4. One of the questions which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the Inspector of School has control over the teachers of the school in question on the fact and in the circumstances of the case. It is not disputed that the school does not receive grant-in-aid from the State Govern­ment, that is to say, the school is purely a private institution. However, the order dated 30.5.87 of the Inspector of Schools (Annexure G to the writ petition) indicates that the Inspector, in the exercise of the power under the Rules, reconstituted the Managing Committee. The Rules indicates that they apply to aided school. There is no indication that Rules apply to an unaided private school. It may be as a matter of courtsey, the management forwarded to the Inspector names of the persons proposed as office bearers and members of the Managing Committee, and the Inspector accordingly purported to reconstitute the Committee. The Rules do not give any such power to the Inspector Recognition of a private school is dealt with by the Assam Education Department Rules and Orders. Under para 6 of that Rules and Orders, in respect of Managing Committee of a private recognised school, it is sufficient if the school is under the control of management of a regularly constituted committee in which teaching staff is represented. Under para 6 of that Rules and Orders, in respect of Managing Committee of a private recognised school, it is sufficient if the school is under the control of management of a regularly constituted committee in which teaching staff is represented. Be that as it may, the order dated 31.3.76 appointing the petitioner as temporary teacher with effect from 1.4.76 ( Annexure A to the petition), the order dated 28.12.82 appointing the petitioner as Vice Principal (Annexure B to the petition), and the order dated 5.10.88 confirming the petitioner as Assistant Teacher with effect from 1.4.88 (Annexure B (1) to the petition) were made by the Management without prior approval of the Inspector. If the rules are or were applied to thi school, such appointments are or were to be made with the prior approval of the Inspector of School under Rule 23 (5) of the Rules. Therefore, merely because the Managing Committee was purportedly reconstituted by the Inspector of Schools, or the constitution of the Managing Committee was purportedly approved by the Inspector, under the Rules, it cannot change the character of the school as an aided institution as the school does not receive grant-in-aid from the Government, and the power to appoint or to remove the teachers is not with the Ins­pector of Schools but with the Managing Committee although the Director of Public Instruction has the authority to recognise the school or to withdraw the recognition. It may be stated here that no rule or statute has been brought to our notice to show that the Inspector or the Director has control over the teachers of an unaided school in the matter of appointment or removal of teacher. 5. The next question which arises for consideration is whether a writ of Mandamus would lie against an unaided private body running a school. 6. Andi Mukta Sadguni vs. VR Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607 : (1989)2 SCC 691 , is a case where Mandamus was issued to a Government aided college. The facts of that case were as follows. A trust was managing an affiliated college to which public money was paid as Government aid. The trust closed the college with the termination of services of all academic staff. The teachers demanded only arrears of salary, provident fund, gratuity and closure compensation. They did not claim their continuance in service. The facts of that case were as follows. A trust was managing an affiliated college to which public money was paid as Government aid. The trust closed the college with the termination of services of all academic staff. The teachers demanded only arrears of salary, provident fund, gratuity and closure compensation. They did not claim their continuance in service. One of the questions which came up before the Court for consideration was whether the trust which was not a statutory body was subject to writ jurisdiction. The Court held that the aided institution like the Government institution discharges public function by way of imparting education to the students the service conditions of the academic staff are not purely of a private character, and the employment in such institutions is not devoid of any public character. In para 19 of the judgment it was held : "The words 'any person or authority' used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the right of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists Mandamus cannot be denied."(emphasis added). At para 20, it was observed : "In Praga Tools Corporation vs. CA Imanual, 11969)3 S~R 7/3 ( AIR 1969 SC 13 u',), this Court said that a Mandamus can issue against a person or body to carry out the duties placed on them by the Statutes even though they are not public officials or statutory body." In para 21. it was held : "Here again we may point out that Mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Comme­nting on the development of this law, Professor De Smith states "To be enforceable by Mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute It any be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common taw custom or even contract, (Judicial Review of Administrative Act 4th Ed. p.54 )). We share this view." 7. p.54 )). We share this view." 7. In Uani Krishnan vs. State of AP, (:993 I SCC 645, the Supreme Court has, inter alia held : "1. The citizens of this country have a fundamental right to educa­tion. The said right flows from Article 21. This right is, however, not an absolute right, its content and parameters have to be determined in the light of Articles 45 and 41. 2. The obligation created by Articles 41, 45 and 46 of the Constitu­tion can be discharged by the State either by establishing institutions of its own o by aiding, recognising and/or granting affiliation to private educational institutions. 3 A citizen of this country may have a right to establish an educational institution but no citizen, person or institution has a right much less a fundamental right, to affiliation or recognition, or to grant-in-aid from the State. The recognition and/or affiliation shall be given by the State subject to the conditions set out in, and only in accordance with the scheme contained in the judgment." In respect f nature of function discharged by private educational instituti­ons, it was observed at para 77 that they discharge public duty, and after considering the decision in Aadi Mukta Sjtigura (supra) the Co art. at para 79, observed : "-...In spite of it, if the emphasis is on the nature of duty on the same principle it has to be held that these educational institutions discharge public duties. Irrespective of the educational institutions receiving aid it should be held that it is a public duty. The absence of aid does not detract from the nature of duty." (emphasis added) 8. In view of the above observation, a private institution, whether or not it receives grant-in-aid, performs or discharges public duty in so far as it concerns imparting of education; and the question, whether such an institu­tion will be amenable to writ jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the right-duty relationship between the institution and other persons. 9. The question then is, - Whether a writ shall lie against the managem­ent of the school in question for the relief claimed by the writ petitioner ? As already stated, the school is a recognised one and the relief prayed for in the writ petition is deal nation that the resolution and notice for reversion is illegal. 9. The question then is, - Whether a writ shall lie against the managem­ent of the school in question for the relief claimed by the writ petitioner ? As already stated, the school is a recognised one and the relief prayed for in the writ petition is deal nation that the resolution and notice for reversion is illegal. Therefore, if the declaration is granted it will amount to reinstatement of the petitioner as the Vice Principal of the school as a consequence to the declaration. The legal status of an employee in a privitely managed college and whether a contract for persona1 service can be specifically enforced came up before the Supreme Court in Vaish Degree College vs. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1976 SC 888 : (1976) 2 SCC -8 The facts in that case were thus. Vaish Degree College which was registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act was initially affiliated to Agra University and later to the Meerut University. The service of the Principal of the college who was appointed after obtaining formal approval of the Vice Chancellor was terminated about two years later. The Principal challenged the order of termination in a suit filed by him. The Supreme Court has, after considering the earlier decision of the Court, held : "On consideration of the authorities mentioned above it is clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a Court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after h ving been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions - (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contrave­ntion of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute." A similar question again came up for consideration in Dipak Kumar vs, DPI, AIR 1987 SC 1422 : ( 1987 2 SCC 252 . In that case Dspak Kumar was appoin­ted lecturer in English in Lady Keans Girls College, Shillong which was a Government aided college Later his services were terminated. In that case Dspak Kumar was appoin­ted lecturer in English in Lady Keans Girls College, Shillong which was a Government aided college Later his services were terminated. The Supreme Court refused to grant declaration that Dipak Kumar continued to be in service of the college and that he was entitled to all the benefits following from the declaration. However, the Supreme Court, by exercising the power under Article 136 of the Constitution, directed the State of Meghalaya to grant three years' salary and allowances to the teacher with effect from the date of termination. 10. In Andi Mukta (supra), at para 12, it was observed : "The decision in Vaish Degree College was followed in Deepak Kumar Biswas case. There again a dismissed lecturer of a private college was seeking reinstatement in service. The Court refused to grant the relief although it was found that the dismissal was wrongful. This Court instead granted substantial monetary benefits to the lecturer. This appears to be the preponderant judicial opinion because of the common law principle that a service contract cannot be specifically enforced." At para 14, it was observed thus ; "If the rights are purely of a private character no Mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty Mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to Mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, Mandamus cannot be denied." (emphasis added) 11. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in above cited cases may now be summarised. A service contract cannot be specifically enforced except in the cases of civil servant, workmen under the industrial laws, and employee or officer under statutory body and governed by the statute. If the rights are purely of a private character no Mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty. Mandamus will not lie. 12. Although a private educational institution performs public duty in so far as imparting of education is concerned, it may not discharge public duty in other matters. The present case is purely of a private institution and the management of the school is also a private body. Therefore, if the right of the employees in this school is purely of a private character, the manag­ement performs no public duty in this regard. The present case is purely of a private institution and the management of the school is also a private body. Therefore, if the right of the employees in this school is purely of a private character, the manag­ement performs no public duty in this regard. The petitioner is an employee of a private body. He is not a civil servant nor a workmen under the industrial law. This being the position, if the petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service it would be against the preponderant judicial pronouncement of the Court that a service contract cannot be specifically enforced. Therefore, the alleged right of the petitioner in this case is of a private character, and no Mandamus can issue and no petition for Mandamus will lie. 13. Learned Single Jude issued the writ on the ground that the principle of natural justice was violated. Even if a writ lies against the management of the school, it is to be examined whether principle of natural justice is attracted in such a case. 14. The next question which, therefore, arises for consideration is whether the principles of natural justice would be attracted in the present case. It has already been concluded that the school in question is a private institu­tion (not Government aided school), and that the alleged rights of the petitioner are of purely a private character. Therefore, the law of master and servant shall apply in such a case. This being the situation, no prior notice or affording the servant of an opportunity to have his say is required before termination or dismissal. If the servant sues the master and the master satisfies the Court that master was justified in terminating or dismissing the service, it will be sufficient. The view taken by us finds support from a decision in Ridgway vs. Hnugerford Market, (1835) 3 Ad & EL 171. In that case, it was held that it was sufficient if, when the servant sued the master, the master satisfied the Court that hi was justified in termination the service (see also Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol 16, para 648). There­fore, the principle of natural justice is not attracted in such a case. 15. Keeping the above principle in view, let us now examine the case on hand. There­fore, the principle of natural justice is not attracted in such a case. 15. Keeping the above principle in view, let us now examine the case on hand. The management has explained that the seniority was required to be determined as a complaint was made by Smti Ratna De to the effect that the petitioner who was junior to her had been promoted to the post of Vice Prin­cipal. Before determination of the seniority, the petitioner was given notice to show cause as to why his seniority should not be counted from 1.6.78. He submitted his reply to the show cause and also participated in the meeting of the Managing Committee held on 4.2 89 after considering the materials before it, resolved that the petition was junior to Smti Ratna De by giving reasons thereof and Smti Ratna De was promoted (see Annexure II to the counter). Promotion of a teacher who is senior to the petitioner to the post of Vice Principal and reversion of the petitioner from the post of Vice Principal which he was holding in the temporary capacity, was are of the view was justified. 16. For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the learned Single Judge made in Civil Rule No. 476 of 1989 is set aside. Writ petition is dismissed accordingly. No costs.