Judgment : This appeal and revision petition are directed against the order of acquittal in Sessions Case No.50 of 1986 on the file of the Court of Session (Additional Assistant Sessions Judge), Thalassery Division; the appeal is by the State and the revision petition by P.W.2 in the Sessions Case. Respondents three in number, stood trial for the offence under Sec.304 read with Sec.34, I.P.C, for having caused the death of 14 year old Mohammed at or about 4 p.m. on 21. 1986 by their act of placing a live electric wire at an open place. Mohammed stepped on it and was electrocuted. They were also charged wit having committed the offences under Sec.201, I.P.C. and Sec.43 of the Electricity Act, in the course of the same transaction. 2. Deceased Mohammed, the only son of P.W.2, was working in a shop. His meagre income was the sole support for him and his young mother. On 21. 1986, which was a holiday for the shop, deceased and P.W.2 paid a visit to their relatives. Around 4 p.m. they went to the nearby river for washing clothes and bathing. While P.W.2 was washing clothes, deceased stepped into the river. He suffered an electric shock, fell forward, suffered convulsions and fell backwards on the bank of the river. P.W.2 cried out in anguish and that brought P.Ws.1, 3, A-1 and A-2 to the scene. On seeing Mohammed lying supine, A-1 is alleged to have said that the unfortunate event was the result of his carelessness, in leavinga live wire in an open place. Second accused tried to remove the wire and then first accused warned him not to touch it. Second accused replied that he had disconnected power supply. Mohammed was then carried to the house of the accused, later to the Chakkarakallu Primary Health Centre, and then to the Kannur Government Hospital. By then, he had died. 3. The next morning, P.W.1 made a report to the Kannur Police at 9.30 a.m. Ex.P-1 (a) First Information Report was registered and then transferred to the Kuthuparamba Police Station. P. W.20 registered Ex.P-13 F.I.R. and proceeded with the investigation. Meanwhile, P.W.9 Assistant Engineer in the Electricity Department, had also made a report to the Kuthuparamba Police around 9 a.m. (he is not specific about the time). But, that related only to the offence under the Electricity Act. The dead body was sent for post-mortem. P. W.20 registered Ex.P-13 F.I.R. and proceeded with the investigation. Meanwhile, P.W.9 Assistant Engineer in the Electricity Department, had also made a report to the Kuthuparamba Police around 9 a.m. (he is not specific about the time). But, that related only to the offence under the Electricity Act. The dead body was sent for post-mortem. P.W.13heldan autopsy and issued Ex.P-10certifi-cate. P.W.13 stated that the cause of death was electric shock. P.Ws.1 to 3 speak to the occurrence. The accused denied the charges against them, when questioned under Sec.313 of the Code. The court below acquitted all the accused of all the charges against them. 4. P.W.1 states that Mohammed received electric shock from a wire that originated from the house of first accused and fell down in ankle deep water. Seeing that, he cried for help and that brought A-1 and A-2 to the scene. He would also say that on reaching the scene, A1 exclaimed that the tragedy was the result of his carelessness. A-2 was cautioned by him, not to touch the wire lying there. Mohammed was removed to the house of A-1, and then to the hospital. Next morning he made Ex. P-1 report before the Kannur police. P.W.2 mother of deceased, states that while she was washing clothes, deceased stepped into the river, received electric shock and fell forward. The shock caused convulsions and he was thrown back to the bank. She too speaks about the arrival of P.Ws.1& 3 and accused 1 & 2.P.W.3-brother of P.W.1 and cousin of deceased, states that the deceased sustained electric shock. Like P.W.2, this witness also states that Mohammed was seized by convulsions and that he fell backwards on the bank of the river. He states further that A-1 cautioned A-2, not to touch the wire, as it could be live. 5. The court below rejected the evidence of P. Ws. 1 to 3 as unbelievable. In para.l4 of its judgment, the court below observed: "The presence of P.W.1 itself is doubtful". According to P.W.1, deceased was lying over M.O.I wire with his head on the banks of the river and his feel in the water. But according to P.W.2, the wire was in the water. Treating this a serious contradiction, the court found that P.W.1 was not present at the scene. The logic of this, eludes comprehension. P.Ws.1 & 2 can be correct, at the same time. But according to P.W.2, the wire was in the water. Treating this a serious contradiction, the court found that P.W.1 was not present at the scene. The logic of this, eludes comprehension. P.Ws.1 & 2 can be correct, at the same time. Even if the wire was in the water, it would have to originate from a plug point, travel over land and reach water. The court below should have appreciated evidence, having regard to normal probabilities. It is not as if, the alchemy of two slightly-different versions, vitiates evidence. Theobserva-tions of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh v. Suite, A.I.R 1978 S.C. 1091, bear repetition: "If a case is proved too perfectly it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws, inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect.... Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish and guilty man cannot get away with it because truth suffers some infirmity when projected through human processes." 6. An equally unrealistic approach was adopted in considering another part of the evidence, P.W.1 stated that first accused exclaimed that it was his folly that led to the tragedy. The court below condemned this part of the evidence, stating: ”By no stretch of imagination, the extra-judicial confession resorted to by the prosecution can be relied upon.“ The learned Judge did not disclose the reasons for his conclusion. Apparently, there are no reasons, but only hunches. He himself states that it was only a ‘stretch of imagination’. If the court below meant that an extra judicial confession is not acceptable in evidence, it was wrong. In Darshan Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 898 and in Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana, A.I.R 1991 S.C. 37, the Supreme Court held that an extra-judicial confession can be accepted, if the witness speaking to it, is reliable. At any rate, there is corroboration for the extra judicial confession. P.W.2 corroborates the version of P.W.1 on this aspect. P.W.3 speaks to the presence of the wire at the site. Recovery of two pieces of wire (M.O.8) under Ex.P-7 mahazar, attested by P.Ws.10 & 11 also affords corroboration. Even in the First Information Report, P.W.1 had mentioned that the first accused confessed that it was his folly that brought about the death of the boy. P.W.3 speaks to the presence of the wire at the site. Recovery of two pieces of wire (M.O.8) under Ex.P-7 mahazar, attested by P.Ws.10 & 11 also affords corroboration. Even in the First Information Report, P.W.1 had mentioned that the first accused confessed that it was his folly that brought about the death of the boy. The evidence of P.W.1 has to be accepted. 7. Evidence of P. W.2 the mother of deceased, was rejected merely because she could not answer some of the questions relating to the sequence of events. The court below said: ”P.W.2 conveniently states that she became unconscious.“(emphasis supplied) P.W.2 who was only 28 at the time of the occurrence, had lost her only son and perhaps only support in life, in a tragic manner. As a normal human being and as a mother, her grief would have been deep and immeasurable. If she fainted, it was only natural. It is regrettable that the court below condemned P.W.2 without any good reason, and in a sinister manner. A better understanding of human nature was expected of the trial Judge. Law of evidence, cannot be far apart from the law of life. The court below rejected the evidence of P.W.3, also for untenable reasons. About P.W.3, the court said: ”He is too much interested and cannot be believed.“(emphasis supplied) The court below does not appear to have asked itself in what sense or for what reason, P.W.3 was an interested witness. The unreasonableness of the approach is not confined to appreciation of oral evidence. While discussing possibilities of death by drowning, the court below seems to think that drowning could be caused by the flow of water through the nostrils of a person, lying in ankle-deep water. Drowning is a form of As phyxial death in which, access of air to lungs is prevented. Death is caused by cardiac arrest, due to vagal inhibition. This does not occur due to water entering nostrils. 8. Evidence must be appreciated with a sense of realism and with awareness of life in its ordinary quality. Sound forensic sense must guide the Court in evaluating evidence. Vague hunches have no place in a criminal trial. Exaggerated devotion to maudlin sentiments, can make a mockery of criminal law. This does not occur due to water entering nostrils. 8. Evidence must be appreciated with a sense of realism and with awareness of life in its ordinary quality. Sound forensic sense must guide the Court in evaluating evidence. Vague hunches have no place in a criminal trial. Exaggerated devotion to maudlin sentiments, can make a mockery of criminal law. The Supreme Court observed in Shivaji Sahebrao Bodade and another v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2622: ”The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles of the golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be stretched morbidly to embrace any hunch, hesitancy and doubt... enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent...“ In the instant case, relying on what the trial Judge himself calls”a stretch of imagination“, he rejected reliable evidence without any reason, stated or discernible. P.W.1 was portrayed a perjurer merely because, his description of the wire and the description of P.W.2 were at variance. P.W.2 was rejected because, she”conveniently fainted“and P.W.3 was thrown overboard because,”he is too much“interested. No person witnessing a tragic event of this nature like P.W.1, would pause to make a minute study of the wire. That apart, powers of observation and powers of retention vary from witness to witness and context to context as pointed out in State of U.P. v. M.KAnthony, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 48. 9. In State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal & another, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2154, Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was), counselled that: ”Doubts must be actual and substantial... as opposed to vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense... uninformed legitimisation of trivialities would make a mockery of administration of criminal justice." 10. The, evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 unmistakably show that the deceased stepped on a live electric wire and met with his end. The opinion in Ex.P-17 and the attendant circumstances leave no room for doubt about the cause of death. The involvement of first accused is obvious. P.W.1 states that the first accused confessed that the mishap was due to his carelessness. P.W.2 states that the first accused cautioned the second accused not to touch the wire. The opinion in Ex.P-17 and the attendant circumstances leave no room for doubt about the cause of death. The involvement of first accused is obvious. P.W.1 states that the first accused confessed that the mishap was due to his carelessness. P.W.2 states that the first accused cautioned the second accused not to touch the wire. This is a piece of conduct evidence which reveals his complicity in tapping electrical energy and charging the wire, that caused the death of Mohammed. 11. Counsel for the accused submitted that the offence, even then, will be the offence of rash and negligent act under Sec.304-A, I.P.C. I am unable to agree. The offence of causing death by a rash and negligent act, implies doing of a lawful act in an unlawful manner, namely rashly or negligently. In that case, the act is lawful, but the manner of doing it makes it unlawful. As far as an unlawful act is concerned, nothing more is needed to make it culpable. Murder is unlawful, whether or not it is done negligently or rashly. Negligence/rashness is a concept that appertains only to the doing of lawful acts. A lawful act becomes unlawful by the manner of doing it. An unlawful act, is not made any worse, by doing it rashly or negligently. I find support for my view in Queen Empress v. Damodaran, I.L.R. (1889)12 Mad. 56 and Empress of India v. Idu Beg, I.L.R. (1881)3 All, 776. In Andrews v. D.P.P, (1937)2 All E.R. 552, Lord Atkin observed: "There is an obvious difference in the law of man slaughter, between doing an unlawful act and doing a lawful act with a degree of carelessness which the legislature makes criminal". This view was followed in R. v. Vickers, (1957)2 All E.R. 741 and D.P.P. v. Smith, 1961 A.C. 290. 12. If the act is contrary to law, it is an unlawful act. Unauthorised tapping of electrical energy is an unlawful act. Drawing power lines across a public place without authority is also unlawful. First accused must be credited with the knowledge that a person using land or water where power lines are laid, is likely to tread on them and that it is likely to cause the death of such person. The act would thus clearly fall under the third limb of Sec.299, I.P.C. .13. First accused must be credited with the knowledge that a person using land or water where power lines are laid, is likely to tread on them and that it is likely to cause the death of such person. The act would thus clearly fall under the third limb of Sec.299, I.P.C. .13. The decision in Cherubin Gregory v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1964S.C. 205, was relied on by counsel to submit that the offence would fall only under Sec.304-A, I.P.C. In the case cited, the accused was convicted of the offence under Sec.304-A, for leaving a live wire at the back of his house. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the nature of the offence involved. As seen from paragraph (6) of the judgment, the question considered was only whether a person leaving a live wire in his premises to prevent trespass, could claim private defence. The Court held: ."Even a trespasser was not an outlaw" and repelled the plea. 14. Counsel then argued that there was a delay of 18 hours in lodging the First Information Report. The injured was taken to Chakkarakallu and then to Kannur, 30 Kms. away. The body was brought back to Chakkarakallu for funeral. The mother of the deceased had no other support and naturally P.W.1 a close relative, would have had to attend to various matters. Only next morning he went to Kannur, travelling another 30 Kms. and made a report. In the circumstances, there is no unexplained delay. .15. It was also argued that there was an earlier report, and that Ex.P-1 could not be treated as the first information statement. The earlier statement mentioned in Ex.P-18, made by P.W.9 Engineer before the Kuthuparamba Police. The time when that statement was made is not stated, except that it was around 9 a.m. More importantly, that relates only to the offence of tapping electrical energy. It is not the First Information Report in respect of the death of Mohammed. Besides, it is difficult to see the point which counsel seeks to make from this. 16. The order of acquittal against the first accused cannot be sustained, and it is accordingly set aside. He is convicted under Sec.304, I.P.C. and also under Sec.43 of the Indian Electricity Act. The acquittal of second and third accused has to be affirmed, as the evidence does not establish the charges against them. 17. 16. The order of acquittal against the first accused cannot be sustained, and it is accordingly set aside. He is convicted under Sec.304, I.P.C. and also under Sec.43 of the Indian Electricity Act. The acquittal of second and third accused has to be affirmed, as the evidence does not establish the charges against them. 17. Then arises the question of sentence. The sentencing jurisprudence presents a broad spectrum. It must be deterrent, but not deterrent alone. Penal Justice is not the sole component of sentencing jurisprudence. It combines penal justice and restitutive justice. The 42nd Report of the Law Commission (page 50) noticed that the concept of reparation to the victim had been receiving increased attention in recent lines. Mere punishment of the offender, though it may exhaust the primary function of criminal law, is not total fulfilment of its functions. 18. Compensation to victims of crimes, was visualised even in ancient days. The ‘Manusmrithi’ bears evidence to this. Emperor Jehangir ordered payment of a munificent compensation to a laundress, whose husband was slain. Hummarabi’s Code (B.C. 1775) provided compensation to victims of crime. Victims of robbery were compensated by the Governor, even if the robber could not be found, if the victim declared his loss, in the name of God (Cyrus H.Gordon, Hummarabi’s Code, Forward on Quaint). The Holy Bible identified cases for compensation. For example, compensation was to be paid for striking a man, for injuring his Ox or Ass, or for violating a virgin etc. (Exodus). Homer’s Iliad also refers to compensation to victims of wrongs. .19. Succeeding ages noticed a shift in attitudes. An attempt to find differences between penal and civil liability, led to a decline in the penalogical importance of restitution. While punishment of crime was regarded as a State concern, compensation to victim was regarded as a matter of tort/civil liability. Criminal Justice system viewed criminal and crime only in terms of the need of society. About this situation, Barnes and Teeters (New Horizon of Criminology) observed: .“Our barbarian ancestors were wiser and more just than we are today, for they adopted the theory of restitution to the injured, where as we have abandoned this.” .20. However, recent years found a revival of restitution, as part of criminal jurisprudence system. Stephen Schafer states: .“Crime should be seen in its functional dynamics. However, recent years found a revival of restitution, as part of criminal jurisprudence system. Stephen Schafer states: .“Crime should be seen in its functional dynamics. An all dimensional view of crime cannot accept the criminal’s behaviour and victim’s behaviour as separate forms of conduct. Victims often play esoteric and not exoteric roles. Victimology must reckon these and formulate policies.” 21. Benjamin Mandelsohn-a Rumanian Criminologist and Lawyer, considered crime the result of bio-social factors and described the criminal and the victim, as the ‘penal couple’. There can hardly be any crime without a victim. Mandelsohn classified victims as victims of man, society, technology, environment, machinery, social trends and sometimes of themselves. Victims could also be classified as innocent victims, ignorant victims, etc. There are also victims of social situations, like immigrants, ethnic and racial groups. There are also victims who precipitate crime and shared relationships are seen in this area. A study by Meuller of the United States, reveals shared relationship in twentyfive per cent of the cases of homicide, and thirty five per cent of the cases of rape. .22. Victimology came into sharp focus on the international scene,in the later decades of the Twentieth Century. The first international symposium on victimology held at Jerusalem (1973) suggested payment of compensation to victims as an integral part of the criminal justice system. A major reappraisal of societies’ the response to victims of crimes took place in many countries. Response to victims was accepted as something beyond a kind of first-aid. ‘Maguire & Corbett’ noticed the changing bend, as much more than a symbolic assurance to the victim, that the community was sorry about what had happened to him. A.Gold Stien (Mississippi Law Journal, 1982) felt the need for redefining the role of victims in criminal prosecutions. The need to accomplish attitudinal changes was highlighted by Joanne Shapland (Fiefs & Peasants 1988). It was felt in certain quarters that the victims should be heard on sentences (H.Rubel-Victim Participation in Sentence). There was considerable debate as to the rights that should be conferred on victims in the management of criminal justice system (David Miers-Cardif Law School-in British Criminology Conference 1991 & Modern Law Review 1992, July). But, there are inherent and institutional limitations to active victim participation, as noticed in R. v. Chief Constable for Kent and Crown Prosecution Services, 1991 Crl.L.R. 841. But, there are inherent and institutional limitations to active victim participation, as noticed in R. v. Chief Constable for Kent and Crown Prosecution Services, 1991 Crl.L.R. 841. Partisan participation could also lead to privatisation of criminal law, which on not be permitted, as the system may lose its objectivity, so essential for its credibility. However, the prosecuting agency must protect the interests of victims. It is basically the responsibility of the State to do so. The victim of crime, is at once the victim of the State’s failure to protect him or her. 23. The State’s obligation was highlighted by Arthur Goldberg, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, in “Equality and Government Action, 1963”. Senator Mike Mansfield introducing a Bill in the United States Senate, highlighted the State’s responsibility to compensate the victim, for its failure to protect him/her. The responsibility of the State to protect its citizens against crime, was thus accepted as a ground rule. Consequently failure to do so, invited obligations, to be fulfilled by meaningful victim compensation. 24. The obligation on the part of the wrong doer to make amends for his wrong was also recognised. The Paris Penal Congress (1895), felt that a portion of the earnings of a prisoner during detention should be paid to the victim by way of reparation. Italian Criminologists, like Cesare Lambroso, Raffalcle Gerofalo and Enrico Ferri also strongly advocated victim compensation by the offender. Von Hentig said: “Payment to injured party will have a stronger inner punishment value, than payment to a neutral State. Correctional restitution could be a correctional instrument through which the criminal would understand his social responsibility.” According to Herbert Spencer, prison work and prisoner’s income should be utilised for paying compensation to victims. Gerofalo felt that where the criminal is solvent his property could be con-fiscatedand restitution made; if he is insolvent, he should work for the State and compensate. Ms.Margret Fry in her Book “Arms of the Law” suggested that the wrong doer must himself compensate the victim from his earnings. Prisoners being put to work has several advantages, according to John Louis Gillin, “Criminology and Pe-nalogy”. Work alleviates tedium of prison life. It will help repress criminal instincts. Production of economic commodities by this process will also decrease cost of support of prisoner. Prisoners being put to work has several advantages, according to John Louis Gillin, “Criminology and Pe-nalogy”. Work alleviates tedium of prison life. It will help repress criminal instincts. Production of economic commodities by this process will also decrease cost of support of prisoner. Prisoner could be paid for his work and a part of it could go for his support while another part could go to the victim. A Scheme has been evolved to pay wages to prisoners for the work done by them in jail. This cannot be faulted. But a better sense of priorities must prevail. The solicitude shown to the offender must be extended to his victim. The proper perspective would be to put the victim first in priority, and the offender next. Constitution of a work force by the State consisting of convicts could be thought of, as it has several advantages. It can ensure channelling of energy in right directions and utilisation of human resources. Those who would otherwise be classified criminals, could be upgraded as work force, relenting the normal prison rigours, assuring them dignity of existence. .25. In recognition of victim compensation as a State concern, Laws for compensating victims were enacted in different countries. In 1963, Newzeal-and enacted the Criminal Injuries Act. Several of the Australian States followed suit and enacted State legislations. North South Wales passed The Injuries Compensation Act in 1967. Queens Land and other States also enacted similar laws. Even where there was no trial, the victim could apply to the Compensation Board. Sweden was the first European country (other than Britain) to introduce a Compensation Scheme (1971). Norway introduced a compensation scheme by a Royal edict, on 12th March 1976. Sec.44 of the Norwegian Penal Code also made provision to compensate crime victims. Italy also had laws for compensating crime victims. Article 185 of its Penal Code is a provision in this behalf. The French Penal Code allowed determination of compensation, to be linked with criminal trials. In 1976, Netherlands introduced a scheme of “Just & Fair Compensation” to victims. The victims could even appeal against the quantum, if they were dissatisfied. Canadian States also introduced compensation programmes, similar to Workmen’s Compensation Schemes (Eremko 1969). A comprehensive legislation ‘Victim Compensation Act 1969’ was enacted. It contained unique features. In 1976, Netherlands introduced a scheme of “Just & Fair Compensation” to victims. The victims could even appeal against the quantum, if they were dissatisfied. Canadian States also introduced compensation programmes, similar to Workmen’s Compensation Schemes (Eremko 1969). A comprehensive legislation ‘Victim Compensation Act 1969’ was enacted. It contained unique features. In the words of Allen Linden: .“We have a little bit of criminal justice here, a little bit of tort law and a little bit of welfare law”. (Third International Conference on Victims of Crime Toronto) Royal Commission on criminal liabilities recommended compensation for innocent victims also. 26. In 1962, a non party group ‘justice’ (British Section of International Commission of Jurists) advocated victim compensation, as an integral part of the justice system. This was followed by the announcement of a scheme by the British Home Office. The Criminal Injuries Board was established as a non statutory body. The Compensation Board under Sir Walker Carter, succeeded in extending relief to the victims of crime on a large scale. The idea was gathering momentum. The British Government, then brought out a white paper on victim compensation on 5th May, 1964. From then on, rapid strides were made in this direction. The Compensation Board received statutory recognition. (It is interesting to notice that even in the 19th Century, England had a law to compensate riot victims-The Riots Damages Act, 1886 (See Glanville Williams-BookofCrimi-nal Law). Several enactments followed. The Theft Act, 1968, Powers of Criminal Courts Act, 1973, Public Order Act, 1986 and Criminal Justice Act, 1988, are some of those. Sec.28 of the Theft Act empowers the Court to pass an order of bankruptcy. Likewise, Sec.35 of the powers of Criminal Courts Act, 1973, empowers Magistrates to award damages, subject to a limit. Secs.108 to 117 of the Criminal Justice Act, incorporate important provisions, enabling Courts to compensate victims effectively. Sec. 104 of the Act, required Courts to state reasons when compensation was not awarded. Sec.49 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1991, made further refinements in the system. Video recordings were made admissible in evidence, where child victims were involved. Provisions were also made for contracting out of prison, during mediation. Compensation paid out to victims grew in size. While 3 Million Pounds were paid as compensation to 8012 victims in 1973, compensation paid to victims by the turn of the next decade exceeded to 10 Million Pounds. .27. Provisions were also made for contracting out of prison, during mediation. Compensation paid out to victims grew in size. While 3 Million Pounds were paid as compensation to 8012 victims in 1973, compensation paid to victims by the turn of the next decade exceeded to 10 Million Pounds. .27. The American experience also deserves notice. Several States enacted legislations to compensate victims of crime. California was the first State to do so (1965). New York, Maryland, Alaska and other provinces followed. A new head of compensation was evolved in the United States by the "Good Samaritan Laws". Kitty Genevese was murdered and then raped, in a New York suburb on 13. 1964. Though more than 30 persons had witnessed the assault, no one intervened to save the helpless woman. They were bad Samaritans. There were good Samaritans, too. Arthur Collins (28) was killed by a drunken man when he attempted to save some ladies from his attack. He was not a direct victim of the crime, in the strict sense. But, he was a victim being a good Samaritan. To reach relief to such, an Ordinance was enacted to grant compensation to those killed or injured in an attempt to prevent crime in public places. This proved to be the blue-print for other good Samaritan laws. 28. As noticed in preceding paragraphs, right in the victim to receive compensation, and duty in the State and offender to pay compensation, were recognised by Law. Various legislations were enacted to translate this recognition into an operational scheme. Naturally, the question of funding resources must receive attention. There could be cases where the offender can pay compensation, and where he cannot. A methodology must be found. The creation of a Fund will be an answer. Such a fund is maintained in Netherlands. Switzerland also maintains a fund from which compensation is paid to victims. An indemnification fund was maintained by Cuba (pre-revolution era). A fund could be set up by channelling the fines imposed by Courts into it. This idea had been advocated by Sir David Livingstone (1736-1836) in his Model Code. This was the inspiration for the Commission set up in 1837, presided by Sir Thomas Macaulay to draft a Penal Code for British India, to incorporate provisions for levy of lines. However, fines have now become another source of revenue for the Government. This idea had been advocated by Sir David Livingstone (1736-1836) in his Model Code. This was the inspiration for the Commission set up in 1837, presided by Sir Thomas Macaulay to draft a Penal Code for British India, to incorporate provisions for levy of lines. However, fines have now become another source of revenue for the Government. How a fund is to be created and operated, and how the State and the offender are to pool the fund, are matters for the Executive and the Legislature to consider. 29. Changing times and laws, have made the victim the Cinderella of the criminal justice system. The victim is assured that the or she is not forgotten by the system. 30. In India, Sec.357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Sec.5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, are powerful legislative devices to ensure justice to victims. If these provisions are modulated with judicial craftsmanship, victimology will be a meaningful reality. Sec.357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, enables the court to award compensation, in addition to fine, which in certain cases is limited. Sec.5 of the Probation of Offenders Act, while sparing the accused the agony of incarceration, provides for atonement of his wrong. Even where there is no direct victim (as in the case of Abkari offences), compensation can be ordered to the State. 31. In Hari Kishan & State of Haryana v. Siikhbir Singi, A.I.R 1988 S.C. 2127, the Apex Court awarded a compensation of Rs.50,000 to the victim, whose power of speech was impaired as a result of the injury suffered by him. The Court highlighted the significant position of Sec.357 in the Code of Criminal Procedure: "...It is an important provision, but courts have seldom invoked it. Perhaps due to ignorance of the object of it. It empowers the court to award compensation to victims while passing judgment of conviction. In addition to conviction, the court may order the accused to pay some amount by way of compensation to victim who has suffered by the action of accused. It may be noted that this power of courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences, but it is in addition thereto. This power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. It may be noted that this power of courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences, but it is in addition thereto. This power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system. It is a measure of responding appropriately to crime as well as reconciling the victim with the offender. ...We therefore recommend to all courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the ends of justice in a better way." (emphasis supplied) Despite the directions of the Highest Court in the land, the provisions have not been effectively implemented by the majority of trial courts. Ignorance of law, is no excuse for anyone, and much less for courts. The law declared by the Supreme Court of India is binding on all courts and failure to adhere to it, can amount to disobedience of orders of the Apex Court. 32. The insensitivity shown in this regard, has caused an unwholesome impact. As observed by Shri V.N.Rajam (formerly Inspector General of Police) in Victimology in India’-Allied Publishers, (1981): "Immediate reaction of the victim, to the matter of fact approach on the part of the police and the equally impersonal attitude of the Court, is one of revulsion to the entire system. Who has the time or who makes an effort to assess the emotional, familial, or financial impact of the victim?" This ‘Victim apathy’ has been commented upon by Edel Herts & Gies, as responsible for an indifference to the court system. Commenting on the situation in U.K., Joanne Shapland (Centre for Criminological Research, Oxford) and David Cohen (Editor, Psychology), said: "Magistrate Courts seem more resistant to the spread of new concepts, perhaps through natural conservatism, perhaps for fear of upsetting delicate balance." 33. The attitudes of the courts must change. They must take inspiration from the law declared in Hari Kishan, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2127. Criminal justice system is no longer penal justice alone; it is restitutive justice, too. The words of Benjamin Cordozo must be heeded: "The Inn that shelters for the night, is not the end of the journey. Law like the traveller, must be ready for tomorrow". 34. In the back-drop noticed in the preceding paragraphs the question of punishment has to be considered. The words of Benjamin Cordozo must be heeded: "The Inn that shelters for the night, is not the end of the journey. Law like the traveller, must be ready for tomorrow". 34. In the back-drop noticed in the preceding paragraphs the question of punishment has to be considered. The deprivation caused to P. W.2, the nature of the wrong committed by the Accused and his capacity to pay compensation/fine, must enter consideration. In the instant case, the victim has lost his life by a callous act of the first Accused. He must atone for his wrong by compensating P. W.2 mother of Mohammed, whose sole support Mohammed appeared to be. It is said that fishing by using live electric wires has become common. This must be put an end to, by imposing deterrent punishment. Modulating the diverse concerns and having regard to the totality of circumstances, while convicting the first accused under Sec.304, I.P.C. he is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. He will also pay a fine of Rs.25,000 (Twentyfive Thousand) as compensation to P.W.2. The amount of fine if realised, will be paid to P.W.2 as compensation. In default of payment of fine, he will suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of two years and six months. For the offence under Sec.43 of the Indian Electricity Act, the first accused is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.200 (two Hundred). The appeal and the revision petition are allowed. Shri.P.Vijaya Bhanu appeared as amicus curiae and assisted the Court ably. I place on record appreciation for the help rendered by him. The Registrar of this Court will bring this Judgment and the need to comply with the directions in Hari Kishan & State of Haryana v. Sukhbir Singh & others, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 2127, to the notice of all Sessions Judges and Chief Judicial Magistrates in the State, who in turn will call the attention of the Judicial Officers in their Districts to these directions.