K. I Cheriyan v. Mohanan — 1993 DIGILAW 140 (KER)

ORDER L. Manoharan, J. 1. These petitions are for impleadment under S.482 Cr. P.C. Crl. M.P. 451 of 1993 is in Crl. M.C. 82/93 and Crl. M.P. 446 of 1993 is in Crl. M.C. 83/93. In both the Crl. M.Cs, petitioner is the same, who is the first respondent in the above Crl. M.Ps. The second respondent in the Crl.M.Ps. is the sole respondent in the Crl. M.Cs. An order passed by the Magistrate under S.451 Cr. P.C. with respect to a bus is under challenge in the Crl. M.Cs. After the Crl. M.C.s. were heard and orders reserved, these Crl. M.Ps. were filed seeking impleadment consequent upon which the said Crl. M.Cs. are posted for spoken to. 2. Petitioner claims that he is the owner of the bus and one Gopalakrishnan, the registered owner is the hirer. Respondents 1 and 2, according to the petitioner, claim right only under the said Gopalakrishnan. Therefore, the petitioner would maintain that he has got superior right than that of the respondents in the matter of interim custody under S.451 Cr. P.C. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the second respondent is the guarantor of the hire purchase, as can be seen from Annexure R2A. Though the second respondent has filed a counter to these petitions, the said aspect is not denied. In such circumstances, according to the petitioner, he is entitled to he heard in the matter of interim custody of the bus under S.451 Cr. P.C. Therefore, according to the petitioner, he is entitled to be impleaded in the Crl.M.Cs. for which the inherent power of High Court under S.482 Cr. P.C. has to be invoked. 3. Learned counsel for the second respondent contended that there is no provision for impleading in a criminal proceeding and on that ground itself, the petitions are liable to be dismissed. It is not disputed that the petitioner has filed a petition under S.451 Cr. P.C. before the lower court and the said petition is now pending. As regards the question of jurisdiction, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent relied on the decision in Assan Haji v. S.I. of Police ( 1977 KLT 76 ) to contend that for invoking S.482 Cr. P.C. it is not enough to show that the impleadment is for the purpose of securing ends of justice. As regards the question of jurisdiction, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent relied on the decision in Assan Haji v. S.I. of Police ( 1977 KLT 76 ) to contend that for invoking S.482 Cr. P.C. it is not enough to show that the impleadment is for the purpose of securing ends of justice. It has further to be shown that it is for giving effect to any order passed under the Code or for preventing abuse of the process of court or for a purpose analogous to them. According to the learned counsel, this application for impleadment cannot fall under any of the categories mentioned under S.482 Cr. P.C. 4. As noticed, the petitioner is not a wayfarer. He has shown himself to be interested in the subject matter with respect to which proceedings are pending. In view of the fact that the Crl. M.Cs. have not been disposed of, the question as to interim custody of the bus is still pending. 5. The inherent power under S.482 Cr.P.C. is only a recognition of the power vested in this court. The Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Nairn ( AIR 1964 SC 703 ) held with reference to S.561A of the old Code held: "It is now well settled that the section confers no new powers on the High Court. It merely safeguards all existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court necessary (among other purposes) to secure the ends of justice. The section provides that those powers which the court inherently possesses shall be preserved lest it be considered that the only powers possessed by the court are those expressly conferred by the Code and that no inherent powers had survived the passing of the Code". 6. The question of invoking this inherent power should depend upon the nature of the proceedings that is pending and also the status of the party, who seeks such impleadment. When there is provision in the Code to answer on situation, inherent power cannot be invoked. Inherent power cannot also be invoked, where the exercise of the same would adversely affect what is provided for in the other provisions of the Code. The purpose of impleadment is to enable the petitioner to present his case and to pursue his claim with respect to the interim custody of the bus. Inherent power cannot also be invoked, where the exercise of the same would adversely affect what is provided for in the other provisions of the Code. The purpose of impleadment is to enable the petitioner to present his case and to pursue his claim with respect to the interim custody of the bus. Since it is shown that he is interested in the matter and the proceeding that is pending is a valid proceeding, he is a person, who is entitled to come on record. The denial of the same in effect would be denial of opportunity of being heard. When the jurisdiction under S.482 Cr. P.C. is thus sought to be invoked to implead such a party to pursue his claim in a matter as the one now pending, it cannot be said that the same is not permitted under S.482 Cr. P.C. The decision referred to by the learned counsel for the second respondent in Bratindra Nath v. S.C. Dey (AIR 1970 Calcutta 85) is clearly distinguishable in as much as the question that arose for consideration was as to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to a matter, which was pending on the original side of the High Court. In such circumstances, the prayer of the petitioner to get himself impleaded as additional respondent in these petitions has to be allowed. In the result, the Crl. M.Ps. are allowed.