JUDGMENT 1. There are four applications which should be disposed of by one common judgment and order. 2. One application is by the Official Liquidator in relation to sale of the property of the company which is Premises No.6A, short street. The said premises comprise 23 cottahs 3 chitaks and 17 square feet of landed area with a pucca building thereupon leaving large parts of the land as vacant land. 3. The second application is of one Hyam Joseph Hallen for leave to purchase the said company property. 4. The third application is by one Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla who is owner of 6B, short street which land contiguous to the said company property. Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla is also a shareholder and a contributory of the company (in liquidation) and as such is interested in the manner 6A, short street is disposed of. She prays in her application in effect for removal of all possessors and occupants of 6A and 6B, short street and for amendment of the sale notice issued by the Official Liquidator which was published on the 4.9.1992. He complaint is that the said sale notice seeks to sell 6A, short street on an as is where is basis with tenants, whereas in fact there are no tenants but only unauthorized trespassers, and the property should be rendered vacant before sale so that a far larger price is obtained than would be otherwise available if it is sold with illegal occupants. 5. The fourth application is by the owner of 6D, short street one Khemka who had purchased from certain Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla the said property measuring about 12 cottahs, 14 chitaks, 34 square feet. The prayers in the application of Khemka are for a clarification that the sale notice of the Official Liquidator should not be read so as to include any portion of the building which falls on 6D, short street, though, admittedly, by far the larger portion of the said same building is in 6A. Mr. Sen appearing for the Khemka has also said that the sale notice should specify the reservation of a common passage in 6A, short street which according to Mr. Sen should be kept open for the owners and occupiers of 6D for the purpose for egress and ingress. In effect he claims for a right of easement over 6A for the dominant tenement of 6D. Sen should be kept open for the owners and occupiers of 6D for the purpose for egress and ingress. In effect he claims for a right of easement over 6A for the dominant tenement of 6D. The other prayers in the application of Khemka cannot be looked into in the company jurisdiction as 6D, short street is no company property and the way the same should be enjoyed is no concern of the company court. 6. The entire premises no.6 short street which was in all a little under 3 bighas of land originally belonged to Sir Asutosh Chowdhury, a Judge of this court, around the time of the first war, and then passed on in title through his son Mr. Amiya Nath Chowdhury, Barrister, to on Khandalwal. 7. There was a suit in or about the year 1957 as between Khandalwal and one Ezekaiel Mordecal who was then tenant of the entire land. The suit was settled and the rent reserved at the time being Rs. 650/- per month was increased to Rs. 1100/- and the tenancy was limited largely to the portions now indicated by 6A and 6B, short street, 6C being completely left out and 6D being also largely left out those two latter portions then comprising the tennis courts on the south. 8. In 1960 the land purchased (over the head of Ezekiel in part) by the company now in liquidation, when partition of 6A, B, C, D was also effected, the company retaining only 6A as owner. 9. The above is old history, and what concerns us now as the first document from which an examination of title should begin in respect of these four applications is a registered indenture of lease dated 23.9.1961. 10. The said lease was between the company (in liquidation), being the owners of 6A, short street, Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla, the owners of 6B, short street and also R.N. Jhunjhunwalla, the erstwhile owners of 6D, short street. 11. The lease was for 10 years and the leases were the said Ezekaiel Mordecal, his brother Solomon Mordecal, and sister Maric Mordecal. 12. The company went to liquidation by an order passed by this court in 1970. 13. The lease expired after running out of the reserved period of 10 years in 1971. 11. The lease was for 10 years and the leases were the said Ezekaiel Mordecal, his brother Solomon Mordecal, and sister Maric Mordecal. 12. The company went to liquidation by an order passed by this court in 1970. 13. The lease expired after running out of the reserved period of 10 years in 1971. Accordingly, when the lease period ran out it was the Official Liquidator who was to be paid the rent or monthly charges, under whatever head, in respect of the said leased property. 14. This was not only because the Official Liquidator became entitled to passes the company property, being 6A, but also because of an earlier arrangement, by way of which, the company had become the collecting agent of the entire monthly rent for all the three lessors. 15. The Official Liquidator was duly tendered the sum of Rs. 1100/- per month for several years from 1970. How and in what manner such tender became a matter of disputed and controversy and at what period of time is explained below. 16. Ezekaiel and Solomon both died in the mid 1970. None had married. Their nearest heirs in accordance with section 47 of the Indian Succession Act would be their brothers or their sisters or the children of the brothers or sisters. 17. Though the brothers died in the 1970 Maric survived until 1986. There is no dispute that until 1986 Marie would be a protected tenant under the West Bengal Premise Tenancy Act and as such the sums paid monthly to the Official Liquidator until for the month of March, 1986 were paid and accepted by him without any scope for dispute from anybody. 18. Marie died a lunatic in March, 1986. She was also unmarried. Her nearest heirs also brothers, sisters and the children of brothers and sisters. The point, therefore, arises as to the right of the persons, if any, to possess the company property being 6A, short street subsequent to the death of the last recorded tenant as appearing from the face of the registered indenture of lease. 19. The case of company or the Official Liquidator, as it should be, for vacating of 6A, short street has been taken up by Mr. Bimal Kumar Chatterjee ably assisted Mr. Jishnu Saha, both of whom appeared for Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. 19. The case of company or the Official Liquidator, as it should be, for vacating of 6A, short street has been taken up by Mr. Bimal Kumar Chatterjee ably assisted Mr. Jishnu Saha, both of whom appeared for Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that his olient can use the present winding up proceedings for the purpose of getting vacant possession of 6B, short street also, which belongs not to the company but to Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla. The company court would not have jurisdiction to wield summary power of eviction over 6B, short street as it is not company property. 20. Mr. Chatterjee pressed as a contributory of the company for vacating of 6A, short street too. The opposition to Mr. Chatterjee's clients came neither from the Official Liquidator nor from the Khemkas (who are owners of 6D) nor from the Chhaocharias (who are the owners of 6C, short street and who have not even appeared before me). But the opposition came from one Hyam Joseph Hallen. It is the same gentlemen who has made an application for leave to purchase. 21. On the defensive front it is the figure of Hyam Joseph Hallen that looms large. It is Hallen who has filed affidavits either by himself or through an authorised agent. It is Hallen who claims to be the sole tenant of 6A short street although Mr. P.K. Das appearing for Hallen and another could not support the said statement at all. 22. Who is Hellen? The answer must be that in the eye of law he is a nobody. The lease of 1961 went to two brothers and a sister all of whom were Mordecals. Mr. Das has not shown me anything whereby Hallen could be called an heir of any of the three Mordecals. It is quite possible and quite acceptable that Hallen has been acting as the constituted attorney of money a Mordecal. But he has no personal right to become a tenant or a statutorily protected tenant in respect of 6A, short street. Yet it is Hallen who possesses the said property. 23. How is it that he possesses the said property? He occupies the first floor of the building largely constructed on 6A, short street. Sometime after the visit of Mrs. But he has no personal right to become a tenant or a statutorily protected tenant in respect of 6A, short street. Yet it is Hallen who possesses the said property. 23. How is it that he possesses the said property? He occupies the first floor of the building largely constructed on 6A, short street. Sometime after the visit of Mrs. Indrani Chatterjee as the Special Officer in 1988 Hallen appears to have stated a school on the ground floor of the said premises. He has, on his own showing, given licence to the school to function. Again on his own showing, he is the patron of that school. It is said that the school is run on a charitable basis for handicapped children. The show is run by Hallen and he has relied upon photographs to emphasize his central position so far as possession of the company property is concerned. Hallen and his school are mere trespassers. There is no document to show any legal right of Hallen or his school to continue in possession of 6A, short street, in opposition to the interest of the Liquidator or in opposition to the interest of the company (in liquidation). 24. If the pleading were to be taken on a strict basis this would be an end of the case. There would be no difficulty in ordering the Official Liquidator to effect summary eviction of Hyam Joseph Hallen and all others occupying under his leave or licence from 6A, short street. The would be no difficulty in direction such summary eviction from the out houses of 6A, short street where certain menials like Dhobis, one electrical engineer, and one packer mover were found by the special officer to be staying, and who have no right independent of or superior to that of Hallen, since they were paying rent (under Rs. 35/- each) to Hallen. 25. But Mr. P.K. Das has sought to resist the application of Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla on the basis of the other client of his who is one Mrs. Trixie Mordecal. She is the wife of one David Mordecal who died in or about 1973 and who was brother to the three original Mordecal lessees. Mr. Das has said that if Hallen is not a protected tenant then Trixie is a protected tenant. Mr. Trixie Mordecal. She is the wife of one David Mordecal who died in or about 1973 and who was brother to the three original Mordecal lessees. Mr. Das has said that if Hallen is not a protected tenant then Trixie is a protected tenant. Mr. Das has further said that if Trixie is a tenant then summary eviction from 6A, short street is not permissible. 26. As I have said, upto March 1986 no question of any eviction arose as an original lessees was alive until then protected by the provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Mr. Das has said that at all material times Trixie Mordecal was also a resident of 6 short street and that she was so a resident with Marie Mordecal in 1986 when Marie died. Mr. Das has drawn my attention to various documents disclosed in these proceeding and he is quite right that the presence of Trixie Mordecal at 6, short street is amply borne out by the tenor of these documents. There are documents addressed by Trixie in 1977 and there are do documents addressed to Trixie in the 1980 giving her address as 6, short street. In case therefore Trixie is held to be a tenant or a statutorily protected tenant the application of Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla for vacating 6A, short street prior to sale must fail. 27. Under Section 446(2) of the Companies Act this Court is to determine all questions that arise in winding up. Such questions include eviction of trespassers from the property of the company in liquidation. What would have to be decided by filling of a regular suit against a trespasser becomes a question of enquiry by the company court on the basis of such procedure as it finds convenient to adopt. A company court can, by summary order, direct eviction of a trespasser from company property. But the company court must follow the law of the land in regard to such eviction. The procedure is summary but the law to be applied prior to ordering eviction of a trespasser is the same law as would have to be applied by any Civil Court ordinarily trying a suit against a trespasser. 28. Mr. But the company court must follow the law of the land in regard to such eviction. The procedure is summary but the law to be applied prior to ordering eviction of a trespasser is the same law as would have to be applied by any Civil Court ordinarily trying a suit against a trespasser. 28. Mr. Chatterjee relied in this regard upon two Division Bench judgments one of Vidyadhar Upadhyay vs. Sree Madan Gopal Jew, 67 Company cases, page 394, and another Division Bench Judgment in the case of Indramoni vs. Shriram Jute Mill Pvt. Ltd., which is quoted from in the said former decision. It is unnecessary to quote the said passage once again but these Division Bench authorities recognize the summary power of the company court to order and to enforce eviction of a trespasser. 29. Mr. Das could not show anything to dispute that under the Jewish Law of Succession Trixie Mordecal would not be the closest heir of Marie Mordecal. This is because, to mention but one of the many other closer heirs and heiresses of Marie, David Mordecal, the husband of Trixie Mordecal, had children one of whom is Cheryl Issac. She is a brother's child so far as Marie is concerned and as such she would excluded her mother Trixie who only be a brother's wife so far as Marie is concerned. Cheryl Issac is not and was not at any material time ordinarily a resident of 6, short street. Nobody is appearing for her today. It was recorded in an order passed on the 26.6.1986 that Hallen was constituted attorney of Cheryl Issac and many others and that the said persons were all residents of U.K. and U.S.A. There is thus no question of any other person being in the run for the status of a statutorily protected tenant than Trixie Mordecal. 30. Was Trixie Mordecal a protected tenant from and after the death of Marie Mordecal in 1986 under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act? If the answer is 'Yes' Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla's claim for eviction must fail, and if the answer is 'No' Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla's claim for eviction must succeed. 31. 30. Was Trixie Mordecal a protected tenant from and after the death of Marie Mordecal in 1986 under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act? If the answer is 'Yes' Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla's claim for eviction must fail, and if the answer is 'No' Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla's claim for eviction must succeed. 31. If Trixie were a protected tenant then the claim of Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla must fail because, for on thing, there was no notice served under Section 13(6) upon any protected tenant in respect of 6A, short street although in regard to 6B, short street such a notice was sought to be served by the advocate on record of Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla in May 1984. 32. Section 2 (h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act reads as follow:- "(h) Tenant (means) any person by whom or on whose account or behalf, the rent of any premises is, or but for a special contract would be, payable and includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy or in the event of such person's death, such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction." 33. The first point to determine is who is an heir of the tenant within the meaning of Section 2 (h). It is quite clear that a legatee of a tenant cannot be an heir within the meaning of the said sub-section if the legatee is also not otherwise an heir of the tenant. If it were otherwise the case then a tenant in West Bengal could pass on the protection of his statutory tenancy, to say as servant of his, by devising to such servant household effects such as one table or one or two chairs. It was suggested by nobody that is the law. 34. A problem of greater importance is as to which of the many possible heirs of a person would be included within this sub-section. There are heirs of nearer degrees who exclude heirs of further degrees. It was suggested by nobody that is the law. 34. A problem of greater importance is as to which of the many possible heirs of a person would be included within this sub-section. There are heirs of nearer degrees who exclude heirs of further degrees. If a tenant dies, leaving both near heirs and far heirs, could a further removed heir, although not entitled to succeed to property upon intestate succession because of the presence of persons being nearer heirs, be entitled to the protection of Section 2 (h)? 35. The answer to this question must be in the negative. A living person has no heir and the heirs of a person can be ascertained only upon his death. Those only are the heirs of the dead person who succeed to property of the deceased as on intestacy. That there are heirs further removed is only a way of loose expression. The correct expression would be that those relations further removed have not become heirs upon the death of the deceased because of the presence of the nearer relations, but they might have become the heirs under certain other circumstances. There is no reason to interpret the word heir occurring in Section 2 (h) in any way different from the way it is interpreted in the rest of the body of the laws. 36. In the instant case therefore Trixie Mordecal would not be a protected tenant under section 2 (h) because she was not the heir of Marie Mordecal who died in 1986. To mention but one, Cheryl Issac, Trixie daughter would totally exclude Trixie from the heirship or part heirship of Marie Mordecal. 37. So far so good. But, Mr. Das said, that notwithstanding the special mention of heirs residing with a tenant in section 2 (h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, under the general law, statutory tenancy as well as tenancy are both heritable like other property. Accordingly, if Marie was a statutory tenant in 1986 her tenancy would be inherited by all heirs of Marie whether resident with Marie or not at the time of her death. Therefore, said Mr. Das there are a host of possible tenants. Cheryl Issac would be a tenant upon ordinary succession upon intestacy. There are other children also of David who might he heirs of Marie Mordecal. Therefore, said Mr. Das there are a host of possible tenants. Cheryl Issac would be a tenant upon ordinary succession upon intestacy. There are other children also of David who might he heirs of Marie Mordecal. Thus, it was said, that the tenancy long continuing in the Mordecal family will still continue in the Mordecal family on the principle of ordinary succession. 38. Indeed it Mr. Das is right and if statutory tenants in West Bengal pass on their statutory tenancy like other property to their heirs on intestacy, then again eviction cannot be ordered today by me because, though Trixie is not an heir, there are other heirs of the dead Mordecal. 39. See however, to what distance we have now traveled, in the matter of examination of the defence to the claim for eviction made by Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla. The person who purposes to possesses the land on his own right, Hyam Joseph Hallen has long gone out of any consideration. He had not title and no right to possession under tenancy. Trixie Mordecal, who was a person present on the scent at 6, short street and who has not field any affidavits and has stayed largely in the background, also takes leave, because she is not an heir of any of the three original lessees. The person through whom the claim is resisted is a person who ordinarily stays abroad. It is said that Cheryl Issac whose ordinary residence is neither short street nor Calcutta is to be considered for resisting the prayer of Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla for eviction. 40. Since in this jurisdiction the order that I pass is to take the place of a summary decree, even this contention I consider at the instance of Hyam Joseph Hallen who is or at least at all material times hereunto was, the constituted attorney for representing the interest of Cheryl Isaac in India. 41. Mr. Das relied upon the high authority of the case reported in Smt. Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar & other, AIR 1985 SC 796 , which is a five Judge decision of the Supreme Court. I accept the proposition laid down there, as indeed I must, that generally speaking statutory tenancies are heritable like ordinary tenancies. 41. Mr. Das relied upon the high authority of the case reported in Smt. Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumar & other, AIR 1985 SC 796 , which is a five Judge decision of the Supreme Court. I accept the proposition laid down there, as indeed I must, that generally speaking statutory tenancies are heritable like ordinary tenancies. Bhagwati, J. speaking there before all others was the first to alter His Lordships views taken in an earlier case and explained the many principles why statutory tenancy should also be considered to be an estate like an ordinary tenancy under the transfer of Property Act. Indeed, one rarely hears these days that a leasehold is a chattel interest in real property passing on to those known as the next of kin. 42. But the said case also clearly indicates, as even the beginning of the head-note would show that the heirs of the deceased tenant will step into the position of the deceased tenant even if be is only a statutory tenant if and only if there are no words to the contrary in the rent legislation in question. 43. In our Rent Act the special mention of heirs residing with the statutory tenant cannot be robbed of all content. The high authority of a Five Judge Bench is at least matched by the high authority of words in the legislation enacted by a competent legislature. Upon the principle expressio u jusest exclusio alterlus it would mean that the special mention of heirs resident with the tenant exclude all those heirs who are not ordinarily resident with the tenant. 44. If such an exclusion is not to be implied then it would militate against another well known canon of statutory construction that words occurring in the legislation of competent legislatures are to be given some meaning. If heirs not residing with the tenant succeed to statutory tenancy then the special inclusive definition of heirs residing with the tenant would lose all meaning and be robbed of all content. 45. In my opinion it is quite clear from the definition of Section 2(h) quoted above that statutory tenancy can be taken on only by the heirs of the statutory tenant residing with him, and not other heirs like Cheryl Isaac residing in the United Kingdom or in the United States. 46. 45. In my opinion it is quite clear from the definition of Section 2(h) quoted above that statutory tenancy can be taken on only by the heirs of the statutory tenant residing with him, and not other heirs like Cheryl Isaac residing in the United Kingdom or in the United States. 46. It is important to note that Section 2(h) gives special protection to resident heirs in case and only in case the tenancy of the deceased tenant had been terminated. If there is no termination of the tenancy then the lease or the tenancy would be inherited by the heirs of the tenant in accordancy with the ordinary law. That would be a case quite different from the present. In the present case the tenancy terminated after expiry of 10 years in 1971. I am unable to accept Mr. Das contention that the words termination of his tenancy occurring in Section 2(h) relate only to termination of tenancy by service of notice under the Transfer of Property Act and do not include termination by efflux of time. In my opinion, for the present purposes, determination by notice to quit or determination by efflux of time are at par. This would also appear from another case cited by Mr. Das being the case Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. vs. Sm. Kohinoor Devi, 93 CWN 773, wherein paragraph 10 of the judgment might be referred to in this regard. 47. Several other decisions binding upon me were relied upon by Mr. Das for supporting the proposition that even in West Bengal all heirs of a statutory tenant succeed to statutory tenancy and not merely those heirs resident with the statutory tenant. Mr. Das relied upon the cases reported in Krishna Dhone Pramanick vs. Ram Palat Sahoo, 84 CWN 447. 48. In my opinion none of these cases contains the above provision sought to be supported by Mr. Das. It is absolutely true that in case a tenant dies pending an eviction suit in West Bengal all the heirs of the tenant would be parties necessary to be substituted in his place and stead. That is because it might be shown by any of the heirs not residing with the tenant that the notice of termination was bad in law and in that case the non residing heir would also succeed to the unterminated tenancy as on intestacy. That is because it might be shown by any of the heirs not residing with the tenant that the notice of termination was bad in law and in that case the non residing heir would also succeed to the unterminated tenancy as on intestacy. This is because in case of an invalid notice of termination, there is no real termination, and the tenant remains entitled to his property being his tenancy, and is not relegated yet to the class of the merely statutorily protected and so called tenants. 49. The proposition, therefore, that all heirs need to be substituted in place of a deceased tenant defendant, is different from the proposition that all the heirs of a statutory tenant succeed to his statutory tenancy. 50. I also accept to proposition deducible from the above cases, that in case of tenancy not determined as to its contractual status, the same is ordinary property and devolves upon all heirs whether residing with the tenant or not. 51. Cheryl Isaac, therefore, would not be a person entitled to succeed to the statutory tenancy of Marie Mordecai, even though she might be an heir as on intestacy of the said Marie Mordecai. She would not be a statutory tenant in West Bengal because she was not residing with Marie Mordecai ordinarily in 1986 or at any other material time. 52. The Official Liquidator went on accepting the monthly payment of Rs. 1100/-evenafter March 1986 i.e. even after the death of Marie Mordecal. I am not prepared to hold that such acceptance by the Official Liquidator either from Hyam Joseph Hallen or from Trixie Mordecal gave rise to a fresh tenancy upon the principles enacted in Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, as between the company in liquidation represented by the Official Liquidator on the one hand, and leather Hallen or Trixie on the other. There was no intention evinced by the Official Liquidator to create any fresh tenancy after the death of Marie. The Official Liquidator would be prohibited by the call of his duty to create any such fresh tenancy and in case even any such were attempted to be created by the Official Liquidator the Court would retain power to relieve the parties against such an unauthorized fresh creation of tenancy by the liquidator. 53. Mr. The Official Liquidator would be prohibited by the call of his duty to create any such fresh tenancy and in case even any such were attempted to be created by the Official Liquidator the Court would retain power to relieve the parties against such an unauthorized fresh creation of tenancy by the liquidator. 53. Mr. Chatterjee relied in this respect upon the apposite Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Ardhanari Gounder vs. Ardhanari Mudshair & other, AIR 1975 Madras 231. It is recognized therein that the act of the Court shall not unduly prejudice any party. The possession of the Official Liquidator is the possession of the Court. If the payment of monthly sums to the Official Liquidator and acceptance by him are to be construed as grant of a fresh monthly tenancy by the Official Liquidator, either to Hallen or to Trixie Mordecai, then the same would unduly prejudice the creditors and contributories of the company (in liquidation). 54. The Official Liquidator had been asked not to let out property any further in regard to 6A, short street by order of Court dated 7.6.1988. In the face of such an order, and the circumstances prevailing even prior to the said order, it was not and could not be the intention of the Official Liquidator to cut at the root of all proceedings by creating a fresh tenancy. 55. Mr. Das referred me to the Supreme Court case of Krishna Kumar Khemka vs. Grindlays Bank P.L.C. & other, 1990(3) SCC 669 . He drew my attention to paragraph 14 of the judgment where the Madras case is considered. Quite rightly it was pointed out by Mr. Das that their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not find the said Madras case to be applicable to the facts in the case before the Supreme Court. But I do not find that any dictum of the Madras Full Bench was differed from by the Supreme Court. The principle laid down by the Madras Full Bench is, therefore, good law. I respectfully follow the same. 56. Mr. Das submitted that the Official Liquidator has not created anything new by accepting the monthly payments after March 1986. But I do not find that any dictum of the Madras Full Bench was differed from by the Supreme Court. The principle laid down by the Madras Full Bench is, therefore, good law. I respectfully follow the same. 56. Mr. Das submitted that the Official Liquidator has not created anything new by accepting the monthly payments after March 1986. If that is so, then of course the problem does not arise and the question reverts to the earlier question as to whether Trixie Mordecai or anybody else like Cheryl Isaac can claim protection under the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, I have already held that they cannot. 57. Mr. Chatterjee relied also upon the case Ravindra Ishwardas Sethna & another vs. Official Liquidator, High Court, Bombay & another, AIR 1983 SC 1061 and I accept the said case to be a good authority for the proposition that in liquidation proceedings summary eviction can be ordered in appropriate case and no suit regularly filed is necessarily called for before such an order is passed. 58. The Official Liquidator should hereafter, therefore, not accept any further monthly payment in respect of the company property. He must also return in the manner directed below the sums received @ Rs. 1100/- per moth for the months March 1986 to January 1993 i.e. for 83 months aggregating Rs. 91,300/-. 59. In the matter of disposal of the present applications all the parties as well as I have been considerably assisted by the excellent map handed up by Mr. Das in Court. This I have already directed to be kept on record which has been so kept. 60. Mr. P.C. Sen's client being the owners of 6D is indeed entitled to a clarification that in the sale notice of the Official Liquidator the building mentioned as on the company property i.e. 6A, short street should be clarified so as not to include within it that portion of the building which falls within 6D, short street. The matter is so obvious that no resistance can be put thereto. 61. In so far as, however, the claim for easement and egress and ingress through the yellow portion marked "Common passage" in 6A, short street is concerned, the position is quite different. In case the partition of 1961 is a registered instrument Mr. The matter is so obvious that no resistance can be put thereto. 61. In so far as, however, the claim for easement and egress and ingress through the yellow portion marked "Common passage" in 6A, short street is concerned, the position is quite different. In case the partition of 1961 is a registered instrument Mr. Sen's client might have got thereunder certain rights of agree and ingress but that will be so only if the said partition is a registered instrument. Be that as it may, from 1961 until now i.e. for about 32 years, and therefore, definitely upwards of 20 years, there is nothing to show that the owners and occupiers of 6D. Short Street have used the common passage for egress and ingress and that they have not used a portion of 6C, short street for such egress and ingress. A claim for easement accordingly need not be mentioned in the sale notice of the Official Liquidator and a mention that the property shall be sold on and as is where is basis would be quite sufficient. I make it clear that in so far as the prayer for eviction from the northern portion of 6D, short street is concerned regarding land measuring 1 cottah 10 chitaks 1 square foot I have not gone into that question herein, nor have permitted Mr. Sen to go into that question as that relates to eviction from property which does not belong to the company. I would have no jurisdiction in that regard i.e. the northern portion of 6D, short street for the same reason as I would lack jurisdiction to pass orders for eviction in respect of 6B, short street. 62. The four applications are disposed of by the following order:- (a) The sale notice of the Official Liquidator published on 4.9.1992 is cancelled and a fresh sale notice is to be published with the modifications indicated below. (b) The Official Liquidator shall within 7 days from date hereof return to the Advocate on Record of Mr. P.K. Das the pay order deposited by Hallen as 10% price i.e. Rs. lakh, and Rs. 91,300/- by an A/C Payee Cheque drawn by the Official Liquidator in the name of Hyam Joseph Hallen. (b) The Official Liquidator shall within 7 days from date hereof return to the Advocate on Record of Mr. P.K. Das the pay order deposited by Hallen as 10% price i.e. Rs. lakh, and Rs. 91,300/- by an A/C Payee Cheque drawn by the Official Liquidator in the name of Hyam Joseph Hallen. Hallen would be entitled to encash the said cheque and appropriate the proceeds either for self or as constituted attorney of Trixie Mordecai without prejudice to the rights and contentions of Hallen or Trixie that by the payment for the 83 months there had arisen in their favour a right to stay on in the premises assuming Hallen or Trixie Mordecai find it necessary to urge such a point before any tribunal or court of law in any proceeding hereafter or in continuation hereof. (c) The Official Liquidator shall forthwith get the entirety of 6A, short street vacated. The Official Liquidator shall be entitled to have police help in case any obstruction is met with in this regard. After vacating of the said property the Official Liquidator shall raise partition walls for segregation, if necessary even running through the different floors of the building situated on the company property with a small portion on 6D, Short Street so as to show the separation clearly. (d) Pushpa Devi Jhunjhunwalla is permitted to take such steps in regard to vacating of 6B, short street as the might be entitled to in law. (e) The vacating of 6A, short street and the raising or partition wall to show compete segregation form other plots, being 6B, 6C and 6D would be completed within 8 weeks from date hereof. The next sale notice to be issued shall be issued in the same manner as before and in the same papers as before with this modification that the company property shall be mentioned there as vacant property and that the portion of the two storeyed building falling within 6D, short street shall be clearly mentioned as being left out of the ambit of the sale. If shall also be mentioned that the property shall be sold on an as is where is basis. If shall also be mentioned that the property shall be sold on an as is where is basis. (f) The said sale notice shall be published between a period 12 weeks from date hereof and 14 weeks from date hereof fixing a date which will be the Friday next after expiry of 17 weeks from date hereof as the date of sale. (g) Hyam Joseph Hallen and any others interested are permitted to bid at the said subsequent sale in accordance with the sale notice after enclosing 10% of the bid by way banker's cheque as is usual. (h) Expenses for the discharge of the Official Liquidator's duties mentioned above would come out of the funds in his hands and he would be entitled to draw upon reserve funds in that regard also, if necessary. Stay of operation of this order and judgment is prayed for by Mr. P.K. Das but the same is refused. 63. There will be no order as to costs. All parties, the Official Liquidator, the police authorities and others concerned to act on a signed copy of this judgment and order on the usual undertaking.