K. J. VAIDYA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant-Shankar Daji and 18 others who came to be tried alongwith other three accused (acquitted) viz. (I) Shankar Dharma (2) Madhu Bapji and (3) Lakhia Ramji for the alleged offences punishable under sections 302 323 324 325 326 147 148 and 149 of the IPC by the learned Additional Sessions Judge Bulsar in Sessions Case No. 76/84 were at the end of the trial ordered to be convicted and sentenced for various minor offences as stated in detail in the impugned judgment and order dated 22 It may be stated that all the appellants were acquitted of the offence punishable under section 302 of the IPC and that the original accused nos. 14 15 and 16 abovenamed came to be acquitted of all the charges against them. It may also be incidentally stated that as against the impugned judgment and order of acquittal the Slate has not filed any appeal. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution the incident in question wherein Dharma Sukar who was stoned to death and five others viz. (1) Bai Raiji (PW-2 Ex-31); (2) Bai Ramti Dharma (PW-9 Ex-51); (3) Laxubhai Rupjibhai (PW-13 Ex-58) (4) Maganbhai Laxubhai Varli (PW-11 Ex-53) and (5) Zinubhai Ramjibhai (PW-10 Ex-52) who received some stick and stone injuries at the hands of various accused took place on 23-6-1984 at 15-00 hours in Mani Falia of village-Arni. According to the prosecution both the groups viz. that of the appellants-accused and that of the prosecution witnesses are residents of village-Arni and that there was some enmity between them on account of some election for the office of the Sarpanch of the Village-Arni which was contested by Jiva Chhagan (PW-14 Exh. 59) and the appellant No. 16 Devalia Ravia. In the said election the appellant No. 16 was successful whereas Jiva Chhagan was defeated. It is further the ease of the prosecution that since the relations between the accused side and the prosecution witness were strained the accused were wailing for some opportunity to teach a lesson to the prosecution witnesses. 59) and the appellant No. 16 Devalia Ravia. In the said election the appellant No. 16 was successful whereas Jiva Chhagan was defeated. It is further the ease of the prosecution that since the relations between the accused side and the prosecution witness were strained the accused were wailing for some opportunity to teach a lesson to the prosecution witnesses. It also further appears from the record that on the day prior to the incident the Appellant No. 1 Shankar Daji had gone to Nani Falia and at that time one Kolu Chhagan (not examined) asking the appellant- How are you Sarpanch whereupon the Appellant No. 1 was annoyed and went to the house of Nanji Jana collected the people of Upla Falia and started raising shouts. At that time the people of Nani Falia collected near the house of Kolu Chhagan and other people of Chinchwada Falia started pelting stone at the people of Mani Falia. It further appears that on 23-6- 19x4 at 15-00 hours the incident in question took place wherein as a result of pelting of stone and stick blows by some of the appellants (as staled in detail in FIR) Dharma Sukar met with death while others received injuries. On the basis of these facts Bai Raiji (PW-2 Exh. 31) filed a complaint (Exh. 67) on 23 at about 20. 00 hours before PSI- Babubhai L. Rathod (PW-16 Exh. 66) and after the investigation was over the respondents came to be charge-sheeted for the aforesaid alleged offences before the Sessions Court at Valsad to stand the trial. ( 3 ) AT trial the respondents pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In their further statement under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code it is their specific case that as the Appellant- accused No. 16 namely; Devalia Rabia had won the election defeating the rival candidate Jeeva Chhagan (PW-14 Exh. 59) because of the political enmity they have been falsely implicated. ( 4 ) THE trial court after duly appreciating the prosecution evidence brought on the record convicted and sentenced the appellant-accused for various offences as staled in detail in the impugned judgment and order giving rise to the present appeal. ( 5 ) MR. 59) because of the political enmity they have been falsely implicated. ( 4 ) THE trial court after duly appreciating the prosecution evidence brought on the record convicted and sentenced the appellant-accused for various offences as staled in detail in the impugned judgment and order giving rise to the present appeal. ( 5 ) MR. J. V. Desai the learned advocate for the appellant while challenging the impugned judgment and order of conviction has carefully taken this Court through the evidence of all the material witnesses as well as the reasons for conviction and sentence given by the trial Court. Mr. Desai while attacking the impugned judgment submitted that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses though claim to have received the injuries at the lime of incident is not dependable at all. Mr. Desai further submitted that not that some of the prosecution witnesses had not received any injuries during the course of the incident but at the sametime looking to the manner in which the strong crowd of about 300 people stoned their houses it was just difficult if not impossible for them to have seen a particular accused armed with the particular weapon i. e. slick or stone causing particular injury. Under the tense moments when attacked by several members of the mob at a time the witnesses ordinarily would be more confused and in a defending position and that their minds would not be that concentrated enough to clearly notice the exact assailants. Mr. Desai further submitted that the possibility also cannot be ruled that when mob actually attached while running away to save themselves the prosecution witnesses either because falling down or otherwise might have received injuries without properly identifying the accused. Mr. Desai further submitted that the medical evidence brought on the record clearly go to show that the injuries sustained by some of the injured-witnesses were also possible by fall Mr. Desai under the circumstances further submitted that when there was a sharp fraction in the village because of deep sealed election rivalry between the two groups it would not be impossible for the injured party to resist the temptation to falsely involve and implicate as many accused as possible connecting their injuries with those particular accused-persons who belong to the rival faction even though they had nothing to do with the injury Mr. Desai further submitted that the matter does not rest here simply as even Bai Raiji the Complainant in this case has given a complete go-bye to her earlier version of having gone to Kaprada Police Station to file the Complaint (Exh. 67) before PSI-Rathod. In fact in cross-examination Bai Raiji in an unmistakable terms admitted that the Complaint was recorded within an hour after the incident at her residence only Mr. Desai further submitted that not only Bai Raiji given a complete go-bye to her version of having given FIR at Kaprada Police Station but admittedly the first and foremost information of cognizable offence recorded at her house by the police is unfortunately not brought on the record and what ought we know that because the said complaint did not disclose the names of any accused that the same has been deliberately with-held Mr. Deasi further submitted that the evidence of Bai Raiji also further suffers from yet another infirmity of improbability in as much as that at the point of lime the alleged incident took place some four police personnel (not named) were actually dining at the place of Dharma Suker. Now if indeed the said police persons were dining at the said place then in the first instance they should have been examined by the prosecution as witnesses in this case as they were easily the best witnesses but yet they are not examined. In the second instance if indeed four police personnel were present at the scene of offence then perhaps the incident in question would not have taken place at all and in case of the third instance supposing the incident had taken place then in that case the police personnel would have immediately come out of the house and on seeing them the crowd perhaps might have dispersed. 5. 1 It was next submitted by Mr. Desai that Bai Raiji (PW-2 Exh. 31) was admittedly knowing Konkani language only and therefore in order to properly record understand and appreciate her evidence in Gujarati language services of one Yashvant Tulsiram Pawar who was believed to have been conversant with both Gujarati and Konkani languages was availed of to interpret the evidence given by her before the Court. Desai that Bai Raiji (PW-2 Exh. 31) was admittedly knowing Konkani language only and therefore in order to properly record understand and appreciate her evidence in Gujarati language services of one Yashvant Tulsiram Pawar who was believed to have been conversant with both Gujarati and Konkani languages was availed of to interpret the evidence given by her before the Court. Accordingly it was on this Yashvant Tulsiram Pawar interpreting evidence Of Bai Raiji given in Konkani language was interpreted in Gujarati that her evidence ultimately came to be recorded by the trial Court. Now in this regard Mr. Desai has two fold contentions to be raised. Firstly that there is nothing on the record to show that the interpreter- Yashvant T. Pawar was administered any oath before he was asked to interpret evidence of Bai Raiji before the Court. This according to Mr. Desai was on face of it a patent infirmity going to the root of the matter. In support of this contention Mr. Desai has invited attention of this Court to Section 4 of the Oaths Act 1969 which reads as under:-"4 Oaths or affirmations to be made by witnesses interpreters and jurors (1) Oaths or affirmations shall be made by the following persons namely: (a) all witnesses that is to say all persons who may lawfully be examined or give or be required to be give evidence by or before any Court or person having by law or consent of parties authority to examine such persons to receive evidence; (b) interpreters of questions put to and evidence given by witnesses and (c) jurors:secondly there is also nothing on the record by way of some tangible material to indicate that Interpreter-Yashvant T. Pawar was indeed conversant enough with both Konkani and Gujarati languages and thereby competent to interpret the evidence given out by Bai Raiji before the Court. This infirmity according to Mr. Desai also creates some reasonable doubt about the dependability of the interpreted version. On the basis of these two infirmities also according to Mr. Desai the evidence of Bai Raiji deserves to be discarded. 5. 2 Now undoubtedly the aforesaid two contentions apparently raise quite important point of law and therefore they do require to be examined in proper perspective having ultimate effect on the evidentiary value of Bai Raiji. Taking the first contention first of Mr. Desai the evidence of Bai Raiji deserves to be discarded. 5. 2 Now undoubtedly the aforesaid two contentions apparently raise quite important point of law and therefore they do require to be examined in proper perspective having ultimate effect on the evidentiary value of Bai Raiji. Taking the first contention first of Mr. Desai nodoubt in this case Yashvant T. Pawar has not been administered any oath but at the sametime the alleged irregularity is not such which would render his interpreted evidence inadmissible. As a matter of fact while making this submission Mr. Desai has clearly over-looked Section 7 of the said Act to which in an unmistakable terms have clarified that no omission to take oath or make affirmations and no irregularity on that count shall invalidate any proceedings or render inadmissible in evidence whatsoever. It is true that when the Court feels necessary to take assistance of an interpreter it is desirable and therefore it ought have been careful enough to administer an oath to him with a view to ensure and quite vouch-safe the dependability of the said witness. Not that in absence of any oath administered to the interpreter the Court cannot rely upon the evidence of such witness but at the sametime why such a lacuna which if it is otherwise avoidable enough with little more care and caution should be kept open to provide an easy and unnecessary ground for argument on the said count. In fact the Supreme Court in one of its decisions rendered in case of Rameshwar Kalyansingh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1952 S. C. page-54 has observed that an irregularity in administering the oath or solemn affirmation cannot affect the admissibility of the evidence of the girl of 7 or 8 years. Further having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case since Bai Raiji was duly administered oath and nothing is alleged in particular against the Interpreter-Yashvant T. Pawar that he has deliberately given some twisted or perverse interpretation it appears to this Court that merely because the oath was not administered to him that by itself will not sufficient to discard evidence of Bai Raiji on the said count of the oath being not administered to him. 5. 3 That takes this Court now to yet another and second contention of Mr. Desai. 5. 3 That takes this Court now to yet another and second contention of Mr. Desai. In this regard it has got to be admitted that there is indeed nothing on the record on the basis of which Appellant Court could have any opportunity to know as to whether in fact the concerned witness was competent enough to appear as an Interpreter having complete workable knowledge of both the languages i. e. Konkani and Gujarati. In cases wherein the Trial Court has to call-in-aid the services of Interpreter for any witness before that person is accepted as such the Court must satisfy its judicial conscience by insisting upon some tangible material on the basis of which it can feel rest assured that the witness coming forward as an Interpreter is competent enough to discharge his duty of interpreting evidence. It appears that in the instant case the trial court has requisitioned services of Mr. Yashvant T. Pawar straight-away honestly believing and taking for granted that he was having full knowledge of both the languages and therefore was competent enough to act as an Interpreter. But such a blind acceptance of any person as an Interpreter particularly in absence of any satisfactory material to land assurance on that count is fraught with the great risk which in a given case can result into serious miscarriage of justice. Therefore under the circumstances a question may arise as to what could be that tangible material on the basis of which it can reasonably be said that the same is sufficient to satisfy the judicial conscience regarding competency of a person to act and appear as an Interpreter before the Court. In this regard of course some certificate or some sort of evidence whereby the knowledge of interpreter regarding the two languages could be tested and safely vouch-safed in necessary. Now what exactly indeed should be the nature of same material to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court is a matter left open for the concerned court which has to find out and record the same. Now in the instant case on reading the evidence given by Bai Raiji as interpreted by Yashvant T. Pawar it is very clear that there is nothing on the basis of which it can be said with certainly that he was fully conversant with both he languages and therefore competent enough to give evidence before the Court. Now in the instant case on reading the evidence given by Bai Raiji as interpreted by Yashvant T. Pawar it is very clear that there is nothing on the basis of which it can be said with certainly that he was fully conversant with both he languages and therefore competent enough to give evidence before the Court. As regards the interpreted evidence the Court must be satisfied to the fullest for the simple reason that this being a criminal trial a little mistake here or there can as well result in acquittal or conviction and thus either way any erroneous acquittal or conviction would be patent injustice either to accused or the society at large. In order to meet with such an eventuality the trial Court must fully satisfy itself regarding the competency of the interpreter to act as interpreter before he is asked to interpret. Now turning to the facts of this case since there is nothing on the record to establish competency of Yashvant T Pawar as a competent interpreter of Konkani language into Gujarati it would be simply risky and hazardous to rely upon his interpreted evidence. Maybe he had good knowledge of both Konkani and Gujarati languages and has perhaps correctly interpreted the evidence of Bai Raiji but this is only at the stage of maybe. It is ultimately the responsibility of the Court to decide whether in fact witness appearing as an interpreter was competent or not. 11 there is nothing for the Court to satisfy then even if the witness is otherwise competent that by itself cannot assist the Court and therefore by abundant caution his evidence has got to be excluded from consideration. The fate of accused cannot be tagged with maybe by saying that he maybe a competent interpreter. Further still in cases wherein the service of the interpreter is indispensable being an absolute necessity and accordingly he is so examined then in that case the Court must record its finding as to how and on what basis it was satisfied regarding his competency so that the appellate court has an opportunity to objectively assess and appreciate the same. ( 6 ) WHILE attacking the evidence of Bai Raiji (PW-9 Exh. 51) Mr. Desai submitted that she was a daughter of deceased Dharma Shukar aged 15 only. Mr. ( 6 ) WHILE attacking the evidence of Bai Raiji (PW-9 Exh. 51) Mr. Desai submitted that she was a daughter of deceased Dharma Shukar aged 15 only. Mr. Desai submitted that so far as this Bai Raiji is concerned there is nothing on the record to show that she was knowing Gujarati language and yet the services of the interpreter were not requisitioned to interpret her evidence in Gujarati language and the trial court appears to have taken risk in straighway recording her evidence. This submission of Mr. Desai cannot be accepted at its face value for the simple reason that if for whatever reasons Bai Ramti was found to be quite capable enough of expressing herself in Gujarati and the trial court accordingly feeling satisfied about the same might have thought it fit to dispense with the Interpreter and therefore merely because Interpreter was not called in service thereby it would not be proper to allege that the trial court has committed any error. If the trial court was satisfied it was within its discretion to dispense with the services of the interpreter so far recording of evidence of Bai Ramti is concerned. However it is quite true that though this witness claims to be injured by the appellant No. 13 viz. Bai Hatu who is alleged to have given her a stick blow she has not been examined by the Doctor so as to get the injuries corrborated Mr. Desai further submitted that Bai Ramti herself has admitted in her cross-examination that when the crowd of 300 persons mounted assault by pelting stones etc. and her father collapsed because of the stone injuries though her three brothers ran away to save their lives this girl boldly remained at the place to face the stones. According to Mr. Desai this also reflects on the improbability of the evidence as she would have certainly joined her brothers while running away in order to save herself. This submission or Mr. Desai has considerable force and bearing in mind this improbability it would be simply hazardous to place implicit reliance upon such witness. ( 7 ) THAT takes us to the third injured witness Zinabhai Ramjibhai (PW-10 Exh. 52) who claims to be injured in the incident. The criticism leveled against this witness by Mr. This submission or Mr. Desai has considerable force and bearing in mind this improbability it would be simply hazardous to place implicit reliance upon such witness. ( 7 ) THAT takes us to the third injured witness Zinabhai Ramjibhai (PW-10 Exh. 52) who claims to be injured in the incident. The criticism leveled against this witness by Mr. Desai is that though he is alleged to have received injuries on 23 at 15-00 hours and his statement came to be recorded on the next day i. e. 24 he came to be examined by Dr. P. N. Panwale (PW-7 Exh. 41) on 25-6-1984 at 8. 00 pm. Undoubtedly Dr. Panwala in para-7 of his deposition has clearly admitted that on taking X-ray there was a fracture of hip-bone and on third fourth and filth fingers. The question would be if indeed this witness had received such serious injuries on that particular day i. e. 23 1984 why did he not take medical treatment immediately and that came to be examined by doctor on 25-6-1984 is difficult to understand. The injuries sustained by this witness are undoubtedly serious and therefore required immediate attention and yet quite surprisingly no immediate medical treatment was taken? This is not to say that the witness has not received the injuries. The question is whether these particular injuries were received at the relevant point of time on 25-6-1984 when the alleged incident in question took place or thereafter? Further Dr. Panwala (PW-7 Exh. 41) in para-13 of his cross-examination had clearly stated that it was not possible to give an age of the injury as to when infact they were inflicted. He has also admitted that while running if one falls down the fracture on hip- bone was possible. It is because of the lime-gap between the lime of incident and the date of examination that some doubt is created as to why this witness was not examined at the earliest when he was already available claiming that he was injured. Under the circumstances the possibility cannot be ruled out that though the witness is infact found to be injured his injuries came to be falsely co-related with the main incident. Under these circumstances though the witness is injured it would be quite reasonable to resolve the doubt arising under the aforesaid circumstances in favour of the appellants-accused. Under the circumstances the possibility cannot be ruled out that though the witness is infact found to be injured his injuries came to be falsely co-related with the main incident. Under these circumstances though the witness is injured it would be quite reasonable to resolve the doubt arising under the aforesaid circumstances in favour of the appellants-accused. ( 8 ) THAT takes us to yet one another injured witness-Magan Laxu (PW-11 Exh. 53 ). This witness has received simple injuries which can be possible by fall. He came to be examined by Dr. P. N. Panwala (PW-7 Exh. 41) and Mr. Desai has leveled the same criticism which was leveled against the earlier witness-Zinubhai Ramjibhai (PW-10 Exh. 52 Thus this witness though claims to be injured his evidence is not satisfying enough to make him dependable to connect the accused. According to Mr. Desai this witness in Examination-in-chief has stated that Devji Shankar had given him a stick blow while in cross-examination he has admitted that he has not staled before the police as to which accused has injured him on what part. This material contradiction has been brought on the record. This witness has also admitted that he belongs to the rival fraction. Under these circumstances Mr. Desai is quite right in asking this Court not to place any reliance on this witness. 8. 1 Mr. Desai further submitted that there are certain other witnesses who are neither injured nor having seen the incident in question but they unquestionably do not throw any light which can in any way assist the prosecution in sustaining the order of conviction and sentence. ( 9 ) MR. B. D. Desai the learned APP appearing for the State though in the initial stage made some feeble attempts to take shelter under the impugned judgment and order of conviction by adopting the reasonings of the learned Judge but when he was confronted with the patent infirmities appearing in the prosecution case as highlighted by Mr. J. V. Desai and as discussed above he was frank enough to say that he was not in a position to take the prosecution case any further. J. V. Desai and as discussed above he was frank enough to say that he was not in a position to take the prosecution case any further. Apart this this Court having carefully gone through the evidence of each and every witness brought on the record is quite satisfied that in view of the back-ground of the sharp fractions between the two groups and the glaring infirmities appearing in evidence of prosecution witnesses on the basis of improbabilities contradictions and partision-ship ect. it would be simply hazardous to accept the evidence of prosecution witness to sustain the order of conviction and sentence of the appellants. ( 10 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion there is no alternative left for this Court but to reverse the order of conviction and sentence and set the appellants at liberty. ( 11 ) IN the result this appeal is allowed. The impinged judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court is quashed and set aside. The fine if paid is ordered to be refunded to accused. The bail bond stand cancelled. Appeal Allowed. .