Judgment :- The petitioner K.Jayachandran had been appointed as Surveyor while the 5th respondent M.Rukmangedan had been appointed as Assistant Supervisor in the Electricity Department of the Corporation of Madras on 211. 1965 by the proceedings of the second respondent Commissioner made in ELDC No.A3/5076/65. In the said proceedings, eight appointments had been made and the 5th respondent and the petitioner were respectively shown in serial nos. 2 and 3. All the appointees in the said proceedings were directed to report for duty to the Electrical Engineer, Corporation of Madras, Ripon Buildings, Madras, within three days of the receipt of the memorandum with their certificates, in original, traceable to their qualifications, date of birth etc. for verification and medical examination. If they failed to report for duty within the time specified, the appointment orders issued will be treated as automatically cancelled. 2. The petitioner joined duty on 211. 1965 while the 5th respondent on 211. 1965. Both are diploma holders in Electrical Branch, having passed LEE. The posts of surveyor and Assistant Supervisor were recognised as equivalent and interchangeable. .3. In G.O.Ms.No.31, RD & LA Department, dated 7th January, 1969, rules relating to the Madras Corporation Engineering Service came into force. .In the terms of the said rules, the post of the Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical) is selected both by direct recruitment and by promotion or appointment on deputation. In the case of promotion, the qualification prescribed is that the candidate possessing a Degree in Electrical Engineering from a recognised University or an Institution is eligible, provided he served as a Supervisor in the Corporation Subordinate Service for a period not less than five years. Similarly in the case of Diploma Holders, the service in the Corporation Subordinate Service for a minimum period of 15 years was necessary. The rules relating to reservation were confined to appointments by direct recruitment alone and not to those by promotion. Further, there is no rule prescribing any ratio between the graduates and diploma-holders for promotion or any other recruitment. .4. The Corporation Council, by its resolution No.79/1973, dated 2. 1973, approved the ratio of 1:1 (one degree-holder: one diploma-holder) in the matter of appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical). Further, there is no rule prescribing any ratio between the graduates and diploma-holders for promotion or any other recruitment. .4. The Corporation Council, by its resolution No.79/1973, dated 2. 1973, approved the ratio of 1:1 (one degree-holder: one diploma-holder) in the matter of appointment to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical). On the basis of the resolution, a panel consisting of four persons, adopting the ratio of one Degree-holder; One Diploma Holder, namely, P.Seshachalam (B.E.), (4th respondent), M.Rukmangadan (5th respondent L.E.E.) S.Veeraraghavan (6th respondent B.E.) and K. Jayachandran (petitioner-L.E.E.), was said to have been prepared and in the preparation of the said panel, the second respondent-Commissioner was said to have proceeded on the presumption that the 5th respondent was senior to the petitioner. 5. Two vacancies arose in the post of Assistant Executive Engineer, consequent to the promotion of one M.A.Subramaniam as Divisional Executive Engineer and the other due to leave vacancy of one K.A.Nagalingam. Consequently, the first two persons in the panel, namely, P.Seshachalam (4th respondent) and M.Rukmangadan (5th respondent) had been temporarily promoted and appointed as the Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical), in the existing vacancies, by virtue of the memorandum of the Corporation made in GDC.No.A1/9219/79, dated 5. 1984. Consequent to their appointment, they had been in the promotional posts and the appointments so made were sent to the Government for approval. 6. The petitioner, contending that he was senior to respondents 4 to 6 on the basis of his length of service in the Corporation of Madras; that further there was no provision in the rules prescribing fixation of ratio between degree-holders and diploma-holders; that the Council resolution cannot introduce an amendment to the statutory rules prescribed by the Government under the Legislative power and that therefore, the promotion of respondents 4 and 5 as Assistant Executive Engineers cannot be sustained in law, came forward with the present action under Art.226 of the Constitution praying for issue of writ of certiorari-fied mandamus to quash the impugned order dated 3. 1984 of the second respondent and to direct respondents 1 and 2 to promote him as Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical). 7. 1984 of the second respondent and to direct respondents 1 and 2 to promote him as Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical). 7. Respondents 1 and 2 put forth a plea that in the absence of any specific provision in the rules for fixation of ratio, the council, in order to achieve administrative efficiency, fixed the ratio of 1:1 between degree and diploma-holders in the Engineering Services for the purpose of promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer, that such fixation of ratio done by the Council cannot be stated to be beyond its competency and that in that view of the matter, the impugned appointments are valid in law. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner put forth two contentions thus: .(i) In the absence of any statutory rules governing; the promotion to the post of the Assistant’ Executive Engineer from the case of Junior Engineer, the Corporation Council, under the facade of a resolution cannot usurp the Legislative power in fixing a ratio between the degree and diploma-holders as eligible criteria for promotion to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer and appoint respondents 4 and 5 before over the resolution got the approval of the Government. .(ii) The length of service reckoned from the date of joining duty, if taken into account, the petitioner alone is the seniormost in the category of Junior Engineer eligible to be appointed in the vacancy arising in the promotional post of Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical), in preference to that of respondents 4 to 6. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents would however repel those contentions. 10. There is no pale of controversy that there is no rule governing the appointments of the category of Junior Engineers in the Corporation Subordinate Service having different educational qualifications, namely, Degree and Diploma, to the next category of promotional post of Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical). In such a predicament situation, the Corporation Council, motivated by best of intentions to increase the efficiency of service, thought fit to introduce a promotional policy by fixing 1:1 ratio between the degree and diploma holders, in the Engineering Service for purpose of promotion, thereby creating a placid atmosphere of conceded service among the degree and diploma holders holding the posts. With a view to get the approval of the policy so framed, the resolution, in fact, had been forwarded to the Government for favour of approval. With a view to get the approval of the policy so framed, the resolution, in fact, had been forwarded to the Government for favour of approval. Before such approval actually came, promotions were given to the incumbents in office, having the requisite qualifications, according to the policy framed. The fact remains that the promotions were given to respondents 4 and 5 according to the policy framed even in the year 1984 and they also immediately joined and continued in service without any interruption whatever. Such a position is now sought to be it, for the alleged reason of the Corporation council not having the requisite power to do so. 11. It is not as if such a question never arose for consideration before the apex of the judicial administration of the country and the fact is that such a question did arise for consideration in Shamkant Narayan Deshpande v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, (1992) 2 Scale. 857 . In order to understand the principle evolved in that decision on the points raised, better it is, I feel, to pen down the background facts and accordingly I do so. .(a) The petitioner a diploma-holder in Engineering and holds the post of Executive Engineer in the respondent-Corporation. Till 1974, the promotional post of the Superintending Engineer was available both for diploma-holders and degree-holders according to merit-cum-seniority. This was so according to the practice followed by the Corporation without making any rules or regulations in that behalf. In 1974, the Corporation made regulations by passing a resolution and continued the same practice. ‘Admittedly, the regulations were not made under Sec.64 of the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) under which the respondent-Corporation was created. Thereafter in 1988, the Corporation passed a resolution, for the first time, making 75 per cent of the posts of Superintending Engineers available to the Executive Engineers holding degrees and 25 per cent to the Executive Engineers who were diploma-holders. This resolution was also admittedly not a regulation made under the said Sec.64. But for this resolution, the petitioner who was senior to respondent No.2 would have been promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer on 31st October, 1990. However, since respondent No.2 was a degree holder, he got the benefit of the said resolution and was promoted to the said post on that date. But for this resolution, the petitioner who was senior to respondent No.2 would have been promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer on 31st October, 1990. However, since respondent No.2 was a degree holder, he got the benefit of the said resolution and was promoted to the said post on that date. It is this promotion which was challenged by the petitioner by a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court dismissed the said petition. Consequently, the matter had been against before the Supreme Court. .(b) Two contentions were raised before the Supreme Court and they are couched in the following terms: (1) that no classification could be made along the Executive Engineers on the basis of their educational qualifications for the purpose of promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer, since they belong to the same cadre of Executive Engineers and do the same work. There was also a common seniority list of the Executive Engineers maintained. Hence the classification was discriminatory in nature and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. .(2) that if at all such a discrimination was permissible, it could be made only by a statutory rule or regulation framed under Sec.64 of the said Act. A mere resolution or an executive instruction could not effect such discrimination. .(c) The Supreme Court found no merit in either of those contentions by observing thus: "It is now well-settled that for the purposes of promotion, a valid classification can be made among the members holding the same post on the basis of their qualifications. In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Tirloki Nath Khosa & Ors., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1: (1974)1 S.C.R. 771 , & Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that such a classification is permissible and does not violate Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.....As regards the next contention, admittedly neither the practice followed till 1988, nor the resolution passed by the respondent-Corporation in 1988 was a regulation passed in accordance with Sec.64 of the. Act. It is well settled that in the absence of a rule or regulation, the authority can prescribe service conditions by executive instructions and this is what was done till the year 1988 and is also sought to be done since 1988 by the impugned resolution. Act. It is well settled that in the absence of a rule or regulation, the authority can prescribe service conditions by executive instructions and this is what was done till the year 1988 and is also sought to be done since 1988 by the impugned resolution. The proposition that in the absence of the rules and regulations, the authority can act by executive instructions finds direct support in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopinath Gundachir, (1968)1 S.C.R. 767 .A.I.R 1968 S.C. 464 and V.Balasubramaniam v. Tamil Nadu Housing Board and others, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 6. 12 While considering similar provisions in the Tamil Nadu Housing Board Act, 1961 on an earlier occasion, what the Supreme Court expressed in the case of V.Balasubramaniam v. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, A.I.R.1988 S.C. 6, is quite relevant; “...The regulations were submitted by the Board to the Government for its approval after the said resolution was adopted by the Board. Until the regulations were approved and confirmed by the State Government, the Board had necessarily to take decisions in accordance with certain norms laid down by it as regards the modes of appointment of officers and staff of the Board. These decisions cannot be invalidated merely on the ground that the regulations had not yet been promulgated in accordance with law”. 13. On the principles evolved by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two decisions, to say that the Corporation Council was not competent enough to frame a promotional policy by way of resolution, in the absence of statutory rules governing the situation does not merit any substance. 14. In view of what has been stated above, the petitioner, being a diploma-holder, cannot claim precedence in seniority, by virtue of his length of service, over respondents 4 and 5, degree-holders to the promotional post of Assistant Executive Engineer. 15. What remains to be considered is inter se seniority between him and the 5th respondent, both being diploma-holders. As adverted to earlier, both of them had been appointed on one and the same day in the same proceedings along with others as Surveyor or Assistant Supervisor. All those appointees, as earlier stated, were directed to join duty within a prescribed period of three days from the date of receipt of the order of appointment. The order of appointment however appointed the appointees in specified serial numbers. All those appointees, as earlier stated, were directed to join duty within a prescribed period of three days from the date of receipt of the order of appointment. The order of appointment however appointed the appointees in specified serial numbers. Serial numbers allotted to the 5th respondent and the petitioner are respectively 2 and 3. There is however a variance in the dates of their joining duty. The petitioner, in fact, joined duty on 211. 1965 while the 5th respondent joined duty on a day later, namely, 211. 1965. It is by virtue of such date of joining duty, the petitioner is claiming seniority over the 5th respondent in the year 1984. Of course, there is no specific indication by specific verbal expression that the order of seniority will be according to the placement of persons in the serial numbers in the appointment order. However, the said appointments, the Memorandum says, were ordered on a temporary basis for a period not exceeding one year without right of probation. If however persons are appointed on one and the same day and a common proceeding is issued to all of them requiring them to join within a specified period, it is taken for granted in the normal run of things that the persons appointed in serial numbers are taking their seniority according to which they are appointed, notwithstanding the fact that they joined duty on different dates, though within the time specified. Taking that aspect into account and the fact that the said appointment was temporary ‘without right of probation and also the further factor of the petitioner keeping dormant and silent without even raising his little finger for nearly two decades, necessary conclusion to be reached is that the petitioner recognised the 5th respondent as his senior all along. Further, the impugned order is not Shown to suffer from any vice or infirmity. 16. The writ petition, as such, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. Rule nisi issued is discharged. No costs.