JUDGMENT Kamlesh Sharma, J.—The dispute between the parties is in respect of land measuring 0-27-11 hectare comprised in Khasra No 348 situated in Mohal Majethli, Mauza Pathiar, Tehsil and District Kangra as per copy of Missal Haquiat Bandobast Jadid (hereinafter called the land in dispute). 2. Admittedly, Smt Shanti Devi, the mother of the respondent-plaintiff, was owner of the land in dispute and after her death the respondent-plaintiff succeeded her. She filed Civil Suit for possession of the land in dispute against appellant-defendant. The case set up by her is that the land in dispute was previously under cultivation of Piar Chand, Savitri, Lachhmi and Kirpoo, but after the death of Kirpoo, they handed over the possession to the owner Smt. Shanti Devi. It is further alleged that taking advantage of the absence of the respondent-plaintiff, the appellant-defendant got his name entered in the column of cultivation in the revenue record in collusion with the Settlement Staff as well as Piar Chand and on that pretext he forcibly took possession of the land in dispute in the year 1975. According to respondent-plaintiff, the appellant-defendant has no right, title and interest in the land in dispute and he is liable to put her in possession. 3. The appellant-defendant resisted the suit mainly on the ground that he was tenant over the land in dispute and in view of relationship of landlord and tenant between him and the respondent-plaintiff, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. He denied the allegations of the respondent-plaintiff that he ever took forcible possession of the land in dispute, rather the mother of the respondent-plaintiff Smt. Shanti Devi had inducted him as a tenant by a written agreement dated 23-8-1966 on payment of lumpsum amount of Rs, 150 per annum as rent. According to him, he continued to be in possession as tenant even after the expiry of the lease period of four years He has also denied that he got the entries made in his favour in the revenue record in collusion with the revenue staff as alleged by the respondent-plaintiff. According to him, he continued to be in possession as tenant even after the expiry of the lease period of four years He has also denied that he got the entries made in his favour in the revenue record in collusion with the revenue staff as alleged by the respondent-plaintiff. In her replication, the respondent-plaintiff admitted the claim of the appellant-defendant to the extent that he was inducted as tenant by her mother Smt. Shanti Devi for a period of four years but alleged that after the expiry of the lease period, the possession of the appellant-defendant over the land in dispute is that of a trespasser. 4. On these pleadings the parties went on trial and produced their oral and documentary evidence. The trial Court rejected the defence of the appellant-defendant that he continued to be in possession of the land in dispute in his capacity as tenant after the expiry of lease period of four years and held his possession as that of a trespasser. In view of these findings, the trial Court further held that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try the suit of the respondent-plaintiff. These findings of the trial Court were affirmed by the Additional District Judge, Kangra at Dharamsala by his decree and judgment dated 13-1-1984, Hence, the present regular second appeal. 5. This Court has heard the learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. It is not denied that there are concurrent findings of fact of both the courts below that the appellant-defendant was inducted as a tenant for a fixed period of four years by lease deed Ex. DW-l/A on 23-8-1966 on payment of Rs. 150 per annum as rent. It is also concurrently held that the appellant-defendant continued in possession of the land in dispute on the expiry of lease period of four years on 22-8-1970, but his status was that of a trespasser and not of a tenant as alleged by him. In view of their findings that relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased to exist on expiry of fixed period of lease on 22-8-1970, both the courts below have held that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction, 6 Ms. In view of their findings that relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties ceased to exist on expiry of fixed period of lease on 22-8-1970, both the courts below have held that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction, 6 Ms. Grewal, appearing vice learned Counsel for the appellant-defendant has raised a substantial question of law that the suit of the respondent-plaintiff-landlady was in fact to eject the appellant-defendant, who was tenant over the land in dispute and such a suit was triable by the Revenue Courts only. To substantiate her point, she has referred to sections 77, 40 and 110 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (hereinafer called the Act). She has prayed that the decrees and judgments of Courts below may be set aside and the plaint of the respondent-plaintiff may be returned to her as provided under second proviso to section 77 (3) of the Act, 7. The argument of Ms. Grewal, though attractive, yet has no substance, hence rejected. The first part of section 40 of the Act is clear that a tenant holding for a fixed term under a contract is liable to be ejected from his tenancy at the expiration of the fixed term. This Court is not concerned with the later part of this section, which provides that the tenancy for a fixed term under a contract is also liable to be terminated before the expiration of the fixed term but only on the grounds given therein. So far section HO of the Act is concerned, Ms. Grewal has made an endeavour to take the assistance of its sub-section (I) (c) that nothing in any agreement made between a landlord and a tenant after the passing of this Act shall entitle a landlord to eject a tenant otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The submissions made by Ms. Grewal would have been accepted and the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant been admitted. Since the respondent-plaintiff has based her suit on the ground that on the expiry of fixed period of lease, the appellant-defendant had become trespasser and the appellant-defendant has claimed that he continued to be tenant, admittedly there exists a dispute whether the relationship of parties is that of landlord and tenant and such a dispute falls in the jurisdiction of Civil Court. 8. 8. The suit for ejectment of a tenant falls under Clause (e) in Second Group under sub-section (3) of section 77 of the Act which was considered by the Supreme Court of India in Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solan v. Tholu and others, AIR 1963 SC 361 and it was held that:~ (After reproducing sub-section (3) of section 77 of the Act and first proviso thereto, and Clauses (d) and (e) of Second Group). "...It would, however, appear that not only items (d) and (e) but; every other item in the three groups relates to a dispute between tenants on the one hand and the landlord on the other. There is no entry or item relating to a suit by or against a person claiming to be a tenant and whose status as a tenant is not admitted by the landlord, It would, therefore, be reasonable to infer that the legislature barred only those suits from the cognizance of a civil court where there was no dispute between the parties that a person cultivating land or who was in possession of land was a tenant -“ The learned Judges of the Supreme Court have relied upon the observations of Lahore High Court in two earlier decisions of Sham Singh and others v. Amarjit Singh, AIR. 1931 Lahore 362 and Baru and others v. Niadar and others^ AIR (29) 1942 Lahore 217. In the case of Sham Singh (supra), learned Tek Chand, J had observed that it is obvious that the bar under clause (d) is applicable to those cases only in which the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted and the object of the suit is to determine the nature of the tenancy i.e. whether the status of the tenant falls under sections 5, 6, 7 or 8 of the Act In that case the plaintiff had claimed that be had succeeded to the tenancy on the death of occupancy tenant in which context learned Tek Chand, J. had further held that, "In a suit like the one before us the point for decision is not the nature of the tenancy, but whether the defendant is related to the deceased tenant and if so whether there common ancestor had occupied the land- If these facts are established, the claimant ipso facto succeeds to the occupancy tenancy. But if they are found against him he not a tenant at all/* 9. In the case of Durga Singh (supra) the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have also approved the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh in Daya Ram and others v. Jagir Singh and others, AIR 1956 HP 61, wherein it was held that if the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant is not admitted a suit for ejectment falls in the jurisdiction of Civil Court and bar provided under sub-section (3) of section 77 of the Act does not apply. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court also quoted with approval their earlier judgment in Sir Chnnilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v- Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd , AIR 1962 SC 13?4, wherein while interpreting the provisions of section 7 (1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act, 1948, which are similar to the provisions of section 77 of the Act, it was held that, It would be unreasonable to hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant also falls within the purview of the said section. The scheme of section 7(1) is unambiguous and clear. It refers to the tenant and landlord as such and it contemplates disputes of the specified character arising between them. Therefore, in our opinion, even on a liberal construction of section 7 (1) it would be difficult to uphold the argument that a dispute as regards the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by the Collector under section 7 (1)f> (Also see : Murti Mandir Mani Ram and another v. Bhagat Ram, 1986 SLJ 385). 10. Ms. 10. Ms. Grewal has relied upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in Gundaji Satwaji Shinde v. Ramachandra Bhikaji Joshi, AIR 1979 SC 653, wherein the learned Judges of the Supreme Court considered sections 70, 8>A and 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act to hold that where in a suit properly constituted and cognizable by the Civil Court upon a contest an issue arises which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a competent authority under the Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to settle, decide or deal with the same is not only ousted but the Civil Court is under a statutory obligation to refer the issue to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act to decide the same and upon the reference being answered back, to dispose of the suit in accordance with the decision of the competent authority under the Tenancy Act. Applying the ratio of this judgment to the facts and circumstances of the present case, had the Civil Court come to the conclusion that the appellant-defendant continued to be tenant on the expiry of fixed period of lease, it was under obligation to return the plaint to the respondent-plain tiff for presenting it before the competent authority as directed under second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 77 of the Act- By their judgment in the case of Gundaji Satwaji Shinde (supra) the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have not differed from their earlier view in the case of Durga Singh (supra), wherein they had interpreted the same provisions of law with which we are concerned in the present case. 11. So far another case of the Supreme Court in Smt Kazi Najmunnissa Begum v. Yusuf Khan and others, AIR, 1989 SC 2289, to which a reference is made by Ms. Grewal, is concerned, it is on its own facts and provisions of law and not applicable to the present case. 12. Ms Grewal has further urged that the appellant-defendant continued to be tenant on the expiry of the lease period because once a tenant is always a tenant This Court does not find any substance in this submission in the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. Ms Grewal has further urged that the appellant-defendant continued to be tenant on the expiry of the lease period because once a tenant is always a tenant This Court does not find any substance in this submission in the facts and circumstances of this case. The appellant-defendant ceased to be tenant on the expiry of maximum lease period of four years as neither he was accepted as a tenant by Smt. Shanti Devi, the then landlady nor by her successor the respondent-plaintiff at any point of time. He has also not proved that he continued paying rent to the land owner as such he cannot be termed as tenant as defined under section 4 (5) of the Act. Therefore, both the courts below have rightly held that the Civil Court has the jurisdiction to try the suit of the respondent-plaintiff. No other point is urged on behalf of the appellant-defendant. 13 In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -