S. K. DUBEY, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal is by the plaintiffs aggrieved by the judgement and decree passed by the lower appellate Court, whereby the suit of the plaintiffs for declaration and possession decreed by the trial Court has been dismissed. ( 2 ) THE appeal was admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law :-" (1) Whether it would be legal for the first appellate Court to brush aside the findings of the trial Court without giving adequate reasons for rejecting them ? (2) Whether without a specific plea by the defendant that he was paying lagan to Bhaiyalal, the evidence of payment of such rent could be permitted to be adduced in the trial Court ? (3) Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in rejecting the application under Order 41, Rule 27, CPC ? ( 3 ) BRIEF facts leading to this appeal are thus : the suit relates to agricultural land situated in village Bothi, Tehsil Kurwai, District Vidisha, bearing survey No. 42, area 4 bighas 14 biswas and survey No. 44, area 13 bighas 7 biswas. The plaintiffs' case is that originally Natthe Khan was the owner and in possession of the suit land. The defendant Gulabsingh was his holder of general power of attorney. Natthe Khan transferred the suit land to one Bhaiyalal vide registered sale deed dated 30-9-1963, which is not denied by the defendants. In turn, on 22-2-1973 Bhaiyalal transferred the suit land putting the plaintiffs in possession vide registered sale deed dated 21-5-1973 (Ex. P. 1), but it is stated that the defendant Gulabsingh (who died during the pendency of this appeal and his legal representatives have been brought on record) started obstructing in cultivation of the land asserting his right over the land, therefore, the plaintiffs had to institute the suit for declaration. During the pendency of the suit, it was alleged by the plaintiffs that they were dispossessed, therefore, claimed the relief of possession by amending the plaint on 16-12-1976. The defendant contested the suit. In para 11 of the special pleas, a defence was set up that in June, 1966 the suit land was given by Bhaiyalal to the defendant as a Shikami tenant and he continued as such in possession on yearly payment of Rs. 22/- as lagan. To prove the defence, four receipts, Exts. The defendant contested the suit. In para 11 of the special pleas, a defence was set up that in June, 1966 the suit land was given by Bhaiyalal to the defendant as a Shikami tenant and he continued as such in possession on yearly payment of Rs. 22/- as lagan. To prove the defence, four receipts, Exts. D1 to D4, and khasra entries, Exts. D5 to D7 showing the possession of the defendant in column No. 12, were produced. ( 4 ) THE trial Court decreed the suit. The defendant preferred an appeal. In appeal, the plaintiffs filed two applications; one under Order 6, Rule 17, for claiming mesne profits, and another under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereby the plaintiffs prayed for admitting additional evidence, the certified copy of the return dated 31-12-74 submitted by the defendant before the Competent Authority under the M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960 (for short, the 'act' ). The lower appellate Court after hearing the appeal rejected both the applications. The application u/o. 41, R. 27 was rejected on the ground of delay, as the certified copy of the document sought to be adduced as an additional evidence was received by the plaintiffs/appellants on 28-3-78, while the application u/o. 41, R. 2 7 was filed on 9-4-1980. On reappraisal of evidence the lower appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs holding that the defendant was a sub-tenant of Bhaiyalal prior to the sale in favour of the plaintiffs, and thus acquired occupancy rights. Hence this second appeal. ( 5 ) SHRI K. K. Lahoti, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the reversal of the decree is contrary to the settled principle, as the reasons have not been stated therefor, in view of the law laid down in Madhusudan Das v. Smt. Narayani Bai, AIR 1983 SC 114 , the judgement and decree of the lower appellate Court deserve to be set aside. It was submitted that in view of the sale-deed, oral evidence of Bhaiyalal was inadmissible, as S. 91 of the Evidence Act prohibits reception of such evidence. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Chainsingh v. Ramchand, 1992 (1) MPJR 299. It was submitted that in view of the sale-deed, oral evidence of Bhaiyalal was inadmissible, as S. 91 of the Evidence Act prohibits reception of such evidence. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Chainsingh v. Ramchand, 1992 (1) MPJR 299. It was also submitted that the entry in column No. 12 was not made in accordance with the Land Records Manual, and under Chapter IX of the M. P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 no presumption arises about its correctness, such entry of unauthorised possession doesn't confer any right, unless the trespasser acquires title by adverse possession, which is neither pleaded nor proved; reliance was placed on a decision of this Court reported in 1991 RN 75, Jugala v. Chutta. Lastly, it was contended that the lower appellate Court erred in not allowing the application u/o. 41, R. 27, CPC, as in the return submitted by the defendant u/s. 9 of the Act the defendant is not shown to be holder of the suit land in any of the capacities specified in clause 2 (h) of the Act. Therefore, in fact, the entries in column No. 12 are collusive and receipts are concocted, because Bhaiyalal was the brother-in-law of Gulabsingh. The story set up by the defendant is false. In any case, if the defendant has acquired the rights, in that case the defendant has defrauded the State by filing a false and wrong return so that the land may not be declared 'surplus land' under the provisions of the Act. ( 6 ) SHRI R. A. Roman, learned counsel for the respondents, supported the judgement and submitted that the application under O. 41, R. 27 was rightly rejected, because on examining the evidence as it stands, the lower appellate Court did not find any lacuna or defect. It was a discovery outside the Court of fresh evidence and the application was made to import it. Therefore, as the appellate Court was able to pronounce the judgement on materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence, the appellate Court did not commit any illegality. Reliance was placed on AIR 1951 SC 193 , Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh, and, AIR 1986 MP 3 , Jhangloo v. Tularam. Therefore, as the appellate Court was able to pronounce the judgement on materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence, the appellate Court did not commit any illegality. Reliance was placed on AIR 1951 SC 193 , Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh, and, AIR 1986 MP 3 , Jhangloo v. Tularam. ( 7 ) SHRI P. N. Kelkar, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for State submitted that it is a case where Order l, Rule 3-B and Order 6, Rule 4-A, C. P. C. , inserted by the M. P. Amendment in Code of Civil Procedure, come into play. ( 8 ) AFTER hearing, I am of the view that no opinion at this stage need be expressed on the merits of the appeal, as the lower appellate Court has illegally on irrelevant considerations rejected the application u/o. 41, R. 27 without finding whether the additional evidence sought to be adduced was not available in spite of exercise of due diligence, or was not within the knowledge of the defendant at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or the document is not essential to enable the Court to pronounce its judgement. The law is well settled that additional evidence should not be permitted at the appellate stage in order to enable one of the parties to remove certain lacunae in presenting its case at the proper stage, and to fill in gaps. Of course, the position is different where appellate Court itself requires certain evidence to be adduced in order to enable it to do justice between the parties. See AIR 1957 SC 912 : (1957 All LJ 921), State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava. ( 9 ) THE document of which permission was sought by the appellants u/o. 41, R. 27, throws light on the dispute; admittedly, the appellants could not have known, as the return u/s. 9 of the Act was filed by the defendant on 31-12-1974 and the suit was instituted on 16-10-1975. Though the plaintiffs instituted the suit on 16-10-1975, it was a document of which the defendant was in knowledge and possessed of the copy of the same. In this document, the defendant has not shown himself to be the holder of the land nor the land has been shown as his holding as defined u/s. 2 (i) of the Act, may be for any reason. In this document, the defendant has not shown himself to be the holder of the land nor the land has been shown as his holding as defined u/s. 2 (i) of the Act, may be for any reason. Before this Court, after the insertion of O. 1, R. 3-B and O. 6, R. 4-A, C. P. C. by M. P. Amendment Act No. 29 of 1984 which came into force from 14-8-1984, though the State has been impleaded as party and the plaintiffs/appellants furnished particulars under O. 6, R. 4-A, CPC, the defendant did not furnish any particulars nor declared that the subject matter of the suit or proceeding is not covered by the Act. The object of Order 1, Rule 3-B and O. 6, R. 4-A, CPC, is to protect the interest of the State, so that the provisions of the Act may not be made ineffective or set at naught by unscrupulous persons utilising the forum of Civil Courts. See 1991 (2) MPJR 279 , Brijraj Singh v. Smt. Bitto Devi. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, it was incumbent upon the defendant, at least in this Court, to declare by furnishing particulars of his total agricultural land to show that the subject matter of the suit is not covered by the provisions of the Act and in relation to such land proceedings are not pending before the Competent Authority, but the defendant has in all fairness not stated so; obviously if he declares the land in his return, it becomes surplus. Therefore, by means of this litigation through the media of Civil Court not only to defeat the claim of plaintiffs, but also to defeat the provisions of the Act, the defendant submitted a false and wrong return. ( 11 ) UNDER R. 27 (1), the appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only it requires such evidence "to enable it to pronounce judgement", but also for "any other substantial cause". There may well be cases where even though the Court finds that it is able to pronounce judgement on the state of record as it is, and so it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgement, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgement in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause. See AIR 1963 SC 1526 : 1963 All LJ 903, K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy. ( 12 ) IN such circumstances, the delay in not applying for admitting additional evidence after receipt of certified copy of the return filed u/s. 9 of the Act by the defendant before the Competent Authority will not be fatal. Therefore, the application filed by plaintiffs under O. 41, R. 27, CPC, in lower appellate Court is allowed. ( 13 ) AS a consequence of that, the judgement and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside. The case is sent back to the lower appellate Court to rehear the appeal afresh after affording an opportunity to the defendant to adduce the evidence in rebuttal. If parties so desire, the appellate Court shall record the evidence also on the additional evidence so admitted, which shall be kept present by the parties, thereafter, the appeal shall be decided in accordance with law within a period of four months from the date of appearance of parties, who shall appear on 30/03/1993, for that no notice shall be issued to parties, as they have been noticed here. However, the State shall be noticed through Collector, Vidisha for its representation. Records of the two Courts be sent to the lower appellate Court so as to reach on or before 30/03/1993. ( 14 ) PARTIES to bear their own costs of this appeal. Order accordingly. .