MOHMED MUSA v. STATE — 1993 DIGILAW 146 (GUJ)

S. NAINAR SUNDARAM, J. ( 1 ) THESE two Letters Patent Appeals arise under The Bombay Cinemas (Regulation) Act 1953 hereinafter referred to as the Act and the Bombay Cinema Rules 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Rules. The respondents 9 and 10 in Special Civil Application No. 5325 of 1987 have preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 134 of 1993 and the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 343 of 1991 has preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 133 of 1993. The petitioners in the Special Civil Applications shall hereinafter be referred to as the petitioners for the sake of convenience in this order of ours. We shall refer to the respondents as per their array in Letters Patent Appeal No. 134 of 1993. ( 2 ) THE father of the 3rd respondent obtained from 2nd respondent a no objection certificate under the Rules even as early as on 7. 12. 1971. On 19. 4 the father of the 3rd respondent obtained the requisite permission to construct the cinema house. Despite extensions being granted the construction could not be completed and the father of the 3rd respondent expired on 17. 2. 1981. Anterior to his demise the currency of the no objection certificate and the permission to construct lapsed on 31. 12. 1977. On 19. 7 the 1st respondent taking note of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in particular the fact that the construction had come up to the plinth level chose to accord exemption from getting a fresh no objection certificate. On the basis of the order made by the 1 respondent the 2nd respondent on 13. 8. 1986 accorded permission to complete the construction. Obviously after the construction got completed there was a move to obtain the cinema licence and that was declined by the 2nd respondent on 24. 8 An appeal therefrom was also rejected on 30. 1. 1990. We find that the petitioners objected to the grant of the cinema licence. However on a fresh move on 3. 12. 1990 the cinema licence was granted by the 2nd respondent. ( 3 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5325 of 1987 the challenge was of the accord of exemption dated 19. 7. 1986 and the consequential permission to complete the construction granted on 13. 8. 1986. However on a fresh move on 3. 12. 1990 the cinema licence was granted by the 2nd respondent. ( 3 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5325 of 1987 the challenge was of the accord of exemption dated 19. 7. 1986 and the consequential permission to complete the construction granted on 13. 8. 1986. The petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 343 of 1991 challenged the order of the 2nd respondent dated 3. 12. 1990. The learned single Judge who dealt with both the Special Civil Applications along with another Special Civil Application No. 4492 of 1991 preferred by the petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 5325 of 1991 challenging also the order dated 3. 12. 1990 of the 2nd respondent found that the 2nd respondent having refused to accord the cinema licence on 24. 8. 1989 and which order of refusal has been confirmed in appeal on 30. 1. 1990 lacked in law the power to review the question and hence the order dated 3. 12. 1990 is objectionable. However the learned single Judge found that substantial justice has been meted out by the 2nd respondent and the earlier order of the 2nd respondent dated 24. 8. 1989 had lost sight of the non-applicability of Rules 8a and 8b introduced subsequently to the situation and that has been rectified rightly. The learned single Judge found that the petitioners lacked the locus standi to come to this Court voicing forth any grievance in respect of any of the impugned proceedings. The learned single Judge dismissed the Special Civil Applications. These Letters Patent Appeals are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge. ( 4 ) WE heard Mr. J. R. Nanavati learned counsel who appeared for the petitioners before the learned single Judge. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the learned single Judge ought not to have non-suited his clients on the ground of lack of locus standi. He would submit that once it is found that the 2nd respondent lacked the power to review his own order and the order of the 2nd respondent dated 3. 12 is not proper on this count the learned single Judge ought to have struck down that order instead of non-suiting the petitioners on the ground of lack of locus standi. He would submit that once it is found that the 2nd respondent lacked the power to review his own order and the order of the 2nd respondent dated 3. 12 is not proper on this count the learned single Judge ought to have struck down that order instead of non-suiting the petitioners on the ground of lack of locus standi. The learned counsel for the petitioners would also submit that the order passed by the 2nd respondent on 24. 8 which was confirmed on appeal was perfectly justifiable and it does not call for any review and in any event the petitioners ought to have been heard before review. The learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that the 1 respondent ought not to have accorded exemption on 19. 7. 1986 and that too without hearing the petitioners. Here we must remember the principle that this court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can relevantly look into the question of locus standi of the person who seeks the highly prerogative writ jurisdiction. His right to come to this court to impeach the propriety or otherwise of the orders of the authorities is certainly relevant to be looked into and assessed. Only an aggrieved person could invoke the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. As to when a person could be called an aggrieved person will largely depend on the scope contents and the intendment of the legislation breach of which is alleged: In that context this Court will also examine the nature and the extent of the interest of the person and the prejudice or injury complained of by him. There is no doubt in our mind that the Act and the Rules regulate only the rights of individuals to carry on the particular business of running cinema houses. The Act and the Rules do not confer any justiciable right on persons like the petitioners. It is true that they could lodge objections as members of the public to the grant of no objection certificate. The petitioners were not at all there in the locale at the time when the no objection certificate and the permission to construct were accorded to the father of the 3rd respondent and the petitioners entered the locale only subsequently. Even if they had objected the Act does not give them any right of appeal. The petitioners were not at all there in the locale at the time when the no objection certificate and the permission to construct were accorded to the father of the 3rd respondent and the petitioners entered the locale only subsequently. Even if they had objected the Act does not give them any right of appeal. In that sense they are not persons aggrieved. Keeping aside the aspect of grant of no objection certificate we find that with reference to the question of accord of the cinema licence the petitioners could have no voice at all to be heard at any point of time and this exactly is the view taken by the learned single Judge and in our opinion correctly. When all these aspects are remembered we do not think that the petitioners could have an audience before this Court under article 226 of the Constitution of India impeaching the concerned proceedings. They have no right of appeal as against the order according the cinema licence. Even with regard to the power of the 1st respondent to accord exemption we do not find that the petitioners could claim that they should be heard before the accord of exemption. It is not possible to enlarge the scope of the statutory provisions which are portently silent on this aspect to cast an obligation of hearing persons like the petitioners on the question. Hence we are not able to accede to the request of Mr. J. R. Nanavati learned counsel for the petitioners to read something into the statutory provisions so as to say that the petitioners ought to have been heard before the 1 respondent accorded exemption on 19. 7. 1986. The petitioners could not be stated to have been affected in any legal right of theirs. They could not claim to have suffered injury to any legally protected interest of theirs. The impugned proceedings could not have the character of decisions against the petitioners. The petitioners suffered no legal wrong or legal grievence. Thus they are not persons aggrieved to come to this court claiming locus standi. ( 5 ) WE are also in complete agreement with the view of the learned single Judge that though there had been a technical flaw committed by the 2nd respondent when he chose to accord the licence on 3. 12 substantial justice has been meted out by so doing. ( 5 ) WE are also in complete agreement with the view of the learned single Judge that though there had been a technical flaw committed by the 2nd respondent when he chose to accord the licence on 3. 12 substantial justice has been meted out by so doing. It could be stated that there had been an overstepping of the power in this behalf but that overstepping has set right an apparent injustice done to the 3rd respondent earlier by refusing the cinema licence on erroneous grounds and rightly the learned single Judge declined to strike down the impugned proceedings at the instance of the petitioners. The assessment of the factual position and the appreciation and application of the legal position by the learned single Judge are perfectly justifiable and appeal to us. We have not found a warrant for interference with the order of the learned single Judge. Accordingly these two Letters Patent Appeals are dismissed. We make no orders as to costs. Letters Patent Appeals Dismissed. .