Judgment : The above writ petition has been filed for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for and quash the proceedings of the first respondent in G.O.Ms.No.1487, Home (Courts-II), dated 27. 1989 and all the consequential appointment made based on the said Government Order and to direct the respondents to appoint Special Executive Magistrate/Judicial Magistrate Grade II/Metropolitan Magistrate only persons having law decree following the judgment reported in Narayanaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1985 M.LJ. (Crl.) 453. The petitioner Mr.R.Gandhi is the President of the Bar Federation of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry and also the President of Madras High Court Advocates’ Association and has come up with this writ petition as a public interest litigation and also in his desire and anxiety to ensure the maintenance of rule of law and to prevent the unhealthy practice of entrusting work of judicial adjudication to persons without proper qualification or training in law. The petitioner, in the affidavit, claims that whenever there is a threat of inroads by the Executive in the administration of justice, the petitioner’s association has been questioning the same voicing their grievance against such unwarranted interference, that the impugned order is patently in violation of a Division Bench Judgment of this Court and also the provisions of Art.l4of the Constitution of India and that therefore, the majesty of law should be allowed to proceed in its majestic way and the executive’s usurping of judicial function should be stopped. 2 It is averred in the affidavit in support of the writ petition that in exercise of the powers under Sec.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Revenue Officials were conferred indiscriminately with judicial powers to act as Judicial Magistrates of Second Class for specific period and when in the year 1982 the second respondent proposed an amendment of Rule 3 of the Tamil Nadu Special Judicial Magistrates and Special Metropolitan Magistrates’ Qualification Rules, 1974, by passing G.O.Ms.No.2846, Home (Courts V) Department, dated 111. 1982, there was a challenge before this Court and a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with the same and in the decision reported in Narayanaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1985 M.L.J. (Crl.) 453, struck down Sec.13 (1) and Sec.18 (1) as well as Rule 3 of the Tamil Nadu Special Judicial Magistrate Qualification Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) as violative of Artil 4 of the Constitution of India. In so doing, the Division Bench has held as hereunder: "We are also not able to see any intelligible differentia distinguishing persons who hold or have held any post under the Government and those who do not so hold or have held, any such post. The classification is not based or even attempted to be justified on exclusive or special qualities or characteristics, which can be found only in those who hold or have any post under the Government, having regard to the object to be secured an expeditious administration of criminal justice. A judicial temperament and a disposition to render expeditious justice in criminal cases cannot be the exclusive virtue of only those who hold or have held any post under the Government. Is it impossible to find such qualities in the other persons left out. If the classification is to be justified on the ground of the so-called experience gained by a person who holds or has held any post under the Government, it cannot be accepted that other persons who do not so hold or have held any post under the Government are all inexperienced and unfit to discharge their functions as Special Judicial Magistrate or a Special Metropolitan Magistrate. The requirement of a Special Judicial Magistrate or a Special Metropolitan Magistrate is an ability to understand, deal with and dispose of cases which are brought up before him and from the point of view of competency to deal with and effectively dispose of such cases, the holding of any post or even the holding of any post under the Government appears to be totally irrelevant and immaterial especially when the object of the appointment and the conferment of powers on persons as Special Judicial Magistrate or the Special Metropolitan Magistrate is with a view to relieve the stipendiary Magistrates of their workload. Further, it may be that the post held by a person might have been in a Department of the Government which is not in any manner concerned with the administration of criminal law. The king of experience that is likely to have been acquired by a person during the period when he holds or has held such an office would not in any manner assist him in effectively dealing with and disposing of cases relating to offences in his capacity as a Special Judicial Magistrate or as a Special Metropolitan Magistrate. Therefore, the holding or the past holding of any post under the Government does not bear any reasonable relation whatever to the object of the legislation. There is no rational relation at all between the classification of persons, as those who hold or have held any post under the Government and the others and the object, namely, the administration of criminal justice through the Special Judicial Magistrate or the Special Metropolitan Magistrates. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that the classification is not only arbitrary, but is irrational and is totally unrelated to the object with which appointments as Special Judicial Magistrate or as Special Metropolitan Magistrate are made and powers conferred upon them for discharging their functions as such, namely, the administration of criminal justice with reference to petty criminal offences. We are also unable to appreciate how the argument based upon the experience of Government service could be a justification for classification, for as pointed above, such experience may be totally unrelated to the sphere of the exercise of powers and performance of duties as a Special Judicial Magistrate or as a Special Metropolitan Magistrate. We are, therefore, of the view that Secs.l3(1) and 18(1) of the Code in so far as they confined the appointment of and the conferment of powers of Special Judicial Magistrates or Special Metropolitan Magistrates to any person who holds or has held any post under the Government, are arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India and have to bestruck down". Again while concluding the decision, it has been observed as hereunder: ”However, inasmuch as we have earlier held that Secs. Again while concluding the decision, it has been observed as hereunder: ”However, inasmuch as we have earlier held that Secs. 13(1) and 18(1) of the Code, in so far as they confined to the appointment of and conferment of powers of a Special Judicial Magistrate or a Special Metropolitan Magistrate to persons, who hold or have held any post under the Government are arbitrary and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India, the rules framed, particularly Rule 3 incorporating that requirement under Secs. 13(1) and 18(1) of the Code, should also be declared to be invalid, as the rule gives effect to the holding or past holding of a post in a Department in a scale of pay not lower State Government in a scale of pay not lower than Rs.750-50-1350. Therefore, rule 3 of the rules in so far as it prescribed the holding or the past holding of a post under the Government in a scale of pay not lower than Rs.750-50-1350 as one of the conditions for eligibility for the appointment of and conferment of powers of a Special Judicial Magistrate or a Special Metropolitan Magistrate, would also be invalid and liable to be struck down “. 3. Relying upon the said decision, the impugned Government order is challenged in this writ petition. The impugned order reads as hereunder. "G.O.Ms.No.1487, Home, (Courts-II), 29th July, 1989. No.I/H/589/89 - In exercise of powers conferred by Sec.21 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby appoints all the regular Taluk Tahsil-dars and Deputy Tahsildars including Special Deputy Tahsildars of all Districts as Special Executive Magistrates in the Districts concerned for perennial period and confers on them all the powers exercised by an Executive Magistrate under the said Code and also specifically empowers them to exercise the powers under Secs.133,143 and 144 of the said Code. Sd/- R.Nagarajan, Commr. Sd/- R.Nagarajan, Commr. and Secy, to Government." The grievance of the petitioner is that implementing the impugned Government Order about 20 Officials in Tirunelveli District were notified as Judicial Magistrates of Second Class and had the same published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 8-8-1990 and that several other Revenue Officials were also conferred with similar and identical nature of powers with similar designation, and that allowing such persons without basic qualification in law to hold the post of Special Judicial Magistrates would amount to making laughing stock of administration of justice and enforcement of law and that the said move is also opposed to the decision of the Supreme Court in. Sampathkumar, S.P. v. Union of India, 1987 W.L.R. 1. The petitioner contends in the affidavit that a person having a degree in law with required integrity and independence, reputation and character, sincerity and devotion to work and possessing rich worldly experience from every walk of life alone can reasonably expected to be considered for appointment and not otherwise. .4. The first respondent has filed a counter affidavit contending that Sec.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) enables the first respondent to appoint Executive Magistrates known as Special Executive Magistrates for particular areas or for the performance of particular functions and confers such of the powers as are conferable under the Code on Executive or Special Executive Magistrates as the Government may deem fit and it is only in that context, the Government have appointed all regular Tahsil-dars and Deputy Tahsildars including Special Tahsildars of all districts as Special Executive Magistrates for a period of one year from time to time. Reference is also made to the Division Bench Judgment referred to above and it is stated that against the said judgment a Special Leave Petition No.8383 of 1984 has been filed and while granting leave, the appeal has been numbered as Civil Appeal No.1276 of 1986 and by an order dated 7-4-1986 stay of the operation of the judgment has been granted. In view of that factual position and having regard to the provisions contained in Sec.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the first respondent would try to justify their action. In view of that factual position and having regard to the provisions contained in Sec.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the first respondent would try to justify their action. It is also pleaded that according to the rules in force in Revenue Subordinate Services, a Deputy Tahsil-dar has to undergo Magisterial Training for 6 months and in order to depute them for Magisterial Training, the State Government requested the High Court to confer the powers of the Special Judicial Magistrate under Sec.13 of the Criminal Procedure Code on such Deputy Tahsildar for a period of 6 months. 5. The second respondent also has filed a counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit, while narrating the historical background of the matter to which reference has already been made including the making of a reference to the relevant rules and the provisions of the Code as well as the earlier Division Bench judgment and the orders of the Apex Court, it is contended that since, the order of the High Court has been stayed by the Supreme Court, Secs.l3(1) and 18(1) and Rule 3 of the said Rules are to be considered to be in force and therefore, the impugned proceedings are in accordance with law. It is also stated that some of the service rules including the rules governing declaration of probation of the officers of the Indian Administrative Service, oblige the candidates undergoing District Training including exercise of Magisterial powers and that therefore, in the absence of such conferment of powers and authorisation in favour of the said category of officers for exercising Magisterial powers, it would create inconvenience to the officers concerned and hinder their confirmation and promotional prospects, and therefore, it also became necessary for the second respondent to confer such powers of Special Magistrates at the request of the Government upon the Officers of the Executive belonging to the category referred to above. 6. Mr.R.Gandhi who has argued the matter as party in person, invited my attention to the earlier Division Bench Judgment of this Court, thesubse-quent pronouncement of the Apex Court already referred to supra, and yet another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Balachandran v. Union of India, 1992 W.L.R. 302. 7. 6. Mr.R.Gandhi who has argued the matter as party in person, invited my attention to the earlier Division Bench Judgment of this Court, thesubse-quent pronouncement of the Apex Court already referred to supra, and yet another decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Balachandran v. Union of India, 1992 W.L.R. 302. 7. Mr.P.Chandrasekar, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, while reiterating the stand taken already in the counter affidavit, contended that so longas Sec.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remains unchallenged, no exception could be taken to the impugned order and that at any rate, the decision of the Division Bench in Balachandran v. Union of India, 1992 W.L.R. 302 cannot be said to support the cause of the petitioner in the manner in which it is now sought to be projected. .8. In Sampathkumar, S.P. v. Union of India, 1987 W.L.R. 1, the Apex Court deprecated every move in any form to interfere with the independence of thejudiciary from executive pressure of influence secured under the Constitution of India and also the appointing of persons to judicial posts or vest with judicial powers to the members of the executive who very much depend upon the goodwill and favourable stance of the executive since such move would be likely to affect the independence and impartiality of the adjudicating authority itself. In Balachandran v. Union of India, 1992 W.L.R. 302, a Division Bench of this Court, though repelled, a challenge to Sec.10-E of the Companies Act, 1956, yet struck down the Rules which enabled the Constitution of a Board with adjudicatory powers with Administrative Members enabling them to discharge judicial functions exclusively. .9. The provisions of Sec.21 on which heavy reliance has been placed by the respondents, provides that the State Government may appoint, for such term as it may think fit, Executive Magistrates, to be known as Special Executive Magistrates, for particular functions and confer on such Special Executive Magistrates such of the powers as are conferable under this Code on Executive Magistrates, as it may deem fit. There is no controversy that on such appointments the officers were also conferred with the powers of Special Judicial Magistrates or Special Metropolitan Magistrates by the High Court with appropriate powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no controversy that on such appointments the officers were also conferred with the powers of Special Judicial Magistrates or Special Metropolitan Magistrates by the High Court with appropriate powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The fact that an appeal has been entertained by the Apex Court and leave has been granted does not efface the efficacy of the decision rendered by this Court as binding judicial precedent. Even assuming that the issue relating to the Constitutional validity of Secs. 13 and 18 is pending before the Apex Court, it would be well open to this Court without adjudicating on the constitutional validity of the said provision once over again to entertain an adjudication on the Constitutional validity of the impugned Government Order. The impugned Government Order enables the Officers appointed thereunder to exercise powers under Secs.133, 143 and 144 of the Code. That apart, an Executive Magistrate is entitled by virtue of the impugned notification to exercise other powers under the Code specifically conferred to enquire into the disputes relating to immovable properties under Sec.145 of the Code and to appoint receivers within the permissible limits. Power under Secs. 107, 117,13,129, 130,133 to 147, 167(2A) and 174 of Code of Criminal Procedure which could also be exercised by such notification have serious impact and repercussions as well as consequences upon legal substantial and vital rights of a citizen and in a sense upon some of the fundamental rights secured to a citizen under the Constitution of India and other laws in force. The question would be whether such powers should be permitted to be conferred upon persons who are part of the Administrative Machinery of the Executive Government to be independently exercised in a manner detrimental to the rights of citizen without any legal qualification or training that normally is required of a Judicial Officer exercising such and similar powers. 10. In my view, the ratio of the decisions referred to above would militate against the conferment of such powers and the impugned Government Order is liable to be struck down for the very same reasons and on the ratio laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Narayanaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1985 M.L.J. (Crl.) 453 as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The appointment of persons who have no legal qualification prescribed for manningjudicial posts and such of those who are not even holding any degree in law is impermissible and it would be all the more improper, illogical and arbitrary to designate Administrative Officers of the executive government. It would also run counter to the conscience of the Constitution of India found expressions in Art.50 of the Constitution which provides in unmistakable terms that the State shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the State. Though the said provision forms part of the chapter relating to the Directive Principles of State Policy the same could provide the touch stone with reference to which the reasonableness of the law enacted or theorders passed by the State could be tested. The fact that some of the Service Rules governing Government servants would prescribe a Magisterial Training is no justification to confer upon them exclusive powers irrespective of their qualifications or the reasonableness or propriety of conferring such judicial powers upon administrative personnel for being exclusively exercised while they still continue to be part and parcel of the members of the executive government. Whatever may be justification or otherwise to have provisions to enable them to be associated with such exercise of powers to acquire, a reasonable knowledge of those powers, there could be no justification in law to allow them to do so independently and sitting exclusively unless they at least possess the required legal qualifications. .11. The fact that Sec.21 enables the appointment of such Officers is no escape for the respondents to otherwise justify the Constitutionality of an unconstitutional appointment or notification, particularly when a notification of the nature impugned is challenged as being unconstitutional or invalid in law. The Constitutional validity of an order passed under a Section can itself be tested without even challenging the provisions of the Act and the fact that the provisions of Sec.21 is not challenged in the writ petition cannot give any cover of immunity to an otherwise unconstitutional order made thereunder. The enabling powers under Sec.21 have to be, in my view, reasonably construed so as to permit only the doing of legitimate things or actions and not anything by appointing or designating anyone of their choice. The enabling powers under Sec.21 have to be, in my view, reasonably construed so as to permit only the doing of legitimate things or actions and not anything by appointing or designating anyone of their choice. Placing of such restricted construction and reading down of powers to ensure that the provisions expressed in general terms are well within the constitutional prescriptions and prohibitions, is a well known rule of construction of Statutes and, therefore, I do not see any merit or substance in the above plea on behalf of the respondents. The content of powers and scope of Sec.21 requires to be read down in the light of the decisions relied upon for the petitioner. 12. For all the reasons stated above, the impugned proceedings stood vitiated not only as violative of Art.14 of the Constitution of India, but also the decisions of this Court and the Apex Court referred to supra and consequently shall stand hereby quashed. The writ petition shall stand allowed as prayed for. No costs.