JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, J. 1. This writ application had been moved on behalf of Bus Jatri Samannawaya Committee and its Vice President and Secretary, all based in Midnapore District, complaining of the alleged discrimination in the matter of revision of bus fares as contained in the Notification No. 12504 WT dated 26.9.1992, issued by the State Transport Department. Went the application was moved on 23.12.1992, it was submitted that the fare structure for the District of Midnapore contained in the aforesaid notification was discriminatory in relation to the fare structure for Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans. Considering the submissions of the respective parties, as an interim measure, the respondents were directed to charge fares for the District of Midnapore in keeping with the fares fixed in respect of the Districts of Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans. It was, however, made clear in the order that in the event the fare structure had already been implemented, then the same was not to be disturbed and would abide by result of the writ application. 2. Thereafter, three separate applications were filed by the Midnapore Zilla Bus Babyasayee Samity and another, Inter and Intra Region Bus Association and another and the Midnapore District Bus Driver's Association, for being added as parties in the writ application. The Same were heard and allowed on 7.1.1993, and the two applications filed on behalf of the Midnapore Zilla Bus Babyasayee Samity and the Midnapore District Bus Driver's Association, for vacating the interim order passed on 23.12.1992, were taken up for hearing thereafter. 3. Appearing in support of the application filed on behalf of the Midnapore District Bus Owner's Association, Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, learned advocate, firstly submitted that the revised fare structure had become operative from 27.9.1992, and had already been given effect to in respect of buses operated by the Calcutta State Transport Corporation and other State Transport Corporations. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that while the private operators had received the revised fare structure on 24.12.1992, this Court had passed the interim order on 23.12.1992. 4. Referring to the revised fare structures for Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the fare for the 1st stage was enhanced from 70 paise to Rs. 1/-. For subsequent stages, the fare was enhanced by 30 paise per stage above the existing fare. 4. Referring to the revised fare structures for Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the fare for the 1st stage was enhanced from 70 paise to Rs. 1/-. For subsequent stages, the fare was enhanced by 30 paise per stage above the existing fare. As far as the other districts were concerned the minimum fare in respect of ordinary buses operated by the State Transport Corporations was also enhanced from 70 paise to be Rs. 1/- but for subsequent stages the fare was enhanced from 10 paise per kilometer to 12 paise per kilometer. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that, although, at first glance the two fare structures appeared to be mutually discriminatory, in fact, there was a good deal of logic in fixing the fare after the first stage on a kilometer basis in the districts and on a stage basis in Calcutta and Howrah and the districts of North and South 24 Paragans. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the distance between two stages in the rural districts and in Calcutta, Howrah and the districts of North and South 24 Paragans were different and had to be treated differently for the purpose of fixation of fare. According to Mr. Chatterjee, since in city areas the stoppages on a route were much more frequent and covered a lesser distance than in rural areas where the stoppages were less frequent and covered much greater distances, the fixation of fares for stages after the initial stage in cities had to be done on the basis of stages, whereas in rural areas it had to be done kilometer wise. 5. Mr. Chatterjee than submitted that fixation or revision of fares was effected by the State Government under the powers vested in it under Section 67 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the fares had been revised on the basis of recommendations made by an Expert Committee, namely, the P.N. Roy Committee, and should be treated differently from other administrative acts of the State Government, as such revision was almost legislative in character. 6. Mr. Chatterjee then submitted that in case the injunction was maintained in respect of the district of Midnapore alone, it would cause various problems in charging fares on Inter District routes, since in other districts the revised fares would continue to be operative. Mr. 6. Mr. Chatterjee then submitted that in case the injunction was maintained in respect of the district of Midnapore alone, it would cause various problems in charging fares on Inter District routes, since in other districts the revised fares would continue to be operative. Mr. Chatterjee further submitted that the continuance of the interim order would result in two different fare structures being in existence simultaneously, since some operators had already implemented the revised fares while others had not, and this would result in an anomalous situation. 7. Urging that the balance of convenience and inconvenience lay in vacation of the interim order, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that in the event the writ petition failed, it would not be possible for the operators to recover the difference in the fares from the commuters and the loss suffered by the operators would be permanent. 8. It was also sought to be argued that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the principles of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as another writ petition was pending in respect of the self same point being urged in the present writ petition. 9. Another point urged by Mr. Chatterjee was that in view of the omission of the right to raise objections in respect of revision of fares in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a parallel could be drawn to the case of Mithilesh Garg vs. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 448. In the said case the Supreme Court, inter alia, held that the existing operators in a given route could not raise any objection to the grant of a new permit since the provision relating to raising of such objections had been excluded from aforesaid act. 10. Mr. Chatterjee lastly submitted that the writ petition was not maintainable as the writ petitioners had no locus standi to file the same. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the writ petitioners were a Society and some of its office bearers who could not be said to be representing all the commuters in the district of Midnapore. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the interim order was liable to be vacated on such score also. 11. Appearing for the Inter and Intra Region Bus Association, Mr. Asok De, learned advocate, while adopting the arguments advanced by Mr. Chatterjee added a few more points of his own. 12. Mr. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the interim order was liable to be vacated on such score also. 11. Appearing for the Inter and Intra Region Bus Association, Mr. Asok De, learned advocate, while adopting the arguments advanced by Mr. Chatterjee added a few more points of his own. 12. Mr. De firstly submitted that the writ petitioners had no locus standi to maintain the writ petition as they were not "persons aggrieved" and had no right to object to the enhancement of fares. Comparing the provision of Section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter referred to as the 1939 Act, with the provisions of Section 67 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter referred to as the 1988 Act, Mr. De urged that Section 43 of the 1939 Act, and Section 67 of the Act 1988 Act were more or less similar, expect that the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 67 had been amended so as to specifically exclude the provision for receiving and considering objections regarding the matters included in clause (i) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 67 of the 1988 Act. 13. Mr. De submitted that in view of the changed provisions in the 1988 Act, the State Government was no longer required to make a draft publication of the revision of the fare structure, as the right of objection had been taken away by legislation. 14. Mr. De then submitted that only persons with a clear legal right can seek remedy before the writ court. Mr. De submitted that a legal right is a right protected by the rule of law and includes statutory and constitutional rights, which the petitioners did not have. 15. In this regard, Mr. De referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mani Subrat Jain vs. State of Haryana & other, AIR 1977 SC 276 , wherein it was reiterated that no one can ask fore a Mandamus without a legal right. It was observed by the Supreme Court that there must be a judicially enforceable right as a legally protected right before a person could ask for a Mandamus. Furthermore, a person can be said to be aggrieved only when his is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to obtain from doing something. 16. Mr. Furthermore, a person can be said to be aggrieved only when his is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to obtain from doing something. 16. Mr. De referred to a decision of the Queen's Bench in the case of In re: Reed Bowen & Co., 1887 Law Reports 147 where much the same thing has been said in the following terms: – "A person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision had been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully, refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something." 17. In this regard, Mr. De also referred to the following decisions of this court, namely: – Sand Carrier's Owner's Union of India & other vs. Board of Trustees for the Port of Calcutta & other, 1989(2) Cal LJ 201, and Vinay Kumar Vijay Kumar Ganodia vs. Canton Carpentry Works Pvt. Ltd. & other, 1991(1) Cal LJ 136. 18. Developing the said point further, Mr. De also referred to certain passages from James High's "Extraordinary Legal Remedies" and Ferris "Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies" wherein the learned authors had observed in the same view that Mandamus will not lie at all unless the petitioners has a clear and unquestioned legal right. 19. Mr. De than submitted that the writ petition could not also be treated as Public Interest Litigation. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India & other, AIR 1984 SC 802 . Mr. De submitted that the spirit of Public Interest Litigation entails an attempt to ensure observance of social and economic rescue programmes, legislative as well as executive, framed for the benefit of the have-nots and the handicapped and to protect them against violation of their basis human rights which is also the Constitutional obligation of the executive. In Public Interest Litigation the Court only assists in the realization of Constitutional objectives. Mr. In Public Interest Litigation the Court only assists in the realization of Constitutional objectives. Mr. De pointed out that as had been observed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, as well as in the decisions referred to hereinabove, the Court would not, in exercise of its discretion, intervene at the instance of a meddlesome inter-loper or busybody and would ordinarily insist that only a person whose fundamental right is violated should be allowed to actives the Court. Where, however, the fundamental right of a person or class of persons, who could not have resort to the Court on account of his or their poverty and disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, was violated, the court can and must allow any member of the public acting bona fide to espouse the cause of such persons or class of persons for judicial enforcement of the fundamental right of such person or class of persons. 20. Mr. De submitted that not a single member of the public had come forward to file the writ application and that, as indicated hereinbefore, the petition has been filed by a Society and its Secretary and Vice President. Mr. De submitted that it did not appear from the writ application that the said Society was at all entrusted by the commuters of Midnapore District to move the writ application on their behalf. Mr. De submitted that the present writ application was liable to be quashed as the same was not a representative action on behalf of a class of persons who had been deprived of a fundamental right. 21. Mr. De submitted that on the aforesaid ground, not only was the injunction liable to be vacated, but the writ petition itself was liable to be dismissed. 22. In this connection Mr. De also referred to a Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Akhil Bharatia Grahak Panchayat (Bombay Brach) & other vs. State of Maharastra & other, AIR 1985 Bombay 14, where it had been held that fare hike was not a question which could be decided by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. In the said case it was observed that it was not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appeal court over the decision of the State Government and to resolve the dispute which was qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes. Mr. In the said case it was observed that it was not for the High Court to constitute itself into an appeal court over the decision of the State Government and to resolve the dispute which was qualitatively different from ordinary civil disputes. Mr. De submitted that as there had been no arbitrary exercise of power, it was not necessary for the Court to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in it under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. 23. Mr. De next submitted that the writ petition suffers from the vice of suppression of material facts. Mr. De submitted that it had not been mentioned in the writ petition that the fare structure had been revised on the basis of a report submitted by a One Man Fare Revision Committee in June, 1992. Mr. De submitted that the said Committee, popularly known as the P.N. Roy Committee, had been constituted for the purpose of considering in detail the various grievances of the owners of Bus/Mini-Buses/Taxies/Auto etc. and to suggest remedial measures for improvement of their conditions. Among the terms of reference, the Committee was required to take into account the fare structure in Calcutta and the districts and the difference bases of differences between them. 24. Referring to a copy of the Report submitted during the course of the hearing, Mr. De pointed out that in paragraph 24 of chapter 2 of the Report, it had been mentioned that the Committee had given hearings to different State Level Associations of Buses and Mini-Buses in Calcutta. The Committee also held meetings outside Calcutta, amongst other places, at Midnapore, and gave hearing to different District Level Bus/Mini-Bus Associations and Regional Transport Authorities. In addition, the Committee also received a large number of representations from different passenger forums, bodies, associations and individuals. The District Level Associations also represented their views before the Committee at its held in the districts. Mr. De pointed out that despite the fact that the provisions for inviting objections had been omitted in the 1988 Act, the State Government had in its fairness decided to appoint the Committee which invited objections from all different kinds of bodies and associations, including individuals, and had, thereafter, made its recommendation for revision of the fare structure. 25. Mr. Mr. De pointed out that despite the fact that the provisions for inviting objections had been omitted in the 1988 Act, the State Government had in its fairness decided to appoint the Committee which invited objections from all different kinds of bodies and associations, including individuals, and had, thereafter, made its recommendation for revision of the fare structure. 25. Mr. De submitted that opportunities were given to the public to appear before the Committee, but such opportunity had not been availed of by the petitioners. It was not, therefore, open to the petitioners to raise any grievance at this stage when the notification had already taken final effect. Even under the 1939 Act, it had been the intention of the legislature to invite objections at the draft publication stage and once the notification had been finally published it was no longer open to anybody to raise objection in respect thereof. 26. Mr. De. submitted that from the report it will be evident that various factors had been taken into account by the One Man Committee in recommending the revised fare structure and that since an Expert Body had made a recommendation, after taking into account the various factors relating to the operation of the Transport System, both by private operators and the State, the Court should be slow to interfere with such recommendation. 27. Mr. De also pointed out that the revision of fares had been recommended on the basis of different local conditions, as would be evident from chapter 9 of the report where each district had been dealt with separately. In fact, while recommending the change in the structure of ordinary bus fares fore the districts, it was noted that the rates, as suggested, were provisional on account of different conditions prevailing in the districts and that the district Regional Transport Authorities should exercise their discretion and judgment in ultimately fixing the rates fore their respective districts. It was further pointed out that the said recommendation applied to the fixation of rates of the district Mini-Buses also. 28. Mr. It was further pointed out that the said recommendation applied to the fixation of rates of the district Mini-Buses also. 28. Mr. De submitted that as had been repeatedly stressed by the Supreme Court, the opinion of an Expert Body should not ordinarily be interfered with, expert where the Report was patently mala fide or where the same had been prompted by extraneous considerations or where the same had been made in contravention of he principles of natural justice or in violation of any Constitutional provision. 29. Mr. De submitted that there had been no violation of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and no fundamental or legal right had been violated by the State Government while revising the fares in respect of Buses/Mini-Buses/Taxies/Auto etc. 30. In support of his aforesaid contentions, Mr. De referred to various decisions of the Supreme Court. 31. Mr. De first referred to the decision in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh & other vs. J.P. Chaurasia & other, AIR 1989 SC 19, wherein while considering the question as to whether two posts were equal and should carry equal pay, it was decided that the question was administrative in nature and that the Courts should not normally interfere with the opinion of the Pay Commission. It was held that such questions are to be determined by expert bodies as they would be the best judges to evaluate the nature of duties and nature of posts. If there is any such determination by a Commission or Committee, the Courts should normally accept the same. The Courts should not try to tinker with such equivalence unless it is shown that it was made with extraneous consideration. 32. The next decision cited by Mr. De was that of Neelima Mishra vs. Harinder Kaur Paintal, AIR 1990 SC 1402 , where also it was observed that Courts should be slow to interfere with the opinion of experts in the given filed. 33. Another decision cited by Mr. De was that of National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences vs. Dr. K. Kalyana Raman & other, AIR 1992 SC 1086, wherein also the Supreme Court, while considering the case of selection of candidates, observed that the Selection Committee was formed of experts holding high status and the Court would normally be slow to interfere with decision of such a Select Body. 34. K. Kalyana Raman & other, AIR 1992 SC 1086, wherein also the Supreme Court, while considering the case of selection of candidates, observed that the Selection Committee was formed of experts holding high status and the Court would normally be slow to interfere with decision of such a Select Body. 34. The other decisions cited by Mr. De were in much the same vein and does not bear re-petition. 35. Mr. De then pointed out that the notification impugned in the writ petition, being Annexure "G" to the writ petition, concerned buses operated by the State Transport Corporation only and not private operators and that new fares had already been given effect to from 28.9.1992. Mr. De submitted that the revised fares in the districts other than Calcutta, Howrah, North 24 Paragans and South 24 Paragans, not having been challenged in the writ petition, the same could not now be questioned by writ petitioners. In this connection, Mr. De referred to the letter no. 12511-WT dated 26.9.1992, issued by the Transport Department, Government of West Bengal, to the District Magistrate, Midnapore, including a copy of the Transport Department Notification No. 12504-WT dated 26.9.1992, regarding the revised fare structure for district ordinary buses run by the State Transport Corporations, being Annexure "G" to the writ petition, and requesting him to convene a meeting of the Regional Transport Authority immediately and to consider similar revision of fares within his jurisdiction in respect of stages carriages and other services operated by private operators. The District Magistrate was requested to send said recommendation of the Regional Transport Authority and revision of fares in the district of Midnapore to the Transport Department at the earliest opportunity so that the State Government could accord final approval thereto. 36. In support of his aforesaid contentions relating to finality of the notification published in relation to revision of fares, Mr. 36. In support of his aforesaid contentions relating to finality of the notification published in relation to revision of fares, Mr. De referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case B. Srikantiah & other vs. The Regional Transport Authority Anantapur & other, AIR 1971 SC 1705 , wherein while considering the publication of a notifications in exercise of the powers under Selection 43(1)(i) of the 1939 Act, the Supreme Court observed that once such notification had been issued calling upon the Regional Transport Officers to notify the operators to collect the enhanced fares and on such notification being done, the enhanced fare should be collected as if the fare tables had been amended. 37. Mr. De also referred to a decision of this Court in the case of Federation of Bus Syndicate & other vs. State of West Bengal & other, AIR 1973 Cal 389 , where it was held that fare was a condition of permit. Of course such observation was made in the context of interpretation of the provisions of Section 48(3) and Section 43 of the 1939 Act. 38. Mr. De concluded his submissions by submitting that on all the aforesaid grounds the interim order passed by this Court on 23.12.1992 was liable to be vacated or suitably modified. 39. Mr. Bikash Bhattacharya, who appeared for the Midnapore Zilla Bus Babyasayee Samity submitted that the revision of the fare structure is done by an Expert Body which takes in to account various aspects relating to the running of vehicles, such as increase in the price of oil, lubricants and spars parts, the condition of roads and increase in operational costs. It also has to take into account the density of commuters in a particular area or district. Mr. Bhattacharya submitted that having regard to the above, it would neither be reasonable nor practicable to expect that a common fare chart would be operative in all the districts in the State, irrespective of the local conditions. 40. Mr. Bhattacharya also submitted that revision or fixation of fares is an administrative decision of the State Government based on its fiscal policy and was, therefore, not justiciable in writ jurisdiction. 41. In this regard, reference was made to a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in case of M/s. Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. 40. Mr. Bhattacharya also submitted that revision or fixation of fares is an administrative decision of the State Government based on its fiscal policy and was, therefore, not justiciable in writ jurisdiction. 41. In this regard, reference was made to a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in case of M/s. Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. & another vs. Union of India & other, AIR 1990 SC 1277 , wherein it was, inter alia, held that fixation of price of levy sugar and the grouping of sugar factors of the basis of their geographical location was a policy decision based on exhaustive expert conclusions and did not attract the power of judicial review since judicial review is not concerned with matters of economic policy. 42. Mr. Bhattacharya also submitted that the revised fare structure had already been given effect to in district of Midnapore and had been accepted by the commuters of the district and had already been acted upon and unless the interim order was vacated it would cause a deadlock in the transport system in the district of Midnapore and the operators would suffer irreparable loss and injury. 43. Appearing for the State Transport Authority, West Bengal, Mr. Dilip Kumar Seth adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Chatterjee, Mr. De and Mr. Bhattacharya, but added that both the notifications under challenge, namely, Annexure "G" and "H" to the writ petition, were dated 26.9.1992, and had already been given effect to Moreover, the directions contained in the Transport Department's Memo No. 12511 dated 26.9.1992, whereby a general direction had been given to all the Regional Transport Authorities, had not been challenged in the writ petition. 44. Mr. Seth repeated the submissions of Mr. De relating to amendment of the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 67 of the 1988 Act. Mr. De submitted that in view of the amended provisions, the State Government, while revising the fare structure, was not required to consider any objections in respect thereof. Mr. Seth further submitted that revision of fare structures was really a continuous process, and since the earlier revision had not been challenged, the present revision, which was a continuation of the earlier process, should not be allowed to be challenged also. 45. Mr. Seth then referred to the recommendations of the P.N. Roy Committee published in the month of June 1992. Mr. 45. Mr. Seth then referred to the recommendations of the P.N. Roy Committee published in the month of June 1992. Mr. Seth submitted that the revised rates had been recommended on the principle of reasonable differentia depending on the local conditions in particular area. Mr. Seth submitted that the differences in the fares recommended for Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans and the other districts of the State, appeared at first glance to be discriminatory, but were in reality based on reasonable discrimination. 46. Mr. Seth submitted that, in any event, since the revised fare structure had already been implemented prior to the passing of the interim order, no usesual purpose would be served in maintaining the interim order. 47. Mr. Manik Das appearing for the Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore, submitted that except for Midnapore, none of the commuters of the other districts had challenged the revised fare structure. Even in respect of Midnapore, only the petitioners no.1 Society and its Vice President and Secretary had challenged the revised fare structure and not even one commuter had joined in such challenge. Mr. Das submitted that since the State Government had acted within the powers conferred under Section 67 and had not transgressed the said provision while revising the fare structure, the same could not be challenged in the present writ application. 48. Replying to the submissions made on behalf of the added respondents, the State Transport Authority, West Bengal, and the Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore, Mr. Kashi Kanta Moitra appearing for the writ petitioners, firstly submitted that the Regional Transport Authority, Midnapore, should not be permitted to make any submissions relating to vacation of the interim order as it had not complied with the directions given by the Court for fixation of fares. Furthermore, as the State had not filed any affidavit, it could not also contend that the classification or difference in the fare structure was reasonable. In the absence of any affidavit, it must be presumed that the State had not come forward to defend its actions. 49. Mr. Moitra then submitted that the State had chosen not to comply with the report of the Expert Committee, and there was nothing on record to show that the State had acted in accordance with such report. Mr. Moitra submitted that it was the duty of the State to defend its actions. 50. Mr. 49. Mr. Moitra then submitted that the State had chosen not to comply with the report of the Expert Committee, and there was nothing on record to show that the State had acted in accordance with such report. Mr. Moitra submitted that it was the duty of the State to defend its actions. 50. Mr. Moitra referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of B. Prabhakar Rao & other vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & other, 1985 SCC (Suppl.) 432, on the question relating to the constitutionality of remedial legislation measures for a certain class of persons. While considering the said question, the Supreme Court observed that the burden of establishing the reasonableness of a classification and its nexus with the object of the legislation is on the State. Mr. Moitra submitted that when the State had not come forward with any affidavit to establish the reasonableness of the differences in the fare structures in the districts of Calcutta, Howrah, North Paragans and South 24 Paragans and the other districts, it was not for private parties to establish the same, in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. 51. In this regard, Mr. Moitra also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D.S. Nakara vs. Union of India, 1983(1) SCC 305 . 52. On the question that different fare structures in the different districts could result in administrative chaos, Mr. Moitra referred to a decision of Lord Denning in the case of Bradbury & other vs. London Borough of Enfield, 1967(3) AER 434, wherein while considering a question whether injunction should issue with regard to maintenance of certain schools having regard to the provisions of Section 13 of the Education Act, 1944, it was observed as follows: – "Ought an injunction to be granted against the council? It has been suggested by the Chief Education Officer that, if an injunction is granted chaos will supervene. All the arrangements have been made for the next term, the teachers appointed to the new comprehensive schools, the pupils allotted their places, and so forth. It would be next to impossible, he says, to reverse all these arrangements without complete chaos and damage to teachers, pupils and the public. All the arrangements have been made for the next term, the teachers appointed to the new comprehensive schools, the pupils allotted their places, and so forth. It would be next to impossible, he says, to reverse all these arrangements without complete chaos and damage to teachers, pupils and the public. I must say this: if a local authority does not fulfill the requirements of the law, this court will see that it does fulfill them. It will not listen readily to suggestions of chaos. The department of education and the council are subject to the rule of law and must comply with it, just like every one else. Even if chaos should result, still the law must be obeyed." 53. On the question of the locus standi of the writ petitioners to maintain the writ petition, Mr. Moitra submitted that the Courts had held on various occasions that an association could file a writ application for the enforcement of the rights of its members, particularly in case of a public injury leading to public interest litigation, where the association has a special interest in the matter. Mr. Moitra submitted further that the meaning of a person aggrieved could vary according to different situations. Mr. Moitra submitted that even a stranger could move the Courts for enforcement of a right in common with the public at large. Mr. Moitra submitted that the present writ application was fully maintainable as the writ petitioners were espousing a cause of general public interest for enforcement of a right of the traveling public of Midnapore. 54. In this regard Mr. Moitra also referred to the case of A.B.S.K. Sangh (Rly) vs. Union of India & other, AIR 1981 SC 298 , and that of S.P. Gupta & other vs. Union of India & other, AIR 1982 SC 149 . In the first of the said two cases, a technical point had been taken that the petitioner no.1 being an unrecognised association, the writ petition was not maintainable. Overruling such contention, the Supreme Court observed that the narrow concept of "cause of action" and "person aggrieved" and individual litigation is becoming absolucent in some jurisdictions. In the first of the said two cases, a technical point had been taken that the petitioner no.1 being an unrecognised association, the writ petition was not maintainable. Overruling such contention, the Supreme Court observed that the narrow concept of "cause of action" and "person aggrieved" and individual litigation is becoming absolucent in some jurisdictions. In the second case it was observed that where a legal wrong or legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by reason of violation of a constitutional or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law and such person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain a writ application for appropriate orders. 55. On the question of reasonableness of State action in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution, Mr. Moitra submitted that a policy decision, whether executive or legislative, was always subject to judicial review and Courts were entitled to interfere in appropriate cases and to test the fairness and reasonableness of such decision. 56. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Moitra referred to the case of K. Rajendran vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1982(2) SCC 273 , and that of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & other, AIR 1991 SC 537 . In both the said cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that State actions, if arbitrary, could be judicially reviewed under Article 14 of the Constitution. 57. Regarding the question of reasonable classification and rational differentia, Mr. Moitra contended that it had to be shown by the added respondents that the commuters of Calcutta were as a whole different from the commuters in the rest of the State. Mr. Moitra repeated his submission that as the State had not chosen to defend its actions, it was not open to the added respondents to don the mantle of the State in that regard. 58. Mr. Moitra referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in this regard in the case of N. Abdul Basheer vs. K.K. Karunakaran, 1989 (Suppl.) (2) SCC 344, and in the case of Roop Chand Adlakhar vs. Delhi Development Authority, 1989 (Suppl.) (1) SCC 116. 58. Mr. Moitra referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in this regard in the case of N. Abdul Basheer vs. K.K. Karunakaran, 1989 (Suppl.) (2) SCC 344, and in the case of Roop Chand Adlakhar vs. Delhi Development Authority, 1989 (Suppl.) (1) SCC 116. In both the cases, the Supreme Court reiterated the principles relating to permissible classification so as not to offend the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was observed that the reasonableness of classification depends upon the facts of each case and the same must be based on rational differentia and must have reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 59. Mr. Moitra submitted that since the State had not come forward to defend its action in recommending different fare structures for Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans and other districts, it could not be contended by a third party that in making such distinction there was a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, the smooth functioning of the transport system. 60. On this point Mr. Moitra also referred to the case of State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Derokinath Khosla, 1974 SCC (L & S) 49, and the case of Union of India vs. Jyoti Unit Fund and Finance & other, AIR 1976 SC 1163 , where on the question of locus standi, the Supreme Court made certain purposeful observations with regard to the trend of modern processional jurisprudence. The Supreme Court observed that a broadened view of locus standi leads to the futility of technical flaws where larger issues of public concern are involved. 61. Mr. Moitra then took up the point relating to omission in the 1988 Act of the right given to the public in the 1939 Act to raise objection to revision of the fare structure. Mr. Moitra submitted that it was now well settled that where a statute did not make any provision for giving a hearing, natural justice and administrative fair play demanded that such heating be given, unless the statute specifically excluded a right of nearing Mr. Moitra contended that, although, the 1988 Act did not provide for inviting objections or considering the same, a right of hearing had not been specifically barred either. 62. Moitra contended that, although, the 1988 Act did not provide for inviting objections or considering the same, a right of hearing had not been specifically barred either. 62. Referring to the observations of Justice Frankfurter, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airports Authority of India & other, AIR 1979 SC 1628 . Mr. Moitra urged that an executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged. 63. Mr. Moitra urged that the principle of fairness and reasonableness of State action and judicial review of legislative action was considered by the Supreme Court as far back as in 1952 in the case of State of Madras vs. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 195. Mr. Moitra submitted that the said principle has been developed over the years and had been expanded in various directions, giving a new dimension to the concept of fairness and reasonableness of all State action as expressed in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi's case (supra) amongst several others. 64. While on this question, Mr. Moira submitted that no time gap had been left between the date of publication of the impugned notification and its implementation. Mr. Moitra submitted that while the notification had been published on 26.9.1992, it was directed to be given effect to from 28.9.1992, within a period of two days, thus depriving the petitioners of a chance to file their objections to the revised fare structure. Referring to Rule 123 of the West Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, which made provision for the from in which to apply for a permit, Mr. Moitra pointed out that in respect of stage carriages Form IA was to be used. Referring to From IA, Moitra pointed out that the same provided for publication and hearing of objections. Mr. Moitra submitted that a right of hearing was engrained in the very nature of the provisions themselves and could not be denied merely because no specific provision had been made in that behalf. Mr. Moitra also referred to some of the other Form in this regard. 65. Mr. Moitra then submitted that the State Transport Authorities were not adversely affected on account of the interim order. Mr. Moitra also referred to some of the other Form in this regard. 65. Mr. Moitra then submitted that the State Transport Authorities were not adversely affected on account of the interim order. In fact, by virtue of the interim order the State had been directed to implement the impugned notification dated 26.9.1992, being Annexure "H" to the writ petition, in respect of the district of Midnapore also. 66. Mr. Moitra also contended that from earlier revisions of the fare structure, the operators in Midnapore district were at an advantage in comparison to other districts and they continued to receive a higher benefit than their counterparts in other districts. 67. On the factual aspect it was sought to be urged that it was not the petitioner's case that the fares could not be enhanced, but such enhancement must be done on an uniform basis throughout the State and these not be different standards for the different districts. 68. It was also sought to be contended on behalf of the writ petitioner's that the impugned notification dated 26.9.1992, being Annexure "G" to the writ petition, was applicable to private operators as well, and the Memo addressed to the District Magistrate, Midnapore, on 26.9.1992, by the Transport Department, Government of West Bengal, was only a forwarding letter. It was contended that the parent notification, referred to in the Memo, had been challenged in the writ petition and there was, therefore, no need to separately challenge the said forwarding Memo No. 12511 WT stated 26.9.1992. 69. It was further urged that in chapter 9 of the report of the One-Man Committee the districts of Howrah and Midnapore had been clubbed together, and the same fares had been proposed for the two districts, but the State Government had chosen to make a differentiation between the two illogically and arbitrarily. 70. Reference was then made to paragraph 20 of the writ petition and the comparative chart set out therein which would make the discrimination complained of clear. It was urged that continued discrimination did not preclude a party from coming to Court even if the parties had not come forward at the first instance to challenge such discrimination. 71. 70. Reference was then made to paragraph 20 of the writ petition and the comparative chart set out therein which would make the discrimination complained of clear. It was urged that continued discrimination did not preclude a party from coming to Court even if the parties had not come forward at the first instance to challenge such discrimination. 71. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he respondents had failed to make out a case for vacation of the interim order, and the applications filed on behalf of the added respondents for vacation of the interim order were liable to be dismissed with costs. 72. Since the matter has been dealt with at great length by the parties, touching the merits of the writ applications, it will be to the advantage of all concerned if the writ application itself is disposed of on the basis of the submissions made. 73. The sole grievance of the writ petitioners is in respect of the discrimination allegedly practiced by the State Government with regard to fixation of fares in Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans, and the other districts of the State. 74. The main thrust of Mr. Moitra's arguments was that while rational discrimination was permissible, it had to be defended by the State and a reasonable nexus between the discrimination alleged and the objects sought to be achieved would have to be shown. In fact, it has been strenuously emphasized by Mr. Moitra that since the State had not come forward to file any affidavit to explain and defend its actions, the writ petitioners challenge in this regard went in answered and no amount of justification of the State's actions by other private parties could fill up the lacunae. 75. On the question of classification itself Mr. Moitra submitted that the State and the other respondents had failed to establish that the commuters of Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans, were any different from the commuters of other districts, which could possibly justify the disparity in the fare structures. Both the cases referred to by Mr. Moitra on this point stressed the principle relating to permissible classification so as not offend the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitutions. Both the cases referred to by Mr. Moitra on this point stressed the principle relating to permissible classification so as not offend the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitutions. Of course, each case has to be considered on its own facts, but the underlying principle that such classification must have a reasonable nexus with object sought to be achieved, has to be fulfilled, if such classification is to be upheld. 76. The aforesaid contention of Mr. Moitra has been sought to be answered on behalf of the added respondents in the applications filed by then for vacation of the interim order passed on 23.12.1992. Furthermore, while it is true that State has not filed any affidavit in the matter, there are sufficient materials on record to enable the learned Counsel for the State to make his submissions in this behalf. 77. The most tangible material in support of such classification is report of the One Man Committee published in June 1992, which has been referred to by the added respondents, and a copy whereby has also been produced by them. 78. Although, in view of the amended provisions of the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 67 of the 1988 Act, the right to file objections in respect of revision of the fare structure, has been specifically omitted, the State Government in order to arrive at a proper evaluation of the problems facing the transport sector because of rise in operational costs, the conditions of roads, the volume of commuters, etc. appointed a One Man Committee to go into the said questions in detail. As has been pointed out by Mr. De, the Committee invited the views of a broad spectrum of society. Apart from associations of operators and other bodies, the Committee also considered the views of individuals as well while making its recommendations instead of acting on arbitrary considerations, the State showed its bona fides in proceeding to revise the fare structure on the basis of the report submitted by Committee. I cannot, therefore, accept Mr. Moitra's submissions that sufficient time was not provided between the publication of the notification and the date of its implementation for giving a hearing to those who wished to make any objection. 79. The Report discloses that various factors, including local conditions, were taken in to consideration by the Committee while recommending the change in the fare structure. Moitra's submissions that sufficient time was not provided between the publication of the notification and the date of its implementation for giving a hearing to those who wished to make any objection. 79. The Report discloses that various factors, including local conditions, were taken in to consideration by the Committee while recommending the change in the fare structure. The basis difference in the plying of stage carriage within Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans and the other districts is that the number of commuter within Calcutta and Howrah are much greater and the stoppages are much more frequent over a much shorter distance. As far as the districts of North and South 24 Paragans are concerned, a good part of the routs pass through Calcutta and its suburbs. The situation in the outlying districts is totally different. A practical and logical difference exists with regard to the plying of stage carriages within city limits and in outlying districts, which make it necessary to have two different fare structures for Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans and the other outlying districts. There is, therefore, a definite nexus between the difference in the revised fare structure and the objects sought to be achieved. 80. Coupled with the above is the question as to how far the Courts should interfere with the recommendations of an Expert Body. As has been observed by the Supreme Court in the various cases cited on behalf of the added respondents evaluation processes must be left to expert bodies which would be the best judges in such matters and the Courts should not try to tinker with such evaluation and should be slow in interfering with the recommendation of such expert bodies, unless it is shown that it was made with extraneous consideration. 81. Except for pleading arbitrary discrimination, the writ petitioners have not imputed any extraneous consideration on the part of the State Government in the matter of differences in fixation of fares in Calcutta, Howrah, North and South 24 Paragans and the outlying districts. As mentioned hereinbefore, in view of the different situations prevailing, a logical and intelligible differentia has been established in the fixation of two modes of fares for Calcutta. Howrah, North arid South 24 Paragans and the outlying districts, and the decision of the State Government cannot be faulted on that score. As mentioned hereinbefore, in view of the different situations prevailing, a logical and intelligible differentia has been established in the fixation of two modes of fares for Calcutta. Howrah, North arid South 24 Paragans and the outlying districts, and the decision of the State Government cannot be faulted on that score. It cannot also be lost, sight of that the two different modes of fares were already in existence from before and only an enhancement has been effected in the rates. What is now being sought to be described as discriminatory, has, in effect, remained unchallenged over the years. Having acquiesced in the two different modes of fare structure all along, the writ petitioners, in my view, cannot now complain of the enhancement effected on grounds of discrimination. 82. Having regard to the view taken by me as aforesaid, it is not really necessary for me go into the question of locus standi in detail. It is sufficient to say that a legal action would be maintainable by any person or body of persons who is or are aggrieved by any act of an individual or the State. As the petitioners are persons who claim to represent at least some of the commuters of the district of Midnapore, I am of the view that the writ application is maintainable at their instance. 83. However, in view of the findings arrived at by me on the other points, the writ application fails and is dismissed and all interim orders are hereby vacated. 84. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 85. Let xerox copies of this order be given to the learned advocates of the respective parties on their undertaking to apply for and to obtain a certified copy of the same. Prayer for stay of this order made on behalf of the petitioners is considered and refused.