SK Homchaudhuri, J.-This writ appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20.5 1982 passed in Civil Rule-No.24 of 1980. 2. The appellants' case is that their predecessor-in-interest late Adhir Chandra Dey took lease of about 8 Kanis of watery land (a lake known as 'Dimsager') appertaining to Taskhichi Taluka No.274 for a period of 5 years from the ex-ruler of Tripura at annual rent of Rs.300/-for rearing and catching fish therein in execution of a registered deed of lease dated 11.8 1958. After execution of the registered deed of lease, late Adhir Chandra Dey took posse­ssion of the watery land. The ex-ruler of Tripura was supposed to extend the period of lease for another term of 5 years. During subsistence of the lease, the Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act, I960, hereinafter referred to as the TLR and LR Act, was enacted and it came into force with effect from 14.11.61. As per provision of section 134 and 135 of TLR and LR Act} right, title and interest of lessor namely the ex-ruler in respect of the said watery land (lake) vested in the Govt of Tripura free from encumbrances, with effect from 14 11.1961. The ex-ruler submitted return of vested Taluka in Form 55 under Rule 175 of Tripura Lund Revenue and Land Reforms Rules, herein­after mentioned as the Rules, and in the return stated that the watery land measuring about 8 Kani had been in occupation of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants under Periodic Ijara for 10 years from 1958 to 1968. 3. According to the appellants, their predecessor-in-interest, late Adhir Chandra Dey, being a tenant of the watery land measuring about 8 Kanis under the ex-ruler, acquired the status of 'Raiyat' in respect of the said land under section l?5(d) of TLR and LR Act. But the appellants having not been recorded as 'Raiyats' in respect of the land, they made an application under section 45 of the TLR and LR Act, before the competent authority, namely, the Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer for correction of the entry in the records of right and to record them as Raiyats under the Govt in respect of the 8 Kanis of watery land. The Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer by order dated 10.9.74 partially allowed the application holding that out of the total area of watery land measuring 6.119 acres (8 Kanis), appellants were raiyats or tenants in respect of land measuring 5.46 acres under the Govt. By the said order, the Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer also held that Smti Meera Sarkar, Ranjit Nag and Gopal Krishna Chanda were 'Ijara Dakhaldar' in respect of remaining part of the laud measuring .656 acres Being dissatisfied by the order of the Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer, wrongly recording these 3 persons as 'Ijara Dakhaldar' in respect of land measuring .656 acres, the appellants filed a revision petition under section 95 of TLR and LR Act before the Collector and revision application was regist­ered as Case No. 1 of 1V76. The Collector after hearing the parties and on perusal of the materials on record by the order dated 25.9.78 allowed the revision petition holding that the appellants were the Raiyats in respect of the entire land measuring 6.119 acres. The Collector accordingly directed deletion of the names of those persons and recording the appellants as raiyats/tenants in respects of the entire watery land measuring 6.119 acres (8 Kanis). Thereafter, the Khatian was issued mutating the appellants as raiyats/tenants in respect of the entire area of land. The appellants further case is that there was no objection from any quarter against the correction of records of right mutating the appellants as 'Raiyats' of the watery land measuring 6.119 acres directly under the Govt as per provision of section 135 (d) of the TLR and LR Act, and land revenue was also regularly received from the appellants. However, the Collector, subsequently in the exercise of power under section 96 (1) of the TLR and LR Act initiated a proceeding to review the order dated 25.9.78 passed by his predecessor-in-office and ultimately set aside the order dated 25.9.78 by the impugned order dated 10.3.1980. 4. The appellants impugned the aforesaid order dated 10.3.80 in this Court in a writ petition registered as Civil Rule No. 24 of 1980. The petition was heard by a Single Bench presided by Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.M.Ali, as he then was, and learned Single Judge after conclusion of hearing by the impugned judgment and order dated 20.5.82 dismissed the writ petition. The appellants have thereafter approached this Court in the appeal. The petition was heard by a Single Bench presided by Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.M.Ali, as he then was, and learned Single Judge after conclusion of hearing by the impugned judgment and order dated 20.5.82 dismissed the writ petition. The appellants have thereafter approached this Court in the appeal. Before passing of the impugned order dated 10.3.80. the appellant sold the 'raiyati' right of small plots of land to 9 persons out of 6.119 acres, - who have been impleaded as appellants Nos. 5 to 13 as per order passed on 16.11.90 in the writ appeal. 5. Mr. JP Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the impugned order dated 10.3.80 as well as the judgment passed in Civil Rule No.24 of 1980 mainly on the following grounds : (i) Apparently the Collector passed the impugned order dated 10.3.80 renewing the earlier order dated 25.9.78 passed by his predecessor-in-office, in his own motion in exercise the power under sub-section (1) of section 96 of the TLR and LR Act. But the Collector could exercise power of review in his own motion, only after obtaining prior permission from the Govt. Although the impugned order specks of obtaining the prior permission from the compe­tent authority, but the permission to review was clearly accorded mechanically without application of mind and; as such, the permission appears to have accorded is no permission in the eye of law. Consequently, the impugned order dated 10.3.80 purporting to review the order dated 25.9.78 passed by his predecessor-in-office, is ; illegal and s without jurisdiction and void. In support of his contention Mr Bhattacharjee has placed reliance in the decision of this Court the case of-Mohendra Chandra Das & others vs. State of Tripura-& others.; reported in (1989) 1 GLR. 192. In the said case a Division Bench of this High Court has held that the legal position is well settled that when an authority is to-, accord permission or sanction, it has to apply its mind independently before passing appropriate order. Such permission or section cannot be granted mechanically and without application of mind. 192. In the said case a Division Bench of this High Court has held that the legal position is well settled that when an authority is to-, accord permission or sanction, it has to apply its mind independently before passing appropriate order. Such permission or section cannot be granted mechanically and without application of mind. On consideration of facts of that case this Court found that the Revenue Commissioner, who was the specified authority for according permission for suo motu review of the earlier order by the collector under section 96 (1) of the TLR and LR Act accorded, permission with that case mechanically without application of mind and consequently the order passed in review was liable to be struck down. (ii) There, was no error apparent on the face of the record in passing the earlier order on 25.9.78. As such, there was no scope for review of the earlier orders and the in impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction. (iii) On the facts and circumstances of the case only course open to the Govt has to institute a suit contesting the order of the Collector passed on 25.9.78 within a period of 6 months from the date of passing of the order as contemplated under section 11(4) of TLR - and LR Act. In support of his contention Mr. Bhattacharjee has placed reliance in the decision of this Court in the case of Kumar Madbusudhan Dev Bama vs. Narayan Upadhaya & others, reported in (1989) 1 GLR 364 [1989 (1) GIJ 291 ] In that case a Division Bench of this Court in the Judgement in para 7 amongst others held as follows : "7 Our attention has however, been drawn to sub-section (3) of section 11 of the TLR and LR Act which runs as follows :- "11(3). Where any property or any right in or over any property is claimed by of on behalf of the Government, or by any person as against the Government and the claim is disputed, such dispute shall be decided by the collector whose order shall subject to the provisions of this Act, be final," We are of the opinion that where any property or any right in or over any property is claimed by or on behalf of the Government, or by any person as against the Government such dispute or claim is covered by the foresaid sub-section (3). In the instant case, there are allegations and counter allegations regarding settlement of the land by Ex. Maharaja and surrender of the land by him in favour of the Government. The above being the factual position, we are of the opinion that this case can be properly decided only by the authorities under section 11 (3) of the TLR and LR Act and it is difficult to decide these issues in revision even though, as we have held, a revision lies and the powers are there in the revisional authority to decide the same " (iv) Undisputedly the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants took lease of about 8 Kanis (6119 acres) of watery land from the ex-proprietor upon execution of a registered deed of lease dated 11.8.58 appertaining to Taskhichi Taluka No.274 for a period of 5 years and during the subsistence of the lease, the entire lease hold land vested in the Govt. as per provision of the TLR and LR Act, 1960. It is also clear from the return filed by the ex-proprietor in Form 55 under Rule 175 of the TLR and LR Rules annexed as Annexure No. 2 to the writ petition that the ex-proprietor treated the petitioner as tenant in respect of 8 Kanis of watery land which was leased out to him in the year 1958 for a period of 5 years. The materials on records clearly established the intention of the proprietor was to create tenancy right of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants over the said watery land. Mr. Bhattacharjee drawn our attention to the definition has of land under section 2 (d) of the TLR and LR Act and pointed out that under section 2 (d) of the TLR and LR Act 'agriculture' includes pisiculture. As such, the lease of the watery land was taken for 'pisiculture' deemed to be for agriculture purpose and there is no escape from holding that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was inducted as tenant in the lease hold watery land, measuring 8 Kanis by the ex-proprietor and the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had been a tenant of the holding when the same vested in the Govt under section 135 of TLR and LR Act. As such under sub-section (d) of section 135, after the land in question vested in the Govt. As such under sub-section (d) of section 135, after the land in question vested in the Govt. the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was entitled to hold the land directly under the Govt as 'raiyat' thereof. In support of his contention Mr. Bbattacharjee has placed reliance on the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of 1. Anandan Behera & another vs. State of Orissa reported in AIR 1956 SC 17 ; 2. Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co. op. Society vs. Sepai Singh, reported in AIR 1977 SC 2149 ; 3. Soroj Kumar Bose vs. Kanai Lai Mondal & others reported in AIR 1985 SC 1674 . 6. Mr. Bhattacharjee has submitted that the learned Single Judge committed manifest errors in holding that the registered deed executed on 11.8.58 did not create any tenancy right over the land in placing reliance on the decisions which have no application on the farts of the case, inasmuch as, those decisions were rendered on the basis of the provisions of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, whereas the provisions of the TLR and LR Act are quite different and distinct. 7. Mr. S. Deb, learned counsel for the appellant Nos. 5 to 13 has adopted the submissions made on behalf of the appellant Nos. 1 to 4. 8. Mr. RK Lala, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand, has submitted that neither in the writ petition nor in the memo of Appeal, the appellants urged that previous permission for review of the earlier order of the Collector, in his own motion, was accorded by the competent authority mechanically and without application of mind and consequently the respondents have been deprived of the opportunity to rebut the contentions by filing affidavit-in-opposition. Mr. Lala has, however, placed the relevant records before this Court and has submitted that it is apparent from the materials on records that when Collector found that there occurred an error apparent on the face of the record in passing the order dated 25.9.78 by his predecessor-in-office he sought permission for review by his letter dated 15.1.79 addressed to Secretary to the Govt of Tripura, Revenue Department. In response thereof the Govt of Tripura, Revenue Department by letter dated 27.1.79 asked the Collector to transmit the case record to the Revenue Department for consideration. In response thereof the Govt of Tripura, Revenue Department by letter dated 27.1.79 asked the Collector to transmit the case record to the Revenue Department for consideration. The Collector transmitted the entire record for consideration of the Govt of Tripura, Revenue Department by his forwarding letter dated 17.2.79. After receipt of the r- cords the case was processed by the Secretariat and the case records were placed before the Secre­tary with notes suggesting that permission might be accorded for suo motu review of the earlier order. Thereafter, the Secretary, Revenue Department approved the proposal to accord permission for review and formal order according permission was issued on 5.4.79. Mr. Lala has submitted that from the order sheets of the relevant file it is clear that before according approval the competent authority applied its mind to the facts of the case and as such it cannot be said that the previous permission was given mechanically and without application of mind. 9. Mr. Lala has submitted that on going through the registered deed executed on 11.8.58, it becomes apparent that the deed was a temporary 'Ijara' and the right over the watery land of late Adhir Chandra Dey the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was confined to rearing and catching fish and nothing else. He did not get any right over the sub-soil and as such, although the registered deed termed it as lease, in fact it was a licence and not lease. The predecessor-in-interest of the appellants being a mere licensee question of acquisition of right to be treated raiyat or tenant under section 135 (d) of the TLR and LR Act could not and did not arise and consequently there occurred an error of law apparent on the face of the record in passing the earlier order dated 25.9.78 and the Collector in the exercise of power under section 96 (1) of the TLR and LR Act has rightly reviewed the earlier order. Mr. Lala has submitted that it is not disputed that exercise of power to review under section 96 (1) of the TLR and LR Act by the Collector in his own motion, was not barred by limitation. Mr. Lala has submitted that materials on records clearly indicate that the order dated 10.3.80 was passed suo motu and not at the instance of the Govt. Mr. Lala has submitted that materials on records clearly indicate that the order dated 10.3.80 was passed suo motu and not at the instance of the Govt. As such question of institution of suit as contemplated und.-r section 11 (4) of TLR and LR Act did not and could not arise. In support of his contentions Mr. Lala has placed reliance on the decision in the following cases : I. First Appeal No 3 of 1983 (judgment delivered on 27.7.89 - Land Acquisition Collector, West Tripura vs. Kirit Bikram Deb Barma); 2. Anand Behera vs. State of Orissa, reported in AIR 1956 SC 17 ; 3. Asnini Kumar Das & others vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 1963 CWN 993; and 4. BM Lai vs. Dunlop Rubber Company & others reported in AIR 1968 SC 175 . 10. In reply, Mr. Bhattacharjee has submitted that the records disclose that the competent authority below simply wrote the note 'yes please' and put initial and did not pass any order according permission, which clearly shows thr.t the permission for suo motu review of the earlier order was accorded mechanically and without application of mind. Mr. Bhattacharjee has further submitted that the dicision of Aswini Kumar Das (supra) was rendered on basis of the provisions of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, which is quite distinct and different from those of the TLR and LR Act and as such has no application on the facts of the instant case. 11. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellants as well as on behalf of the respondents and have perused the materials on records. 12. The submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents that the question of legality and/or validity of the previous permission having been urged for the first time in course of argument, the respondents have been deprived of the opportunity to controvert and rebut the contentions, no doubt, has force. Since the question raised, goes to root of the jurisdiction of the Collector and the respondents having placed materials before us, we do not propose to reject the submission of the appellants because this point has not been specifically urged either in the writ petition or in the Memo of Appeal. We have perused the materials on record. Since the question raised, goes to root of the jurisdiction of the Collector and the respondents having placed materials before us, we do not propose to reject the submission of the appellants because this point has not been specifically urged either in the writ petition or in the Memo of Appeal. We have perused the materials on record. The materials on record produced before us, disclose that the Collector approached the Govt for according necessary permission for review of the order dated 25.9.78 passed by his predecessor-in-office, by a letter dated 15.1.79 addressed to the Secretary to the Govt of Tripura, Revenue Department Thereafter, the Govt of Tripura, Revenue Department called for the relevant case records from the Collector and the Secretariat processed the case and placed the same before the Secre­tary to the Govt of Tripura, Revenue Department for passing necessary order. The Secretary after going through the records at the bottom of the note approved the proposal for according permission and wrote 'yes please'. Thereafter, by letter dated 5.4.79 permission for suo motu review under section 96 (1) of the TLR and LR Act was conveyed. On perusal of the records and the order sheet, we find that the relevant file with notes was placed before the Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura Revenue Department for consi­deration of the proposal for according permission. We make a judicial notice that, this is the usual practice followed by the Govt. in according sanction and permission. 13. In the case of Edwingson Bareh vs. State of Assam & others reported in AIR 1966 SC 1220 , validity of constitution of separate District Council of Jowai Sub-division was considered. In that case on receiving certain representations, the Governor of Assam appointed a Commission under para­graph 14 (1) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. The Commission was required to examine and report in the matter of-(l) creation of new Autonomous District for the people of Jowai Sub-division of United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, and (ii) exclusion of the area from the Autonomous District Council of United Khasi and Jaintia Hills. The Commission was required to examine and report in the matter of-(l) creation of new Autonomous District for the people of Jowai Sub-division of United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, and (ii) exclusion of the area from the Autonomous District Council of United Khasi and Jaintia Hills. The Commission submitted report recommending creation of Autonomous District Council for people of Jowai Sub-division on consideration of the report of the Commission, the Council ff Ministers in the meeting on 28.4.64 decided to accept the recommendation and a explanatory memorandum was then drawn up and the whole file was placed before the Governor. After the Governor read the file on 21.9.64 wrote on it 'Seen. Thanks'. The question arose, whether the procedure followed in that case was complied under para 14of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution or not. In para 33of the judgment the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "33. For the purpose of dealing with this aspect of the matter in the present appeal, we are prepared to assume that when para 14 (2) refers to the Governor, it refers to him as Governor who must act on his own and not be assisted by the advice tendered to him by the Council of Ministers. Even on that assumption, we are unable to see how the procedure followed in the present case can in substance, be said to contravene the substantial requirements of para 14 (2). What para 14 (2) requires is that before the matter goes to the Legislature of the State, the Governor must apply his mind to it and make his recommendations on it. It would b; unreasonable to suggest that in considering the report, the Governor is precluded from receiving the assistance of the Council of Ministers before he makes up his mind as to what recommendations should be sent before the Legislature of the State. If the Governor think that the question raised by the report should first be considered by the Council of Ministers and then submitted to him we do not see how it can be said the para 14 (2) has not been complied with. On the other band, if the Governor, in the contest, is expected to act as a Constitutional Governor, it would be appropriate that the matter should first be examined by the Council of Ministers and then submitted to him for his own recommen­dations. On the other band, if the Governor, in the contest, is expected to act as a Constitutional Governor, it would be appropriate that the matter should first be examined by the Council of Ministers and then submitted to him for his own recommen­dations. However one looks at it, the facts disclosed in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Assam unmistakably show that the matter has been considered both by the Governor and the Council of Ministers and they are all agreed that the recommendations of the Commission should be accepted. The criticism that the Governor has not made any recommendation as such but has merely consented himself with making a short note "Seen, thanks", has, in our opinion, no substance. We have looked at the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Assam and have examined the other documentary evidence to which our attention was drawn. In the present case, the record clearly shows that the Commission recommended that a new Autonomous District should be created, the Governor agreed with the said recommen­dation, and so did the Council of Ministers. Therefore, we see no reasons to interfere with the majority decision of the High Court that the power conferred on the Governor by para 1 (3) of the Sixth Schedule has been validly and properly exercised by him." We are of the view that when after processing the case by the Secretariat the case records were placed before the competent authority with the proposal to accord permission it is to be presumed that the approving authority after going through the records, applied mind before accepting the proposal to accord permission and that the contention that the approving authority did not apply its mind merely because by making writing "Yes please" in the order sheet, is not acceptable. The judgment and order passed in the case of Mohendra Chandra Das (supra) on which the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance, was rendered on consideration of the facts of that case. 14. The judgment and order passed in the case of Mohendra Chandra Das (supra) on which the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance, was rendered on consideration of the facts of that case. 14. As to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that after passing of the final order by the Collector on 25.9.58, only remedy open to the Govt was to institute civil suit contesting the order passed in revision within a period of 6 months as contemplated under section 11 (4) of TLR and LR Act, on perusal of the materials on records, we find that the impugned order dated 10.3.80 was not rendered by the Collector, because of the fact that Govt raised dispute or claim over the land after passing of the order dated 25.9.78. It is apparent that the Collector being satisfied that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was in fact not a tenant in respect of the watery land under the ex-proprietor at the time when the land vested in the Govt, decided to review the order dated 25.9.78 in his own motion. As such question of institution of suit by Govt, as contemplated under section 11 (4) of the TLR and LR Act, did not arise. As to the submission whether the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants held the land in question as tenant under the ex-proprietor, to appreciate the rival contentions, it is proper to quote the following provisions of the TLR and LR Act. "2 (b) 'agriculture' includes horticulture, the raising of annual or periodical crops or garden produce, dairy farming, poultry farming, stock breeding, grazing and pisciculture; 135. "2 (b) 'agriculture' includes horticulture, the raising of annual or periodical crops or garden produce, dairy farming, poultry farming, stock breeding, grazing and pisciculture; 135. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any agreement or contract, express or implied with effect from the vesting date - (a) each estate to which the notification relates and all rights, title and interest of intermediaries in such estate shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances, including - (i) rights in hats, bazars, ferries, forests, wastelands, abadi sites, fisheries, tolls and other interests; (ii) rights in any building other than a dwelling house or in any part of such building, used primarily as office or cut cherry for collection of rent; (b) all grants and confirmation of title to the estate and rights there­in made in favour of an intermediary shall cease and determine; (c) any building used for educational or charitable purposes and held by the intermediary shall vest in the Government for those educational or charitable purposes; (d) subject to the other provisions of this Act, every tenant holding any land under an intermediary shall hold the same directly under the Government as a raiyat thereof or (as a non-agricultural tenant thereof, as the case may be) and shall be liable to pay to the Government land revenue equal to the rent payable by him to the intermediary on the vesting date, subject to a maximum of the value of one-eight of the gross produce which value shall be determined in the manner prescribed;" 15. On a plain reading of the provisions of section 135 (d) of TLR and LR Act it becomes apparent that in case the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants held the watery land in question as tenant thereof under the ex-proprietor, after the land vested in the Govt he would have continued to hold thereof as 'raiyat' or tenant directly under the Govt. It is, therefore, to be seen as to whether their predecessor-in-interest held the watery land measuring about 8 Kanis as tenant or as licensee under the original propri­etor by virtue of the registered deed executed on 11.8.58. On perusal thereof we find that as per the deed, late Adhir Chandra Dey, the appellants predecessor-in-interest, took temporary 'Ijara' lease of watery land (lake) for 5 years and his right thereon was confined to rear and catch fish. On perusal thereof we find that as per the deed, late Adhir Chandra Dey, the appellants predecessor-in-interest, took temporary 'Ijara' lease of watery land (lake) for 5 years and his right thereon was confined to rear and catch fish. The deed conferred no right over the sub-soil of the watery land. The statement made in the return in Form No. 55 under Rule 175 of the Rules, by the original owner is apparently inconsistent with the contents of the registered deed dated 11.8.58 inasmuch as per the statement made in Form 55, the predece­ssor-in-interest of the appellants held the land under 'Ijara' lease for 10 years. It is well settled that whether the occupier of land is a lessee or licensee the label which the parties choose to put upon the deed is not decisive. The answer is to gathered from construction of the terms of agreement stipulated in the deed, its objects and the circumstances under which it was executed. 16. In the case of Ananda Behera (supra) at para 9 and 10 the Hon'ble Supreme Court amongst other held : "9. The facts disclosed in para 3 of the petition make it clear that what was sold was the right to catch and carry away fish in specific sections of the lake over a specified period. That amounts to a licence to enter on the land coupled with a grant to catch and carry away the fish, that is to say, it ha 'profit a prendre': see 11 Halsburry's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition) pages 382 and 383. 10. Section 3 (26), General Clauses Act, defines 'immovable property' as including benefits that arise out of the land. The Transfer of Property Act does not defines the term except to say that immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. 10. Section 3 (26), General Clauses Act, defines 'immovable property' as including benefits that arise out of the land. The Transfer of Property Act does not defines the term except to say that immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. As fish do not come under that category the definition in the General Clauses Act applies and as a 'profit a preadre' is regarded as a benefit arising out of land it follows that it is immovable property within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act." In para 11 of the case of the Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fisherman Co-operative Society vs. Siphai Singh ( AIR 1977 SC 2149 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court amongst other held : "...The right to catch and take away the fish being a "profit a prendre' i.e. a profit or benefit arising out of the land, it has to regarded as immovable property within the meaning of TP Act read in the light of section 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act ..... Even if the settlement of Jalkar with respondent No. 1 is regarded as lease as described by him in Annexure 2 to the writ petition. It could not make any difference because lease of fishery which immovable property as defined by section 2 (6) of the Registration Act, if it is for any lease exceeding one year or seasons a yearly renewal has also to be registered by section 17 (6) (d) of the Indian Registration Act." In the case of Soroj Kumar Rose (supra) the lessor granted a registered lease of Jalkar Fishery right in tank without sub-soil to the lessee for a term of 11 years upto and including the Bengali year 1369 at an annual rent. Under the Act the interest of ths intermediaries vested in the State with effect from 15.4.1955. The lessor filed a suit for recovery of rent for the year 1361 and 1362 BS together with interest. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case held that the lessor was entitled to recover the rent for the years 1361 and 1362 BS as his interest did not vest in the State either as tenants or as inter­mediaries in view of section 6 and the provisions of Chapter VI of the Act were given effect to from Baishakh 1363 BS. 17. 17. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Aswini Kumar Das (supra) placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ananda Behera (supra) held that the right of fishery was not right in land. It is what might be called 'profit a prendre' which meant profit or benefit arising out of the land, and therefore, the petitioners right was not a right in land but benefit arising out of it. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ananda Behera (supra) held that a deed of contract to catch fishes in watery land was a licence and right to catch fish did not create any right on sub-soil. Howe­ver, in the instant case, by the deed, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant was given right to rear and catch fish for 5 years. Now, whether such right created tenancy or not, is to be considered in the light of the provisions of TLR and LR Act. In First Appeal No, 3 of 1983 (Land Acquisition Collector vs. Kirit Bikram Deb Barma) two watery tanks along with others land belonging to the ex-ruler of Tripura were acquired by the Govt for public purpose. At the time of acquisition these two tanks had been in occupation of a second party by virtue of a registered deed of temporary 'Ijara' lease for 5 years with effect from 1.6.68 to 31.8.73 for rearing and catching fish in the tanks. On perusal of the documents this Court found that as per terms of the deed right conferred on the occupier of the tanks was confined to rear and catch fish and no other specific right over the tank or sub-soil was given and accordingly in the judgment dated 21.7.89 passed in First Appeal No. 3 of 1983 held that the transaction was a licence and not a lease. As already observed, right of predecessor-in-interest of the appellants as per the deed executed on 11,8.58, was confined to rear and catch fish. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the decision of this Court rendered in First Appeal No. 3 of 1983 was confined to facts of that case and is not applicable on the facts of the present case. We are unable to accept the contention. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the decision of this Court rendered in First Appeal No. 3 of 1983 was confined to facts of that case and is not applicable on the facts of the present case. We are unable to accept the contention. The terms of agreement of the deed considered by the Court in First Appeal No. 3 of 1983 are narrated in the judgment and on perusal thereof we find that the terms of agreement of that deed are similar to those of the deed dated 11.8.58 by which the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was inducted in the watery land measuring 8 Kanis to rear and catch fish. We do not find any reason to differ with the decision of the Division Bench holding that the deed of temporary 'Ijara' lease to rear and catch fish was a licence and not lease and the occupier thereon was a licensee. Non consideration of the fact that deed dated 11.8.58 was a licence and the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was a licensee and not a lessee in respect of watery land measuring 8 Kanis by the Collector while passing the earlier order dated 25.9.78, was an error apparent on the face of the record and, as such, passing of the subsequent order dated 10.3.80 in the exercise of power under section 96 (1) of TLR and LR Act by the Collector cannot be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. For the reasons stated above, we are inclined to hold that the judg­ment and order passed by the Single Bench does not suffer from any infirmity which merits interference. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. We make no order to costs.