JUDGMENT Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. 1. This is an appeal against the order dated 18th March, 1993 passed by the learned trial Judge dismissing the writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in which only liberty was given to the appellant-petitioner to file a suit. The fact of the case relevant for the purpose of this appeal is that Midnapore Zilia-Parishad by notice dated 26th March 1992 invited tenders for auction of Srirampur Ferry Service for a period of 1 year from 1st Baishakh 1399 B.S. corresponding to 14th April, 1992 to 30th Chaitra 1399 B.S. corresponding to 13th April, 1993. The said auction was held for grant of settlement of Srirampur Ferry Ghat and that the appellant/petitioner participated in the said tender and on the basis of which an auction was held on 10th April, 1992. It also appears that the said notice inviting tenders dated 26th March, 1992 was issued pursuant to judgment-and order dated 11th April 1992 passed by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. passed in C.O. No. 7777(w) of 1991. The said order passed by Paritosh Kumar Mukherjee, J. was affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court on 7th April, 1992 passed in F.M.A.T. No. 965 of 1992. 2. The appellant as well as another person participated in the said tender. The appellant was declared highest bidder by the Midnapore Zilla Parishad authorities and the appellant’s bid was Rs. 1,93,000/- while the bid of the other bidder was Rs. 1,92,700/-. Accordingly the appellant was declared as the highest bidder and the appellant was directed by Midnapore Zilla Parishad to deposit the entire money on the spot on that date, i.e. 10th April, 1992 when the auction was held and accordingly, the appellant, deposited the sum of Rs. 1,93,000/- in cash under a money receipt. 3. Thereafter, on 13th April, 1992 the appellant was served with a letter dated 10th April, 1992 issued by the Secretary Midnapore Zilla Parishad in which the appellant was informed that the appellant was appointed as Izaradar of Srirampur Ferry Ghat for a period of one year 'from 1st Baishakh 1399 B.S. to 30th Chaitra 1399 B.S. corresponding to 14th April 1992 to 13th April, 1933, respectively according to English Calendar year. In the said order it was mentioned that the appellant would be given possession of the said ferry ghat on and from 1st Baishakh 1399 B.S. which, corresponds to 14th April, 1992. The rate of the toll that was prevailing in the said ferry ghat was revised by the Commissioner by Burdwan Division with effect from 1st Baishakh 1399 B.S. in pursuance of the order dt. 11th March, 1992 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in a writ proceeding and that taking advantage of the said revised rate, some interested persons created disturbances in the said ferry ghat and that apprehending disturbances the Zilla Parishad authorities intimated Sub-Divisional Officer, Sabhadhipati, Panchayat Samity, Block Development Officer, Sub-Divisional Police Officer and the Police Authorities to extend all sorts of help to the appellant-petitioner so that the appellant petitioner can collect the revised rate of toll approved by the Government but nothing were done. 4. On 14th April, 1992, i.e. 1st Baishakh 1399 B.S. the appellant went to take physical possession of the said ferry ghat pursuant to the letter issued by the Secretary, Midnapore Zilla Parishad dt. 10th April, 1992 and at the time some people under the leadership of the unsuccessful bidder obstructed the appellant from taking possession of the ferry service and that it is alleged that the people under the leadership of the said unsuccessful bidder and the local M.L.A. started disturbances in running the ferry service and prevented the appellant from collecting the revised rate. Accordingly, the appellant informed the higher authorities. It is not necessary to go into the details of this case in as much as the Additional District Magistrate, Midnapore who was also Additional Executive Officer, Midnapore Zilla Parishad informed the Sub-divisional Officer, and Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Tamluk by radiogram which reads as follows : "Shri Basudev Mondal of Srirampore is the legal lessee of Zilla Parishad in respect of Srirampore Ferry Ghat for 1992-93 with effect from 14.4.92 to 13.4.93 (1399 B.C.) ( .). It has been reported that some miscreants are creating hindrance and preventing from collecting Ferry Charges (.) The same should be stopped immediately ( .) Shri Basudev Mondal should be provided all necessary help in the management of the said Ferry Service. It has been reported that some miscreants are creating hindrance and preventing from collecting Ferry Charges (.) The same should be stopped immediately ( .) Shri Basudev Mondal should be provided all necessary help in the management of the said Ferry Service. (.)." The possession of the said ferry ghat was ultimately obtained the appellant only 5th June 1992 and that because of this appellant was prevented from collecting the tolls of the said ferry ghat for 53 days. It is alleged that the Zilla Parishad authorities took no effective steps to the hooliganism and vandalism in collecting the tolls at Srirampur ferry service and also did not take any step to give physical possession of the ferry service to the appellant till 5th June, 1992. The appellant authorities also did not take any steps for rendering necessary police help and that because of the inaction on the part of the respondents the appellant had to move this Court by a Writ application whereupon Ruma Pal, J. passed an order on 29th May, 1992 and pursuant to the order passed by Ruma Pal, J. by which the police authorities were directed to implement the order already passed by the S.D.M., Tamluk for the purpose of rendering necessary police assistance which was urgently required for the purpose of running the ferry service of the said ferry ghat and because of this thing that has happened the appellant lost 53 days. It is alleged that the appellant had to incur loss of Rs. 300/- per day for three boats and that the appellant also incurred loss by paying wages to 11 employees of the ferry ghat without any work for which the appellant had to pay Rs. 25/- per head per day for all these workers for 53 days. According to appellant the loss incurred was Rs. 68,317/- for which necessary details were disclosed in the petition. 5. Mr. Kashi Kanta Moitra, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that even though the contract was for 365 days and after the contract was entered into and after the appellant had paid the said sum of Rs. 1,93,000/- for the entire year, it was the duty on the part of the Zilla Parishad authorities to had over possession to the appellant and that it was only because of obtaining an order from criminal court enforced by writ court. 1,93,000/- for the entire year, it was the duty on the part of the Zilla Parishad authorities to had over possession to the appellant and that it was only because of obtaining an order from criminal court enforced by writ court. The appellant could not get possession of 53 days from the date of getting possession and accordingly, the appellant was entitled to adequate compensation-or in the alternative the appellant should be allowed to run 53 days more i.e. upto 5th June, 1993. Under the contract the period was to expire on 13th April, 1993 and that it was further submitted that in the meantime the Zilla Parishad authorities were going on to invite tenders for the purpose of settling the said ferry ghat with effect from 14th April, 1993. It was submitted by Mr. Moitra that writ court is competent to grant adequate compensation as the Zilla Parishad authorities are public authorities discharging the public duties and that in the facts and circumstances of the case when because of the laches and negligence on the part of the public authorities, the appellant was deprived of realising 53 days income, the appellant was bound to be compensated by such public authorities. 6. Mr. R. C. Das, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 5 submitted that the appellant was not entitled to get compensation from the Zilla Parishad authorities. According to Mr. Das suit was the only remedy for obtaining compensation. The Supreme Court in the case of Sri Anadi Mukta Sadguru etc. Vs. V.R. Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607 observed: “The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. It may be recalled that the remedy by prerogative writs in England started very limited scope and suffered from mah procedural disadvantages. To overcome the difficulties, Lord Gardiner (the Lord Chancellor) in pursuance of s. 3(1) (e) of the Law Commission Act, 1965, requested the Law Commission “to review the existing remedies for the Judicial Control of administrative acts and commissions with a view to evolving a simpler and more effective procedure”. The Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law Com. No. 73). It was implemented by Rules of Court (Order 53) in 1977 and given statutory force in 1981 by s. 32 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981. The Law Commission made their report in March 1976 (Law Com. No. 73). It was implemented by Rules of Court (Order 53) in 1977 and given statutory force in 1981 by s. 32 of the Supreme Court Act, 1981. It combined all the former remedies into one proceedings called Judicial combined all the former remedies into one proceeding called Judicial review. Lord Denning explains the scope of this “Judicial review.” “At one stroke the courts could grant whatever relief was appropriate, Not only certiorari and mandamus but also declaration and injunction. Even damages. The procedure was much more simple' and expeditious. Just a summons instead of a writ. No formal pleadings. The evidence was given by affidavit. As a rule no cross-examination, no discovery, and so forth. But there were important safeguards. In particular, in order to quality, the applicant had to get the• leave of a Judge. The statute is phrased in flexible terms. It gives scope for development. It uses the words "having regard to". Those words are very' indefinite. The result is that the courts are not bound hand and foot by the previous law. They are to have regard to ‘it so the previous, law, as to who are an who are not public authorities is not absolutely binding Nor is the previous law as to the matters in respect of which relief may be granted. This means that the Judges can develop the public law as they think best. That they have done and are doing”-(See The Closing Chapter-by Rt. Hon Lord Denning p.122).- It was further observed at para 21 in that judgment by the Supreme Court: "Here again we may point out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, professor D' Smith states: "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract." (Judicial review of Administrative Act 4th Ed. p. 540). We share this view. The Judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. p. 540). We share this view. The Judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a' very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found' Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Art. 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the Writ petition." 7. With regard to obligation arising out of contract it is now well settled that a State should not seek to defeat the legitimate claim of the citizen by adopting a legalistic attitude but should do what fairness and justice' demand. In this connection a reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Hindusthan Sugar Mills vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. reported in AIR 1981 SC 1681 wherein Supreme Court held that the Central Government should honour its legal obligation- arising out of contract and not drive the citizen concerned to file a suit for recovery of the amount. In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, it is the duty of the State to do what is fair and just to the citizen, and the State should not seek to defeat the legitimate claim of the citizen by adopting' a legalistic attitude but should do what fairness and justice demand. It is also settled that in respect of the pure contracts between the parties' in Private law rights writ petition is not maintainable and that 'prerogative remedies-are' not available to control the activities of bodies which derive from jurisdiction solely from contract. There is a distinction, the clear, between rights derived from contract which are classed as private law' rights and derived from public law. By public law rights, the court 'generally mean the ability to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the court to ensure that public authorities perform their statutory duties and properly exercise their statutory powers. Where the contract is entered into by, the statutes, the liabilities created under such a contract could not be avoided by such public authorities at will. By public law rights, the court 'generally mean the ability to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the court to ensure that public authorities perform their statutory duties and properly exercise their statutory powers. Where the contract is entered into by, the statutes, the liabilities created under such a contract could not be avoided by such public authorities at will. In this case admittedly the Zilla Parishad is a body created under the statute, it is discharging public duties under a statute and accordingly the contract entered into by such' public authorities, in' the discharging of its statutory duties are amenable to writ jurisdiction. The settlement of ferry service was made specifically pursuant to the statutory) provisions of Zilla Parishad Act and accordingly this Court have jurisdiction over such matter. The next question is whether compensation could be awarded on the writ application. The power 'of this Court to grant damages has been approved by the Supreme Court in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru (supra) on the claim for damages included in a writ application if such claim is made against public authorities discharging public duties. It is also well settled that the respondent cannot take advantage of their own' laches and negligence or their own wrong and cannot make the other party to suffer. In the instant case, the Zilla Parishad authorities refused to entertain the claim for damages for 53 days loss. Learned trial Judge held that the suit is the appropriate remedy. The claim made by the appellant is undoubtedly against a public authorities who are governed by the public, law and in this connection observation of Lord Diplock in the case of O’ Reilly vs. Madman (1983)2 AC 237 at page 285 is set out: ".. . as a general rule be contrary to public policy, and as such an abuse of the process of the court, to permit a person seeking to establish that a decision of a public authority infringed rights to which he was entitled to protection, under public law to proceed by way of ordinary action and by this means, to evade the provisions of Or. 53 for the protection of such authorities." The Supreme Court also in the case of Rudal Sah vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1983 SC 1986 held that where there was illegal detention even after acquittal in trial apart from release from illegal, detention, State was required to, repair damages done by its Officer to the affected party and accordingly Supreme Court directed payment of monetary compensation, in that case. Same view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of 'Sastain M. Mongrary Vs. Union, of India, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1026 , as well as in the case of Bhim Singh vs. State of J. & K. reported in AIR 1986 SC 494 . In M. C. Mehta vs. Union of India, reported in' AIR 1987 SC 1086 the Supreme Court held that, industries engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and, harm results to anyone on account of any accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity, industry is liable to compensate affected persons by monetary compensation. 8. The right of the writ court to grant compensation was also considered by the Supreme Court in the case of A.S. Mittal Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1989 SC 1570 . These cases established the principle that in case of infraction of any right fundamental and/or otherwise, the writ court is competent to pass an order for compensation for damage done to its citizen otherwise it would amount to doing mere injustice to the citizen which the State has grossly violated. This principle holds good in case of other cases of damage caused in other spheres by public authorities discharging public duties. 9. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, we are of the view that the facts and circumstances of the case even though this court have power to order payment of compensation it is rather difficult on the part of this Court to determine the amount of damages suffered for which the appellant was entitled to get compensation. Even if the case is decided by the Civil Court, the Civil Court would also be a handicapped as to quantum of damages to be awarded in the facts and circumstances of the case. Even if the case is decided by the Civil Court, the Civil Court would also be a handicapped as to quantum of damages to be awarded in the facts and circumstances of the case. Because of the difficulties we are of the view that the problem before us could be solved by simply directing the contractual period to extend for another period of 53 days which was lost by the appellant because of the inaction on the part of the respondents and that this would adequately compensate the 53 days' loss of income and damages. The Respondent Zilla Parishad realished, the entire sum of Rs. 1,93,000/- for whole of the year but allowed to run the said Ferry Ghat 53 days short of one year. 10. Accordingly, we are of the view that the learned trial Judge was wrong in dismissing the writ application summarily and directing the appellant to file a suit for recovery of damages in the facts and circumstances of the case when admittedly the appellant lost clear 53 days income and suffered damages for all these days for no fault of the appellant and that the respondents cannot take advantage of their own wrong and cannot take such a stand. It is the duty on the part of the respondents to act fairly and reasonably as a public authority discharging public duties in accordance with statutory provisions. Accordingly, the respondent are directed to allow the appellant-petitioner to continue to realise the tolls of the ferry ghat under the contract upto 5th June, 1993 and that the respondents authorities would be at liberty to invite tenders for settling the said ferry ghat only with effect from 6th June 1993. The order of the Learned trial Judge dated 18th March, 1993 is set aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. 11. Let a xerox copy of this judgment be given to the learned Advocates for the parties on usual undertaking. Appeal allowed and the impugned order set aside. Respondents directed to allow appellant-petitioner to continue to realise the tolls of the ferry ghat up to 5th June, 1993. Rabin Bhattachayya, J.: I agree.