LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA v. REKHABEN KANAIYALAL PARMAR
1993-03-30
S.NAINAR SUNDARAM, SHARAD D.DAVE
body1993
DigiLaw.ai
S. NAINAR SUNDARAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge passed in Special Civil Application No. 1374 of 1991. Earlier we ordered notice pending admission. Finding that appearance has been entered for the respondent through her learned counsel Mr. J. J. Yagnik and considering the limited scope of the controversy in this Letters Patent Appeal we decided to dispose it of on merits. ( 2 ) WE heard submissions in full of Mr. K. N. Raval learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. J. J. Yagnik learned counsel for the respondent on the merits of the case. ( 3 ) THE respondent herein is the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 1374 of 1991 and the appellant herein is respondent in the Special Civil Application. For the sake of convenience we shall refer to the parties as per their nomenclature in the Special Civil Application. ( 4 ) THE petitioner is the widow of one Kanaiyalal L. Parmar who was employed as a peon under the respondent and who died in harness on 27. 3. 1976. On the date of his demise he left a son who was then only 2 years and. 9 months old. The petitioner the widow did not choose to seek any employment for herself under the respondent on compassionate grounds within the time limit. However after the lapse of 15 years the petitioner ventured to apply for an appointment for her son on compassionate grounds. This application was rejected by the respondent on the ground that it was belated. The petitioner filed the Special Civil Application -to quash the communication of the respondent in this behalf and to direct the respondent to offer appointment to the son of the petitioner on compassionate grounds. The learned single Judge who dealt with the Special Civil Application of course took note of the fact that the application for appointment on compassionate grounds had come to be made beyond time; the time limit being 2 years from the date of the demise of the employee yet on a reasoning that 2 years time would run only on the son of the petitioner attaining majority chose to give a direction to the respondent to consider the application of the petitioner for employment of her son on compassionate grounds. ( 5 ) MR.
( 5 ) MR. K. N. Raval learned counsel for the respondent appellant herein would submit that there cannot be importing of any ficition in a matter of policy governing appointment on compassionate grounds and the learned single Judge ought not to have directed the consideration of the application for appointment of the petitioners son on compassionate grounds when the application had come to be made 15 years after the demise of the employee. Mr. J. J. Yagnik learned counsel for the petitioner/respondent herein would submit that the objective behind the policy for giving employment on compassionate grounds is only to rehabilitate the destitute family of the employee who dies in harness and keeping in mind this objective behind the policy. We must hold that what the learned single Judge did is perfectly in order. It is true that the learned counsel for the respondent would also place reliance on instructions issued by the concerned Executive Director on 20. 1. 1987 on the subject wherein under clause (3) it is notified that where all the children are minors the appointment may be considered upto three years from the date of death. Mr. J. J. Yagnik learned counsel for the petitioner objects to placing any reliance on these instructions on the ground that this material was not at all pressed into service before the learned single Judge. But we find that even without reference to these instructions there is no dispute that ordinarily an application [or appointment on compassionate grounds should be made within 2 years from the dale of the demise of the employee. The instructions now relied on only enlarges the time limit upto 3 years in case all the children are minors. On the simple ground that the person in the family of the deceased employee who would be eligible otherwise for appointment on compassionate grounds was not able to apply because. of his being a minor there could not be an extension of the time until he attains majority in the absence of a provision made therefor in any of the Rules Regulations Circulars or instructions governing the services under the respondent. It would be most inappropriate for this Court to substitute or superimpose its own views on the subject of policy decision.
It would be most inappropriate for this Court to substitute or superimpose its own views on the subject of policy decision. To enlarge such policy decision governing the services under the respondent by substitution of the views of this Court on equitable grounds will lead to drastic and unpredictable results and situations in the service parlance of the respondent. Whatever has not been expressed anywhere in the service parlance shall not be imported by a view of this Court however liberal it may choose to be. Our attention was drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner to a pronouncement of a learned single Judge of this court in Divyaben D. Oza vs. Divisional Controller. State Road Transport Corporation Ahmedabad XXX (2) GLR page 969 to say that there could be appointment on compassionate grounds even beyond the prescribed period. Such was not the proposition countenanced at all in the pronouncement. There the policy was revised so as to make a provision for examining the question of appointment being given on compassionate grounds even beyond the normal period of 5 years from the date of the demise of the employee. Such a provision is lacking here. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent it is not possible to give an expansive construction over a policy decision. Apparently the objective behind the policy is where an employee dies in harness and his family faces stringent financial circumstances there should be a provision to help or assist the rehabilitation of the family at that juncture. But there has got to be a reasonable time to work out this objective and the reasonable time that has been expressed is normally 2 years from the date of the demise of the employee and 3 years in case all the children are minors. If within the period none in the family of the deceased employee being eligible is available for getting the appointment on compassionate grounds the Court is not supposed to put a larger construction so as to rewrite the policy itself. ( 6 ) THIS being our conviction on the question we are obliged to allow this Letters Patent Appeal. Thus this Letters Appeal is allowed; the order of the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 1374 of 1991 is set aside and that Special Civil Application will stand dismissed. We make no order as to costs.
( 6 ) THIS being our conviction on the question we are obliged to allow this Letters Patent Appeal. Thus this Letters Appeal is allowed; the order of the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 1374 of 1991 is set aside and that Special Civil Application will stand dismissed. We make no order as to costs. However it is open to the petitioners son to ask for appointment under the respondent on his own independent right and certainly dehors the question of appointment will look into the request of the petitioners son and view it sympathetically and extend him reliefs if that is feasible. Application Allowed. .