GULAB C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellant, Smt. Surjeet Kaur, feels aggrieved by her conviction under S. 302, I. P. C. and sentence of life imprisonment by judgement dated 2/04/1986 passed by Shri D. P. Verma, I Addl. Sessions Judge, Raipur in Sessions Trial No. 64. of 1985 and challenges legality and validity thereof in this appeal filed under S. 374 (2), Cr. P. C. ( 2 ) THE appellant is alleged to have caused death of Smt. Harjinder Kaur, wife of Gurdeep Singh, her daughter-in-law on 3/01/1985 by pouring kerosene oil on her body and lighting fire. Prosecution alleges that the deceased was married to appellant's son on 25-2-1984 and lived with the appellant in the same house at Housing Board Colony, Birgaon, Raipur. It is also alleged that the appellant used to ill-treat the deceased and demand dowry. It is alleged that on 3-1-1985 at about 9. 00 a. m. , the appellant sprinkled kerosene oil on the deceased and set fire to her. The deceased is alleged to have been pushed inside the room and locked from outside. The deceased started crying for help loudly and her screams attracted attention of neighbours, who assembled at the place for help. Husband of the deceased was not present in the house. The appellant's husband Santosh Singh, however, got the door opened and thereafter, both the appellant and her husband tried to put off the fire. The deceased was, however, severely burnt and was rushed to D. K. Hospital, where she was found to have 95% burns. Her dying declaration (Ex. P/16) was recorded by Komal Singh, ADM (PW 7) at 12. 05 p. m. on 3-1-1985 itself, where the deceased stated that the appellant had poured kerosene oil on her and lighted the fire, resulting in burn injuries. The deceased succumbed to injuries on the night between 7th and 8/01/1985 at the hospital. Dr. D. C. Jain (PW2) performed autopsy of the dead body and opined that death was caused due to burn injuries, which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The appellant and her minor daughter Nirmal Kaur were thereafter charged under Ss. 302 and 498-A, I. P. C. and sent for trial. Nirmal Kaur being a juvenile is being tried before the Juvenile Court. ( 3 ) THE appellant denied having committed any offence. The appellant and her minor daughter Nirmal Kaur were thereafter charged under Ss. 302 and 498-A, I. P. C. and sent for trial. Nirmal Kaur being a juvenile is being tried before the Juvenile Court. ( 3 ) THE appellant denied having committed any offence. She however, admitted that deceased suffered burn injuries and died as a result thereof. She however, submitted that the deceased, in order to pressurise her and the family to remake gold bangles for her, had sprinkled kerosene oil on her person and put fire. She could not, however, manage the fire and suffered severe burns. Her specific defence is that her husband and son are engaged in business. Their shop was damaged in the mob frenzy following the murder of Smt. Indira Gandhi in November, 1984. In order to restart the business, her two gold bangles were sold much against her wish. She wanted the family to remake two gold bangles for her before Lodhi festival and in order to put pressure on them, followed the aforesaid method. It is also submitted that the deceased never anticipated that she would not be able to control the fire and would suffer severe injuries resulting in her death. It is thus submitted that though death of the deceased is unfortunate and be lamented, the appellant is not in any manner responsible for the same. As regards dying declaration (Ex. P /16), it is submitted that it is not the statement of the deceased and is a concoction and her real statement recorded earlier by the police has been withheld. It is also the appellant's case that the deceased having burnt her thumbs, could not have put her thumb-impression on the dying declaration. ( 4 ) THE learned ASJ relying on evidence of Komal Singh, ADM (PW7) held that the dying declaration (P-7) was the true version of the deceased and had her thumb impression. The learned Judge also held that the same was recorded before any one could meet the deceased or tutor her. The learned ASJ also held that since it did not allege anything against Santosh Singh (PW 1), the father-in-law, it was honest. Evidence of Dr. Chandrakar (PW 8) did not, according to learned ASJ, establish that the dying declaration was suspicious or that the deceased was not in a fit condition to give the statement. The learned ASJ also held that since it did not allege anything against Santosh Singh (PW 1), the father-in-law, it was honest. Evidence of Dr. Chandrakar (PW 8) did not, according to learned ASJ, establish that the dying declaration was suspicious or that the deceased was not in a fit condition to give the statement. The learned ASJ also held the defence unreliable and wholly unjustified and rejected the same. The learned Judge, therefore, held that offence under S. 302, I. P. C. was established beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Judge, however, held that the dying declaration could not be used to establish demand of dowry and consequent cruelty as it was outside the purview of S. 34 (1) of the Evidence Act. The other evidence, in this behalf, was not of the requisite quality. The learned Judge, therefore, held that offence under S. 498-A, I. P. C. was not proved. That is how the appellant has been convicted and sentenced under S. 302 I. P. C. , but acquitted under S. 498-A, I. P. C. It is this judgment, which is under challenge in this appeal. ( 5 ) THOUGH the appeal has been argued by Shri Rajendra Singh, Sr. Advocate, for the appellant, with skillful care and preparation and was heard with respect for about two days, we are sorry to state that this care and concern was missing at the side of respondent State of Madhya Pradesh. The appeal was argued by a Panel Lawyer, who was not even given full factual information and could not, for that reason, go beyond the Paper Book, which did not contain the entire record. We do not, however, subscribe to the view that it is adversary litigation, where the Court has only to act as an Umpire. We are aware that a crime concerns the society in general and prosecution for the reason is left to the State. We have, therefore, considered it our solemn obligation to carefully read the record of the case to properly and lawfully appreciate submissions of the appellant. We must, however, observe that our job would have become easier if we had received the corresponding careful and prepared help from the respondent State. ( 6 ) THE submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant are, in the main, as follows :- (1) (i) The dying declaration (Ex. We must, however, observe that our job would have become easier if we had received the corresponding careful and prepared help from the respondent State. ( 6 ) THE submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant are, in the main, as follows :- (1) (i) The dying declaration (Ex. P/16) cannot be the basis of conviction, because - (a) It was not recorded under apprehension of death; (b)it was not signed or thumb marked by the deceased; (c) there are interpolations in it; (d) it is said to have been recorded in Q and A form, but it is really not so indicating that it is not the real one; and (e) real dying declaration was recorded by a policeman earlier and has not been produced perhaps because it did not support the prosecution; (2) Evidence of oral dying declaration is interested and otherwise full of inconsistencies making the same wholly unreliable; and (3) Defence version as made out from the evidence on record is well established. As against it, the learned Panel Lawyer only supported the judgment and submiited that the same was written in accordance with law and needed no interfercnce of this Court. ( 7 ) IT is now well settled that a statement made by a dying person as to the cause of death has been accorded by the Legislature a special sanctity by enacting S. 32 of the Evidence Act and the same has to be, on first principle accepted unless there are clear circumstances brought out in the evidence to show that the person making the statement was (i) not in expectation of death, (ii) that the statement was not made at the earliest opportunity, and (iii) that the statement was not properly recorded. As regards expectation of death, it does not affect its admissibility though it affects its weight. Recording of the statement at the earliest opportunity is insisted upon to avoid the possibility of the person making the statement being tutored. Hence in order to pass the test of reliability, adying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny keeping in view, the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused, who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. Hence in order to pass the test of reliability, adying declaration has to be subjected to a very close scrutiny keeping in view, the fact that the statement has been made in the absence of the accused, who had no opportunity of testing the veracity of the statement by cross-examination. The law in this regard is clearly stated in Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 22 : (1958 Cri LJ 106), the decision strongly relied upon by the appellant. This decision further clarifies that once the Court comes to the conclusion that the dying declaration was the truthful version as to circumstances of the death and assailants of the victim, there is no question of further corroboration. To the same effect is the decision in Thurukanni Pompiah v. State of Mysore, AIR 1965 SC 939 : (1965 (2) Cri LJ 31) also relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. Since then there have been large number of decisions dealing with almost all important aspects of the law on the subject. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Paniban v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 1817 : (1992 Cri LJ 2919), notices all of them and summarizes the law, as under :- ". . . . The principle on which dying declarations are admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim : "memo moriturus proesumitur mentiri a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth". " the situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene when he is dying the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded, it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a scrap of evidence. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot from the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. The Court has laid down in severaljudgements the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under : (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. Munnu Raja v. State of M. P. , (1976) 2 SCR 764 : AIR 1976 SC 2199 : (1976 Cri LJ 1718 ). (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can base conviction on it, without corroboration State of U. P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 : (1986 Cri LJ 836); Ramavati Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164 : (1983 Cri LJ 221 ). (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. Rama Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994 : (1976 Cri LJ 1548 ). (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264 : AIR 1974 SC 332 : (1974 Cri LJ 361 ). Rama Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 SC 1994 : (1976 Cri LJ 1548 ). (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 264 : AIR 1974 SC 332 : (1974 Cri LJ 361 ). (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M. P. , AIR 1982 SC 1021 : (1982 Cri LJ 986 ). (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. Ram Manorath v. State of U. P. , 1981 SCC (Cri) 581. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 6l7 : (1981 Cri LJ 9 ). (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 SC 1505 : (1979 Cri LJ 1182 ). (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. Nanahau Ram v. State, AIR 1988 SC 912 : (1988 Cri LJ 936 ). (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. State of U. P. v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1989 SC 1519 : (1989 Cri LJ 1485 ). Some other recent decisions needing notice are : Surinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1992 SC 2037 : (1992 Cri LJ 3660 ). This was also a case of bride burning and the deceased had suffered 70% burns. Dying declaration of the deceased was challenged on the basis of the evidence of Doctor admitting the deceased in the hospital and recording that the deceased had suffered burn injuries while cooking. The evidence was held not sufficient to discredit dying declaration. This was also a case of bride burning and the deceased had suffered 70% burns. Dying declaration of the deceased was challenged on the basis of the evidence of Doctor admitting the deceased in the hospital and recording that the deceased had suffered burn injuries while cooking. The evidence was held not sufficient to discredit dying declaration. In Surajmal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 559 : (1992 Cri LJ 520), the Medical Officer had during crossexamination stated that he was not sure if the prosecution version of the incident was correct and hence he did not attest the statement. This statement was used to submit that dying declaration was unreliable. The Court rejected the submission and held this 'sporadic admission' of Medical Officer could not in any way affect the veracity of the statement in dying declaration. Similarly, in Gangotrising v. State of U. P. , AIR 1992 SC 948 : (1992 Cri LJ 1290), the challenge to an otherwise proper dying declaration was made on the basis of statement of Medical Officer that the patient had told him that some unknown person had shot at him. Since the Court found that the dying declaration was recorded by an Executive Magistrate and there was no evidence of tutoring, the same could not be rejected only because of the aforesaid state of Medical Officer. It may, therefore, be taken to be well established that though the Court would subject the dying declaration to a close scrutiny to ascertain whether it was honest and truly the statement made by the deceased, it would not reject the same on extraneous consideration such as admissions made by Medical Officer during cross-examination or the like. Indeed once the Court holds that the dying declaration contains the statement of the deceased as to the cause of death and if the same was recorded before any one had the opportunity to tutor the deceased, the same will be accepted and relied upon. ( 8 ) THE dying declaration (Ex. P/16) has been recorded at 12. 05 p. m. as would be clear from the time mentioned on the top of the statement. Certificate of fitness (Ex. P/ 15) given by Dr. Chandrakar at 12 noon mentions that "she is fully conscious and well oriented. She is in condition to give her statement. She is not under effect of any drug. " Dr. 05 p. m. as would be clear from the time mentioned on the top of the statement. Certificate of fitness (Ex. P/ 15) given by Dr. Chandrakar at 12 noon mentions that "she is fully conscious and well oriented. She is in condition to give her statement. She is not under effect of any drug. " Dr. Chandrakar as PW 8 has testified the correctness of the certificate and has further stated that "she remained in the sound condition throughout her statement was recorded. " (para-4 ). In his cross-examination, Dr. Chandrakar has further stated that "when I examined the patient, then I found that she was not in a state of shock. " (para-9 ). Even the A. D. M. , Komalsingh (PW 7) has stated on oath that the deceased was fit to give her statement and doctor was present throughout her statement. It would, therefore, appear that the deceased was in a fit physical and mental condition to give her statement. The statement (Ex. P/16) clearly alleges that the appellant poured kerosene oil on her and lighted fire and thereafter pushed her inside the room. The incident has taken place at about 9. 00 a. m. and the deceased was brought to the hospital at 11. 00 a. m. The dying declaration was recorded at 12. 05 p. m. indicating that it was recorded without any delay and with utmost promptness. No relation of the deceased is shown to have been present with her at the time of recording of the dying declaration or immediately before it. Indeed her mother Minder Kaur (P. F. 16) reached the hospital in the night. Though Dr. Chandrakar (PW 8) has stated about the presence of some police officer recording the statement of the deceased, he does not allege that any police officer has prompted the deceased to give any particular statement. Statement of Komal Singh (PW 7) is that the deceased gave her statement voluntarily and he recorded that statement as given cross-examination of Komalsingh does not show any interest of the witness in the matter. He is an Executive Magistrate and hence it is reasonable to assume that he was interested in lawful recording of the statement. In this view of the matter, the dying declaration must be held to be prompt, voluntarily given and properly recorded. He is an Executive Magistrate and hence it is reasonable to assume that he was interested in lawful recording of the statement. In this view of the matter, the dying declaration must be held to be prompt, voluntarily given and properly recorded. It must also be held that there was no chance of any one influence or tutoring the deceased. This dying declaration thus meets all essential requirements of the law noticed above. ( 9 ) WE may now examine the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant to ascertain whether the dying declaration (Ex. P /16) is made by the deceased in accordance with law and is free from doubt. English law of evidence admits only such statements as dying declaration as are made by the victim under expectation of death. This is, however, not the law in India. Section 32 of the Evidence Act, as observed in Tehalsingh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 1347 : (1979 Cri LJ 1031) does not require that a statement by the victim should be made in expectation of death. Even Khushal Rao's case (1958 Cri LJ 106) lays down this law and holds that survival of the victim may affect the weight to be attached to the statement and nothing more. Then, the victim of the present incident has admittedly died as a result of burn injuries. The submission that she was not expecting death at the time of making the dying declaration seems to be based on the statement of Smt. Minder Kaur (PW 16), the mother of the deceased in para-9 that the condition of the deceased was such that she hoped that she would survive and even the doctors had this feeling. This witness had reached the hospital at 9. 00 p. m. on 3-1-1985. , i. e. , about 9 hours after recording of dying declaration at 12. 05 p. m. Admittedly, she was given medical treatment. Possibility of her condition improving as a result of medication cannot be ruled out. There is, therefore, no justification for the submission that she was not under apprehension of death. Indeed this apprehension is evident from the statement of Rammurthy Naidu (DW2) who claims to have heard her saying"mummi DADDY MUJHE BACHA LO". No one would beg help for survival unless under expectation of death. This Court is, therefore, unable to find any factual basis for the submission. Indeed this apprehension is evident from the statement of Rammurthy Naidu (DW2) who claims to have heard her saying"mummi DADDY MUJHE BACHA LO". No one would beg help for survival unless under expectation of death. This Court is, therefore, unable to find any factual basis for the submission. ( 10 ) DYING declaration (Ex. P/ 16) is said to have been thumb marked by the deceased. The ADM Komalsingh (PW 7) insists that the same is thumb marked by the deceased at place 'a-A'. He has emphatically denied that both thumbs of the deceased were burnt. Dr. Ghanshyam Chandrakar (PW7) has, however, deposed that both thumbs of the victim were burnt, though burns were superficial (para-6 ). It is on the basis of this statement of Dr. Chandrakar that it is argued that the statement could not be thumb-marked by the deceased. The thumb mark on Ex. P/16) is clear and hence contra-indicative of burn. Dr. Chandrakar does not, however, state any foul play at the time of recording of the statement. Indeed, he insisted that the victim was in sound condition while giving statement. He does not state any interference by anyone in the process of recording statement. He has, on the contrary stated clearly that the victim was not in a state of shock. Dr. Amita Thakur (PW 1), who had earlier examined the deceased and given report (Ex. P/1 ) does not say that both thumbs of the deceased were burnt. There is no written report of examination by Dr. Chandrakar. His report about the condition of the victim at the time (Ex. P/15) does not mention this. Clearly, therefore, Dr. Chandrakar was making the statement of thumb burning from his memory. Should this Court discredit ADM Komal Singh (PW 7) only on this basis. This Court finds no justification for adopting such a course. At this stage it is necessary to recall decisions in Gangotri Singh (1992 Cri LJ 1290) and Surajmal (1992 Cri LJ 520) (supra) where similar arguments were advanced in the court on the basis of some statements of Medical Officers. The Court has doubted the honesty of the officer concerned and rejected the submission. Since Dr. Chandrakar did not depose on the basis of any report or document, his statement as aforesaid may reasonably lead to an inference that he was trying to help the appellant in his cross-examination. The Court has doubted the honesty of the officer concerned and rejected the submission. Since Dr. Chandrakar did not depose on the basis of any report or document, his statement as aforesaid may reasonably lead to an inference that he was trying to help the appellant in his cross-examination. In these days of diminishing moral values, such an inference would indeed be justified. Even otherwise a statement given after about 4 months and that too without any documentary aid need not be taken seriously. It cannot in any case, be accepted as sufficient to discard clear and cogent evidence of Komal Singh (PW7) and the dying declaration (Ex. P/16 ). This court is thus not able to accept the submission and is, on the contrary, of the view that (Ex. P/16) bears the thumb mark of the deceased. ( 11 ) THE objection that though questions were asked and answered, the dying declaration is not in question and answer form and must, therefore, be rejected as not being the correct version of the deceased, is also based on the statement of Dr. Ghanshyam Chandrakar (PW 8) made at the fag-end of his cross-examination. It is true that in Rabi Chandra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 1738 : (1980 Cri LJ 1257), the Supreme Court has observed that dying declaration should preferably be in question and answer form, but the same is not laid down as a universal rule. In that case, the dying declaration was very short and cryptic and did not contain full information. There was no effort made to get information by putting question. It was in that context that the Court made those observations. In the present case the dying declaration is complete and hence those observations cannot be used to make it inadmissible. Then, even this objection is based on Dr. Chandrakar's statement in cross-examination and has to be rejected because he being a witness to the recording of the statement does not allege its wrong recording. He also does not allege that anything stated by the deceased was left out or any answer was suggested to the deceased. As against this, there is clear and cogent evidence of Komalsingh ADM (PW 7) that the statement was recorded in the narrative and nothing was suggested to the deceased. He also does not allege that anything stated by the deceased was left out or any answer was suggested to the deceased. As against this, there is clear and cogent evidence of Komalsingh ADM (PW 7) that the statement was recorded in the narrative and nothing was suggested to the deceased. Komal Singh had rushed to the hospital along with the C. S. P. on hearing the incident and did not know details thereof. He had not met anyone who could give him detailed information. Under the circumstances, he could not put leading questions nor could he otherwise suggest false involvement of the deceased. Since nothing has been brought out in crossexamination to even suggest that he had any ill-will either against the appellant or her family, there is nothing to doubt the honesty and integrity of Komalsingh. In this view of the matter, we find no substance in this objection. ( 12 ) THE criticism of dying declaration (Ex. P/16) that it is interpolated may now be examined. A bare perusal of the original indicates that portion marked 'c-C' has been written after portion marked 'b-B' has been written. Komalsingh (PW7), when asked about it in his cross-examination, has denied that this portion was subsequently added (para-8 ). Explanation given by him is that since he found that the deceased was likely to give a long statement and the available space was small, he started writing in small letters, but subsequently, when he found that the statement had ended, he wrote 'e-E' in his usual way. The explanation is clearly not acceptable. Dying declaration (Ex. P/16) clearly indicates that portion immediately before 'c-C' had been written with a fullstop. The fullstop is a long one. If the explanation was to be accepted, the line immediately after it should not have overlapped the fullstop. Similarly, the word "meri" overlaps the word "ab" of 'e-E', indicating that portion marked 'c-C' was written after the portion marked 'e-E' had been written. Does it amount to interpolation? 'interpolation', as understood by us, means 'insertions after the document has been executed' and does not include corrections made before completing the document. Under the circumstances, only that part of the dying declaration would be accepted as 'interpolation', which has been inserted into it after the document had been signed by the witness Komalsingh (PW 7) and thumbimpressed by the deceased. Under the circumstances, only that part of the dying declaration would be accepted as 'interpolation', which has been inserted into it after the document had been signed by the witness Komalsingh (PW 7) and thumbimpressed by the deceased. There is, however, nothing on record to indicate that 'c--C' is a subsequent addition and amounts to interpolation. Indeed, no suggestion has been given to Komalsingh (PW7) that it was written after the deceased had put her thumbmark on the same. The witness has emphatically denied such a suggestion. Dr. Chandrakar, who claims to be present at the time of recording of the dying declaration was not asked about this part, though he has been asked about portions marked 'h--H'. Under the circumstances, there is nothing to justify an inference that portions marked 'c-C' had been added after the deceased had put her thumb-mark on the document. In spite of it, this Court would think that it would have been better if the ADM, Komalsingh (PW 7) had accepted that the document was written subsequently and had submitted that it was written before he and the deceased had signed the same. Be that as it may, unacceptable explanation by itself would not be a justification for holding that the document is interpolated. As regards the relevance of this portion marked 'c--C', it concerns only the daughter of the appellant, who is being tried before the Juvenile Court and for that reason, nothing much be said about it. Suffice it to say that the Court finds no infirmity in the dying declaration (Ex. P/16) for this reason alone. ( 13 ) IN view of the discussion aforesaid, it is apparent that objections to the legal validity of dying declaration (Ex. P/16) have no justification whatsoever either on fact or law and, therefore, no fault can be found with the said statement. Since this Court is satisfied that the document contains the statement of the deceased recorded voluntarily without affording any opportunity to anyone to tutor her, the same must be held to be admissible as evidence under S. 32 of the Evidence Act. It may, therefore, be examined if the document contains the true version of the incident, making it reliable and sufficient to base the conviction on its basis. It may, therefore, be examined if the document contains the true version of the incident, making it reliable and sufficient to base the conviction on its basis. ( 14 ) THE first sentence of the document is, "aaj SAVERE KE KARIV 9 BAJE MERI SAAS NE MUJH PAR MITTIKA TEL CHHIDAK KAR AAG LAGA DI, TATHA KAMRE MEIN DHAKEL DIYA". The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that this sentence means that kerosene oil was sprinkled on the deceased and fire was put to her outside the room and thereafter pushed into the room. There appears to be no justification for reading the aforesaid sentence in the manner suggested by the learned counsel. This interpretation is said to be based on the evidence of Narendra Singh (PW 3), who had reached the spot immediately and taken photographs. The witness has in para-5 of his statement stated that a glass bottle was found outside the room and was smelling kerosene oil. In cross-examination, he has admitted that thee bottle was outside the room. Serious arguments were made about portions marked 'a--A'and 'b-B' in document (Ex. P/ 2), the seizure memo. The document is said to be originally written as indicating that the said bottle was inside the room, but subsequently, it was corrected to mean that it was seized from outside. Even if it was to be accepted that originally the bottle was seized from inside the room, it will not help the appellant. It will only support the prosecution case, which is, that the entire incident had taken place inside the room. The change in Ex. P/12 would, therefore, provide the basis for argument of the learned counsel and for that reason be treated to be an act in her favour. But, that by itself is not enough to hold that the kerosene in the bottle was used for causing injuries on the deceased. The dying declaration does not state that the kerosene oil was sprinkled outside the room and thereafter the deceased was pushed inside the room. Other witnesses, namely, Jagtarsingh (PW4), the brother of the deceased, who met the deceased on 4-1-1984 at about 12. 00 noon, has clearly and specifically stated that the incident had taken place inside the room. The dying declaration does not state that the kerosene oil was sprinkled outside the room and thereafter the deceased was pushed inside the room. Other witnesses, namely, Jagtarsingh (PW4), the brother of the deceased, who met the deceased on 4-1-1984 at about 12. 00 noon, has clearly and specifically stated that the incident had taken place inside the room. Smt. Paramjeet (PW 15), who had met the deceased on the night of the incident has also stated that the whole incident had taken place inside the room (para-7 ). In reply to a specific question she categorically stated that she was put to fire inside the room. Smt. Minder Kaur (PW16), the mother of the deceased has also deposed that the incident had taken place, when she was called inside the room and went in there (para-3 ). She specifically denied the suggestion that she was put on fire outside and thereafter pushed into the room (para-7 ). Her statement in Ex. P/5 does not specifically mention that kerosene oil was poured on her outside the room and she was pushed after she had been put on fire. Under then circumstances, no prosecution witness justifies the aforesaid interpretation. Even the appellant in her written statement does not say that she saw the deceased burning outside the room. She has, on the contrary, stated that she saw the deceased burning inside the room and pushed her out on the "angaan" and tried to extinguish the fire. Santosh Singh (PW 1) has also stated that when on hearing shouts of the deceased, he went towards her room. He saw his wife pushing the door opened. Thereafter, both of them entered into the room and tried to extinguish the fire. This should not leave any doubt in the mind of anyone that the deceased was burning inside the room. It is nobody's suggestion that the incident had taken place outside in the "angaan". Under the circumstances, the criticism that it does not contain the true version of the deceased cannot be accepted. This would necessarily involve consideration of defence. The appellant has in her examination under S. 313, Cr. P. C. stated that the deceased was insisting that if her gold bangles were not remade, she would not participate in the Lodhi festival and in order to pressurise the appellant and her husband, she lit fire to herself. This would necessarily involve consideration of defence. The appellant has in her examination under S. 313, Cr. P. C. stated that the deceased was insisting that if her gold bangles were not remade, she would not participate in the Lodhi festival and in order to pressurise the appellant and her husband, she lit fire to herself. The incident, as stated earlier, had taken place on 3-1-1985. Lodhi was on 13-1-1985. There was thus 10 days' gap between the incident and the festival, indicating that there was no urgency to adopt such a dangerous course of action. Then, if the deceased had intended to pressurise the appellant and the members of the family, she would not put herself to fire in a bolted room. If the purpose was to pressurise the family members, such a course should normally have been attempted in the presence of all concerned. Admittedly, the husband of the deceasedwas not present in the house. The father-in-law, Santosh Singh (DW 1 ) was also not on the spot. The appellant claims to be with the father-in-law, at the relevant point of time. It is difficult to believe that the deceased, who was married only about 10 months before and had no complaint against her husband, would indulge in an act like this, by closing herself into a room. Then, the dying declaration (Ex. P/16) mentions that the appellant, after putting fire to her, closed the room and opened only when she started shouting loudly. The appellant has stated nothing about the door in her written statement, but appellant's husband Santosh Singh (DW 1) has in para-4 of his evidence, stated that he heard the shouts of his daughter-in-law and rushed to that spot. The appellant also went towards that. According to him, "meri AURAT NE DHAKKA MAARKAR KAMRE KA DARWAAJAA KHOLA". Now, if the door was really open, no push should have been necessary. If the door was locked from inside, the push would not have made any difference. This evidence, therefore, provides justification to the statement in the dying declaration that the door was closed from outside. If the door was closed from outside, as is the opinion of this Court, nothing further would be required to justify appellant's involvement in the crime and consequently, the trusthfulness of the dying declaration. This evidence, therefore, provides justification to the statement in the dying declaration that the door was closed from outside. If the door was closed from outside, as is the opinion of this Court, nothing further would be required to justify appellant's involvement in the crime and consequently, the trusthfulness of the dying declaration. ( 15 ) ON the evidence of Smt. Nirmala Bai (PW 9) that the deceased stated "mere SE GALTI HO GAI", it is suggested that the statement, as aforesaid, was given only because the deceased had realised her own mistake by putting fire to herself. There appears to be no justification for such an inference. Statement of Smt. Nirmala Bai (PW 9), as aforesaid, has come at the fag-end of her cross-examination. In her examination in-chief, she did not say that the deceased was questioned by anyone. In cross-examination, she first stated that the deceased did not give any reply. It is only at the fag-end of her cross-examination that she volunteered the said statement. Earlier, she had stated that several persons asked the deceased questions, but she did not give any reply. In the context of this statement, it is difficult to attach any significance to the statement relied upon by the learned counsel. Ram Murthy Naidu (DW 2) has stated that several persons, who had assembled on the spot were asking as to how she got burnt and the deceased replied that she had committed a mistake. Evidence of this witness is contradicted by Smt. Nirmala Bai (PW 9), who has stated that she did not give any reply. Even if the statement was accepted as having been made by the deceased, it would not mean that the deceased had put fire to herself. Under the circumstances, there is no justification for the defence, as aforesaid. For the aforesaid reason, it is not possible to hold that the evidence on record suggests that the dying declaration is false in necessary particulars and should for that reason be rejected. The dying declaration, in the opinion of this Court, contains the correct statement and can for that reason be the sole basis of conviction of the appellant. For the aforesaid reason, it is not possible to hold that the evidence on record suggests that the dying declaration is false in necessary particulars and should for that reason be rejected. The dying declaration, in the opinion of this Court, contains the correct statement and can for that reason be the sole basis of conviction of the appellant. ( 16 ) EVIDENCE on record further establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased made a statement about the cause of her death, first to her mother, Smt. Minder Kaur (PW16) and sister-in-law, Paramjeet (PW 15), when the two ladies visited her in the hospital at 9. 00 p. m. on 3-1-1985. This Court is also satisfied that a similar statement was given by the deceased to her brother Jagtarsingh (PW4) on 4-1-1985. The evidence of these witnesses has been examined in detail by the learned ASJ and this Court finds no justification for taking any different view about them. Since this Court is in full agreement with not only the conclusion of the learned Sessions Judge about the evidence of these witnesses, but also the manner in which he has reached to that conclusion, it is not considered necessary to undertake de novo appreciation of their evidence. Suffice it to say that their evidence further justifies the conclusion that it was the appellant, who is responsible for the death of the deceased. ( 17 ) WHILE parting with this case, this Court cannot, but observe that bride burning is becoming fashionable in our modern society, and has, therefore, to be taken serious note of. In the instant case, the deceased was married to the appellant's son only about 10 months before. The relationship between the deceased and her husband was cordial. The Court has, therefore, to display greater sensitivity to this new criminality and avoid, on all counts, soft justice as observed in Stri Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip, (1989) 1 SCC 715 . The aforesaid observation is called for because of the approach adopted by the learned A. S. J. in acquitting the appellant of charge under Sec. 498-A, I. P. C. The said acquittal, however, makes the murder of the deceased cold-blooded, justifying serious view of the matter. The aforesaid observation is called for because of the approach adopted by the learned A. S. J. in acquitting the appellant of charge under Sec. 498-A, I. P. C. The said acquittal, however, makes the murder of the deceased cold-blooded, justifying serious view of the matter. Even then, we are of the opinion that no separate sentence under S. 498-A, I. P. C. would be called for, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Shanti v. State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226 : (1991 Cri LJ 1713 ). ( 18 ) APPEAL fails and is dismissed. Since the appellant is on bail, as per order of this Court. She is directed to surrender before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Raipur on or before 14/04/1993 to undergo the sentence, in accordance with law. Appeal dismissed. .