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1993 DIGILAW 155 (DEL)

BHUVNESHWARI DEV v. COL. KALYAN SINGH

1993-03-09

P.K.BAHRI

body1993
Mr. P. K. Bahri, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision is directed against order dated 24/07/1986, by which the learned Additional Rent Controller bad dismissed the eviction petition brought by the petitioner on the ground ofeviction covered by Clause (e) of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 ofthe Delhi Rent Control Act. ( 2 ) FACTS of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner had filed theaforesaid petition which was brought under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rentcontrol Act. She had mentioned in the application that she is the ownerof the property in question and the premises had been let out to the respondent for residential purpose and she bona fide required the said accommodation for residence for herself and for her family members dependent upon herand she is not in possession of any other reasonably suitable residentialaccommodation. ( 3 ) ELABORATING the facts she mentioned that premises in questionwere let out to the respondent on the conditn that he will vacate thepremises on 31/10/1982. The letting took place on 31/10/1981. She has mentioned that the ground floor which was let out to the respondentis needed by her as she is suffering from angina pectoris and high bloodpressure and has been advised by doctors not to climb up stairs and presentlyshe is living in second floor of Vishwa Apartments, Shankaracharya Road,new Delhi, which accommodation comprises of three bed rooms and onedining-cum-drawing with kitchen, bath and latrine and the family of thepetitioner comprises of herself, her husband, two married sons alongwiththeir wives having two children each and she has also a daughter who ismarried and often visits the petitioner. It was renpeated in the petition thatshe was having a chronic disease of engina pectoris and high blood pressureand doctors have advised her not to climb the stairs. She has also mentionedin para 9 of the petition that the ground floor is occupied by the respondent whereas the first floor is in occupation of another tenant. The demisedpremises are located in B-227, Greater Kailash 1, New Delhi. ( 4 ) SUMMONS being issued in the prescribed form were sent byregistered post as well as by ordinary process. From the record it appearsthat A. D. receipt purported to be signed by someone on 8/04/1986,was received back. The record also shows that the respondent has filedthe Power of Attorney in favour of one Sh. Mela Ram, Advocate, dated 25/07/1986. ( 4 ) SUMMONS being issued in the prescribed form were sent byregistered post as well as by ordinary process. From the record it appearsthat A. D. receipt purported to be signed by someone on 8/04/1986,was received back. The record also shows that the respondent has filedthe Power of Attorney in favour of one Sh. Mela Ram, Advocate, dated 25/07/1986. The respondent did not file any application seeking leave todefend the case. However, the Additional Rent Controller proceeded todismiss the eviction petition holding that the petitioner has not givenmaterial facts in the petition which could go to prove the relevant ingredientsof the ground of eviction covered by Clause (e ). ( 5 ) I am afraid that the Additional Rent Controller has totally misconstrued the pleadings and had, for the reasons best known to him. dismissed the petition. In law it is quite evident from the perusal of Section25-B (4) that as soon as the tenant on whom the summons is duly served inthe form specified in the Third Schedule does not contest the prayer foreviction by filing an affidavit seeking leave to contest, the Controller is boundto take the statements made by the landlord in the application for evictionas correct. Now that the learned Additional Rent Controller has done isthat he, instead of taking the statements made by the petitioner in hereviction petition as correct, has tried to analyse these facts and has cometo the conclusion that ground of eviction has not been made out. He hasmentioned that in the petition it is nowhere mentioned how the petitioner isthe owner of the property in question. In order to prove ownership of theproperty the petitioner was to lead evidence if a dispute has been raisedby the tenant that she is not the owner and somebody else is the owner ofthe property. If in law the Additional Rent Controller was to accept thestatement of fact given in the petition as correct, the Controller has no legalobligation to look into the merits and analyse the facts and state that inabsence of the petitioner disclosing how she became owner of the propertyin question it would not be possible to hold that the important ingredientof ground of eviction stands established. " ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that somedocument showing the title of the property in favour of the petitioner oughtto have been filed alongwith the petition. " ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that somedocument showing the title of the property in favour of the petitioner oughtto have been filed alongwith the petition. The document of title is anevidence to prove ownership. The facts stated in the petition are to bedeemed to have been correctly stated by the petitioner. By fiction of lawthe Controller was not to go further and hold that the petitioner ought tohave produced some document of title alongwith the petition to prove thefactum of ownership. ( 7 ) THE Additional Rent Controller has then mentioned that in thepetition it is not mentioned since how long the petitioner has been sufferingfrom angina pectoris and high blood pressure and when, in fact, she hasbeen advised by the doctors not to climb the stairs. Again this was aquestion of evidence which the petitioner was not bound to mention in theeviction petition. Her statement that she was suffering from angina pectorisand high blood pressure and that she has been advised by the doctors not toclimb the stairs keeping in view the chronic disease of angina pectoris andhigh blood pressure, ought to have been accepted as correct. The Additionalrent Controller legally was not right in appraising the statement and comineto the conclusion that some material ought to have been there alongwith thepetition to show that how long she has been suffering from such disease andwho are the doctors who had advised her not to climb the stairs. ( 8 ) THE Additional Rent Controller has also noted omission of thepetitioner in not filing the plan of the property in question. The plan hasbeen filed alongwith the petition. In para 9 of the petition it was clearlymentioned that the first floor is in occupation of another tenant. The ladid not require that the plan of the whole of the house should have beefiled. Ill the present case, particularly the petitioner was setting up herbona fide requirement for residence in the ground floor and thus it was notat all necessary for her to have disclosed in the petition whether anaccommodation in the first floor was at all available or not. If need of thelandlord is for residing in the ground floor obviously any other reasonablysuitable accommodation for her needs has to be on the ground floor and noton any other floor. If need of thelandlord is for residing in the ground floor obviously any other reasonablysuitable accommodation for her needs has to be on the ground floor and noton any other floor. The Additional Rent Controller went wrong in savingin the impugned order that there was an omission on the part of the landladyto mention about the whole house in the eviction petition. If we keep inview the facts mentioned in the eviction petition which are to be taken ascorrect, all the ingredients of bona fide requirement on the face of it arealready made out and the Additional Rent Controller had no option but topass the eviction order. A similar view was taken by this Court in the caseof Bachan Singh v. Khem Chand, 1987 (1) RCJ 523 . ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent has vehemently arguedthat before looking into the eviction petition the Controller ought to havesatisfied himself whether proper service of summons had been effected onthe tenant. There is no dispute about this proposition of law. In the presentcase, we find that registered summons were sent and the A. D. receipt wasreceived bearing the signatures of someone. So, in law a presumption ofservice arises and there could be no occasion for the Additional Rentcontroller to come to any different finding on the point of service. In casethe respondent claims that he was not duly served with the summons, thenhis remedy is to seek setting aside of eviction order on that ground beforethe Controller. (See Mohd. Quresh v. Smt. Roopa Fotedar and Ors. , 1990 RLR (DB)ll2, decided by a Division Bench on 15/12/1989 ). In thepresent case. we find that in the record there is Power of Attorney alsofiled on behalf of the respondent. We do not know as to when this Counselwas actually engaged and how the resopndent came to know about thependency of the case or passing of the impugned order. At the most whatthe respondent can legally do after the order is passed that he can approachthe Controller with any plea which may be permissible under the law forsetting aside such an order if it is made without effecting service of summonsas prescribed under the statute. The imgugned order is vitiated withillegality. At the most whatthe respondent can legally do after the order is passed that he can approachthe Controller with any plea which may be permissible under the law forsetting aside such an order if it is made without effecting service of summonsas prescribed under the statute. The imgugned order is vitiated withillegality. ( 10 ) I allow this petition, set aside the impugned order and pass theeviction order on the ground of eviction covered by Clause (e) of proviso tosub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act and grant sixmonths time to the respondent for vacating the premises.