JUDGEMENT - V.S. Sirpurkar, J.---As may as 14 students have filed the present petition, challenging the onstitutionality of the Rules framed by the respondent No. 1- State of Maharashtra governing the admission to the Engineering Colleges, for the year 1993-94. The petitioners, inter alia, contend that the said Rules, which have been brought, for the first time, into force, are unconstitutional for various reasons. They also contend that these Rules make them suffer hardship because of the discriminatory treatment given to the students, more particularly of Nagpur University. There is a background, on which the facts regarding the Rules and the challenge thereto will have to be stated. Those facts are as follows:- 2. Prior to 1993-94, i.e., the current year, the Rules, which were in existence, are annexed by the petitioners in Annexure-B to the petition. It is a common knowledge that the admission to the Engineering courses are governed by the Rules generally throughout the State of Maharashtra, and a person, who passes 12th Standard examination, having offered Chemistry, Physics and Mathematics subjects, becomes eligible for admission to these courses. Hither to, i.e., ill 1992-93, the system which was in prevalence, was that the Body, which controlled the admissions, used to take stock of the students offering Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics, in each University and, thus, used to calculate the numbers of students studying in the six Universities in the State of Maharashtra; they being Bombay University, Pune University, Shivaji University, Marathwada University, Amravati University and Nagpur University. This year, of course, Pune University has been divided into two Universities, they being Pune University and North-Maharashtra University. For the purposes of admissions, Pune and North-Maharashtra Universities are being treated as one and the same University. 3. What was being done under the old rules framed by the State for the year 1992-93 can be seen from rule No. 4.2, which runs as follows:- "4.2. For the purposes of admissions, Pune and North-Maharashtra Universities are being treated as one and the same University. 3. What was being done under the old rules framed by the State for the year 1992-93 can be seen from rule No. 4.2, which runs as follows:- "4.2. The seats for conventional courses such as Civil, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering will be allocated to different University areas according to the quota available to that area at one or more Colleges as below: The seats for the courses mentioned above shall be pooled together throughout the State and number of students appearing at the qualifying examination throughout the State shall be taken into consideration for allocation of these seats to each University area on the following basis: (i) Cent per cent students taking Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and any optional subject other than Biology, as fourth optional subject. (ii) 50 per cent students taking Physics Chemistry, Mathematics and Biology as fourth optional subject as these students are also eligible for medical studies. The seats for specialised courses such as Production, Electronics, Instrumentation, Metallurgy, Mining Water Management and Computer Engineering shall be allocated amongst the Universities equally. The Director of Technical Education shall allocate students from backward classes in accordance with the ratio for each University." Thus, the system was that the competent authority governing the regulation of the admissions used to consider the number of seats available in all the Government Colleges or the State aided Colleges in the State of Maharashtra. After deciding upon the total number of seats available, it used to consider the total number of students offering Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics, and then it used to arrive at a figure in respect of each University. What used to be decided was the number of seats allotable to the students of a particular University. It was after this then the admissions used to be considered, treating the whole State as a single Unit and even if the seats in Colleges fell short of the number of students, then those students, who were in excess and who were found eligible for admission to the Engineering Colleges, were being sent to the Government Colleges of different Universities in Maharashtra. This was a common procedure. This was a common procedure. Now, in this procedure, there was a proportional representation given to all the Universities on an intelligible basis regarding the number of students taking education in that particular University. Thus, essentially a ratio between the students taking education in the particular faculty of Science and the seats allotable to the students of that University was identical in each University. The system went on, we are told, for quite number of years and the system, on which the number of seats were allotted, was also followed for quite number of years. 4. This underwent major change for the first time in the present year 1993-94, and the reason for this major change was the verdict handed out by the Apex Court in the case of (Unni Krishnan. v. State of Andhra pradesh)1, 1993 S.C.C. 645. This case was occasioned on account of opening of the Private Colleges in the faculties of medicines and engineering. There were number of Colleges which had been started in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra. All the three States seem to have passed different Enactments governing the admission to these Colleges. As a matter of fact, the enactments legislated upon by these three States aimed at controlling the discretion on the part of the private managements of these Colleges with the idea of curbing the charging of exorbitant capitation fee. The petitioners in Supreme Court challenged these enactments and the constitutionality thereof in Unni Krishnan's case, on the basis of the ratio handed down by the Supreme Court in the case reported in (Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka)2, (1992) 3 S.C.C. 666 , in which the Supreme Court came out with the proposition that the right to education was a fundamental right. On the basis of this proposition, what was urged by the petitioners in Unni Krishnan's case was that not only they had the fundamental right in education, but such fundamental right also included the right to open the institutions, including the institution providing medical education as well as engineering education and the State could not control this education, and the private managements had, as a matter of fact, the absolute discretion in the matter of admission to these Engineering and Medical Colleges, which would hitherto be termed as Private Medical and Engineering Colleges. The petitioners submitted that 50 per cent of the seats could be given for the State control altogether, and the remaining 50 per cent seats were to be controlled at the discretion of petitioners therein. The Supreme Court did not accept this contention. The Supreme Court, in the first place, proceeded to hold that 50 per cent of the seats in such Colleges were to be termed as 'free seats', while even in respect of remaining 50 per cent of the seats, which were to be 'paid seats', the discretion on the part of the managements was not to play the part. On the other hand, even those seats were to go on merits. The Supreme Court, in that case, handed out a scheme for working all these private Medical and Engineering Colleges and declared the law that such schemes should be framed by the respective States, in which there were private Medical and Engineering Colleges, and the admissions should be governed by that scheme alone. This scheme was to be worked out as per the directions given by the Supreme Court, from the year 1993-94. Because of this direction by the Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan's case, the State of Maharashtra as well as the other respondents were obliged to frame a scheme, and the present Rules, according to the respondents herein, are nothing but the manifestation of the scheme framed by the Supreme Court, in the light of the conditions which are in existence in State of Maharashtra. 5. In the present set up, i.e., in the present Rules, the quota system has been completely abolished, in the sense that now because of the Rules and, more particularly, Rule 5.2.2, the candidates, who are from a particular University and who are found eligible for admission, are restricted to the Engineering Colleges in the area of that University only. 5. In the present set up, i.e., in the present Rules, the quota system has been completely abolished, in the sense that now because of the Rules and, more particularly, Rule 5.2.2, the candidates, who are from a particular University and who are found eligible for admission, are restricted to the Engineering Colleges in the area of that University only. For example, a student of Nagpur University, if he was found eligible for admission to the Engineering College, he would have his right of admission either in that Engineering College, which is a Government college, or state aided college, and if he is not able to get an admission, as per his score or as per the merits in that State aided college i.e., if he has given the choice therefor, he would be sent to the free seat available in the private Engineering Colleges, which are essentially situated in the Nagpur University area. Now, this would be highlighted from the language of Rule 5.2.2 which runs as under: "5.2.2 The candidate will be considered for the admission to other University areas, than in 5.2.1 above in order of his/her preference for the University as indicated by him. However, his/her inter se merit will be considered only after all eligible candidates from the area of particular University are accommodated." Rule 5.2.1 speaks in the following terms: "5.2.1 The candidate will be considered for admission first for maximum of 15 courses and maximum of 15 institutions, affiliated to University of his/her area as per his order of preference. His/her area means from where the candidate passes H.S.C. (qualifying) examination or as per domicile of his/her father/mother as per rule 2.2" (Emphasis supplied.) 6. Reading together all these rules would show that now the students of a particular University would be required to take education only in the institutions available in the University area of that particular University and he could go to any other institution situated in any other University area only and only if the students in that particular University are accommodated. Now that would be a utopia, considering the number of students offering themselves for the Engineering college admission, in each University. In short, the situation has come, because of the present rules 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 that the students of a particular University will be restricted to that area alone. Now that would be a utopia, considering the number of students offering themselves for the Engineering college admission, in each University. In short, the situation has come, because of the present rules 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 that the students of a particular University will be restricted to that area alone. However, this is not the only factor which has irked the petitioners. The petitioners contend that because of this rule, their chances to get admissions in the Government Colleges or the State aided Colleges, particularly those who are studying in Nagpur University, would be completely marred, because, according to them, the Engineering Colleges, i.e., Government Engineering Colleges and the State aided Engineering Colleges, are sporadically placed in the State of Maharashtra. It is not as if the Engineering Colleges are eventually distributed in all the Universities' areas. The students, therefore, contend herein that only the Government Engineering College available to the students of Nagpur University is the College of Visvesvaraya Regional College of Engineering, which can accommodate only about 135 students/seats, and probably the Laxminarayan Institute of Technology which caters to only 40 students/seats. The students, therefore, complained that even if the candidates in Nagpur University are meritorious in the State list, and because of their merits, can go much higher and could, under the rules existing prior to the present Rules, be admitted in the Government Engineering Colleges situated elsewhere, now that situation is completely closed, that avenue having been blocked by the present Rules. It is on this back-drop that we will have to consider the contentions raised by the present petitioners, but the things are not enough merely by referring to these two judgments. 7. The second judgment, which is in the field is the judgment passed by the Aurangabad Bench of this Court in (Gopinath Govindrao Latpate v. State of Maharashtra)3, in Writ Petition No. 2005 of 1993 and Writ Petition No. 2006 of 1993, decided on 16.8.1993. The challenge in the said judgment was slightly different. There, the challenge was only to the area restriction and, therefore, the petitioners contended in those petitions that inspite of their meritorious performance, because of rule 5.2.1 and rule 5.2.2, read together, the chances of the brilliant students of a particular University were completely obliterated and marred, inasmuch as they were now restricted to their own area. There, the challenge was only to the area restriction and, therefore, the petitioners contended in those petitions that inspite of their meritorious performance, because of rule 5.2.1 and rule 5.2.2, read together, the chances of the brilliant students of a particular University were completely obliterated and marred, inasmuch as they were now restricted to their own area. As a matter of fact, in that judgment, though the challenge was pervading to the whole scheme, the main rigour of the petitioners was against rules 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. In addition, it was stated as a matter of additional challenge that because of rule 5.13, there was no guarantee that the private Engineering Colleges in which they would be admitted because of their merits, would continue to operate, and in case those private Engineering Colleges did not choose to continue, there was no power in the State Governments to ask those managements to continue those Colleges and curriculum therein. The petitioners therein, therefore, contended that they would be left to the mercy of the managements, and as per rule 5.13, if they ,lost their seats because of the discontinuance of the college, they would be completely without any remedy, because rule 5.13 speaks in the following terms: "5.13 In the event the management of any Private Institute, decides not to conduct courses in their institute for whatsoever reasons, after candidates are allotted to such institution either for free seats or payment seats, the Competent Authority will not reallot such candidates for free seats/or payment seats to other institution." The contention of the petitioners in the Gopinath's case was that they could not be left to the mercy of the managements and could not be allowed to face a fluid situation as created by rule 5.13. The judgment in Gopinath's case, which is handed out by the Aurangabad Bench, strikes down rules 5.2.2 and 5.13, holding that the area restriction was bad and provides a hostile discrimination against a student who was otherwise meritorious. It also proceeded to hold that there was no guarantee because of rule 5.13 to a student taking education in the private Engineering College and, therefore, the scheme framed by the State of Maharashtra and the other respondents was inherently defective. Aurangabad Bench also found out the necessity of treating the seats in the Government Colleges in contra-distinction with the seats available in the private Engineering Colleges. Aurangabad Bench also found out the necessity of treating the seats in the Government Colleges in contra-distinction with the seats available in the private Engineering Colleges. While striking down the rules, Aurangabad Bench also suggested 23 points on the basis of which the further scheme was to be framed by the State of Maharashtra and other respondents. 8. However, there was one rider added to the judgment and that was that the judgment was not to operate for the present year and the judgment was to come into force only for the next year, i.e., for the academic year 1994-95. For considering the grievances and for meeting the genuine complaints of the meritorious students in the University areas, in whose respect the rigour of area restriction operate, Aurangabad Bench came out with a totally genuine device. It was, creation of 10 per cent additional seats on the part of the State of Maharashtra and the other respondents who agreed to create these seats. In view of this agreement, the judgement proceeded on the lines that in fact, the petitioners and the other meritorious students like the petitioners from all the areas event, the backward areas like Marathwada and Vidarbha, could be accommodated and could compete with the other students for the admission in the reputed courses available in other Universities and the so-called advanced Universities like Bombay University and Pune University. With these observations, the Aurangabad Bench made the judgment applicable only from the next year. Undoubtedly, the Aurangabad Bench has declared the rules to be invalid as a whole, without attempting the severability of the rules and has directed the respondents to frame altogether a new scheme in the light of the observation made therein. 9. Some of the salient points decided in the Gopinath's case by the Aurangabad Bench would be discussed later, at a proper place. It would be sufficient at this stage to state that Aurangabad Bench Judgment is to operate from the next year and the 10% seats are created for catering to the meritorious students, this year, i.e., 1993-94. 10. It is on this back-ground that the challenge posed by the present petitioners to the rules has to be considered. It would be sufficient at this stage to state that Aurangabad Bench Judgment is to operate from the next year and the 10% seats are created for catering to the meritorious students, this year, i.e., 1993-94. 10. It is on this back-ground that the challenge posed by the present petitioners to the rules has to be considered. Undoubtedly, the challenge posed in the present petition is entirely different than the one posed in Aurangabad petition, though there is an over-lapping zone, in both the petitions where the theory of area restriction has been challenged. However, in the present petition, the rigour of that theory has been highlighted because of the fact of deprivation of the students from getting admissions to Government Colleges which they used to get hitherto on the basis of the number of students studying in each course. Shri Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, vociferously argued that the scheme has resulted in hostile discrimination to the Nagpur University students and to some other University students in depriving them of what they used to get. The challenge of Mr. Deshmukh can be stated to be on the following lines: (A) According to him, the rules, more particularly rules 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 are constitutionally invalid as bristling against the spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. According to him, the rules are arbitrary and they provide a hostile discrimination against the students, more particularly of Nagpur University. (B) Shri Deshmukh contends that the scheme made is hit by the doctrine of legitimate expectation. According to him, the students of the Nagpur University clearly expected that they would be getting their due quota of seats in the Government Engineering Colleges, which was decided upon rationally by the State Government, considering the number of students taking education in the different universities and the availability of the seats in Government Colleges in the State of Maharashtra. According to him, now, without giving any due notice to the students, majority of the seats were taken away from the reach of these students, without any rhyme or reason. According to Shri Deshmukh, this goes directly against the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' and on that count also the scheme is opposed to the spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. According to Shri Deshmukh, this goes directly against the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' and on that count also the scheme is opposed to the spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (C) The next argument of Shri Deshmukh is that the State Government was treating the seats in the government College on par with the seats in private Colleges. He contends that in farming the scheme and in proceeding with the same, the State Government could not allow to treat the unequal things as equal. According to him, the treatments, which the students get in the Government Colleges, are much better. The Government Colleges or the State aided Colleges are equipped with the laboratories, libraries. The students therein can get the concessions, educational or otherwise. All these things are conspicuously absent in majority, though not in all, the private Engineering Colleges. According to him, therefore, there could be no comparison between the Government Colleges, on one hand, and the private Engineering Colleges, on the other. He contends that in applying the scheme and proceeding further therewith, the State Government would be asking a student, who was hitherto entitled to be admitted to a Government college, may be in Sangli, Karad, Pune or Bombay, to take the education in any private Engineering College, that too, restricted to the area of Nagpur University. According to him, this goes directly against the spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as this exercise on the part of the State Government bristles against the principles of equality enshrined in Article 14 and, therefore, according to Shri Deshmukh, the whole scheme has to go. (D) The last limb of the argument of Shri Deshmukh is that the scheme is beyond the scope as provided for by the Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan's case. According to Shri Deshmukh, the present scheme is not at all in conformity with and is in direct confrontation with the scheme suggested by the Supreme Court which was to be the pedestal for the further edifice of the State scheme. 11. On the other hand, Shri Gordey appearing for respondents 1 and 3, supported the scheme on various grounds. According to him, there is no question of infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in the scheme, intentionally or otherwise. 11. On the other hand, Shri Gordey appearing for respondents 1 and 3, supported the scheme on various grounds. According to him, there is no question of infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in the scheme, intentionally or otherwise. Shri Gordey contends, on the basis of the statistics, that in fact under the new scheme, the petitioners were granted more seats. He refuted the argument of Shri Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, by contending that previously there were only 125 seats available to the petitioners. However, now, 50 per cent of the seats in the private Engineering Colleges having been turned into the free seats, the petitioners are now entitled to many more seats and,, therefore, there was no question of infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As regards the area restriction aspect, Shri Gordey contended that there could not be any infraction of Article 14 on that count. Shri Gordey, however, very fairly conceded that unconstitutionality of rule 5.2.2, on account of the judgment passed by the Aurangabad Bench (Gopinath's case) had become a fait accompli. He, however, opposed the other grounds on which the unconstitutionality of rules 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 was sought to be canvassed by Shri Deshmukh. As regards the arguments in respect of the scheme in Unni Krishnan's case, Shri Gordey contended that there was a substantial compliance with the scheme and, in fact, the State scheme did not, in any manner, contradict the scheme of the Supreme Court. 12. Before considering the rival contentions, we will have to take into consideration the verdict handed out by the Aurangabad Bench of this Court in Gopinath's case cited supra, wherein the Division Bench has declared rule 5.2.2 as unconstitutional. The challenge to the constitutionality of the rule under Article 14 of the Constitution of India has been upheld by the Aurangabad Bench on the following grounds: Firstly, the Aurangabad Bench found that the payment seats and the free seats have been differently treated in the scheme and that bristled against the principle of equality as well as the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, in the scheme. According to the Aurangabad Bench, the Supreme Court has specifically directed that the payment seats and the free seats should be treated in equal manner, as there was no difference whatsoever in those two categories and, in fact, the only difference was that there was the payment of higher fees prescribed for the payment seats. The Aurangabad Bench found that in the rules, there was a different treatment offered to the payment seats and the free seats. The second ground on which the challenge to the constitutionality was upheld was that the new scheme provided for area restriction. According to the Aurangabad Bench, the Supreme Court in (Nidamarti. v. State of Maharashtra)4, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1362 had approved the classification on the basis of the areas. The Aurangabad Bench, therefore, found that such classification, on the basis of the areas, was possible. However, because of the scheme, the meritorious students of one University area were completely blocked from going and receiving education in the Colleges which are situated outside their University area. It also adversely commented upon the other aspects of the scheme and then it proceeded to uphold the challenge to the constitutionality of rule 5.2.2. It also commented and upheld the challenge to rule 5.13 and proceeded to hold that not only the scheme but the implementation thereof was also likely to result in discrimination. As has already been stated, the Aurangabad Bench, however, directed that the judgment should be implemented only from the next year, and for the present year it was satisfied on account of the creation of 10 per cent of additional seats, which were to be filled in purely according to the merit. These 10 per cent of the seats were to be created in each and every institution in the State of Maharashtra, private as well as Government Engineering Colleges, and were to be filled in strictly according to the merit. 13. On this back-drop, we will have, now, to consider the challenges in the present petition. Shri Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, pointed out that insofar as earlier years are concerned, the total number of seats were taken into consideration as against the total number of students taking education in Physics, chemistry and Mathematics. A ratio was arrived at and ultimately a quota was fixed. Shri Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, pointed out that insofar as earlier years are concerned, the total number of seats were taken into consideration as against the total number of students taking education in Physics, chemistry and Mathematics. A ratio was arrived at and ultimately a quota was fixed. For Bombay, the quota was 583 seats; Pune, 509 seats; Shivaji University 342 seats; Marathwada, 330 seats; Amaravati, 286; and for Nagpur University, the quota was 341 seats. Thus, each University was liable to get the seats indicated, and the students studying in the University area of that University were entitled to get the seats out of the Government seat available in whole State of Maharashtra, irrespective of the fact whether the Colleges in that particular area had those many of seats or not. Now, the seats available in respect of the Government Colleges for the Engineering Universities were: Bombay, 547 seats; Pune, 494 seats; Shivaji, 487 seats, Marathawada, 473 seats; Amaravati, 271 seats and Nagpur, 119 seats. A glance to this would clearly bring out the fact that insofar as the Bombay University is concerned, they had about 40 seats, which were in excess than the seats which were available in the Bombay University area. About Pune University, the difference comes to hardly about 15 to 20 seats. Insofar as Shivaji University and Marathwada University are concerned, there the quota was 342 and 330 seats respectively, yet the Government seats available to these two Universities were 487 and 473 respectively. Thus, insofar as these two Universities were concerned, they had the excess seats, while the case of the Nagpur University stands rather on a different pedestal, inasmuch as the Nagpur University had the quota of 341 seats, yet the seats available with it were hardly 119 and thereby there was a short-fall of more than 200 seats insofar as the Nagpur University was concerned. 14. Shri Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, rightly contends that the scheme in Unni Krishnan's case was meant only for the Private Engineering Colleges alone. The Supreme Court has specifically declared in paragraph 210 of its judgment, in this manner: "It is made clear that only those institutions which seek permission to establish and/or recognition and/or affiliation from the appropriate authority shall alone be made bound by this scheme. This scheme is not applicable to Colleges run by Government or to University Colleges. The Supreme Court has specifically declared in paragraph 210 of its judgment, in this manner: "It is made clear that only those institutions which seek permission to establish and/or recognition and/or affiliation from the appropriate authority shall alone be made bound by this scheme. This scheme is not applicable to Colleges run by Government or to University Colleges. In short, the scheme hereinafter mentioned shall be made a condition of permission, recognition or affiliation, as the case may be. For each of them, viz., grant of permission, grant of recognition, grant of affiliation, these conditions shall necessarily be imposed, in addition to such other conditions as the appropriate authority may think appropriate. No private educational institution shall be allowed to send its students to appear for an examination held by any Government or other body constituted by it or under any law or to examination held by any University unless the concerned institution and the relevant course of study is recognised by the appropriate authority and/or is affiliated to the appropriate University, as the case may be." These observations, in which the Supreme Court has very specifically made the scheme applicable only to the private institutions, would amply make it clear that the scheme was not to operate at all in respect of the Government Colleges or the University Colleges. In short, the Colleges, which have been described by the scheme, are Colleges other than the private Colleges. 15. Shri Gordey, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 3, tried to contend by reference to sub-para 4 of para 210, that the Supreme Court had directed to regulate the admissions to the private Engineering Colleges as well as the Government Engineering Colleges, by "one notification only", and further contended that this shows that in the scope of the scheme, the competent authority could include the seats from the Government Colleges also. Now, this is clearly not correct. Firstly, the Aurangabad Bench (Gopinath's case) has also not accepted this position and has unequivocally declared in its judgment that this scheme is not to take into its fold the seats from the Government Engineering Colleges or State aided Engineering Colleges. Secondly, the very idea, by which this scheme was framed by the Supreme Court, was only to curb the discretion which hitherto lay in the managements of the private Colleges. Secondly, the very idea, by which this scheme was framed by the Supreme Court, was only to curb the discretion which hitherto lay in the managements of the private Colleges. It was with that sole idea and also with the idea to make more seats available on the ground of merit to the deserving students that the scheme was framed. Now, Shri Deshmukh is right in contending that prior to the said scheme, as may as about 341 seats were available in the Government Colleges to the students of Nagpur University as of right. What comes by the scheme should be in addition to those seats which were available and not in substitution of those seats. In fact, the reading of Unni Krishnan's judgment makes it amply clear that it was indeed intended that the deserving students, who were less fortunate and who could not get into the Government Engineering Colleges because of their comparatively low percentage and those who could not afford to pay the exorbitant fees of the private Engineering Colleges, were sought to be benefited by the scheme by making 50 per cent of the seats available to them in the private Engineering Colleges. Obviously, therefore, if this addition was being given as a bonus to those students, at the same time what was available to them as of right could not be taken away from them. In short, Shri Deshmukh is right in contending that on one hand the State Government gave them the bonus of 50 per cent of the free seats and, on the other, took away what was available to them. In this queer exercise, strangely enough, because of the sporadic placement of the Engineering Colleges in the State of Maharashtra, it is only the students of Nagpur University who suffered very severely, inasmuch as for them, it was a loss of more than 200 seats. We have already shown by the statistics referred to earlier that while in case of the other Universities, thee was no loss or minimal loss, and while the Shivaji University and Marathwada University did not suffer any loss at all, it was the Nagpur University students alone who suffered loss of more than 200 seats. We have already shown by the statistics referred to earlier that while in case of the other Universities, thee was no loss or minimal loss, and while the Shivaji University and Marathwada University did not suffer any loss at all, it was the Nagpur University students alone who suffered loss of more than 200 seats. It is because of this that the scheme must be said to be discriminatory to a class of students, viz., the students of Nagpur University, and such creation of a class and a discriminatory attitude to that class could not be permitted and Shri Deshmukh is, therefore, right in saying that the scheme and the operation thereof would amount to a hostile discrimination against the students of Nagpur University and would be opposed to the spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, on that count. 16. Hitherto the students of Nagpur University could take the education in the outside Universities, including the Bombay University, Pune University, Marathwada University, etc.., in the Government Engineering Colleges Because of the operation of rule 5.2.1 and rule 5.2.2, this opportunity for the students of Nagpur University was completely lost. Undoubtedly the Aurangabad Bench in Gopinath's case takes care of this area restriction. However, it could be said that the loss to the students of Nagpur University was much more in comparison, because as may as more than 200 students lost an opportunity to take the education in the Government Engineering Colleges. If we go to the oft-quoted judgment in Unni Krishnan's case, in para-85, this is what the Supreme Court observed regarding the private Engineering Colleges : (Justice Shri S. Mohan in his judgment which is concurring with the majority judgment handed over by Justice Shri B.P. Jeevan Reddy, observes:) "Therefore, as on today, it would be unrealistic and unwise to discourage private initiative in providing educational facilities, particularly for higher education. The private sector should be involved and indeed encouraged to augment the much needed resources in the field of education, thereby making as much progress as possible in achieving the constitutional goals in this respect. It could be concluded that the private Colleges are the felt necessities of time. The private sector should be involved and indeed encouraged to augment the much needed resources in the field of education, thereby making as much progress as possible in achieving the constitutional goals in this respect. It could be concluded that the private Colleges are the felt necessities of time. That does not mean one should tolerate the 'so called Colleges' run in thatched huts with hardly any equipment, with no or improvised laboratories, scarce facility to learn in an unhealthy atmosphere, far from conducive to education. Such of them must be put down ruthlessly with an iron hand irrespective of who has started the institution or who desires to set up such an institution. They are poisonous weeds in the field of education. Those who venture are financial adventures without morals or scruples. Their only aim is to make money, driving a hard bargain, exploiting eagerness to acquire a professional degree which would be a passport for employment in a country rampant with unemployment. They could be even called pirates in the high seas of education." (Emphasis supplied). These observations should be sufficient to show at least the qualitative difference between the Government Colleges and the private Colleges. We hastens to add that this could not be the condition of all the Private Colleges. There may be the cases where the Private Colleges would be better in some respects than the Government Colleges, but we cannot shut ourselves to the harsh reality as it exists today. Even from the brochure, which has been supplied by the competent authority, it is clear that most of the private Colleges do not have the necessary laboratories, or their own buildings. At least, there is no references in the brochure, to such institutions being equipped with all these facilities. Number of institutions have been started only for last two years, and the Aurangabad Bench of this High Court has pointed out in Gopinath's case that one such institution had not been even given the recognition when these Rules were published for the first time. The reference is made by the said Bench to a college in Chikhli which comes within the University area of Amravati University, where in fact that college had not even started and yet its name was included in the brochure supplied by the competent authority here. The reference is made by the said Bench to a college in Chikhli which comes within the University area of Amravati University, where in fact that college had not even started and yet its name was included in the brochure supplied by the competent authority here. While, in the brochure, where the names of the institutions, including the Government institutions, which can boast of good buildings, laboratories, libraries etc., are mentioned, there is also a mention of those other institutions in it which do not have such facilities. Undoubtedly, therefore, there cannot be a comparison, muchless a reasonable comparison, between the Government Colleges and the State aided Colleges, which have been catering to the needs of the students intending to have education in the engineering faculty. 17. There is one more point which we must refer to in this behalf. The Supreme Court has made a reference in Unni Krishnan's case to an enactment called "All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987". Now, only some of the private Colleges mentioned in the brochure do make a reference to the recognition of the All India council for Technical Education, set up under this Act. The express reference to the recognition of this All India Body is thus a matter which was felt to be of prime importance by not only the institutions but also the competent authority who published the brochure. Section 3 of the said Act provides for the establishment of the Council, while section 10 specifies the functions of the Council. The Supreme Court further went on to mention in paragraph 189, in the following terms: "Apart from directing generally that the Council shall take all such steps as it may think fit for ensuring co-ordinate and integrated development of technical education and maintenance of standards, the Act specifically empowers the Council, inter alia, to fix norms and guidelines for charging tuition and other fees; grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction of new courses or programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned, and take all necessary steps to prevent commercialisation of technical education. It is true, there is no express provision in the Act which says that no engineering college or technical education shall be established except with the permission of the Council. It is true, there is no express provision in the Act which says that no engineering college or technical education shall be established except with the permission of the Council. But this may be for the reason that such a power was intended to be exercised by the Council itself if it thinks necessary to do so. We are of the opinion that the vast powers conferred upon the Council by section 10, including those specified above, do extend to and entitle it to issue an order to the above effect." 18. Now, it is clear that majority of the private Colleges do not have the recognition of this Council. It is quite true that under the All India Medical Council Act, there is a provision that unless the approval granted by this Council, there can be no new institution for imparting medical education. Such provision may not be there in the present Act which is concerned for the engineering education, Yet the fact remains that while Government Colleges have the recognition, as we were told during the arguments, majority of private Colleges do not have the same. It would, undoubtedly, be clear that there cannot be a comparison between the Government Colleges and the private Colleges and, therefore, if a student who, otherwise was entitled as of right to go to a Government College and to take education therein, if he is asked to go and take admission in a private Engineering college, he would undoubtedly suffer. Here, in this case, such students are going to be more than 200, of a particular university, though this example can be made applicable to three other Universities, viz., Bombay University, Pune University and Amaravati University. The figure there of the suffering students is almost minimal or non-existant, as compared to the vast figure of the students suffering in Nagpur University. On this count, therefore, it would be clear that the class of these Universities, viz., the students of Nagpur University, some students of Bombay University, Amaravati University and Pune University, have suffered, while the students of Shivaji University and Marathwada University would definitely not suffer on this count, for Colleges in their area are sufficient and the students in those areas outclass the number of the students who, according to the quota, should be receiving technical education in engineering faculty. Now, if this be the position, it is clear that because of the implementation of the scheme, injustice is being meted out to some classes, while some classes are being favoured. Therefore, on this count, the challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution of India appears to be justified to the provisions, particularly of rules 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of the new Rules. 19. It was, therefore, stated by Shri Deshmukh learned counsel for the petitioners, that the new rules are also bad as they are contrary to the spirit of the doctrine of legitimate expectation'. Shri Deshmukh contended that the students ordinarily expected that the seats, which were available to them via a quota, would be continued, more particularly in view of the directions of the Supreme Court. Shri Gordey, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 3, however, pointed out that the Full Bench of this Court in the case reported in 1992 Maharashtra Law Journal 1336, (Ashwin Prafulla Pimpalwar v. State of Maharashtra)5, has taken the view that the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' does not apply to the admissions in the Medical Colleges. He pointed out that, in fact, the Full Bench proceeded to hold that there can be no question of applying this doctrine, particularly because it could not be said that the students appeared for the examination keeping the Rules of admissions to the further courses in mind. Same thing could be said in respect of admissions in the Engineering Colleges also. It could not be really said that the students, who appeared for the 12th standard examination offering the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics, had in their mind the quota of the engineering seats available and, therefore, they studied and appeared in the examination with that idea. The law laid down by the Full Bench in Ashwin's case would also be applicable with equal force to the Engineering Colleges admission, and the challenge on that count posed by Shri Deshmukh must fail. 20. Having considered these aspects and having held that rules 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of the new Rules are unconstitutional, additional for the reasons stated above, it remains to be decided as to what course should be taken now by this Court. There could be two options. Firstly the whole scheme could be asked to be quashed. 20. Having considered these aspects and having held that rules 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of the new Rules are unconstitutional, additional for the reasons stated above, it remains to be decided as to what course should be taken now by this Court. There could be two options. Firstly the whole scheme could be asked to be quashed. The Aurangabad Bench in Gopinath's case has, as stated earlier, taken the course of implementing the judgment only from the next years, i.e., from 1994-95, particularly because the State Government had 'agreed' to create 10 per cent additional seats in each institution. Justice Shri Deshmukh, in that judgment, in para-68, has observed in the following manner: "Therefore, the Government is directed to impleament the judgment from next year, more particularly so, in view of the fact that the Government has already agreed to create 10 per cent of seats in all the Colleges and to be filled in, in accordance with the direction of this Court, dated 10th August, 1993, with the modification as stated above." In the concluding portion, the judgment proceeds in this manner: "As the Government has agreed to create 10 per cent of seats additionally, which would be available on Statewise merit, no specific direction is required to be given in respect of admissions of the petitioners." 21. Shri Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, forcefully contended that in fact, the whole scheme must go and it must be made applicable only to the students in the private Engineering Colleges. He suggested that, in fact, the procedure adopted by the State in respect of the admissions for the year 1992-93 should alone have been followed even this year also. He submitted that when the rule, which is almost incapable of being severed from the main scheme, has been found to be unconstitutional, then this Court should not stop at the directions given by the Aurangabad Bench only. Shri Gordey, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 3, submitted strenuously that the law laid down by a co-ordinate Bench was applicable and was binding on this Court also. He submitted that this Court could not take a different course than the one suggested by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court. Shri Gordey, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 3, submitted strenuously that the law laid down by a co-ordinate Bench was applicable and was binding on this Court also. He submitted that this Court could not take a different course than the one suggested by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court. According to him, if the Bench made the observations to the effect that the judgment should be made applicable only from next year, it would mean that the Court had also given the direction that this year, it would be only in pursuance of the present scheme that the admissions would be regulated. 22. Now, it is true that the Aurangabad Bench of this Court in Gopinath's case has given the direction to the effect that the judgment should be made applicable only from the next year. Let us firstly consider whether this course, as suggested by the Aurangabad Bench, is binding upon this Court. There are number of cases of the Apex Court as also of this Court, by which it is suggested that the judgment of the co-ordinate Court is binding on this Court. The supreme Court in (1989 (3) Supreme Court Cases 396), (Sunderjas Kanyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane)6, proceeded to hold that the judgment of the co-ordinate Court is binding normally. The Supreme Court declared in that case, as follows: "The tendency of some judges 'who win the game by sweeping all the chessmen of the table' is to be deprecated. It is needless to state that the judgment of superior courts and Tribunals must be written only after deep travail and positive vein. One should never let a decision go until he is absolutely sure it is right. The law must be made clear, certain and consistent. But certitude is not the test of certainty and consistency does not mean that there should be no word of new content. The principle of law may develop side by side with new content but not with inconsistencies. There could be waxing and waning the principle depending upon the pragmatics needs and moral yearnings. Such development of law particularly, is inevitable in our developing country." 23. The principle of law may develop side by side with new content but not with inconsistencies. There could be waxing and waning the principle depending upon the pragmatics needs and moral yearnings. Such development of law particularly, is inevitable in our developing country." 23. In a case reported in Sunderjar Kanhaiyalal Bhatija v. Collector, Thane, A.I.R. 1990 SC 261, the Supreme Court observed in the similar tone in para-17:- "One must remember that pursuit of law, however glamorous it is, has its own limitations in the bench. In a multi judge Court, the Judges are bound by precedents and procedure. They could use their discretion only when there is no declared principle to be found, no rule and no authority. The judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where a learned Single Judge or a Division Bench does not agree with the decision of a Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to a larger bench. It is a subversion of a judicial process not to follow this procedure." (Emphasis supplied). It will be seen from these observations that a different course could be followed by, and a discretion could be used by a Bench if it did not find a declared principle, or rule or authority. Indeed the whole judgment with its length and breathe on all aspects cannot become a binding precedent. In a Division Bench judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in (Nawab Mir Barkat Ali Khan Bahadur v. ITO (A.P))7, 172 JTR 1988, Justice Shri B.P. Jeevan Reddy (as he then was) has observed: "In our opinion again the observation must be understood in the context of the contention urged and which was being repelled. The observations in a judgment- it is well settled- cannot and should not be read as the provisions of a statute and must be understood in the context of contention urged and the issue raised." The Division Bench of our own High Court comprising of Justices S/Shri S.K. Desai and P.B. Savant, in (Panjumal Hassomal v. Harpal)8, (76) 1974 Bom.L.R. 729 has, while relying on a Supreme Court decision reported in A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 647, observed: "In (State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Mishra)9, it has been observed that a decision is only an authority for what is actually decides. What is of essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the observations made in it. It would be impermissible therefore, in our opinion, to utilise the observation in later Division Bench judgment for the purpose of applying them to different set of facts.-- - -." Though the same rules came to be challenged before Aurangabad Bench, the challenges operated from different spheres and on different facts. 24. It is true that the Aurangabad Bench has taken the view. However. However, the question is, what part of that judgment is binding on this Bench. The judgment proceeded to hold rule 5.2.2 as unconstitutional and, indeed, the unconstitutionality as declared by the Aurangabad Bench is undoubtedly binding on us. However, the question remains, whether the course undertaken by that Bench, of making the judgment applicable only from the next year, is also binding on this Bench. The obvious answer to this question is in negative. It cannot, firstly be lost sight of, that the course adopted by the Aurangabad Bench was on account of the agreement on the part of the State Government to create 10 per cent of additional seats. In a way, this was course which was agreed to between the parties and, therefore, the Aurangabad Bench proceeded to take the course that it did. Though the law stated for invalidating rules 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 is a ratio decidendi of the Aurangabad judgment, the other observations made would be in the nature of obiter dicta, and those observations, being the result of an agreement between the parties, could never be of binding nature on this Bench. We have already indicated as to how the implementation of the scheme even for this year is going to spell a disaster for Nagpur University students and even to the students of other Universities, like Bombay University, Pune University and Amravati University. We do not, therefore, wish to draw the same line and to follow the same course as suggested by the Aurangabad Bench. Instead, what we would be doing is, in issuing the direction, we would not be taking a contrary view as suggested by the Aurangabad Bench, but we would be giving some additional directions. We do not, therefore, wish to draw the same line and to follow the same course as suggested by the Aurangabad Bench. Instead, what we would be doing is, in issuing the direction, we would not be taking a contrary view as suggested by the Aurangabad Bench, but we would be giving some additional directions. The directions would be in the following nature: The Aurangabad Bench did not proceed to implement the judgment by relying upon the case of (Reita Nirankari v. University of Delhi)10, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 1569 and was at pains to point out that immediate implementation of the judgment would have meant the loss of about two months, as the fresh choice would be required to call from the students. We asked the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State of Maharashtra as to what course they had adopted for implementing Aurangabad Bench decision, and he was candid enough to admit that they had to ask for fresh choice from the students. If the fresh choice is going to be asked, as it is, it would delay the matters, as expressed by Aurangabad Bench. Therefore, we are convinced that if the Government is asked to follow the old procedure, i.e., the procedure applicable in 1992-93, only in respect of the seats in the Government Colleges, and if the Government is left free to implement the scheme in respect of only the seats in the private Engineering Colleges, free and paid both, then nothing extra would be required to be done. That would also take care of the injustice caused to number of students due to area restriction policy and abolition of universitywise quota. Indeed, if the choice is to be asked from all the students, as it is, and, indeed, if sometime is being lost, there should be no reason why an additional column could not be added to the choice which the students are called upon to give for implementing decision in Gopinath's case. 25. In view of the above observations, we directs that insofar as the seats in the Government Engineering Colleges and the Engineering Colleges which receive the State aid are concerned, their admissions shall be governed by the old Rules, viz., the Rules applicable for the year 1992-93. After those seats are exhausted, then the admissions would be undertaken for the seats in the Private Engineering Colleges. After those seats are exhausted, then the admissions would be undertaken for the seats in the Private Engineering Colleges. It is immediately made clear that if a student who, on account of the application of the old Rules is required to go out of his University area, declines to go to such outside area, then he would lose his right to admission altogether. In respect of the rest of the application of the scheme, we direct that the scheme shall apply exactly in the manner which is shown and directed by the judgment in Gopinath's case (supra). However this judgment will not be complete unless we record our appreciation for an all-out effort put in by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respective parties, in this case. With these observations, the rule is made absolute. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to the costs. Petition allowed. *****