JUDGMENT : B.N. Dash, J. - The Registrar of Companies, Orissa, Cuttack (complainant-appellant), assails the judgment of the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack, whereby he has set aside the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-cum-Special Court, Cuttack, by acquitting the accused-respondent. 2. The appellant-complainant filed a complaint petition in 2(C) C. C. Case No. 233 of 1977 against Kalinga Advertising and Marketing Private Limited, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 (for short "the Act"), and its directors including the respondent alleging that they were under statutory obligation to file with the Registrar of Companies an annual report in the prescribed form made up to the date of the annual general meeting. The said meeting of the company should have been held latest by March 11, 1976, and the annual return made up to that date should have been filed with the Registrar of Companies on or before May 11, 1976. The company and its directors including the respondent having not filed the return made up to March 11, 1976, before the complainant in spite of service of notice, the complaint petition was filed against them u/s 162 of the Act for contravention of Section 159 of the Act. Since the attendance of the accused-respondent could not be secured for a very long time, the case against him was split up and after his attendance in court the trial against him took place and, by judgment dated March 10, 1983, the trial court convicted him u/s 162 of the Act and sentenced him to pay a fine of 25 paise per day, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. On appeal being preferred, the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack, having acquitted him of the charge by judgment dated May 10, 1984, the present appeal has been filed. 3. When the appeal came up for hearing on June 18, 1993, there was no appearance from the side of the appellant and the hearing was concluded after hearing the learned counsel for the respondent. The only point for consideration is whether the order of acquittal recorded by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge is liable to be interfered with. As already indicated above, the respondent-accused faced trial for the offence punishable u/s 162 of the Act which, so far as material, is extracted below : " 162. The only point for consideration is whether the order of acquittal recorded by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge is liable to be interfered with. As already indicated above, the respondent-accused faced trial for the offence punishable u/s 162 of the Act which, so far as material, is extracted below : " 162. Penalty and interpretation. -- (1) If a company fails to comply with any of the provisions contained in Section 159, 160 or 161, the company, and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to fifty rupees for every day during which the default continues." 4. There is no controversy that in this case there had been non-compliance with the provisions contained in Section 159 of the Act. The trial court clearly recorded a finding that the respondent-accused was an officer of the company at the material time. Such finding was not challenged before the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge but it was contended that there was no pleading or evidence that for non-compliance with the provisions contained in Section 159 of the Act, the respondent-accused was in default and, therefore, the conviction against him was not sustainable. Relying on the principle laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Ajit Kumar Sarkar v. Assistant Registrar of Companies [1979] 49 Comp Cas 909 : [1979] TLR 2001, the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, came to hold that u/s 162 of the Act all the officers of the company are not liable hut only those who are in default and since there was neither any specific averment in the complaint petition nor evidence showing any default on the part of the respondent-accused, he was acquitted. On a scrutiny of the materials on record, I also find that there is neither any specific averment nor evidence as to how for non-compliance with the provisions contained in Section 159 of the Act, the respondent-accused could be said to be in default. Since Section 162 of the Act makes only the officer of the company who is in default liable and as the respondent-accused had not been shown or proved to he an officer in default, his acquittal is not liable to be interfered with. 5. In the result, I do not find any merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed