Ved Prakash v. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad
1993-02-26
S.P.SRIVASTAVA
body1993
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment S.P. Srivastara, J. 1. The petitioner who had moved an application on 31-1-84 seeking allotment of the premises in dispute which had been declared vacant on 28-11-83 has approached this Court for redress feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the revising authority in exercise of the Jurisdiction envisaged under section 18 of the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) whereunder reversing the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, the premises has been released in favour of the landlord and has prayed for the quashing of the said order. 2. A caveat had been filed by Sri M.D. Singh 'Shekhar' Advocate on behalf of Sri Ashok Kumar, respondent no. 2 one of the landlords for whose benefit the premises in dispute had been released I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel representing the caveator and have carefully per used the impugned judgments. 3. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel representing the caveator asserting that in the facts and circumstances of the present case this writ petition at the instance of the petitioner is not entertainable and deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. in support of this submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of a Full Bench of this Court In the case of Talib Hasan v. I Additional District Judge Nainital, 1986 (1) ARC 1 and decision of a learned Single Judge in the case of Smt. Krishna Rani v. District Judge, Dehradun, 1990 (1) ARC 442 and Radhey Lal v. District Judge, Jhansi, 1990 (2) ARC 540. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner however, has, on the other hand asserted that in the present case subsequent to the rejection of the application of release filed by the landlord, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer bad passed an order on 11-4-88 whereunder the premises in dispute had been allotted to the petitioner.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner however, has, on the other hand asserted that in the present case subsequent to the rejection of the application of release filed by the landlord, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer bad passed an order on 11-4-88 whereunder the premises in dispute had been allotted to the petitioner. It has further been asserted that though the order rejecting the release application and the order allotting the premises in dispute to the petitioner was a composite order passed on 11-4-88 yet the actual order of allotment In pursuance of the composite order referred to above had been issued in favour of the petitioner on 11-4-88 itself ; a true copy of which had bees filed as Annexure 4 to the writ petition This contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that by virtue of this order of allotment issued separately in pursuance of the composite order passed en the said date to which a reference has been made above, the status of a tenant stood secured in favour of the petitioner in view of section 15(8) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 which provides that the allottee shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sections (5) sad (9) and section 18 be deemed to become tenant of the building from the date of allotment or where he is unable to obtain possession by reason of a stay order or of any other having occupied or continued to occupy the building from the date on which he obtained possession. In these circumstances, It is asserted that since by a legal fiction the status of a tenant stood secured in favour of the petitioner fee had become not only a proper but a necessary party in the revision proceedings contemplated under section 18 of the Act and since he had been impleaded in those proceedings, he can, under the law maintain the present writ petition.
A Full Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Talib Hasan v. I Additional District judge (supra) had, after carefully considering the various provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the rules framed thereunder bad observed that an application for release under section 16(1)(b) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord in which the out going tenant or the prospective allottee does not have any right to object. It had further been observed that the prospective allottee comes into the picture only after the disposal of the landlord's application for release under section 16(1)(b) and only if the same is rejected. The Full Bench went on to observe that the prospective allottee has no right or interest in the property or claim against the landlord so as to be entitled to any hearing in the disposal of the release application and has no right to be heard in opposition to such an application 5. This Court had clarified in its decision in the case of Naubat Ram Sharma v. Additional District Judge, Moradabad, 1987 (2) ARC 121, that every owner of a building has a right to occupy his own building, and as such, the legislature contemplated that when the building is vacant or is likely to fall vacant and the landlord required the said building for his bona fide need then the said building should be released to the landlord and that this is the sole consideration which has to weigh with the District Magistrate when he takes up the release applications under section 1 of the Act for consideration. 6. It may further be noticed that in its decision in the case of Radhey Lal v. District Judge. Jhansi (supra) this Court had upheld the rejection of a revision under section 18 of the U.P. Act No 13 of 1972 at the instance of a prospective allottee holding it to be not maintainable as he had no right or Interest in the subject matter of the lis between the District Magistrate and the landlord in the matter of release contemplated under section 16 of the Act.
Again in its decision in the case of Smt. Krishna Rani (supra) it was held that a prospective allottee has no locus standi to be heard in the matter of release contemplated under the aforesaid provision In the circumstances, therefore, it is obvious that the mere fact that subsequent to the rejection of an application for release the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an order of allotment in favour of a prospective allottee such an order of allotment can be of no avail so as to vest the prospective allottee with a right of being heard in the matter of release of an accommodation contemplated under section 16 of the Act which is taken up in revision under section 18 of the said Act. The lis between the District Magistrate representing the State and the landlord so far as the matter of release of the accommodation declared to be vacant is concerned becomes pending when the revising authority entertains the revision against the order rejecting the application for release and in this matter the prospective allottee cannot be deemed to be entitled to have any right of being heard and his position remains the same as It was prior to the passing of the order of allotment. The Full Bench was quite emphatic when it pointed out that the application for release under section 16(1)(b) of the Act is a matter between the District Magistrate and the landlord in which the out going tenant or the prospective allottee does not have any right to object. Since the order of allotment has to fall with the reversal of the order rejecting the application for release, it is obvious that the position of a prospective allottee cannot improve simply because proceeding on the basis of an erroneous order rejecting the release application, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has passed an order of allotment in favour of such a prospective allottee. 7.
7. Having regard to the Full Bench decision of this Court and the order decisions to which a reference has been made above, I do not find any justifiable ground to Interfere in the impugned order in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the petitioner whose status so far as the proceedings for release in question arising under section 16 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 cannot be above that of an unauthorised occupant and a prospective allottee. 8. The Writ Petition is therefore, dismissed in limine. Learned counsel for the petitioner has sought for an indulgence from this court on the ground that taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case petitioner may be granted some reasonable time for vacating the premises in dispute. In the totality of the circumstances I think that in case the petitioner files and undertaking before the Kent Control and Eviction Officer clearly indicating therein that he shall handover peaceful and vacant possession to the landlord in whose favour the order of release has been passed on or before 31-1-93 and further, deposits the damages for use and occupation of the premises in dispute which are due for the period ending 31-3-93 within two weeks from today in that event he may not be dispossessed from the premises in dispute on the basis of the Impugned order till 31-3-93. I, therefore, order accordingly. It is however, made clear that in the event of default in complying with any of the conditions indicated above, the order of release shall become executable forthwith. Petition dismissed.