JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.—This appeal is preferred by the Appellant-defendant against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Solan and Sirmaur Districts at Nahan, Camp at Nahan, passed in Civil Appeal No 207-S/13 of 1987 dated 3rd October, 1989 reversing the decree passed 76-S/13of 1988 by Sub-Judge 1st Class, Nalagarh, in Civil Suit No. 70/1 of 1985, dated 10th September, 1987. 2. The short facts leading to this appeal are as under : 3. The plaintiff-respondent filed the suit for recovery of Rs. 28,500 on the allegations that on 30th April, 1982 the defendant had borrowed Rs, 21,000 from the plaintiff in cash with promise to repay the same on demand along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, and the defendant executed a pronote (Ex. P-l) and receipt (Ex. P-2) in consideration thereof It was further alleged that the defendant had failed to re-pay the amount inspite of repeated demands. Notice (Ex. P-3) was also issued by the plaintiff on 8th April, 1985 end as such the present suit had been filed for recovery of Rs. 21,000 as principal and Rs. 7,500 as interest. 4. The defendant has contested the suit, inter alia on the ground that tbe pronote in question was without consideration. It was alleged that the defendant entered into an agreement (Ex. DA) for tbe sale of land measuring 29 Kanals 15 Marlas with the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 2,71,320 and Rs. 1,25,000 were paid as advance through Bank Draft on 30th April, 1982 and that the pronote in question was executed for payment of the balance amount on the condition that in case the land was found less, as per the agreement, at the spot, the pronote amount would be paid to him It was alleged that the land was found less about 23 Marlas on demarcation at the spot. The plaintiff was not entitled to recover any amount from him and failed to return the pronote on demand. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues on 16th January, 1987 and 20th April, 1987 I — (1) Whether the alleged pronote is without consideration ? OPD (2) Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee ? OPD (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of suit amount as alleged ? OPD (2) Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fee ? OPD (3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the recovery of suit amount as alleged ? OPP (3-A) Whether the plaintiff is a money lender, if so its effect ? OPD (4) Relief. 6. The trial Court found from the evidence produced by the plaintiff and plea taken by the defendant, that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant had borrowed Rs. 21,003 from him and had executed the pronote (Ex P-l) and receipt (Ex. P-2) in consideration thereof. In view of these findings the plaintiffs suit was dismissed. 7. In appeal, learned District Judge reversed the said findings of trial Court and came to the conclusion that after considering the entire evidence produced on the record and further that in view of the provisions of section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the onus was on the defendant to prove, which he had miserably failed to discharge. As a result of these findings, the plaintiffs suit was decreed. Dis-satisfied with the same, the defendant has come up in second appeal in this Court. 8. Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant, vehemently contended that the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the execution of the pronote was not duly proved In any case, argued the learned Counsel, the findings of the trial Court that the pronote was without consideration was correct and the learned lower Appellate Court has returned that finding against the defendant arbitrarily. He has further contended that the case put up by the plaintiff was completely belied by the oral and documentary evidence produced on record. In support of his contention he placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian Evacuee Property; Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1316. 9. Shri Praneet Gupta appearing for the respondent has supported the findings of learned lower Appellate Court and contended that the plaintiff has duly proved the execution of pronote and receipt. According to him, the defendant borrowed Rs 21,00 for consideration and as soon as the execution of the pronote and the receipt were proved the presumption under section 18 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was in favour of the instrument for consideration. According to him, the defendant borrowed Rs 21,00 for consideration and as soon as the execution of the pronote and the receipt were proved the presumption under section 18 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was in favour of the instrument for consideration. He also contended that the execution of the pronote and the receipt were admitted by the defendant and there was no evidence on record adduced by the defendant to rebut the presumption. It is contended by him that there was no evidence on record to establish that after demarcation of land 23 Marlas of land was found less, If it was so, according to learned Counsel, then according to the agreed price the value of 23 Marlas would not exceed Rs 8,000. la support of his contention he placed reliance upon judgment in Tarmahomed Haji Abdul Rehman v Tyeb Ebrahim Bharamchari AIR 1949 Bom 257 ; Satya Narain Singh v. Janardan Kanth and others, AIR 1980 Patna 277; Mangubhai Mansukhram Pandya and another v Pranjivan Tribhovandas Purohit, AIR 1992 Guj 1 and Indian Bank v K Nataraja Pillai and another, CCC 1992 (3) SC 342. 10. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and going through the relevant evidence on the record, I am of the considered view that there is no illegality or infirmity in the findings of the learned lower Appellate Court as to be interfered with in second appeal As a matter of fact the trial Court did not properly appreciate the provision of section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and thus failed to appreciate the evidence on record keeping in view the presumption provided therein. However, the learned lower Appellate Court has discussed the entire evidence and has given a firm finding that the testimony of the defendant, who appeared as DW 1, could not be relied upon According to his defence in the written statement and in his statement, it is stated that out of the consideration amount of Rs 2,71,320 he had paid Rs ^50,320 in accordance with the details mentioned in the agreement (Ex. DA) and the amount of Rs. 21,0C0 remained in balance to be paid to the plaintiff as a part of the sale consideration of the agreement to sell. However, he also stated that the pronote and the receipt for Rs. DA) and the amount of Rs. 21,0C0 remained in balance to be paid to the plaintiff as a part of the sale consideration of the agreement to sell. However, he also stated that the pronote and the receipt for Rs. 21,000 had been executed by him as a consideration of the said balance of the sale price under the agreement to sell. 11. The learned lower Appellate Court in paragraph 10 observed as under i— "Even if for the sake of arguments it is admitted that the defendant-respondent had not received the cash amount of Rs 21,000 as consideration of the pronote and receipt, in question, and had executed the said pronote and receipt for the balance amount of Rs. 21,C00 of the sale consideration of the agreement to sell the land dated 30-4-1982, still the said consideration shall be deemed to be a valid consideration for the pronote and receipt, in question, because there is no evidence or allegation if the said amount of Rs. 21,000 as the balance of the sale consideration under the agreement to sell, in question, was ever paid to the plaintiff-appellant." 12. It is further observed that j — "Even if the assertion of the defendant-respondent is admitted that he had not received the cash amount of Rs. 21,000 from the plaintiff appellant as consideration of the pronote and receipt, in question, and it was the amount of the balance of sale consideration under the agreement to sell the land by the plaintiff-appellant, dated 30-4-1982, still it shall be deemed to be a valid consideration because the agreement to sell the land was a lawful agreement and its consideration was also lawful and legal. Therefore, the pronote and receipt, in question, cannot be held to be without consideration. The findings of the lower Court on this point are thus liable to be set aside", 13. I have perused the pronote (Ex. P-l) and the receipt (Ex. P-2), end from their perusal it is quite evident that the defendant had duly executed the pronote and the receipt after signing the same for consideration and the defendant has failed to discharge the onus. In any case, it could not be successfully argued that the findings recorded by the learned lower Appellate Court was not possible on the evidence on record. In any case, it could not be successfully argued that the findings recorded by the learned lower Appellate Court was not possible on the evidence on record. In that view of the matter also the said findings could not be interferred with in this appeal, being a finding of fact. Once it is found that the execution of the pronote and the receipt is proved, then in view of the provisions of section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the onus was on the defendant to prove that it was without consideration. This, the defendant has miserably failed to discharge by leading cogent and convincing evidence On the other hand, there is positive evidence of the plaintiff that he advanced a sum of Rs. 21,000 to the defendant. 14 The authority relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant does not support the contention raised by him. In Kundan Lal Rallarams case (supra), the Supreme Court has held in paragraphs 5 and 8 as under \— "Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act lays down a special rule of evidence applicable to negotiable instruments. The presumption is one of law and thereunder a Court shall presume, inter alia, that the negotiable instrument or the endorsement was made or endorsed for consideration. In effect it throws the burden of proof of failure of consideration on the maker of the note or the endorser, as the case may be. A plaintiff who says that he had sold certain goods to the defendant and that a promissory note was executed as consideration for the goods and that he is in possession of the relevant account books to show that he was in possession of the goods sold and that the sale was effected for a particular consideration should produce the said account books. If such a relevant evidence is withheld by the plaintiff, section i\4t Evidence Act enables the Court to draw a presumption to the effect that, if produced, the said accounts would be unfavorable to the plaintiff This presumption, if raised by a Court, can under certain circumstances rebut the presumption of law raised under section 118 the Negotiable Instruments Act". 15. There is no such contradiction, as regards the facts of the present case, hence the authority has no application in the present case. 16. 15. There is no such contradiction, as regards the facts of the present case, hence the authority has no application in the present case. 16. Of course, the presumption under section 118 is not conclusive and is a rebutable one. However. it will be a question of fact in each case whether the presumption available under section 118 has been rebutted or not. As regards, the facts of the present case, the defendant has failed to rebut the said presumption by any cogent evidence. 17. In Taramahomed Haji Abdul Rehmans case (supra), Chagla, C. J. speaking for the Bench observed as under t— "Section 118 raises a statutory presumption in favour of there being consideration for every negotiable instrument. The presumption continues until it is rebutted and the only way it can be rebutted is by proving the contrary, viz., that the negotiable instrument was without consideration. The presumption that is raised under the section is not in respect of the consideration mentioned Jn the negotiable instrument but the presumption is in favour of there being a consideration for the negotiable instrument, any consideration which is a valid consideration in law. It is perfectly true that if a particular consideration is mentioned in a negotiable instrument and that consideration is found to be false and some other consideration is set up, that is e factor which the Court would take into consideration in deciding whether the defendant had discharged the burden cast upon him by section 118. But the mere fact that the consideration mentioned in the negotiable instrument turns out to be wrongly described does not rebut the presumption under section 118 and the burden still lies on the defendant to satisfy the Court that there was no consideration for the instrument. In order to determine whether the contrary is proved or not as required by section 118, the whole volume of evidence led before the Court including admissions of the plaintiff made in his cross-examination, must be considered. But in considering the volume of evidence the Court must always bear in mind the statutory presumption and also the fact that the burden of proof lies upon the defendant and that burden has got to be discharged by the defendant. But in considering the volume of evidence the Court must always bear in mind the statutory presumption and also the fact that the burden of proof lies upon the defendant and that burden has got to be discharged by the defendant. Where the plaintiff attempts to prove a particular consideration the mere fact that he failed to prove such a consideration does not, in any way, relieve the defendant from his obligation in law to establish the contrary of the presumption". 18. In Satya Narain Singh’s case (supra), Division Bench of Patna High Court said that in view of the provision of section Il8 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it has to be presumed that every negotiable instrument was executed for consideration, the result whereof will be that whenever a claim is made on any negotiable instrument the onus of proving want of consideration is on the defendant. Section 118 only says "for consideration", it does not say "consideration as stated in the negotiable instrument". The words "for consideration" are quite general and they have to be applied in their full literal sense. 19. In Mangubhai Mansukhram Pandyas case (supra), the Gujarat High Court has held that i— "In a case based on pronotes, the initial burden lies on the plaintiffs to prove execution of the pronotes and when this burden is discharged, then the Court shall raise a presumption in favour of the plaintiff under section 118 (a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act for holding that the pronotes were for consideration and it will be for the defendant to rebut that presumption." 20. In Indian Banks case, the Supreme Court has held in paragraph 7 of the report as under :—- "The High Court in our view has taken a wrong approach of the entire case and has ignored the important relevant documents which prove beyond any manner of doubt that the promissory note Exhibit A-l, the basis of the suit was executed with consideration and the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were liable to pay the entire amount claimed by the Bank. Exhibit A-l dated 26-8-1971 is the promissory note executed by the defendants is favour of the Bank for a sum of Rs. one Lakh which itself recites that it was executed for value received. 1 and 2 were liable to pay the entire amount claimed by the Bank. Exhibit A-l dated 26-8-1971 is the promissory note executed by the defendants is favour of the Bank for a sum of Rs. one Lakh which itself recites that it was executed for value received. Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 provides for a statutory presumption of consideration of every negotiable Instrument which includes a promissory note." 21. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid decisions in the present case, I agree with the findings of learned lower Appellate Court that the pronote (Ex. P-l) and the receipt (Ex. P-2) dated 30th April, 1982 were executed with full consideration. The defendant knowingly and with full knowledge had executed the pronote (Ex, P-l) and the receipt (Ex. P-2). As already discussed above, there is also a statutory presumption of consideration in respect of the promissory note under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 22. In these circumstances, I dismiss this appeal and confirm the judgment and decree of the learned lower Appellate Court. 23. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their respective costs of this appeal. Petition dismissed.