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1993 DIGILAW 163 (GUJ)

TRIVEDI NAVINCHANDRA AMBALAL v. RATHOD BUDHABHAI bhaijibhai

1993-04-02

R.K.ABICHANDANI

body1993
ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners have challenged the decision of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dated 23-12-1983 in Revision Application No. TEN/ba/70 of 1981 allowing the Revision Application and setting aside the orders passed by the Courts below it and issuing a direction to the mamlatdar to hold an inquiry under Sec. 32g of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), in accordance with law. ( 2 ) IT appears that the respondent had made an application on 16-12- 1979 to the Mamlatdar and A. L. T. , Anand under Sec. 32ff of the Act, inter alia contending that the land bearing Survey No. 559/2 admeasuring 2 Acres 30 Gunthas situated in village Kunjrao, Taluka Anand was cultivated by him and his predecessors for more than 60 years on the basis of crop share basis and the land should be sold to him by fixing the purchase price under the Act. The application was rejected by the mamlatdar and A. L. T. on 24-1-1960 and an appeal filed before the Deputy collector under Sec. 74 of the Act also came to be dismissed on 30th september, 1980. According to the respondent, there was only a paper surrender in favour of the landlord which could not be taken into consideration, since it was not a legal surrender. It was contended that no application for surrender was made by the tenant and the question was decided on the basis of an application for surrender made by the landlord. According to the petitioners, the tenancy was surrendered and possession was handed over on 31-2-1957 pursuant to proceedings for surrender. In any event, thereafter, in proceedings under Sec. 70 (b), it was directed by an order dated 1-3-1964 that if possession was with the respondent, it should be handed over to the landlord and accordingly, on 28-7-1964, possession was again handed over to the landlord. Thus, since the respondent was not in possession, from 15-6-1965 to 3-3-1973, he was not entitled to any benefit under the provisions of Sec. 32ff of the Act. ( 3 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the very basis of the decision of the Tribunal, namely, the petitioners landlord could not have submitted an application for surrender was erroneous. It was argued that an application could be made either by the landlord or by the tenant. ( 3 ) IT was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the very basis of the decision of the Tribunal, namely, the petitioners landlord could not have submitted an application for surrender was erroneous. It was argued that an application could be made either by the landlord or by the tenant. ( 4 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the application in respect of the surrender of tenancy of the respondent was made by the landlord. The provisions of Sec. 15 (1) of the Act applicable at the relevant time read as under: ( 5 ) THE manner of such verification was prescribed by Rule 9 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules, 1956 which read as under : " (9) Manner of verifying the surrender of tenancy :the Mamlatdar, when verifying surrender of a tenancy by a tenant in favour of the landlord under Sec. 15 shall satisfy himself, after such inquiry as he thinks fit, that the tenant understands the nature and consequences of the surrender and also that it is voluntary and shall endorse his finding in that behalf upon the instrument of surrender. " ( 6 ) IT will be clear from the above provisions that there is a mandatory requirement that the surrender of interest of the tenant is to be made by a tenant in writing and that fact is to be verified before the Mamlatdar in the prescribed manner. The provision does not contemplate a writing by the landlord for getting an order of surrender under Sec. 15 of the Act. A landlord cannot surrender tenancy rights of his tenant and the tenant alone could have surrendered his tenancy rights in writing to be verified in the prescribed manner, in favour of the landlord. Admittedly, the tenant did not make any application in writing surrendering his interest in favour of the landlord. There was no instrument executed by the tenant surrendering his interest in favour of the landlord. The writing could have been made before making an application under Sec. 15 (1) and such a writing when produced before the Mamlatdar could have been verified. The surrender could even have been made by the tenant in writing before the Mamlatdar and that could have been contained in an application made by the tenant. The writing could have been made before making an application under Sec. 15 (1) and such a writing when produced before the Mamlatdar could have been verified. The surrender could even have been made by the tenant in writing before the Mamlatdar and that could have been contained in an application made by the tenant. When there was no other writing by which the tenancy was surrendered, an application by a tenant would alone assume significance in order to ascertain whether he had surrendered his tenancy in writing. In absence of any instrument of surrender or any writing before the Mamlatdar executed by the tenant, effecting the surrender, an application by a landlord that surrender was made would not by itself satisfy the requirements of Sec. 15 (1) of the Act read with Rule 9 of the Rules. It is in this context that the observations of the Tribunal to the effect that surrender proceedings appear to have made on an application submitted by the landlord and not by the tenant and the very root of the alleged surrender would not be considered to be legal and valid, should be read. When there was no writing by the tenant, evidencing surrender of tenancy executed at any time, there was no basis for any valid surrender of the interest of the tenant. The learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of this Court, reported in the case of Hormasji Sorabji v. Gujarat Revenue tribunal, (1963) XIV GLR 645 including the unreported portion of the judgment, by calling for the original judgment from the files of the Court, in support of his proposition that an application could be made by a landlord in respect of surrender of the interest of the tenant. Even if it was possible for the landlord by an application to raise the contention before the Mamlatdar under Sec. 15 (1) that the tenant had surrendered the tenancy, it was absolutely essential that there should be a surrender in writing executed by the tenant. No such writing was executed by the tenant either before the application which was made by the landlord or even before the Mamlatdar. In absence of any such writing, there could arise no question of the Mamlatdar verifying the writing in accordance with Rule 9 and making an endorsement on the instrument of surrender. No such writing was executed by the tenant either before the application which was made by the landlord or even before the Mamlatdar. In absence of any such writing, there could arise no question of the Mamlatdar verifying the writing in accordance with Rule 9 and making an endorsement on the instrument of surrender. ( 7 ) THE Tribunal, therefore, on the basis of the material on record, was justified in coming to the conclusion that the respondent was in actual possession of the land inspite of the alleged surrender. The Tribunal took note of the fact that the Panchnama under which possession was said to have been handed over, did not disclose the fact as to in whose presence it was prepared and there was no signature of any officer appended therein. This factual aspect has not been disputed. There was, therefore, no reliable evidence on record to show that the possession was handed over by the tenant to the landlord pursuant to the alleged surrender. The Tribunal has not committed any error in exercise of its jurisdiction in coming to this finding and there is absolutely no valid reason for interfering with the impugned decision in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court under art. 227 of the Constitution. This petition is, therefore, rejected. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. Ad-interim relief stands vacated. .