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1993 DIGILAW 164 (KAR)

V. MUNISWAMY v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, KOLAR

1993-07-12

D.V.BHAT, S.B.MAJMUDAR

body1993
S. B. MAJMUDAR, C. J. ( 1 ) IN this writ appeal, the writ petitioner has submitted that the alienation of the disputed land in his favour made as early as 20th February, 1953 by the original grantee, who was a member of the Scheduled Caste, cannot be voided under the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, for short the 'act'. The transaction was declared null and void by the authorities and the possession of the land was ordered to be restored to original grantee-Appellant's vendor. He challenged that action unsuccessfully, before the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 26674/1992. That is how he has come by way of this appeal. ( 2 ) A few relevant facts are to be noted to appreciate the grievance made by the appellant for our consideration. An extent of 2 acres-and 3 guntas comprised in Sy. No. 81 of Doddiganahalli, was regranted to one Mudduga bin Hanumanthuga in the year 1942-43. The said grantee had sold the aforesaid extent of land to the appellant by a registered sale deed dated 22nd february, 1953. The Karnataka Legislature enacted the aforesaid Act, which came into force from 1-1-1979. Section 4 of the said Act provided as under:"notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or instrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of the Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant, of such land or the law providing for such grant, or sub-section (2) shall be null and void and no right, title or interest to such land shall be conveyed nor be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer. (2) No person shall, after the commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land, without the previous permission of the government. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority. "the original vendor's son one Shri A. K. Hanumappa, initiated action before the Assistant Commissioner for resumption of the land in question. (3) The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply also to the sale of any land in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or of any award or order of any other authority. "the original vendor's son one Shri A. K. Hanumappa, initiated action before the Assistant Commissioner for resumption of the land in question. He submitted before the authority exercising powers under the Act that the transaction of sale in favour of the appellant had become null and void as per Section 4 (1) of the Act, as his father belonged to Scheduled Caste and therefore, the transaction entered into by his father in favour of the appellant would be hit by Section 4 of the Act. The authority exercising powers under Section 5 of the Act passed order on 22nd July, 1987, declaring the sale transaction effected in favour of the appellant as not valid. It may be noted that the aforesaid proceedings were initiated before the competent authority, under the Act, in November, 1983, Against the order of 1984, there was an appeal preferred by the appellant. The appellate authority by its Order dated 7-11- 1985 allowed the appeal and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. After remand, the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner initiated action once again and gave notice to the parties. The Assistant Commissioner after giving opportunity to parties by his Order dated 22nd July, 1987 declared the sale transaction effected in favour of the appellant as invalid and directed resumption of the property. Appellant once again preferred an appeal to the deputy Commissioner, Kolar District. The appellate authority, dismissed the appeal on the 25th September, 1990, confirming the Order of the Assistant commissioner, dated 22nd July, 1987. Under these circumstances, the appellant came to this court by way of writ petition. ( 3 ) THE contention of the writ petitioner before the learned single Judge and which is repeated before us is to the effect that as the transaction in favour of the appellant was entered into by the original grantee on 20th february, 1953, the appellant completed continuous period of adverse possession within 30 years from the date of the transaction i. e. , by 20th february, 1983 his adverse possession became complete and he become the full owner of this property not liable to be subjected to proceedings under section 4 read with Section 5 of the Act. The action was initiated for the first time on the application of original vendor's son Shri A. K. Hanumappa in november, 1983 and by that time the appellant had already completed more than 30 years of adverse possession and consequently sale transaction could not be held to be void under Section 4 read with Section 5 of the Act. He further submitted that though it was true that on 1-1-1979 when the Act came into force the appellant had not completed 30 years of adverse possession but only because the Act was enacted, without taking any action against him and destroying the continuance of his adverse possession, the running of adverse possession could not be intercepted and consequently running of 30 years got completed from the date of transaction and not prior to initiation of action under Section 5 read with Section 4 and therefore, curtain must drop on this case and the transaction becomes immune from the sweep of the Act. The learned counsel in support of this contention placed reliance on the following two decisions of the Supreme Court: (1) In Manche Gowda v State of karnataka and Others, 1984 (2) Kar. L. J. 1 (SC): ILR 1984 (2) Kar. 1 and as later clarified by the same Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) sunkara Rajyalakshmi v State of Karnataka, ILR 1987 (3) Kar. 2076 (SC ). Relying on these decisions the learned counsel submitted that the concept of adverse possession by the transferees of such transactions has been recognised by the Supreme Court in connection with the present Act and if that is so, running of adverse possession would naturally not stop on 1-1-1979 when the Act was enacted and therefore 30 years period which should be counted for deciding the adverse possession of the transferee of any voidable transaction under the Act must be computed with reference to the date of initiation of the proceedings under Section 5 read with Section 4 of the Act and not prior thereto. The learned single Judge did not agree with this contention and in our view rightly so. The aforesaid decisions of the supreme Court, put an end to the controversy raised before us. The learned single Judge did not agree with this contention and in our view rightly so. The aforesaid decisions of the supreme Court, put an end to the controversy raised before us. ( 4 ) SO far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Manche Gowda v State of Karnataka and Others, (supra) is concerned, it is true that the Supreme court was considering the vires of the provisions and while upholding the vires of the provisions certain pertinent observations have been made which require to be noted at this stage to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for appellant. In para 18 of the aforesaid decision Amarendranath sen, J. speaking for the Supreme Court Bench, has observed as under:"the transferees of the granted land from the original grantees acquired the lands improperly and illegally in contravention of the condition imposed on such transfers. Such transferee must have been aware and must in any event be deemed to have been aware of the condition regarding the prohibition on transfer and they cannot be considered to be bona fide transferees for value. Such persons acquired in the granted lands only avoidable title which was liable to be defeated and possession of such lands could be resumed from such transferees. Such a person who only acquires a defeasible legal right cannot make a grievance of any violation article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution, when the defeasible legal right, is in fact defeated by appropriate legal action or any suitable provision enacted in the Act passed by the competent legislature. It may further be noted that in most cases such transferees have asked the transfer which is liable to be avoided in accordance with law enjoyed for a sufficiently long period the benefits of the land transferred to them before the lands could be recovered from them. Article 19 (l) (f) therefore did not invalidates section 4 of the Act. "in para 21 of the Report it has been further held as under;"with the enactment of the Act, the voidable right or title of the transferee in the granted lands becomes void and the transferee is left with no right or property in the granted lands. The lands which are sought to be recovered from the transferee of their granted land or lands in which the transferees cease to have any interest or property. The lands which are sought to be recovered from the transferee of their granted land or lands in which the transferees cease to have any interest or property. The effect of the provisions contained in Sections 4 and 5 of the Act is that the defeasible right or interest of the transferees in the granted lands is defeated and the voidable transaction is rendered void. We have earlier held that it is clearly open to legislature to declare void the transfers of granted lands in contravention of the condition of prohibition transfer. As soon as such transfers are rendered void by virtue^ of the provisions of the Act, the transferee does not have any right in the granted lands so transferred and possession is sought to be recovered of such lands in which the transferees have lost their right and interest. Therefore, the question of acquisition of any property by the State or any modification or extinguishment of right of property does not really arises and Article 31-A cannot be applied. We, are therefore of the opinion that there is no infringement of artide 31 and Article 31-A of the Constitution. We may further observe that this aspect has been carefully and elaborately considered by the learned judges of the High Court while holding that Articles 31 and 31-A are not violated. "it becomes therefore, clear that with the enactment of the Act that is from 1-1-1979 whatever voidable rights or title the transferee held in the granted land became void and the transferee was left with no right or title in the granted lands. It is because of the operation of the Statutory Scheme that the incomplete adverse possession of the appellant got intercepted and destroyed. Then only remains the steps to be taken by the authorities for recovering possession. So far as the title of the transferee is concerned, it got destroyed on 1-1-1979 once the conditions precedent to the applicability of section 4 were attracted. We are satisfied and it was not disputed before us that conditions precedent to the applicability of Section 4 were attracted. So far as the title of the transferee is concerned, it got destroyed on 1-1-1979 once the conditions precedent to the applicability of section 4 were attracted. We are satisfied and it was not disputed before us that conditions precedent to the applicability of Section 4 were attracted. So far as adverse possession aspect is concerned, in para 24 of the Report it has been held as under:"since at the date of commencement of the Act the title of such transferees had ceased to be voidable by reason of acquisition of prescriptive rights on account of long and continued user for the requisite period, the title of such transferees could not be considered as rendered void by virtue of theprovisions of the Act without violating the constitutional guarantee. We must, therefore, read down the provisions of the Act by holding that the Act will apply to transfers of granted lands made in breach of the condition imposing prohibition on transfer of granted lands only in those cases where the title acquired by the transferee was still voidable at the date of commencement of the Act and had not lost its defeasible character at the date when the Act came into force. Transferees of granted lands having perfected and not a voidable title at the commencement of the Act must be held to be outside the pale of the provisions of the Act. Section 4 of the Act must be so construed as not to have the effect of rendering void the title of any transferee which was not voidable at the date of commencement of the Act. " ( 5 ) THEREFORE the moot question will be as to whether on the date of commencement of the Act the title of the appellant/transferee had ceased to be voidable. As we have already observed earlier the transfer in favour of appellant was effected on 20th February, 1953. So on 1-1-1979 when the Act came into force his title which was earlier voidable had not ceased to be voidable by the doctrine of adverse possession. In other words, before 1-1- 1979 the appellant's possession which was adverse earlier had not matured fully and the title in his favour had remained still in the realm of voidable title which was destroyed by application of Section 4 as aforesaid. In other words, before 1-1- 1979 the appellant's possession which was adverse earlier had not matured fully and the title in his favour had remained still in the realm of voidable title which was destroyed by application of Section 4 as aforesaid. There is a later decision of the Supreme Court, clarifying the earlier decision i. e. Sunkara rajyalakshmi, (supra ). In para 2 of that decision it has been laid down as under"we may also make it clear that so far as the second exception laid down by us in our judgment dated 17-4-1984, is concerned, namely, that the karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 will not apply where the transferees have perfected their title in the granted land by prescription of long and continuous enjoyment before the commencement of the Act, the period of limitation which has to be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the title has been perfected by prescription is that which runs against the State Government and therefore, it would be 30 years and not 12 years. "supreme Court made it very clear that if a transferee of land covered by the sweep of the Act had completed adverse possession for a period of 30 years prior to the date of coming into force of the Act then only he would not be touched. All other transfers, otherwise voidable, but falling within Section 4 (1) of the Act would be liable to be proceeded with under the Act. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid decisions it must be held that only those transfers of lands by scheduled castes persons which have taken place on or before 1-1-1949, i. e. , when transferees have completed adverse possession prior to 1-1-1979, would be saved from the sweep of the Act. All other transactions, would be liable to answer the requirements of the Act and would fall through on the anvil of the Act, on the conditions precedent to Section 4 being attracted. In the present case, as the appellant's transaction falls within this unsafe period, unfortunately for him, there is no escape from the conclusion that this transaction was squarely hit by Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. No fault can be found with the reasoning adopted by the authorities in this case and which is upheld by the learned single Judge. No fault can be found with the reasoning adopted by the authorities in this case and which is upheld by the learned single Judge. ( 6 ) IN the result, appeal fails and is dismissed. --- *** --- .