K. G. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THE Respondent, a Co-operative Housing Society sued Appellant No. 1 - rajnagar Club - for a decree for possession of the suit premises together with arrears of rent, mesne profits, notice charges and costs of the suit. Pending the suit, the Respondent impleaded as defendants the other appellants who are the Office-bearers of Appellant No. 1. The Respondent also applied for and obtained a permission under Order I Rule 8 of the code of Civil Procedure as there were quite a large number of members of Appellant no. 1 Club. Necessary notice under Order I Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure was published. ( 2 ) IN the plaint, the respondent contended that in Ellisbridge Town Planning Scheme no. 3 at Ahmedabad, there is a property known as parimal Gymkhana of the ownership of the respondent, and in that property, there is a building knwon as bhanumati Pavilion bearing Survey No. 715-2-3. The Respondent stated that the aforesaid building knwon as bhanumati Pavilion except one room therein is the subject matter of the suit. It is the case of the Respondent that it has leased out the subject matter of the suit to Rajnagar club with effect from August 11, 1954, at a monthly rent of 83 Rupees 5 Annas and 4 paise. The municipal taxes and electricity consumption charges were to be borne by the tenant Rajnagar Club. A rent note of the demise was executed on December 24, 1954. The month of tenancy commences from the 1st day of every English Calendar Month. ( 3 ) IT is also averred in the plaint that as per the terms of the lease, the Respondent was entitled to use the demised premises for the purpose of holding annual general meetings and the meetings of the executive committee of the Respondent during morning hours. ( 4 ) THE respondent contended in the plaint that in violation of the terms of the tenancy, appellant no. 1 Club, and its members have been causing nuisance and annoyance to the neighbours. It is further the grievance of the Respondent that the appellant club has illegally sub-let a part of the demised premises to others and that the appellant club is making illegal profits out of the demised premises. The Respondent also contended that it bonafide requires the suit premises for its reasonable personal occupation. It is further the grievance of the Respondent that the appellant club has illegally sub-let a part of the demised premises to others and that the appellant club is making illegal profits out of the demised premises. The Respondent also contended that it bonafide requires the suit premises for its reasonable personal occupation. The respondent has also referred to the appellant club having filed a suit against the respondent in the Small Causes Court, and having obtained certain injunctions against the Respondent. In the plaint, the Respondent has also referred to its notice issued by it to the appellant club terminating the tenancy of the appellant club. ( 5 ) IN para 11 of the plaint, the Respondent has averred that as the appellants have been given the premises for running a Club, the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (for short "the Rent Act") do not apply, and consequently, the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad, in which the suit was filed has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit. ( 6 ) THE appellants resisted the suit and denied the allegations made against them by the Respondent in the plaint. They denied the averments made by the Respondent in para 11 of the plaint as regards non-applicability of the provisions of the Rent Act and they contended that the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad in which the suit was filed has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for the reason that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the Respondent and the appellants and the provisions of the Rent Act apply. They also contended that the notice terminating the tenancy issued to them by the respondent is not valid and legal. Their further contention in the written statement was that they arc the tenants not only of the building known as bhanumati Pavilion except one room therein, but they are the tenants of that building together with the surrounding open compound land, whereon are situated tennis court, badminton courts, etc. According to the appellant, the demised premises consists not only of the building known as bhanumati Pavilion but also the surrounding compound. According to the appellant, the demised premises consists not only of the building known as bhanumati Pavilion but also the surrounding compound. It is their case that they are in exclusive possession of the compound surrounding the building known as Bhanumati pavilion, and as the Respondent has terminated their tenancy only in respect of the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion, and has filed the suit for possession only of that building known as Bhanumati Pavilion, both the notice and the suit are bad in law for the respondent has no right to split the tenancy in the manner the Respondent has purported to do. The appellants further contention is that the rent note pleaded by the Respondent in the plaint is incomplete, nominal and inoperative. They have denied the allegations about nuisance, sub-letting, profiteering, etc. They have also denied the allegation that the respondent requires the suit premises bonafide for its reasonable personal occupation. ( 7 ) THE learned Judge of the trial court raised the necessary issues and on the appreciation of the evidence led before him, he firstly found that the provisions of the rent Act are not applicable to the facts of the case, and the City Civil Court at ahmedabad has, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit. He found that the notice terminating the tenancy of the appellants is valid. He turned down the appellants contention that the Respondent has split the tenancy. According to him, the rent note Exh. 78, though in one respect incomplete, binds the parties and that rent note coupled with the other evidence on record, raises a very heavy preponderance of probabilities that what was let to the appellant club was only the superstructure of Bhanumati Pavilion except one room therein, and not the adjacent compound, though as the tenant of the building, the appellant club and its member alongwith the other tenants of the respondent in the other superstructurs, as also alongwith the Respondent were free to use the compound land. According to the learned Judge, therefore, the Respondent has rightly terminated the tenancy of the appellant club in respect of the demised premises and with the rights of the appellant club in the demised premises getting terminated, the freedom of the appellant club and its members to use the compound land jointly with the other tenants of the respondent and the respondent would also come to an end. In the view that the learned trial Judge took about the non- applicability of the provisions of the the Rent Act to the case, he did not decide the contentions about sub-letting, nuisance, etc. ( 8 ) ON the findings as aforesaid, the learned Judge passed the decree, which is challenged by the appellants in this appeal. ( 9 ) MR. R. K. Shah, the learned advocate for the appellants, mainly raised two contentions in support of the appeal. Firstly he contended that the subject matter of the demise by the Respondent to the appellant club was not only the building knwon as bhanumati Pavilion excluding one room therein, but also the entire compound surrounding that building, and as the entire compound surrounding that building, and as the Respondent has terminated the tenancy of the appellant club only as regards the building, the notice terminating the tenancy is bad in law, and the suit having been filed for getting the possession only of the building, the suit is also bad in law. The second contention of Mr. Shah was that the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit. ( 10 ) MR. V. P. Shah, the learned Advocate for the Respondent supported the trial courts judgment and decree. I think, there is no substance in any of the two contention raised by Mr. R. K. Shah, in support of the appeal. ( 11 ) THE record clearly shows that even before the appellant club was inducted as a tenant in the premises in the year 1954, the Respondent which is a Co-operative Housing society, was using its property, i. e. the building knwon as Bhanumati Pavilion and the compound surrounding that building for cultural and recreational activities. There was a tennis Court and two Badminton Courts laid on the open compound surrounding the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion. There was a tennis Court and two Badminton Courts laid on the open compound surrounding the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion. The Respondent landlord continued that activity upto about 1950 A. D. In 1954, the appellant club was inducted as a tenant with effect from August 11, 1954. The rent note Exh. 78 came to be executed on December 24, 1954. At the top of the rent note Exh. 78, the executants of the rent note are shown to be Sheth nanddas Haridas, the President and Indrakant Trikamlal and Krishnakant Ramanlal, the honorary Secretaries of Rajnagar Club. The rent note refers to the demise only of the building knwon as Bhanumati Pavilion of Parimal Gymkhana. The rent note also recites that there is one room in the Pavilion wherein the Respondent Housing Society keeps its account books, and they have to be kept in that room. Of course, at the bottom of the rent note, there are signatures only of Indrakant Trikamlal and Krishnakant Ramanlal, the honorary Secretaries of the appellant club and there is no signature of Sheth Nanddas haridas, the President of the Club. ( 12 ) A bare reading of this rent note would show that what was let out by the respondent to the club was only the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion except one room therein. That one room in the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion was not let out to the appellant club is a fact averned in the plaint and not disputed in the written statement. Even at the trial, it was not in dispute that one room in the building known as bhanumati Pavilion is in the possession of the Respondent. On the basis that the rent note, though it was meant to have been signed also by the President of the Club has not been signed by the President, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the rent note is incomplete and therefore, cannot be read in evidence. Alternatively it was sought to be argued that the rent note is incomplete the oral evidence as regards the extent of the demised premises would not be shut out by virute of Secs. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. Alternatively it was sought to be argued that the rent note is incomplete the oral evidence as regards the extent of the demised premises would not be shut out by virute of Secs. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. The learned trial Judge has considered all these contentions in their proper perspective, and held that though the rent note is not signed by the President, it is binding to the parties, and the oral evidence contrary to the terms of the rent note would be hit by secs. 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. ( 13 ) NANDDAS Haridas, the President of the Club has deposed on behalf of the appellants and he has tried to say that the rent note Exh. 78 was brought to him by the club Secretary Indrakant for his signature, and at that time, he pointed out to Indrakant that the compound surrounding Bhanumati Pavilion which was being used by the club was not mentioned in the rent note, and thus, on that count, as stated by Nanddas, he did not sign the rent note. According to Nanddas, Indrakant, the Honorary Secretary, therefore, took back the rent note and thereafter the matter of the rent note was never dealt with before him, and it is in these circumstances that the rent note does not bear his signature. The attempt on the part of Nanddas was that in the negotiations that preceded the execution of the rent note, the agreement between the parties was that not only the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion, but also the compound surrounding it was to be the subject matter of the demise and as, in the rent note there was no mention about the compund surrounding the building as the subject matter of the rent note, he did not sigh the rent note. Now, on this point, the cross-examination of Nanddas makes an interesting reading. In para 3 of his deposition, Nanddas has stated that after the talk with the secretary that the compund of the premises should be mentioned in the rent note and nanddas did not sign the rent note because that fact was not mentioned, the Secretary did sign it Nanddas has categorically stated that the Secretary signed it competently. Nanddas admitted that it may be that the rent note executed by the Club Secretary may have been accepted as binding by the Club. Nanddas admitted that it may be that the rent note executed by the Club Secretary may have been accepted as binding by the Club. Thus, though the rent note is not signed by Nanddas, the President, it is signed by the two Honorary Secretaries, and according to Nanddas, the Honorary Secretaries have competently signed the rent note, and the appellant club may have accepted the rent note as binding to it. Nanddas has stated that the appellant club maintanis the minute book containing its resolutions. No resolution of the appellant club has been produced to show that the club ever resolved that the rent note would not be binding to the appellant club. The Secretary of the appellant club has not been examined. No other witness except nanddas has been examined by the appellants. In this state of evidence, when the secretaries of the appellant club have admilteldy competently signed the rent note, and the club has not taken any exception thereto, the rent note is certainly binding to the club and that rent note describes only the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion except one room therein as the subject matter of the demise. The contention of the appellants that besides the building knwon as Bhanumati Pavilion, the entire compound surrounding the building was the subject matter of the demise, therefore has no substance. ( 14 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter which is also required to be considered. It is in evidence that the entire property of the respondent society admeasured about 2500 sq. yds. On the open compound land surrounding the building knwon as Bhanumati pavilion there were two Badminton courts and one Tennis Court. The rent note Exh. 78, does not confer upon the appellant club and its members, any right to use the Badmintion courts and/or the Tennis Court. It is not even the case of the appellant that at any time, the members of the appellant club used these Badminton Courts and the Tennis Court for playing badminton or tennis. As I will presently point out, the only activity carried by the members of the appellant club is to play cards and to celebrate certain festivals or occasions. It is not even the case of the appellant that at any time, the members of the appellant club used these Badminton Courts and the Tennis Court for playing badminton or tennis. As I will presently point out, the only activity carried by the members of the appellant club is to play cards and to celebrate certain festivals or occasions. When in 1954, the appellant club came to be inducted as tenant in the premises, the two badminton courts and the tennis court were very much in existence, and as said earlier, upto 1950 the Respondent Housing Society was carrying on recreational activities for its members in the name of Parimal Gymkhana. In 1956, i. e. about two years after the appellant club came to be inducted as tenant, the respondent society allotted or transferred about 1500 sq. yds. of the land out of the open compound surrounding the building knwon as Bhanumati Pavilion to one Prabhudas Patwari, and the said Prabhudas patwari enclosed by a compound wall the area of about 1500 sq. yds. which came to be alloted or transferred to him, and in that, a large part or the tennis court and one badminton court came to be taken away by Prabhudas Patwari. In other words, in 1956 or thereafter when Prabhudas Patwari put up the compound wall for enclosing the area of 1500 sq. yds. of land which came to be acquired by him from the Respondent Housing society, one of the two badminton courts and a considerable portion of the tennis court was lost to the respondent in favour of Prabhudas Patwari. At that time, no new agreement came to be entered into between the appellant club and the respondent society. Even the consent or permission of the appellnl club was not obtained by the Respondent for transferring 1500 sq. yds. of land to Prabhudas Patwari. The appellant club never raised any objection to the respondent transferring 1500 sq. yds. of land to Prabhudas Patwari, and never till now has the appellant club raised any contention for pro rata reduction of the rent on the ground that 1500 sq. yds. of the land out of the compound surrounding bhanumati Pavilion came to be transferred by the respondent to Prabhudas Patwari. yds. of land to Prabhudas Patwari, and never till now has the appellant club raised any contention for pro rata reduction of the rent on the ground that 1500 sq. yds. of the land out of the compound surrounding bhanumati Pavilion came to be transferred by the respondent to Prabhudas Patwari. Nanddas Haridas, the witness for the appellants who was, at the relevant time the president of the appellant club, in his deposition has admitted that out of the compound which was surrounding the superstructure of Bhanumati Pavilion, about 1500 sq. yds. of land has been sold by the respondent to Prabhudas Patwari, after the date of letting to the appellant, and Prabhudas Patwari constructed the compound wall which divided the original compound into two. Nanddas has stated that he did not remember the Respondent society ever having approached the appellants for their consent for selling the aforesaid land to Prabhudas Patwari or giving the possession thereof to Prabhudas Patwari. Mr. Divetia, the Honorary Secretary of the Respondent in his deposition stated that the demised property stands on the Plot No. 46/a. That plot originally admeasured 2500 sq. yds. , out of which in 1956 the respondent society allotted about 1500 sq. yds. to prabhudas Patwari. Prabhudas Patwari after taking possesion of the aforesaid 1500 sq. yds. of land constructed a compound wall dividing Plot No. 46/4. Mr. Divetia has further stated in his deposition that previously, to the west of the electric pole was the tennis court. Half of the tennis court now falls into the area which was eventually allotted to Mr. Patwari. According to Mr. Divetia, there were two badminton courts in the compound, one of which fell on the land which was eventually transferred to Mr. Patwari, and other continues to be in the compound which is the property of the Respondent. The aforesaid facts as they emerge from the deposition of the two witnesses - one for the appellants and the other for the respondent - clearly show that the total area of the property originally was about 2500 sq. yds and there were two badminton courts and one tennis court in the open compound land surrounding the building known as Bhanumati pavilion. The respondent sold or transferred 1500 sq. yds. yds and there were two badminton courts and one tennis court in the open compound land surrounding the building known as Bhanumati pavilion. The respondent sold or transferred 1500 sq. yds. of the open land to Prabhudas patwari in the year 1956; Prabhudas Patwari enclosed that area and therein one badminton court and a part of the tennis court was lost. No consent or permission of the appellant club or its office- bearers was obtained by the respondent landlord for effecting this transfer or transferring the possession of the 1500 sq. yds. land to Prabhudas Patwari. The appellant club or its office- bearers have so far never raised any objection to the above course which was adopted by the Respondent Society. These facts are eloquent in themselves. If, out of the total area of 2500 sq. yds. which according to he appellants was entirely the subject matter of the demised premises, the respondent transferred 1500 sq. yds of land to Prabhudas Patwari and handed ove the possession of those 1500 sq. yds. to Prabhudas Patwari, the appellant club and its office-bearers would never have sat silent over that event They would certainly have protested. They would certainly have raised a demur and they would have asked for pro rata reduction of the rent. Nothing of the son was done by the appellant club or its office-bearers. These facts would show that the appellant club had no title of any son on the open compound land. The contention of the appellant club that even the open compound land was the subject matter of the demise is therefore, required to be rejected, and has rightly been rejected by the learned trial Judge. ( 15 ) THERE is yet one more aspect of the matter which may be noticed. Admittedly, one room in the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion is not the subject matter of the demise, and that room is in the possession of the respondent. Further, it is again an admitted position that in the open compound that surrounds the building known as Bhanumati pavilion, there are two more rooms to the west of that building, and both those rooms are in the possession of the respondent. One of those rooms is in possession of the Watchman engaged by the respondent and the other room is in possession of one Chandubhai, a tenant of the respondent. One of those rooms is in possession of the Watchman engaged by the respondent and the other room is in possession of one Chandubhai, a tenant of the respondent. It is not in dispute that the open compound surrounding the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion is not separated in two parts by any compound wall or fencing, so as to separate the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion in one pan, and the two rooms above referred in the other part. Obviously, the Watchman of the respondent and Chandubhai, the tenant of the respondent would be using the compound together with the members of the appellant club. Even the respondent would be required to use the compound for going to and coming from the one room in the building known as bhanumati Pavilion, which is in its possession. These facts in their totality would lead to the only one inference on preponderance of probabilities that the compound has been used jointly by (1) the respondent, (2) the respondents watchman and the tenant Chandubhai and (3) the members of appellant no. l club. It therefore, cannot be said that the appellant club was ever in exclusive possession of the compound. The learned trial Judge was therefore, perfectly right in coming to the conclusion that what was actually let to the appellant club was only the superstructure of the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion (except one room therein), and not the adjacent compound, though as the tenant of the superstructure. alongwith the other tenants in the superstructure, the appellant club was free to use that land. This finding recorded by the learned trial Judge in para 41 of the judgment, in my opinion, is unexceptionable. ( 16 ) THEREFORE, the contention of the appellants that they are the tenants and in exclusive possession also of the compound has, no merit. That contention has rightly been rejected by the learned trial Judge. ( 17 ) COMING to the second point raised by Mr. R. K. Shah, the contention was that the city Civil Court at Ahmedabad has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit. That contention has rightly been rejected by the learned trial Judge. ( 17 ) COMING to the second point raised by Mr. R. K. Shah, the contention was that the city Civil Court at Ahmedabad has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit. ( 18 ) IN the plaint para 11, the Respondent contended that as the premises have been let to the appellant club for running the club, the provisions of the Rent Act are not applicable, and therefore, the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit. In the written statement, the appellant club denied this averment and contended that the relationship between the parties is that of landlord and tenant, and the provisions of the Rent Act are applicable and therefore, the City Civil Court at ahmedabad has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit On behalf of the respondent, reliance was placed on Sec. 6 (l) of the Rent ACL That Section provides as follows:"6. (1) In areas specified in Schedule I, this Part shall apply to premises let for residence, education, business, trade or storage and also to open land let for building purposes. "sec. 6 of the Rent Act finds place in Part II of the Act and Part II of the Act contains sections from S. 6 to S. 31a, and the provisions contained in that Part confers certain protections upon the tenants. It was not in dispute that the protection to the appellant would be available only if the case is covered by S. 6 (1), viz. that the premises in question should have been let for either residence or education or business or trade or storage. Before the trial court, the emphasis on behalf of the appellants was that the letting of the premises by the respondent to the appellant club was a letting for business. Of course, a vague attempt was made on behalf of the appellant club to contend that the purpose of the letting could also be considered to be educational purpose. It was not the case before the trial court nor is it the case before me that the letting was for the purpose of residence, trade or storage as used in Sec. 6 (1) of the Rent Act. It was not the case before the trial court nor is it the case before me that the letting was for the purpose of residence, trade or storage as used in Sec. 6 (1) of the Rent Act. ( 19 ) THE question is whether the lease of the property by the respondent to the appellant club could be said to be either for education or for business. The judgment of the trial court shows that it was only by way of a vague attempt that on behalf of the appellants it was sought to be contended that the purpose of letting could also be said to be an educational purpose. The learned trial Judge has rejected that contention. The question whether letting of such a premises to such a club could at all be said to be for education is now concluded by a recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Haji ismail Valid Mohmad and Others vs. Sports Club, A. I. R. 1992, S. C. p. 1855. That case also arose from this State. In that case, the premises in question were let to a club, the members of which were playing cards in the premises. The landlord filed a suit against the club for recovery of possession of the premises. When the matter came to this High court, the learned single Judge of this High Court took the view that the premises were let to the tenant also with a view to promote cultural activities or cultural education of the members of the club. The learned single Judge held that"by club life one may effectively project his personality powerfully, and this itself will amount to receipt of cultural education and ones own development having regard to day to day life". The learned single Judge in the ultimate analysis took the view that" the respondent tenant was entitled to protection of S. 6 of the Act as the premises were let for the purpose of education". Their Lordships of the Supreme Court disagreeing with the view of the learned single judge of this High Court held that the activities of the club are more in the nature of cultural activities or recreational activities. They are certainly not for education. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court disagreeing with the view of the learned single judge of this High Court held that the activities of the club are more in the nature of cultural activities or recreational activities. They are certainly not for education. In Their lordships view" in the context in which the term education appears in S. 6 (l) of the act, it does not refer to such cultural activities or recreational activities as amounting to education". As stated by the Supreme Court,"the basic purpose of the club activities relate to fraternising among the members by playing indoor or outdoor games or otherwise. Such activities cannot lead the conclusion that the premises were let for the purpose of education, and consequently, the respondent tenant was not entitled to the protection of the Act. "in the case before me also, taking the evidence led by the appellants at its best, what is established is that the members of the appellant club play cards in the building known as Bhanumati Pavilion and sometimes near the electric poles in the open compound surrounding that building, and secondly, the members of the club observe or celebrate the club anniversary day and Diwali festival and such other festivals in the premises. As stated by Nanddas, the club used to celebrate four to five festivals in a year, and dinners are arranged on such festivals, and in such dinners, the members, their families and guests take part. According to Nanddas, the club members use to sit and play cards and park their vehicles in the compound. These then are the only activities indluged in by the members of the club in the premises. Nanddas has stated that the club had a cook to cater eatables to the club members. These are the activities of the club. These activities could never be said to be educational activities in any sense of the term. Even in the case decided by the Supreme Court which I have just now referred to, the evidence was that there was a Canteen which was ran by the club, and yet the Supreme Court found that the premises cannot be said to have been let to the club for the purpose of education. Even in the case decided by the Supreme Court which I have just now referred to, the evidence was that there was a Canteen which was ran by the club, and yet the Supreme Court found that the premises cannot be said to have been let to the club for the purpose of education. The first contention for ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court that the premises have been let for the purpose of education and therefore, the appellant club is entitled to the protection of the Rent Act, therefore fails. ( 20 ) AT the trial, stress was laid on behalf of the appellant club that the lease is for the purpose of business of the club and therefore, sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 6 would be attracted and consequently the appellant club would be entitled to protection under Sec. 6 (1) of the rent Act. The learned trial Judge has discussed this contention at length and has rejected it. On the evidence as it stands, it could never be said that the lease of the premises by the respondent to the appellant club was for business within the meaning of the word business as used in sub-sec. (1) of S. 6 of the Rent Act Sub-sec. (l) of Sec. 6 of the Rent act uses five words- (i) residence, (ii) education, (iii) business, (iv) trade, and (v) storage. The word "business" is used just before the word "trade". The last word in the list is "storage" and before the trial court certain dictionary meanings of the words "club" and "business" were relied upon. On behalf of the appellant club, attention of the learned trial judge was drawn to the definition of the word "club" as given in the Legal and commercial Dictionary by Mitra, 1973 Edition, where the word club has been defined as " a society of persons associated together for social intercourse for the promotion of politics and science or literature or for any purpose except the acquisition of gain". This definition of the word club has commended to the learned trial Judge and it commends to me also. This definition of the word club would clearly shows that the activities of the association which is sought to be styled as a club could be anything but aimed at acquisition of gain or profit. This definition of the word club has commended to the learned trial Judge and it commends to me also. This definition of the word club would clearly shows that the activities of the association which is sought to be styled as a club could be anything but aimed at acquisition of gain or profit. In the very nature of the things, the word business as used in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 6 has in it, the clement of object or expectation of gain or profit. Thus, the concept of the word club as defined-by Mitra is quite opposed to the concept of the word business as used in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 6 of the Rent Act. The word business as used in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 6 of the Rent Act would mean a habitual activity of a person or an individual or an institution, carried on with the object or expectation of acquiring gain or profit. May be, in the ultimate analysis, the activity may result into loss also. But the object or expectation of carrying on any business would be gain or profit. It would then be that it is a business and not otherwise. The word business in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 6 is used in the aforesaid sense. The club of the present nature, the activities of which are only playing of cards and celebration of certain festivals, and assuming what nanddas has said to be correct, catering certain foodstuffs to its members, could hardly be said to be the activity of business, the object of which, or the expectation from which, would be to earn profits or gains. The appellant club maintains minutes books. It must also be maintaining certain other registers. If the appellant ever entered into any commercial transaction or any business transaction, or earned or expected to earn any profits as a result of the activities carried on by its members, it would be maintaining account books also. No such account books have been produced. If the appellant club wanted to contend that one of its activities is business within the meaning of that word as used in Sec. 6 (1) of the Rent Act, it should have made a proper pleading in the written statement, and should have led proper evidence on that line. Nothing of the sort has been done. If the appellant club wanted to contend that one of its activities is business within the meaning of that word as used in Sec. 6 (1) of the Rent Act, it should have made a proper pleading in the written statement, and should have led proper evidence on that line. Nothing of the sort has been done. It would, therefore, be impossible to accept the contention of Mr. , R. K. Shah, L. A. for the appellants that the activities of the appellant club would fall within the expression business, as used in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 6 of the Rent Act, and therefore, the appellant club would be entitled to the protection of Sec. 6 (1) of the Rent Act, and therefore, the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court would be ousted. . ( 21 ) IN the aforesaid view of the matter, none of the contentions raised by Mr. R. K shah in support of the appeal has any merit The appeal is therefore, dismissed with costs. .