B. S. KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who is a detenu has filed the present petition challenging the legality and validity of the detention order dt. 1-10-92 passed against him by the Police Commissioner Ahmedabad City under section 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act 1985 (hereinafter refered to as PASA) on his being satisfied that it is necessary to detain him for preventing him from continuing his activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The grounds were also served on him on the same day i. e. on 9-10-1992 ( 2 ) ON perusal of the grounds it appears that there were four cases under the Bombay Prohibition Act filed against him out of which three were pending in the Court while the last one was pending investigation There were also statements of four witnesses narrating two incidents One incident narrated by two witnesses is of 18th September 1992 and the other one is of 27th September 1992 However by exercising the powers under Section 9 (2) of PASA the detaining authority has not disclosed the names and addresses of the said witnesses in public interest The detaining authority has also considered the other relevant factors for considering the necessary of detaining the petitioner and thereafter has passed the aforesaid order. ( 3 ) IN the petition several grounds have been raised and Mr. V. H. Patel the learned Advocate for the petitioner in the beginning raised some formal objections with regard to the date of sending the report date of approval and date of making the reference to the Advisory Board the date on which the Advisory Board gave the report and with regard to the confirmation of the order On perusal of the files which are there with the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri R P. Solanki it is clear that the report was made on 12 of October 1992 as 10th and 11th of October 1992 were Government holidays. It was also pointed out from the file that order was approved on 17th October 1992 It was also pointed out that the reference to Advisory Board was made on 30th October 1992 and the Advisory Board gave its report on 25th of November 1992 Thus looking to the files and the provisions of the Act it is clear that all the aforesaid formalities have been done in proper time and hence there is no illegality in undergoing these formalities. ( 4 ) THE next contention which Mr. Patel has raised before us is regarding authority of the respondent No. 1 in issuing the order. He submits that even as mentioned in the order of detention the copy of which is at Annexure A to the petition the petitioner has been shown as a person residing in village Zandal of Gandhinagar District and according to him the Detaining Authority has fabricated the new address i. e. of Katiari Pole Delhi Chakla Ahmedabad with a view to pass the order of detention against the petitioner. On perusal of the grounds also it appears that the Police Commissioner-respondent No. 1 who has passed the order has relied upon the three prohibition cases which are pending trial and which are on the file of Adalaj Police Station which is not within the limits of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation while the fourth case which is relied on is filed at Dariapur Police Station which is under investigation. On the basis of the aforesaid facts his submission is that the Police Commissioner had no jurisdiction to issue the detention order. Mr. R. P. Solanki the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has pointed out that under section 7 of the PASA no detention order shall be invalid or inoperative merely be reason that the person to be detained thereunder though within the State is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the authorised officer making the order or that the place of detention of such person though within the State is outside the said limit. This section is a clear answer to the point raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner and therefore that contention has no merit and hence it is rejected. ( 5 ) THE second contention which is raised by Mr. V. H. Patel is that the representation was made on 12-10-1992. According to Mr. This section is a clear answer to the point raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner and therefore that contention has no merit and hence it is rejected. ( 5 ) THE second contention which is raised by Mr. V. H. Patel is that the representation was made on 12-10-1992. According to Mr. Patel that was sent by Registered Post to the jail authority while there is delay in disposing of the said representation by the detaining authority as well as by the State Government. In this case the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has kept the files ready and he has pointed out from the files that the said representation was received by the Jailor on 16-10-1992 and the same was sent to the detaining authority on 17-10-1992 from Bhavnagar Jail and that was received by the detaining authority on 21-10-1992 and the same has been disposed of on 22-10-1992. Similarly it is pointed out that so far as the State Government is concerned the State Government received the same on 21-10-1992 and decided it on 23-10-1992. When that is so it cannot be said that there is any delay in disposing of the said representation. ( 6 ) HOWEVER Mr. Patel has further stated that though the detaining authority and the State Government disposed of the same within a reasonable time still however the communication thereof was made to the petitioner on 2-11-1992 through the jail authorities and therefore from 23 to 2-11-1992 there is a delay in communication thereof. Mr. Patel has heavily relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Harish Pahwa vs. State of U. P. and others AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1126. On perusal of the facts of that case it is clear that in the said case the order of detention is of 16-5-1980 and a representation was made by the appellant from Varanasi Jail on 3-6-1980. The Government received the same on 4-6-1980. For two days no action was taken in connection with it. On 4-6-1980 comments were called for and such comments were received by the State Government on 13-6-1980. On 17-6-1980 the State Government referred the representation to the Law Department for its opinion which was furnished on 16-6-1980. The rejection of the representation was made on 24-6-1980 and it was communicated to the jail authorities two days later. On 4-6-1980 comments were called for and such comments were received by the State Government on 13-6-1980. On 17-6-1980 the State Government referred the representation to the Law Department for its opinion which was furnished on 16-6-1980. The rejection of the representation was made on 24-6-1980 and it was communicated to the jail authorities two days later. In the background of those facts the Supreme Court observed as under:"in our opinion the manner in which the representation made by the appellant has been dealt with reveals a sorry state of affairs in the matter of consideration of representation made by persons detained without trial. There is no explanation at all as to why no action was taken in reference to the representation on 4th 5 and 25th of June 1980 It is also not clear what consideration was given by the Government to the representation from 13th June 1980 to 16th June 1980 when we find that it culminated only in a reference to the Law Department nor he is apparent why the Law Department had to be consulted at all. Again we fail to understand why the representation had to travel from table to table for six days before reaching the Chief Minister who was the only authority to decide the representation. We may make it clear as we have done on numerous earlier occasions that this Court does not look with equanimity upon such delays when the liberty of a person is concerned. Calling comments from other departments seeking the opinion of Secretary after Secretary and allowing the representation to lie without being attended to is not the type of action which the State is expected to take in a matter of such vital import. We would emphasise that it is the duty of the State to proceed to determine representations of the character above mentioned with the utmost expedition which means that the matter must be taken up for consideration as soon as such a representation is received and dealt with continuously ( unless it is absolutely necessary to wait for some assistance in connection with it) until a final decision is taken and communicated to the detenu". Relying upon the aforesaid observation it is submitted that there is a delay in communication of the order of rejecting the representation. Relying upon the aforesaid observation it is submitted that there is a delay in communication of the order of rejecting the representation. It may be stated that so far as the observation with regard to the expeditious dealing with the representation is concerned it has been already complied with. ( 7 ) SO far as the delay in communication of the decision on the representation is concerned it is pointed out from the 1992 calendar of the Government of Gujarat that from 24-10-1992 to 27 there were holidays and there where also holidays on 31-10-1992 and 1-11-1992. In that view of the matter the communication was made on 2 When it is true that so far as dealing with the representation is concerned would include the communication but if the representation is dealt with as expeditiously as possible but there was some delay in communicating the same in this case looking to the holidays as stated above Government had only time for communicating the same on 28th 29 and 30th of October 1992 and therefore there was delay in communicating the decision only of three days which cannot be said to be fatal because it was immediately communicated on 2-11-1992. We would have taken the same view as expressed by the Supreme Court if there would have been some unexplained delay on the part of the Government in dealing with the representation. In the facts and circumstances of the case we do not consider that there is any delay and if there is delay of three days it cannot be said to be fatal. Accordingly the said contention is rejected. ( 8 ) THE last contention which is raised is with regard to the point of public order. It is contended that the material on the record at the most would reveal the breach of law and order situation and not that of public order. Now so far as any individual case is concerned prima facie it can be a matter of law and order but one has to consider what is its length magnitude and its reach to find out as to whether public order is likely to be affected or not. On this point there are numerous judgments of the Supreme Court. Now so far as any individual case is concerned prima facie it can be a matter of law and order but one has to consider what is its length magnitude and its reach to find out as to whether public order is likely to be affected or not. On this point there are numerous judgments of the Supreme Court. The first in point of time is the case of Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar AIR 1966 Supreme Court 740 and the distinction is made by M. Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) by giving illustrations to clearly find out clear distinction between law and order public order and security of the State and that principle has been followed in number of cases thereafter Even today the same principle has been consistently followed in all the cases all throughout. We have considered our judgment in Special Criminal Application No. 1788 of 1992 decided on 12-3-1993 when similar argument was advanced by Mr. P. B. Majmudar and therefore with a view to shorten the length of the judgment it is not necessary to reproduce here the entire discussion made in paragraphs 8 and 9 thereof here. When it is also clear that when the even tempo of public life is disturbed it would come within the compass of the public order and whether the even tempo of public life is disturbed or not would be a question to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case. So far as the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act is concerned the enlarged meaning is given to the words public order in the Explanation of sub-section (4) of section 3 of the said Act. It is rightly observed in paragraph 4 of the judgment in the case of S. M. Patel vs. Commissioner] of Police reported in 33 (2) GLR. 1360 as under:" When a reference is made to the relevant provisions of the PASAA 1985 it would become clear that the Act has been meant for the preventive detention of bootleggers dangerous persons drug offenders immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers with a view to prevent them from indulging into anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Section 3 of the Act would further go to show that though there is a deeming provision contained under sub-sec. Section 3 of the Act would further go to show that though there is a deeming provision contained under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 the detaining authority has got to record a subjective satisfaction that the detenu who is either a bootlegger or a dangerous person or belongs to any other category of persons as described and defined in the definition clause acts in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. A bare reading to the definition clause and the provisions contained under relevant provisions of the PASAA 1985 unless and until the detaining authority is subjectively satisfied that the detenu falls in one of the above said categories and that his activities are such that they affect or are likely to affect the maintenance of public order. The scheme of the Act is so eloquently clear that no assistance of case law in this respect would be required to support or strengthen the view culminating from a bare reading". It may also be pointed out that this Explanation in sub-sec. (4) of sec. 3 was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendrakumar vs. State of Gujarat AIR 1988 SC 1255 . In para 14 of the said judgment it is observed as under:"the purpose of the detention is with a view to preventing the appellant from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It was not seriously disputed before us that the prejudicial activities carried on by the appellant answer the description of a bootlegger as defined in S. 2 (b) and therefore he comes within the purview of sub-s. (1) of S. 3 of the Act by reason of sub-s. (4) thereof. Sub-s. (4) of S. 3 with the Explanation appended thereto gives an enlarged meaning to words acting in any manna prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and reads: " (4) For the purpose of this section a person shall be deemed to be acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. Explanation:-For the purpose of this sub-section public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in this sub-section directly or indirectly is causing or is likely to cause any harm danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life property of public health". "the District Magistrate in passing the impugned order has recorded his subjective satisfaction with respect to the appellant that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order it is necessary to make an order that he be detained. In the accompanying grounds for detention this is the basis for the formation of his subjective satisfaction. They go on to state that unless the order of detention was made he would not stop his illicit liquor traffic on brokerage and therefore it was necessary to detain him under S. 3 (2) of the Act and recite: In order to safeguard the health of the people of Gujarat for public peace and in the interest of the nation with a view to stop such anti-national activities. . . . . for the purpose of public order and public peace and in the interest of the State. . . . . . " in our opinion these words added by way of superscription were wholly unnecessary. They were set out by the District Magistrate presumably because of total prohibition in the State. In future it would be better for the detaining authorities acting under Secs. 3 (1) and 3 (2) of the Act to avoid such unnecessary verbiage which are of little or no consequence and give rise to unnecessary debate at the Bar". ( 9 ) THE aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court directly deals with the enlarged meaning of the wordsacting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order occurring in section 3 When that is so we have to take into consideration whether the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority was in the ordinary meaning of the words public order as well as under the enlarged meaning of the words acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order given in sub-sec. (4) and Explanation to sec. 3 of the Act. For that purpose it will be necessary to consider the observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of Mrs. Harpreet Kaur vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr. reported in Judgments Today 1992 (1) S. C. 502 which has been already referred to in the case of S. M. Patel vs. Commissioner of Police (supra) where in paragraph 13 it has been observed as under:"after reproducing the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above said six decisions and after considering the same the Supreme Court has said that from the above said law laid down by the Supreme Court it follows that it is the degree and the extent of the reach of the objectionable activity upon the society which is vital for considering the question whether a man has committed only a breach of Law and Order or has acted in a manner likely to cause disturbance to Public Order. The Supreme Court has also pointed out that the facts of each case shall have to be carefully scrutinised to test the validity of an order of detention". The Supreme Court in the context has said thus:"in each case therefore the Courts have to see the length magnitude and intensity of the questionable activities of a person to find out whether his activities are prejudicial to maintenance of Public Order or only Law and Order". In that view of the matter it is now desirable to scrutinise the facts of the present case as revealed in the grounds for detention and the relevant papers. ( 10 ) AS stated earlier the first case is that of Adalaj Police Station being C. R. No. 115/92. It is of 8-3-1992. In the said case 341 bottles of English liquor worth Rs. 20 600 were seized. The second case is of the same Police Station- C. R. No. 33v92 wherein 42 bottles of foreign liquor worth Rs. 1500/- along with scooter were seized. That offence is dated 9th of July 1992 The third one is a case from the same Police Station of the same date: C. R. No. 332 was of 18-00 hours while C. R. No. 333 was of 22-30 hours of the same date. In the case of C. R. No. 333/92 199 bottles of foreign liquor worth Rs. 10 200 were seized. In the case of C. R. No. 333/92 199 bottles of foreign liquor worth Rs. 10 200 were seized. The last case is that of Dariapur Police Station- C. R. No. 120/92 wherein 110 bottles of foreign liquor worth Rs. 7450/- and scooter were seized. That offence is dated 6-10-1992. There is no dispute and there cannot be any dispute that when the petitioner is dealing with foreign liquor he is a bootlegger within the meaning of sec. 2 (b) of the said Act. Now these four cases are registered within a span of seven months. Further it is clear from the statements of four witnesses that two further incidents of 18-9-1992 and 22-9-1992 had taken place. This vicinity of the dates of the incident also clearly discloses that the petitioner is regularly doing his bootlegging activities and looking to the incident it appears that as the two victims did not give their vehicles on the aforesaid two different dates the petitioner along with his associates started beating them on account of which people gathered there and at that time in one incident the present petitioner brought out a Rampuri knife from his pocket and went towards the people who had gathered there and the people had started running helter-skelter and the shop- keepers of the same locality had also closed their shops and the entire traffic on the road was disturbed. In the other incident the vehicle of the victim was also damaged. These two incidents of the dates of 18-9-1992 and 22-9-1992 cannot be treated singularly or as stray incidents. We have to see in the light of the earlier cases pending against the petitioner. It appears that the petitioner has day by day gathered courage to develop his bootlegging activities and to demand the vehicle for his bootlegging activity from any person and if someone refused to give it then to beat him and disturb the public order by disturbing the even tempo of the society namely the business in the shops as well as the traffic on the road. Thus all the said incidents taken together for finding out the cumulative effect thereof would clearly disclose that though individually each one would be a separate incident still however it shows the length maginitude and intensity of the activities of the petitioner as a bootlegger which activities at times disturbed the even tempo of the public life and also are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order within the enlarged meaning of sec. 3 (4) of PASAA. It may be stated that this Court is not sitting in appeal against the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority. So unless it is a case of no data for the purpose of drawing the inference or that the subjective satisfaction is arrived at on no data or is vitiated for any other reason this Court would not like to interfere with the order passed by the detaining authority. In this case we have as laid down by the Supreme Court scrutinised the statements of the witnesses along with the other material on record and we cannot say that subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority is in any way vitiated on the ground that the activities of the petitioner were the activities which were likely to affect law and order and not public order. In that view of the matter we do not find any merit in this contention also. Before parting with the judgment we would like to point out that some other judgments of another Bench of this Court including the judgment in Special Criminal Application No. 1644/92 decided on 3-3-1993 by the Division Bench consisting of A. P. Ravani and J. M. Panchal JJ. were also cited before us but there was no different ratio in them on the point of what will be Public Order and also on the point of Law and Order as laid down in Ram Manohar Lohias case (supra) as well as the other judgments referred to above. Therefore the decisions of another Bench of this Court cited before us would not be useful to the petitioner. In view of what is stated above the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. Rule discharged. Petition Dismissed. .