JUDGMENT There appears to be some confusion in the Courts about the law relating to process fees. It is under rules framed by the High Court under section 20 of the Court Fees Act that process fee is payable. These rules for processes to be issued by criminal Courts are reproduced in Rules 546 to 549 of Rules and Orders (Criminal). At the out set, it may be noticed that process fee is always payable in Court fee stamps and never in cash (Rule 547). Speaking about criminal cases, it is only in non-cognizable cases that process fee is payable (Rule 546). With respect to cognizable cases, process fee is not payable, whether the case was instituted on complaint or not (Rule 548). Thus, the question whether process fee is payable in a given criminal case, does not depend upon whether the case is triable as a warrant case, as the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the present case seemed to think wrongly. It does not also depend upon the quantum of punishment prescribed for the offence, as again the learned Additional Sessions Judge wrongly seemed to think. It depends upon whether the case is a cognizable case or not. If it is a cognizable case, then process fee is not payable under any circumstances. This rule admits of no exception. It does not then matter whether the cognizable case was instituted on a complaint or not. On the other hand, if the case is non-cognizable case, then, speaking generally, process fee is payable for processes to be issued in that case (See Rule 546). This is to repeat, the general rule but it admits of exceptions. Those exceptions may also be noticed. Thus, the Presiding Officer of the Court may remit the process fee payable in non-cognizable case, when he is satisfied that person applying for the issue of process is unable to pay the process fee and in that situation process fee would not be payable [See Rule 546 (4)]. Secondly, when witnesses before charge are recalled for further cross-examination after charge, process fee is not payable for any process to compel the appearance of such witnesses. [See Rule 546 (3)]. Thirdly, no process fee is payable for any process issued upon the complaint or application of any public officer acting as such public officer, or of any Railway servant acting as such Railway servant. [See Rule 546 (3)]. Thirdly, no process fee is payable for any process issued upon the complaint or application of any public officer acting as such public officer, or of any Railway servant acting as such Railway servant. But process fee is payable in cases instituted on complaint by a police officer authorised under the Municipalities Act, or rules or bye-laws made thereunder. [See Rule 546 (2)]. This is briefly the law relating to process fees in criminal cases. . Coming to the present case, the Magistrate framed charge against the accused only under section 495 IPC. Although this offence is punishable with long sentence of imprisonment, a reference to the First Schedule of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1979, to Column No.4 thereof against the above section, shows that it is a non- cognizable offence, i.e., an offence for which a police officer shall not arrest without warrant. The present case was, therefore, a non-cognizable case. Process fee was, therefore, payable for processes to be issued in the case. The trial Magistrate could have remitted process fee even in such a case on the grand that the complainant was unable to pay the fee. Such a remission was not done. On the other hand, the trial Court on every date of adjournment directed the complainant to pay process fee. The complainant was, therefore, bound to pay the process fee. The complainant was bound to pay such process fee not only for summons to be issued but also for bailable warrants with respect to absent bound-over witnesses. The complainant every time, totaling as many as eight occasions, defaulted in payment of process fee for procuring the attendance of remaining witnesses, including two bound-over witnesses aforementioned. In the circumstances, the learned Magistrate was justified in closing the evidence of complainant after the eighth default in payment of process fee had occurred. The learned Magistrate was justified in rejecting the complainant's application dated 18.1.1985 to summon ~he complainant's remaining witnesses. This was a case which had been instituted in the year 1977, in which the complainant's evidence was closed only after a lapse of nearly 8 years. The case of the complainant could not have been allowed to go on ad infinitum, even after repeated defaults. The impugned order of the trial Magistrate could be said to be interlocutory order, against which no revision lay. The case of the complainant could not have been allowed to go on ad infinitum, even after repeated defaults. The impugned order of the trial Magistrate could be said to be interlocutory order, against which no revision lay. Even otherwise, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was wrong in setting aside the trial Magistrate's impugned order, on the wrong assumption that because the case was triable as a warrant case or because the offence was punishable with heavy punishment, or because two bound-over witnesses of the complainant failed to appear, process fee was not payable. The impugned order of the Additional Sessions Judge was unjust and wrong and deserves to be set aside. Revision allowed.