Judgment Nunumani Prasad Singh, J. 1. This application in revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 4th January. 1986 passed by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, West Champaran Bettiah where by he dismissed the appeal affirming the conviction of the petitioner under Sec. 16(1)(b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) and sentence to undergo R/I for sixmonths as passed by the learned sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bettiah in Case No. 36 of 1980. 2. On 8th April 1977, the complainant Pashupati Prasad, Food Inspector, Chanpatia visited the grocery shop of the petitioner and after giving notice, he demanded the sample of mustard oil from the petitioner for chemical examination by the Public Analyst. But the petitioner refused to give him any sample. The complainant, after obtaining necessary sanction from the Chief Medical Officer cum Civil Surgeon, filed prosecution report (Ex. 1) before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bettiah who took the cognizance of the offence under Sec. 16(1)(b) of the Act and transferred the case to the Subdivisional Judicial Magistrate, Bettiah for disposal. The learned S.D.J.M. on consideration of the evidence, convicted and sentenced the petitioner in the manner mentioned aforesaid. 3. As against the conviction and sentence, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Sessions Judge, Bettiah which was heard by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Bettiah who dismissed the appeal affirming the conviction and sentence of the petitioner. 4. Mr. Braj Kishore Prasad learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the trial of the petitioner is vitiated because the learned Magistrate was not specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, as contemplated under Sec. 16A of the Act to, try the cases arising out of this Act. Apart from this, no offence under Sec. 16(1)(a) of the Act is made out in this case against the petitioner, as there is no allegation that he prevented the informant from taking sample of mustard oil, as such the impugned order cannot be sustained. Reliance was also placed in the case of Rewati Raman Sharma V/s. Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee. The contention of Mr. Prasad is well founded and the petition must succeed. In the instant case it is nowhere mentioned in the complaint petition (Ext. Reliance was also placed in the case of Rewati Raman Sharma V/s. Jamshedpur Notified Area Committee. The contention of Mr. Prasad is well founded and the petition must succeed. In the instant case it is nowhere mentioned in the complaint petition (Ext. 1) that the petitioner prevented the complainant from taking the sample of mustard oil from his grocery shop or showed any gesture which amounted to prevent him from taking sample of mustard oil, as desired by him. The complainant has not been examined in this case nor there is any explanation for his non examination. 5. In my view, refusal to sell does not amount to prevention. The ingredient of Sec. 16(1)(a) of the Act is, therefore, not attracted in this case. This also finds support from the case of Rewati Raman Sharma V/s. Jamshedpur Notified Area Committed (Supra). 6. As regards want of jurisdiction of the learned trial court to try the offences arising out of this Act is concerned, it will be relevant to quote here Sec. 16A of the Act which runs as follows: Sec. 16A power of Court to try cases summarily. - Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974) all offences under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the 1st Class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Secs. 262 to 2651 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial: Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year: Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of a summary trial under this Section, it appear to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall, after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code." 7. It is thus, evident that the offences arising out of this Act were triable by a Judicial Magistrate of the 1st Class, specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government. The prosecution in this case has not been able to bring anything on the record that the trial court was specially empowered by the State Government at the relevant time to try the case arising out of this Act. The whole trial of the petitioner is, thus, vitiated and the impugned order cannot be sustained. 8. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are set aside and in the result, the petition is allowed.