The complainant/petitioner an office Assistant in the Office of the then Sub-Divisional Officer, Nalbaii, while discussing with Smti Dharitri Devi and Shri Khanindra Narayan Roy, Office Assistants in the Office of the Superintending Engineer, PWD National Highway, Nalbari about letting out a room of the complainant, the respondent suddenly appeared from behind and gave blows on the head and slapped on his face alleging that the petitioners was taking bribe from the two aforesaid persons. At the order of the opposite party his body guards took the petitioner to the opposite party with the said two persons and the complainant was rebuked by the opposite party. The complainant-petitioner alleged that his reputation was lowered before the eyes of the public and accordingly filed the complaint under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The trial Court after examining the complainant on oath called upon the complainant to produce witnesses in support of his case under section 202 CrPC on 12.4.85 by his order held that sanction under section 197 CrPC as per provisions of the Assam Amendment Act, 1983 required to proceed against the opposite party and held that a reference to the State Government is compulsory and passed order for referring the case to the Govt. of Assam for necessary certificate as directed by section 5 (a) of the Amendment Act. The petitioner moved this High Court impugning the said order in Criminal Revision No. 173 of 1985 and the petition was allowed on 27.5.85 with direction to the Magistrate to dispose of the matter afresh in accordance with law. The Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Nalbari heard the entire matter and after appreciating the materials on record passed an order on 5.8.85 holding as follows :- "In this case assault by the accused can not be considered to be acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, for which he is not protected by the sub-section 1 of section 197 CrPC. Hence sanction in this constant case is considered to be not necessary. Accordingly as the materials on record discloses a prima facie case against the accused under section 352/550 IPC it is ordered to issue summon to the accused under section 352/500 IPC." 3.
Hence sanction in this constant case is considered to be not necessary. Accordingly as the materials on record discloses a prima facie case against the accused under section 352/550 IPC it is ordered to issue summon to the accused under section 352/500 IPC." 3. The opposite party did not appear in Court nor any revision preferred but instead an application under section 205 CrPC was filed to dispense with the personal attendence of the accused and to permit him to appear through his lawyer which was allowed by the trial Court by its order dated 14.10.85. Being dissatisfied with the said order dated 14.10.85 petitioner preferred a revision petition before this High Court being Criminal Revision No.404 of 1985 and the same was dismissed by order dated 3.6.86. 4. On 14.10.85 Public Prosecutor filed an application on behalf of the opposite party being registered as petition No.879 of 14.10.85 (Annexure Dl to the petition) contending that vide notification PLA.95/80/29 dated 16.6.80, the Governor of Assam directed that provisions of sub-section (2) of section 197 CrPC applied to, amongst others, public servant holding the post of Additional District Magistrate and Executive Magistrate; that the opposite party is entitled to protection under section 197 (2) of the said Code and as such previous sanction of the State Government was required before issuing of summons, that under the amendment provisions of section 197 of the Code no cognizance can be taken for any offence against a public servant without prior sanction. No mention was made in the said petition that the opposite party assaulted the petitioner while acting or purporting to Act in discharge of his official duty. The case was transferred to Shri N. Sarma, Munsiff Judicial Magistrate as the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate before whom the case was pending, has been transferred. 5. As it appears, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 5.8.85 passed the order finally on the question of sanction as per the direction given by the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 173 of 1985 holding that sanction was not necessary and no revision was preferred by opposite party before the higher Court.
5. As it appears, the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate by his order dated 5.8.85 passed the order finally on the question of sanction as per the direction given by the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 173 of 1985 holding that sanction was not necessary and no revision was preferred by opposite party before the higher Court. The successor Munsiff Magistrate to whose file the case was transferred reopened the matter for sanction and heard afresh the petition about the requirement of sanction on 11.12.86 and again on 3.7.87 and on 31.7.87 recorded in the order sheet as follows :- " ......... The initial cognizance taken earlier by my predecessor is declined and the further proceeding of the instant case is dropped against the accused for want of sanction. '' This order was passed on the petition under section 197 CrPC. A separate order was passed which was pronounced in the Court and in this or order held that ''the slaps and blows and other abusing words alleged to be used and by that alleged offence to have committed, was done while the accused Vinod Kumar Pripersenia was discharging his official duty as a Superior Officer." 6. The contents of the question posed before this Court is whether the Munsiff Magistrate can review a final order passed by his predecessor and quash the proceeding when the same was proceed ;d after issuance of process and the accused made appearance through his lowyer. 7. Mr. JM Choudhury, learned counsel for the opposite party strenuously submitted that question of sanction under section 197 CrPC can be raised and considered at any stage of the proceeding. In support of his submission he referred AIR 1979 SC 1841 SB Saha vs. MS Kochar) wherein it was held that in considering the question whether or not sanction for prosecution of the accused was required, it is not necessary for Court to confine itself to the allegations in the complaint. It can take into account all the materials on record at the time when the question is raised and falls for consideration. 8. This proposition of law is not disputed by either of the parties. In the instant case the materials brought on record at the initial stage, when the question of 'want of sanction' was raised by the accused, contained a clear allegation against the accused about the commission of an offence under section 352/500 IPC.
8. This proposition of law is not disputed by either of the parties. In the instant case the materials brought on record at the initial stage, when the question of 'want of sanction' was raised by the accused, contained a clear allegation against the accused about the commission of an offence under section 352/500 IPC. In considering the question whether sanction for prosecution was or was not necessary, these criminal act attributed to the accused opposite party were taken as alleged. After making enquiry etc. under section 202, the trial Court held that the sanction was not necessary and after coming to a final decision regarding sanction, issued process of the Court. Admittedly opposite party did not prefer any revision petition before the superior Court for quashing the proceeding or against the legality of the said order and appeared through a lawyer and obtained the order to be represented by a lawyer. The settled position of law is that the question of sanction may arise at any stage of the proceeding, but the plea of necessity of sanction should be gone into in the first instance. In this case the trial Court taken into considerations the provisions of section 5 of the amended provision of Assam Act to the section 197 of the Code and after appreciation of the materials before him came to the finding that sub-section 5 added to section 197 CrPC in Assam Amendment 1983 did not apply to the accused in this case. Against this order the recourse opened to the opposite party was to impugned the same and prayed for quashing the proceeding before the revisional Court as the issue of sanction was finally settled by the earlier order. The words "at any stage of the proceeding" can not and does not mean that the final order can be reopened at "any stage of the proceeding" where allegation in the complaint do not attract the protection of section 197 CrPC. The Court can not reject the complaint at the initial stage for want of sanction, merely because it may be opened to the accused, public servant, to take the defence that he had acted in discharge of his official duties.
The Court can not reject the complaint at the initial stage for want of sanction, merely because it may be opened to the accused, public servant, to take the defence that he had acted in discharge of his official duties. In 1981 Crl LJ 993 (Budhi Parkash Yadav vs. KC Sharma); AIR 1965 Patna 192 (Gani Singh vs. State of Patna) wherein the words "at any stage of the proceeding" means that the issue of sanction, if not decided at initial stage, i.e. before the trial Court, it can be raised and considered at any stage of the proceeding (underline supplied). 9. In this case the opposite party raised the point on the same ground which was decided by the predecessor of the Munsiff Judicial Magistrate, In view of that matter once the issue of sanction was decided by the Court finally in the proceeding, the Court became funcus officio and has no power to revoke, review recall, alter or quash the same. The trial Court has not been conferred, under the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code to 'review' or 'quash' the order passed by himself or by his predecessor. 10. Section 362 CrPC reads as follows : "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court when ii has signed its judgment or final order (underline supplied) disposing a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error." In Amasing vs. State (1979 Crl LJ 1218) the Allahabad High Court held that-"Thus the applicant in this case in hand will not be entitled to claim rehearing even if we were to hold that the applicant could invoke inherent jurisdiction of this Court reserved under section 482 CrPC." This view has been taken by the Apex Court in AIR 1962 SC 1208 (Sankhata Singh TS. State of UP). 11. From the facts and circumstances in the case in hand, the Munsiff Magistrate who is the successor of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate who passed the order cannot review his predecessor's order as he became the functus officio. The words used in the impugned order as : "..
State of UP). 11. From the facts and circumstances in the case in hand, the Munsiff Magistrate who is the successor of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate who passed the order cannot review his predecessor's order as he became the functus officio. The words used in the impugned order as : ".. cognizance taken earlier and drop the further proceeding against the accused for want of sanction." It shows that the trial Court sat upon the order of his predecessors and declined the cognizance and dropped the proceeding as if he passed the order as the superior Court of his predecessor which is in excess of his jurisdiction and the provision in the Criminal Procedure Code does not contemplates such jurisdiction of a trial Court to review or quash a proceeding which was given to the High Court under section 482 CrPC. The settled position of law is that inherent power under section 482 is only given to High Court and unlike section 151 Civil Procedure Code, subordinate criminal Courts have no inherent powers. Obviously it can not be said that a criminal subordinate Court can revise or review the order. In given circumstances the subordinate criminal Court have limited inherent powers and in exercise of those powers they may review or revise their orders for the end of justice except in those cases when the Court itself either expressly or necessary implication prohibits such review or revision and confers on the order some kind of finality until it is set aside by a superior Court in appeal or revision. As discussed above the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed on 5.8.85 was a final order and the accused-respondent made appearance through the lawyer who represented him, by Courts order, in subsequent proceedings no appeal/revision was preferred before a superior Court. 12. For the reasons discussed above, I hold that Shri N. Sarma, Munsiff-Magistrate, Nalbari violated the due procedure of trial under the Criminal Procedure Code and being functus officio acted without jurisdiction in setting aside the final finding of his predecessor as the Code does not provide such provision for review of the final order or quash a proceeding by the subordinate Court itself and therefore the order passed is without jurisdiction. 13. In the result the impugned order is set aside and quashed. The revision petition is allowed.