JUDGMENT K. SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. - The appellant is engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of cashew kernels. It is a partnership firm and it is registered as a dealer under the provisions of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 ("the Act" for short). The appeal pertains to the year April 1, 1981 to March 31, 1982. On August 31, 1984 an order of assessment was made. The assessing authority levied tax at the rate of 5 per cent on the sales turnover of cashew kernels and similarly on the purchase turnover of raw cashewnuts. The Deputy Commissioner initiated proceedings under section 21 of the Act to revise the said assessment order on the ground that the sale consideration received by the appellant in respect of a lorry was not included in the turnover. Subsequently an order was made by the Deputy Commissioner directing the inclusion of the sale consideration in the turnover and consequently he directed the assessing authority to pass a proper order calculating the tax payable and to issue a revised demand notice. This order is dated July 3, 1986. The appellant went up in appeal against this order before the Appellate Tribunal and the said appeal is still pending. In the meanwhile the Joint Commissioner initiated proceedings under section 22A of the Act proposing to revise the order of the Deputy Commissioner aforesaid as well as the order of the assessment. The notice issued opens with the following statement : "Please take notice that the records leading to the assessment order dated August 31, 1984 passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, (Assessments), Mangalore, for the year 1981-82 and the SMR Order No. SMR 107/85-86 dated July 3, 1986 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Admn.), Mangalore, in your case have been examined by me and it is considered that the SMR order and assessment order are erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue for the following reasons :" According to the Joint Commissioner the rate of tax should have been 6 per cent and not 5 per cent on the purchase turnover of the raw cashewnuts. Similarly the rate of tax on the sales turnover of cashew kernels also ought to have been 6 per cent. The appellant objected without any avail. Similarly the rate of tax on the sales turnover of cashew kernels also ought to have been 6 per cent. The appellant objected without any avail. Ultimately an order came to be passed, whereby he affirmed the proposal made by him in the notice. Hence this appeal. Mr. Indrakumar, learned counsel for the appellant, contended as follows : (1) The Joint Commissioner had no jurisdiction to revise the assessment order made by the assessing authority since it had merged in the order of revision made by the Deputy Commissioner. At any rate there was no patent error calling for interference under section 22A of the Act. (2) The levy of tax at the rate of 6 per cent on the purchase turnover of the raw cashewnuts is illegal. (3) The levy of tax at 6 per cent on the sale turnover of cashew kernels is also illegal. Re : Contention No. 1 : In AMCO Batteries Limited v. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (S.T.A. No. 6 of 1985 dated January 22, 1992) a Bench of this Court has held that the doctrine of merger is applicable to a proceedings under the Act and if an order of the assessing authority is the subject-matter of the appellate order, then the order of assessment merges in the appellate order. In the said case assessment order was sought to be revised by the Deputy Commissioner under section 21 but he dropped the proceedings subsequently. However, the Commissioner initiated the proceedings under section 22A and ultimately he revised the order of assessment. Earlier thereto the assessee had filed an appeal against the first order of assessment. The said appeal was dismissed, against which a second appeal had been filed to the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal had allowed the assessee's appeal on March 29, 1982. The proceedings under section 22A were initiated by the Commissioner on August 9, 1984. This Court held that the proceedings were not maintainable because the order of assessment had by that time stood merged in the order made by the Appellate Tribunal; Appellate Tribunal certainly is not an authority whose order can be revised by the Commissioner. In S.T.R.P. No. 94 of 1990 [Ambica Industries v. State of Karnataka [1994] 92 STC 82 (Kar)] we have also applied the doctrine of merger to the proceedings under the Act. In S.T.R.P. No. 94 of 1990 [Ambica Industries v. State of Karnataka [1994] 92 STC 82 (Kar)] we have also applied the doctrine of merger to the proceedings under the Act. It was a case where the assessment order was rectified under section 25-A. We have held that by virtue of the rectification the original order of assessment stands merged and therefore for the purpose of limitation the relevant date will be the date of the rectification order. In the instant case the Appellate Tribunal has not made any order. The appeal of the appellant is still pending consideration before the Appellate Tribunal. The Joint Commissioner has proposed to revise the order made by the Deputy Commissioner read with the order of the assessment. Under section 22A of the Act the Joint Commissioner is competent to call for and examine the record of any proceeding under the Act; and if the Joint Commissioner considers that any order passed therein by any officer who is not above the rank of a Deputy Commissioner is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue, he may pass an order under the said provision. In the instant case the order sought to be revised is of the Deputy Commissioner read with the original order of assessment. The order made by the Deputy Commissioner is an order made in a proceeding under section 21 of the Act. In these circumstances there can be no doubt that the Joint Commissioner had jurisdiction to invoke section 22A. According to Mr. Indrakumar the Deputy Commissioner sought to revise the order of assessment earlier by including the sale price of the lorry in the turnover. The Deputy Commissioner did not deem it fit to revise the other portions of the assessment order such as the rate of tax leviable on the turnovers, therefore the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner was confined to the subject of the sale price of the lorry and if so the Joint Commissioner could have exercised his revisional power only in respect of that subject; but the Joint Commissioner has in effect revised the original order of assessment which had lost its legal personality. The submission of the learned counsel is highly technical. It is true that the order of assessment stood merged in the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The submission of the learned counsel is highly technical. It is true that the order of assessment stood merged in the order of the Deputy Commissioner. However, for understanding the order of the Deputy Commissioner the original order of assessment cannot be ignored; in fact the said order shall have to be read to understand the order of the Deputy Commissioner. By the application of the doctrine of merger, the resultant position will be that the order of assessment stands incorporated in the order of the Deputy Commissioner subject to the modifications made by the Deputy Commissioner. Though in the eye of law the assessment order loses its personality, its physical existence cannot be ignored for all purposes. In fact it will be part of the order made by the higher authority. If the Deputy Commissioner had ignored to consider the proper rate of tax leviable while initiating the proceedings under section 21, it will be a case of an erroneous order and if the higher rate prescribed under the Act is not levied such an erroneous order will be prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. In the instant case, while proceeding under section 21, the Deputy Commissioner had overlooked the provisions of the Act prescribing the rate of tax on the turnovers in question. If so, the said proceedings are liable to be interfered with by the Joint Commissioner under section 22A. Mr. Indrakumar contended that if the subordinate authority had considered a question but decided it wrongly, only then section 22A could be invoked; however, if there was a failure to notice any error while proceeding under section 21 the same cannot be the subject-matter of further revisional proceedings under section 22A. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. Failure to consider a pertinent question while making an order would render the said order erroneous, and if so, certainly section 22A will be attracted provided it is prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. Mr. Indrakumar relied on the decision of this Court reported in H. V. Subraya Setty & Sons v. State of Karnataka (1991) 35 Kar LJ (Tri. Supp.) 44. According to the learned counsel, in the said decision it was held that the revisional jurisdiction under section 22A should be confined to the correctness of any error committed by the appellate authority and no more. Supp.) 44. According to the learned counsel, in the said decision it was held that the revisional jurisdiction under section 22A should be confined to the correctness of any error committed by the appellate authority and no more. This observation is found in para 8 of the aforesaid decision. In the said case the assessing authority proposed to enhance the turnover returned on best judgment basis. The appellate authority found fault with the assessing authority on this aspect on the assumption that there was misclassification of goods and hence allowed the appeal. The Commissioner invoked his revisional jurisdiction on the ground that the order of the appellate authority was prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. The Bench observed that this invocation of the jurisdiction was perfectly in order but found fault with the reasoning adopted by the Commissioner. The Bench also observed that the assessment order gets merged in the appellate order wholly and it has no independent existence. Therefore it was held that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to set aside the order of the assessing authority which had merged in the order of the appellate authority. Thereafter the Bench observed that in the said case the Commissioner had made certain observations as to how the assessing authority should have proceeded to make a best judgment assessment and it was held that that was not part of the jurisdiction which he could exercise in suo motu revision. It is in this context the observation relied upon by Mr. Indrakumar was made. In the instant case before us we have held that there was a merger and the assessment order had no independent legal existence but the fact cannot be ignored that the said order to the extent not disturbed by the appellate authority would stand incorporated in the appellate order and therefore the revisional authority was empowered to interfere with the same subject to the other conditions being satisfied under section 22A. Hence we reject this contention. Re : Contention No. 2. There is no dispute that the appellants purchased raw cashewnuts from agriculturists or from unregistered dealers. Therefore the sale transactions under which the appellant purchased raw cashewnuts were not subjected to tax at the sale point under section 5. Raw cashewnuts are taxable goods under the Act. In the instant case the rate of tax at the sale point was 6 per cent. Therefore the sale transactions under which the appellant purchased raw cashewnuts were not subjected to tax at the sale point under section 5. Raw cashewnuts are taxable goods under the Act. In the instant case the rate of tax at the sale point was 6 per cent. After the purchases, the appellant consumed the raw cashewnuts for the purpose of manufacturing kernels. It is in these circumstances section 6 of the Act is attracted. There is no dispute that section 6 which levies purchase tax is attracted to the fact situation; however the appellant contends that the rate of tax should be the rate prevalent on the date when the raw cashewnuts were consumed in the manufacture of cashew kernels. According to the learned counsel the following taxable events have to be cumulatively satisfied to attract section 6 : (i) A denier purchases taxable goods under circumstances in which no tax under section 5 is leviable on the sale price of such goods. In the instant case this is satisfied because the appellant purchased the taxable goods from the agriculturists and unregistered dealers and therefore no tax was levied under section 5 on the sale price. (ii) The dealer who purchased the goods consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale, etc. Both these events should occur before section 6 is attracted. The second event is the event which fixes the time for levying the tax. On the said date rate of tax has been reduced by the State Legislature to 5 per cent and therefore the revisional authority committed an error in directing the levy at 6 per cent was the argument. Under section 6 purchase tax is payable on the purchase price of the goods at the same rate at which it would have been leviable on the sale price of such goods under section 5. The opening sentence also refers to the phrase "on the sale price of such goods". In other words, if the sales tax is not leviable at the time of the first sale in the State, purchase tax is levied in the hands of the purchaser and that tax is at the rate which would have been leviable on the sale price of such goods. In other words, if the sales tax is not leviable at the time of the first sale in the State, purchase tax is levied in the hands of the purchaser and that tax is at the rate which would have been leviable on the sale price of such goods. Section 6 is therefore quite clear that the rate of tax is the rate applicable to the sale price; in other words the relevant point of time to identify the rate of tax will be the time of the sale. The contention of the appellant involves, by necessary implication, the application of doctrine of alleged taxable event which has been discarded by the Supreme Court while considering similar provisions in Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1993] 88 STC 98 (SC); JT 1992 (6) SC 182. At para 69 (page 134 of STC) it was pointed out that the effect of such a tax is that the tax payable at sale point becomes the tax payable on the purchase point in certain circumstances. At para 84 (page 139 of STC) the doctrine of taxable event was referred while construing the correctness of the decision rendered earlier in Goodyear's case [1990] 76 STC 71 (SC). Ultimately the Supreme Court did not agree with the reasoning in Goodyear's case [1990] 76 STC 71. The Supreme Court pointed out that these conditions are "conditions subsequent" on the satisfaction of which the tax liability is attracted. At para 100 (page 148 of STC) it was observed thus : "For the above reasons, we find it difficult to agree with the reasoning of Mukharji, J., in Goodyear's case [1990] 76 STC 71 (SC). It is also not possible to agree with the learned Judge when he says that 'the two conditions specified, before the event of despatch outside the State as mentioned in section 9(1)(b), namely, (i) purchase of goods in the State and (ii) using them for the manufacture of any other goods in the State are only descriptive of the goods liable to tax under section 9(1)(b) in the event of despatch outside the State'. When the tax is levied on the purchase of raw material, on the purchase price - and not on the manufacture of goods or on the consignment value such a concept is unknown to Haryana Act) or sale price of the manufactured goods - the above construction, in our respectful opinion, runs against the very grain of the provision and has the effect of nullifying the very provision. By placing the said interpretation, section 9 has been rendered nugatory; except for the two minor areas pointed out in Murli Manohar & Co. v. State of Haryana [1991] 80 STC 79 (SC); (1991) 1 SCC 377 , the section - which has its parallels in all the State enactments has practically become redundant." Mr. Indra Kumar relied on the decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. M. K. Kandaswami [1975] 36 STC 191 (SC). This decision was referred to and relied upon by the Supreme Court in Hotel Balaji's case [1993] 88 STC 98. We do not find any particular observation which supports the contention of the learned counsel before us. In fact at page 201 the basic idea of the purchase tax was stated thus : ".... It creates a liability against a dealer on his purchase turnover with regard to goods, the sale or purchase of which though generally liable to tax under the Act have not, due to the circumstances of particular sales, suffered tax under section 3, 4 or 5, and which after the purchase, have been dealt by him in any of the modes indicated in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 7-A(1)." The learned counsel fairly brought to our notice another decision of the Supreme Court reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes) v. Padinjarakara Agencies [1985] 60 STC 308 which according to us directly answers the question against the contention of the appellant. The dealer had a stock of goods as on June 30, 1974. The goods had been purchased earlier. At the sale point there was no levy but the rate of lax was 3 per cent. As on June 30, 1974 it was found that the tax was leviable on the purchase turnover of the assessee. On the said date rate of tax was 5 per cent. The goods had been purchased earlier. At the sale point there was no levy but the rate of lax was 3 per cent. As on June 30, 1974 it was found that the tax was leviable on the purchase turnover of the assessee. On the said date rate of tax was 5 per cent. The Revenue contended that the relevant point of time is the date when it can be conclusively held that the dealer was the last purchaser in the State. The Supreme Court rejected this contention. It was held that since the purchases took place before June 30, 1974, the purchase tax was leviable at the rate prevalent on the respective dates of purchases. It is implicit in this reasoning that the subsequent event resulting in the dealer being treated as the last purchaser is only a condition subsequent to be satisfied to attract the tax liability and not a taxable event as such to impose the liability. Consequently this contention of the appellant is rejected. Re : Contention No. 3 : This pertains the the rate of tax governing the sales turnover of cashew kernels. Formerly "cashew and its kernel" was found in entry 88 of Second Schedule. The rate of tax was either 6 per cent for sometime and thereafter 5 per cent. However, a notification was issued by the State Government on July 31, 1980 under section 8-A (3-A) of the Act reducing the rate of tax to 5 per cent in respect of cashew kernel. By Act No. 7 of 1981 the State Legislature altered entry 88 and confined entry 88 to "cashew". Entry 88A was introduced to govern cashew kernel. However, the rate of tax was the same as hitherto found in the earlier entry 88. The appellant relies on the notification issued by the State Government reducing the rate of tax to 5 per cent and the said benefit was given to the appellant by the assessing authority. However, the revisional authority has opined the notification issued by the State Government ceased to be operative on the introduction of entry 88A by Karnataka Act 7 of 1981. In the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [1993] 91 STC 37; ILR [1992] Kar 1494 it was held thus : ".... In the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [1993] 91 STC 37; ILR [1992] Kar 1494 it was held thus : ".... The first part of the above observation would be equally applicable to the instant case; an intention to erase the earlier notification could easily be attributed in the legislative act altering the rate of tax as otherwise, no useful purpose is served by the Legislature in prescribing a different rate of tax. The legislative will being superior to that of the State Government, former would always override the latter. Similarly, when the Legislature introduces an entry in the Schedule to the Act relating to a particular class of goods, intention of the Legislature as on the said day of the introduction is quite clear, to treat the class of goods only in the particular manner stated in the entry; it is not possible to infer an implied intention on the part of the Legislature to treat the goods in any other manner, contrary to the express intention in the amending Act; necessarily, the earlier notification would cease to be effective automatically. If the Legislature enacts on a particular date that specified goods shall be taxed in a particular manner, it is clear that at least on the said date, the Legislature had a clear intention to levy the tax on the goods in question at that particular rate. The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the prevailing circumstances relevant to the subject-matter in question as it existed when the law was enacted. Therefore, when entry 48A was amended retrospectively with the insertion of sub-entry (ii), it is clear that the Legislature intended that the tax under section 5 will have to be levied in terms of said entry 48A, with retrospective effect from 1st July, 1974. While inserting sub-entry (ii) by Act No. 23 of 1983 the Legislature has not found it necessary to save the operation of the notification issued by the State Government. If actually the intention of the Legislature was to keep alive the tax structure envisaged by the exemption notification issued by the State Government, an appropriate saving provision would have been found. While exercising the power under section 8-A of the Act the State Government functions as the delegate of the State Legislature. If actually the intention of the Legislature was to keep alive the tax structure envisaged by the exemption notification issued by the State Government, an appropriate saving provision would have been found. While exercising the power under section 8-A of the Act the State Government functions as the delegate of the State Legislature. The exercise of the power by the delegate cannot be in conflict with the mandate prescribed by the State Legislature." The above observations were made after referring to a decision of the Supreme Court. However, Mr. Indrakumar contended that the rate of tax as well as the entry were altered in the case involving the said decision. In the present case rate of tax was not altered by the Legislature. Factual position as stated by Mr. Indrakumar is correct but it should be noted that the Legislature has repeated the tax rate as 6 per cent while the earlier notification issued by the State Government had reduced the tax to 5 per cent. The legislative enactment thus clearly expresses the legislative intention that the rate of tax on the date of the enactment should be 6 per cent. The above observations of the Full Bench directly covers the question raised by Mr. Indrakumar and in the circumstances we have to uphold the decision of the Joint Commissioner. Therefore, this contention also is rejected. It was then contended that the statutory intention was to keep alive the rate of tax as stated in the notification issued under section 8-A, and the said notification ceases to be operative only when the rate of tax prescribed in the Act is modified by an amendment to the Act. Therefore, this contention also is rejected. It was then contended that the statutory intention was to keep alive the rate of tax as stated in the notification issued under section 8-A, and the said notification ceases to be operative only when the rate of tax prescribed in the Act is modified by an amendment to the Act. Sub-section (3-A) of section 8-A was referred to in support of this contention; said provision was in force only between January 1, 1968 to March 31, 1984, as inducted by Act 7 of 1981 : "(3-A) If the rate of tax payable under this Act in respect of any goods or class of goods gets modified by an amendment to this Act, notification, if any, issued in respect of such goods or class of goods under clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall, with effect from the date from which such amendment comes into force be deemed to be cancelled to the extent it relates to such goods or class of goods." It looks to us that the above amendment introduced by sub-section (3-A) was by abundant caution because the relevant principle has been stated by the Full Bench in Shaw Wallace case [1993] 91 STC 37; ILR [1992] Kar 1494 at para 7 (page 42 of STC) to the effect that, - "..... if the Legislature enacts on a particular date that specified goods shall be taxed in a particular manner, it is clear that at least on the said date, the Legislature had a clear intention to levy the tax on the goods in question at that particular rate." Again at para 15 (page 45 of STC) the Full Bench answered the question referred to it, which reads thus : "Therefore, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative; we are of the opinion that a notification issued under section 8-A of the Act will be impliedly repealed or rendered ineffective when the Legislature amends the Act and introduces an entry in the Schedule to the Act which relates to the class of goods to which exemption is given by the notification." In view of the above clear enunciation of the principle stated by the Full Bench it is not possible for us to take a different view. It is unnecessary for us to analyse the purpose behind sub-section (3-A) and what follows by it by necessary implication. Mr. It is unnecessary for us to analyse the purpose behind sub-section (3-A) and what follows by it by necessary implication. Mr. Indrakumar then pointed out that the appellant before this Court and only a limited number of assessees are burdened with the higher rate of tax because subsequently the State Government had issued a notification on July 14, 1981, reducing the rate of tax to 5 per cent. If this notification had only been issued a little earlier the appellant would have got the benefit of the same. It is for the State Government or the Commissioner to consider whether in the particular situation the assessee before us has actually suffered any hardship. If only a few dealers, by virtue of the peculiar circumstances, are made to bear a higher tax which was really not the intention of the Revenue, we hope the State Government or the Commissioner would grant the necessary relief to the assessee. But it is not possible for us to grant the relief having regard to the law as we understand the same. Appropriate representation may be made by the assessee in this regard to the State Government or to the Commissioner or to both. In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. Petition dismissed.