Judgment R.R.K. Trivedi, J. 1. In this petition counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged and both the learned counsel for the parties have agreed that petition may be disposed of finally at this stage. 2. Facts giving rise to this petition are that an application under section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 (Hereinafter referred to as the Act) was filed by respondent no. 2 against the petitioner for release of the accommodation in dispute. It was stated in the application that petitioner purchased the accommodation in dispute by a sale deed dated 31-5-1983 However, he is residing in premises no. 1/76, Krishna Nagar, G.T. Road, Kanpur in which he was accommodated as a licensee by one Shri Ramesh who is pressing hard to vacate the premises as he himself is shifting from Delhi to Kanpur. It was further stated that by notice the petitioner was informed about the fact. However, in spite of the notice he is not prepared to vacate the accommodation, hence the application for release has been filed and in case it is not allowed great hardship shall be suffered by him. The release application was contested by the petitioner by filing an objection which is Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The main objection on the part of the petitioner was that 100 sq. yard open land is lying there on which respondent no. 2 may construct a house to satisfy his need. It was further stated that he is a resourceful and rich man and may acquire any other accommodation for his residence and accommodation in dispute will not suit to his status. It was further asserted that respondent no. 2 is residing as tenant in accommodation no. 1/16 and not as licensee as alleged. It was also asserted that defendant no. 2 has no bonafide need of the accommodation in dispute but the release has been sought only for purpose of raising construction afresh for earning higher rent. 3. After hearing both the parties the prescribed authority allowed the release application vide order dated 2-2-1989 which was challenged in Rest Appeal no. 32 of 1989. The appeal has been dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated 26-3-1991. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. I have heard learned counsel for parties. 32 of 1989. The appeal has been dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated 26-3-1991. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. I have heard learned counsel for parties. Learned counsel for petitioner has challenged the orders of the courts below on three grounds :- Firstly, it has been submitted that the provisions of Rule 16(1)(d) of the Act are mandatory but they have not been complied with though the petitioner offered from the very beginning that 100 Sq. yard open land which is part of the premises may be utilised by respondent no. 2 for raising new constructions. Learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that the open land was also a part of the building as defined under section 3(i) of the Act and Rule 16(1) which are mandatory, ought to have been invoked by the authorities below and the judgments ate vitiated for non-consideration of the same. 5. Second submission of the learned counsel for petitioner is that the respondent no. 2 failed to prove that he was licensee in premises no. 1/76, Krishna Nagar G.T. Road, Kanpur, where he is presently residing. He occupied the premises as tenant which was proved by various documents filed by the petitioner. 6. Thirdly, it has been submitted that as respondent no. 2 failed to prove that there was any pressure on him from the side of the landlord to vacate the premises in his occupation, basis of the bonafide need was not there. However, the appellate Authority failed to consider this material aspect of the case and has illegally confirmed the order of release passed by the prescribed authority. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance in case Gurdas Mal v. 1st Additional District and Sessions Judge, 1978 (UP) Suppl. RCC 14. Learned counsel for respondents on the other hand, has submitted that the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner are such in respect of which no foundation has bees laid down in the writ petition. The petitioner cannot be allowed to raise the arguments which have not been taken in the writ petition. It has been further submitted that in para 5 of the release application, respondent no. 5 specifically mentioned that there is a great pressure on him to vacate the premises no. The petitioner cannot be allowed to raise the arguments which have not been taken in the writ petition. It has been further submitted that in para 5 of the release application, respondent no. 5 specifically mentioned that there is a great pressure on him to vacate the premises no. 1/76 as the need for the accommodation in dispute is bona fide and genuine and hard pressed. However, on behalf of the petitioner this fact was not denied. In his objection it was only said that no reply is required the learned counsel has placed before me para 5 of the release application and para 5 of the objection of the petitioner in this connection. It has been submitted that as para 5 of the release application was not denied, the fact ought to have been taken as admitted and it is not open to the petitioner to challenge the orders of the authorities below on this ground Learned counsel for respondents has further submitted that the respondent no. 2 filed letter dated 3-9-1885 seat to him by Rajesh Bhatia for vacating the accommodation in his occupation The letter proved the fact stated in the release application Learned counsel further placed reliance on the findings of the prescribed authority in this regard, In respect of the application of provisions of Rule 16(1)(d) it has been submitted that for purpose of Rule 16(d) open land could not be taken into consideration. The word 'building' referred to in the aforesaid Rule is about a 'building' with roofed structure. The word has been used in the Rule with a different context the learned counsel has also submitted that the petitioner has made false averments in his writ petition that his amendment application and application under O. 41 Rule 27 CPC for admitting additional evidence were rejected by the appellate authority while both the applications were allowed. Learned counsel has referred to Annexures 8 and 10 to the counter affidavit and has also referred to paras 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the writ petition and corresponding paragraphs of the counter affidavit containing replies thereof. It has been submitted that the petitioner has disentitled himself for any equitable relief by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 7. It has been submitted that the petitioner has disentitled himself for any equitable relief by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 7. Learned counsel for petitioner in rejoinder has submitted that though it is true that it was wrongly averred in the writ petition that the amendment application and the application for admitting additional evidence were rejected by the appellate authority, but these facts alleged in the writ petition were not relied on for obtaining orders. They were not used as grounds in the writ petition on which basis it could be said that the Court was influenced in passing order on the basis of the wrong averments. It has been submitted that in the interest of justice the petition should be heard and decided on merits. It has been further submitted that as the amendment application was allowed and additional evidence was also taken on record the appellate authority was under legal obligation to decide the question of bonafide need but no finding has been recorded the appellate authority in an arbitrary "manner after hearing the arguments concluded in four lines without giving any reasons that respondent no 2 was licence in the premises and the order is vitiated. 8. I have given my anxious consideration Jo the aforesaid submissions made by the learned counsel for parties and in my opinion the orders passed by the authorities below are perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. Taking the first question about applicability of Rule 16(1)(d), a perusal of the relevant Rule shows that the word 'building' has been definitely used with reference to a construction with roof, the part of which may be left with the tenant to satisfy his need. The words "part of the building' used in the rule leaves no doubt that it is not in respect of the open land as submitted by the learned counsel for petitioner the learned counsel for petitioner, however, referred to definition of word 'building' provided in section 3(i) of the Act which includes any land. The submission is not correct Definitions provided in section 3 of the Act may change if the context otherwise requires. The context of the word 'building' while used In Rule 16(1)(d) is altogether different. The submission is not correct Definitions provided in section 3 of the Act may change if the context otherwise requires. The context of the word 'building' while used In Rule 16(1)(d) is altogether different. The Rule contemplates constructed building a part of which could be left with the tenant and other part could be released in favour of the landlord. Certainly it could not be in respect of open land which could not be occupied or used for residential purposes either by the tenant or by the landlord. The fallacy of the argument advanced may be judged from another angle that if the open land forms part of the building for the purpose of Rule 16(1)(d) as argued by the learned counsel for petitioner, it could be left with the tenant for his use and it could be said that his need may be satisfied with the same but such a situation cannot be acceptable for the tenant. In the present case it is submitted that the accommodation in dispute consists of only one room and in the circumstances Rule 16(1)(d) could not be attracted The orders of the authorities below cannot be assailed on this ground. Learned counsel for petitioner strongly pressed the petition on the ground that the respondent no. 2 was tenant and not licensee and the appellate authority committed a manifest error is not assigning reasons tot holding respondent no. 2 as licensee and arbitrarily concluding the discussion merely by referring the evidence and arguments of the parties. In my opinion, the orders of the authorities below cannot be assailed on this ground too as admittedly respondent no. 2 is residing the other's building. Whether he occupied it as licensee or tenant could not be of much consequence. The crucial fact was as to whether the respondent no 2 was being pressed to vacate the accommodation in his occupation. So far as this aspect is concerned, the petitioner has not said a word either in his objection initially filed or in the amendment application filed at the appellate stage. He felt satisfied by simply questioning the stand of respondent no. 2 that he was licensee and asserting that he was occupying the premises no. 1/76 as tenant and not as licensee. He felt satisfied by simply questioning the stand of respondent no. 2 that he was licensee and asserting that he was occupying the premises no. 1/76 as tenant and not as licensee. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is correct that there is no foundation for the arguments which have been raised by the learned counsel for petitioner as in the objection filed, para 5 of the release application was not disputed. In the case relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner the reasoning that the relations between father and son were strained which was the basis of the need for the release of the shop was disbelieved and in the circumstances of that case the order of release was disapproved by this court while in the present case the fact is altogether different. Both the authorities have accepted the reason mentioned by the petitioner which is basis for the need that he is being pressed by his landlord to vacate the accommodation in dispute and on this crucial aspect of the case the petitioner opted silence for which the authorities cannot be blamed. The case relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is thus clearly distinguishable and is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 9. The last question remains about the wrong averments made by the petitioner in the writ petition. Learned counsel for petitioner tried to justify the alleged wrong averments on the basis that no ground was raised in the writ petition on which basis it may be said that the court passed the order in favour of petitioner on the basis of the wrong averments. This submission of the learned counsel however, is not correct. Grounds nos. 3 and 4 of the writ petition were in respect of the wrong averments that the application for amendment and application for admitting additional evidence were rejected. There is no justification for making these wrong averments and normally the writ petition could be thrown out without hearing on merits but in the present case after examination on merits also the petitioner has failed to make out any case for interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. No further comment is required by this Court on this aspect of the case. 10. For the reasons recorded above, this petition has no force and is rejected. No further comment is required by this Court on this aspect of the case. 10. For the reasons recorded above, this petition has no force and is rejected. There will be no order as to costs.