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1993 DIGILAW 174 (GAU)

Kedutso Kafpo v. Keneingulie

1993-07-12

W.A.SHISHAK

body1993
This appeal has been preferred against judgment and order passed by Shri LK Achumi learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial) Kohima in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1991 filed by the present respondent for damages for alleged defamation and libel. The said suit was filed in respect of an alleged defamatory letter dated 7th August, 1990 written by the appellant/defendant to the Joint Commissioner, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Govt. of India, New Delhi. The said alleged defamatory letter was written by the appellant at Mysore and the destination was Delhi where it was received by Shri VP Singh, Joint Commissioner, Soil and Water Conservation Division, Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. 2. It appears the appellant while on a visit in Nagaland received some complaint from some farmers of Phek District. As the appellant was of the view that although he was incompetent to take any action from his end since the matter appeared to be important,, this matter was brought to the notice of the Joint Commissioner. The concluding line of the letter dated 7.8.1990 is as follows :- "And I would like to request you to kindly look into it and safeguard the interest of the farmers if you find any merit in it." 3. The appellant contested the suit and raised an issue as regard territori­al jurisdiction of the Court of Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial) at Kohima. The main ground taken in the written statement filed on behalf of the appellant was that the appellant could not have been sued at Kohima inasmuch as he wrote the letter at Mysore and the destination of the letter was Delhi where the content of the letter referred to above was known to the Joint Commissioner at Delhi. After hearing learned counsel of both sides, the learned Court of Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial; Kohima over­ruled the objection taken on behalf of the appellant as regards the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Kohima. Being aggrieved the appellant has approached this Court. 4. After hearing learned counsel of both sides, the learned Court of Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial; Kohima over­ruled the objection taken on behalf of the appellant as regards the territorial jurisdiction of the Court at Kohima. Being aggrieved the appellant has approached this Court. 4. The reason why the appellant's contention was rejected by the learned Court of Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial) at Kohima is because the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial; came to the conclusion that the alleged defamatory letter was published in Delhi as well as at Kohima This conclusion was arrived at because of the fact that consequent upon the letter written by the appellant to the Joint Commissioner bringing to his notice certain complaints made by some farmers of Phek District as stated above, a letter was written by one YP Yadav on 11.9.90 to the Chief Secret­ary, Nagaland informing him that certain complaints had been received from the farmers of one of the projects in Phek District of the State of Nagaland. As such a request was made to take immediate action and to intimate the Department to provide redressal. On receipt of the aforesaid letter from Delhi, the Commissioner and Secretary, Govt. 01 Nagaland, Agriculture Department was requested to take necessary action at an early date. This letter was written by one GVV Sarma, Under Secretary on 19th October, 1990. 5. Admittedly although the appellant hails from Phek District, he works at Mysore and it is stated that he has been at Mysore for the last about seven (7), years. The alleged defamatory letter was written at Mysore. The said letter was addressed to the Joint Commissioner at Delhi. 6. Obviously in the said Civil Suit No. 1 of 1991 instituted at Kohima, the appellant is the sole respondent. 7. It is stated at the time of hearing that as regards certain complaint made by the farmers of one project of Phek District, an enquiry has been going on against the respondent. It is not known whether any charge would stand established against the petitioner, with regard to the complaint made by the farmers. 8. In this case, I am primarily called upon to decide as to the place of suing. The main contention on behalf of the appellant is that no suit lies at Kohima in the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. In this case, I am primarily called upon to decide as to the place of suing. The main contention on behalf of the appellant is that no suit lies at Kohima in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is contended that a suit of this nature shall lie either at Mysore where the alleged defamatory letter was written or at Delhi which was the destination of the letter. In terms of section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure such a suit could be instituted either within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Court where the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. Such a suit could also be instituted within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a Court where the wrong was done. It is in this context that the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the respondent could sue the appellant either at Mysore or at Delhi and not at Kohima. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that when there are several publications of the same libel, a separate action lies for each publication. In other words it is submitted that when defamatory words are repeated it amounts to republication giving rise to fresh cause of action for defamation. It is therefore submitted that every repetition of a libel is a new libel and each publisher is answerable for his act to the same extend as if calumny originated from him. The publisher of a libel is clearly responsible irrespective of the fact whether he is the originator of the libel or is merely repeating it. This submission is relevant from the point of view of the fact that the suit instituted at Kohima is against alone defendant. As stated above the different letters relied upon by the respondent in the Court below were written by different persons and addressed to different persons. In para 16 of the plaint it is stated that cause of action arose for the suit on 7.8.1990 when the appellant wrote the defamatory letter which was published when it was opened in Delhi. It is not the case of the respondent that the appellant had written to any one at Kohirna. In para 16 of the plaint it is stated that cause of action arose for the suit on 7.8.1990 when the appellant wrote the defamatory letter which was published when it was opened in Delhi. It is not the case of the respondent that the appellant had written to any one at Kohirna. Why the respondent is saying is that if the appellant had not written to the Joint Commissioner at Delhi, there would not have been correspondence with the Chief Secretary, Nigaland, It is in this context Mr. Iraki submits that clearly there is a case of contributive publication. In other words it is the submission of Mr. Iralu that the different publications should not be taken in isolation but they should be taken as a whole. It is in this view of the matter he submits that Kohima Court is competent to entertain the suit of defamation. As stated above I may state here again that the suit instituted a£ Kohima is against the appellant only. In other words appellant has been singled out. I do not say that the respondent cannot sue the appellant if there is cause of action to sue the appellant. The question is if the respondent chooses to institute a suit only against appellant, it appears, 1 must see whether Kohima Court is competent to entertain such a suit. As stated above the appellant resides and carries on his work at Mysore. He is said to have written the alleged defamatory letter at Mysore. The said alleged defamatory letter was admittedly addressed/written to the Joint Commissioner at Delhi. Mr. Iralu submits that "wrong includes effect". According to him alleged defamatory letter was circulated at Kohima in Nagaland and the appellant had contri­buted to such circulation. Mr. Iralu has relied on (1988) 1 GLR 117 and also (1991) 1 GLR 389 and submits that in terms of the decisions rendered in these two cases, the Court at Kohima is competent to decide the suit for defamation filed by the respondent. On perusal of the said cases, it appears to me that the facts are different. The above two cases are related to cause and effect. As stated above the cumulative effect of the entire situation cannot be taken in the present case inasmuch as, as I have stated above, only the appellant has been sued at Kohima. On perusal of the said cases, it appears to me that the facts are different. The above two cases are related to cause and effect. As stated above the cumulative effect of the entire situation cannot be taken in the present case inasmuch as, as I have stated above, only the appellant has been sued at Kohima. In another case (1990) 1 GLR 227 this Court held that in terms of provisions of section 19 CPC it is provided that the suit for compensation for wrong done to a person or movable property should be filed at the place where the wrong is done or at the place where the author of the wrong; viz. the defendant resides or works for gain. It is further stated in the said case that these are the two choices available to the plaintiff and he has to choose one of them. He cannot have a third choice. 10. After hearing learned counsel of both sides and on perusal of the pleadings filed before the learned Court below and on further perusal of the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial) Kohima in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1991, I am of the view that if the respondent plaintiff chooses to sue the appellant as the sole defendant, he could only do so either at Mysore or at Delhi and not at Kohima. 11. In the result, in the facts and circumstances that I have stated above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order passed in Civil Suit No. 1 of 1991 is set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.