A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, C. J, J. ( 1 ) BY a Notification issued under the provisions of S. 3 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 Jammat-e-Islami Hind (hereinafter referred to as JEIH) has been declared to be an Unlawful Association and it has been further directed that the Notification shall have effect from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette being 10/12/1992. The petitioner, professing to be the President of JEIH, has challenged the said Notification by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and the learned trial Judge has directed the parties concerned to file affidavits, but has, by a speaking order, declined to issue any interlocutory interdiction. The petitioner having felt aggrieved by the non-issuance of any interlocutory order by the learned trial Judge has moved us in appeal. ( 2 ) MR. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the petitioner/appellant, has made it clear that since the writ petition is awaiting disposal by the trial Court, he does not, in this appeal before us, challenge the legality, propriety or otherwise of the Notification declaring JEIH to be an Unlawful Association, but has confined. his argument only against the legality of the Notification so far as it directs its immediate operation under S. 3 (3) of the aforesaid Act before the Notification is confirmed under S. 4 of the Act. ( 3 ) THE impugned Notification is reproduced hereinbelow :-"notification new Delhi, the 10/12/1992. S. O. 898 (E) - Whereas Shri Sirajul Hasan, Amir of the Jammat-e-Islami Hind (hereinafter referred to as JEIH) declared in a meeting at Delhi held on the 27/05/1990, that the separation of Kashmir from India was inevitable; and whereas Shri Abdul Aziz, Naib-Amir of JEIH addressing a meeting at Malerkotla on the 1/08/1991, observed that the Government of India should hold plebicite on Kashmir; and whereas JEIH has been dmentioned. The mode of measurement is also mentioned in Clause 1 (a) which will be in pre-work and post-work measurement after deducting 1/9th of the volume for sinkage and shrinkage. As against that, in Clause 1 (b) there is no mention that the silver san P to be supplied by the contractor or that the price included the cost of supply of silver sand. Even the mode of measurement is not mentioned in the said clause. As against that, in Clause 1 (b) there is no mention that the silver san P to be supplied by the contractor or that the price included the cost of supply of silver sand. Even the mode of measurement is not mentioned in the said clause. If we take the next clause that is clause (2) there is also mention of earth work and therein it is clearly mentioned that the carried earth is to be supplied by the contractor including the cost of carried earth. In Clause 5 (a) and (b) also, supplying and transporting of brickbats and zama material is clearly mentioned and the mode of measurement is also clearly mentioned. These things, namely that the contractor is to supply the silver sand or to bear the cost of supply of silver sand is not at all mentioned in Clause 1 (b ). The mode of measurement of silver sand is also not mentioned therein. ( 4 ) IT is to be noted that the plaintiff from the very beginning stated and/or insisted that the cost of supply of silver sand is not included in Clause 1 (b) and the cost of supply of the same has to be in accordance with the Presidency Schedule. It is also stated that the mode of measurement is also in accordance with the Presidency Schedule as there is no item in the contract. The definition of the works as given in the Agreement is as hereunder. "the word 'works' shall mean all the works and materials contracted for as set out and described in the said Schedule hereto and in the particulars and specification and the drawings thereof any of them or implied in or by the same or any of them and forming part of this Agreement. " ( 5 ) CLAUSE 1 (b) speaks of rate for labour only and it does not in any way say that the said rate is inclusive of the cost of supply of silver sand. ( 6 ) THE defendant all throughout insisted that the cost of supply of silver sand is not payable by the defendant. This is something which is not borne out by the contract. The defendant by taking a wrongful stand could not alter the contractual rights of the plaintiff. ( 6 ) THE defendant all throughout insisted that the cost of supply of silver sand is not payable by the defendant. This is something which is not borne out by the contract. The defendant by taking a wrongful stand could not alter the contractual rights of the plaintiff. The defendant all throughout required of the plaintiff to supply the sand and also to carry out the work of filling in. The defendant also refused to measure the work in the manner as suggested by the plaintiff, viz. , in stacks. ( 7 ) UNDER the terms of the contract as contained under the heading 'roads - B' Clause 10 provides as follows;"sometime extra items of work are required to be executed in addition or substitution of contract schedule items of works. in other cases the rates will be derived in either of the following ways whichever is applicable. i) Rates for extra works will be derived with the help of analogous items of contract schedule items. ii) If the rates as in (i) above are not available, contract schedule of rates of Presidency Circle, PWD will be followed with adjustment of basic cost of material issued by Trust and cost of such material considered in P. C. Schedule. iii) In case where rates for extra items cannot be derived from either of above two methods, market price of material, labour hire charges of tools and plants will be considered with usual 10% profit to the contractor. In all the above 3 cases % above or below or as per quoted by the contractor will be applicable. This method of arriving at rates for extra items of works will supercede any other relevant condition is given in the works contract. " ( 8 ) IT was argued on behalf of the defendant that in case it is held that the cost of supply of silver sand is not included in Item 1 (b) of the Schedule, then and in that event the total rate for cost of supply of silver sand and filling in will become unreasonably high. It was stated by B. K. Saha in his evidence that the other contractor M/s. Bild Rite Construct Company who was engaged by the defendant in relation to the constru of being stated to the person concerned which may not be implied in the expression "recorded". It was stated by B. K. Saha in his evidence that the other contractor M/s. Bild Rite Construct Company who was engaged by the defendant in relation to the constru of being stated to the person concerned which may not be implied in the expression "recorded". Further the decision in C. B. Gautam (supra) is of a much large Bench than that of in Satyavir (supra) and if it was necessary for us to decide the question we would have had to be governed by the decision in C. B. Gautam. ( 9 ) BUT we, however, need not decide the question whether an order would be bad, incomplete or ineffective unless the reasons therefor are communicated to the party affected as we are inclined to hold, on a proper and meaningful reading of the impugned Notification, that reasons for bringing the Notification into immediate operation are also stated therein. A perusal of the impugned Notification has convinced us that he reasons which have been specified for declaring JEIH as unlawful association are also the reasons for which the Central Government has thought it fit to bring the impugned Notification into immediate effect. The expression "now, Therefore" in the last paragraph of the Notification amply demonstrates that the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs are reasons not only for declaring JEIH as an unlawful association but are also reasons for bringing the Notification into immediate operation. It is true that the reasons for bringing the impugned Notification into immediate operation have not been catalogued separately in a formal frame. But it is substance that counts and must take precedence over a formal chanting. This was precisely the argument advanced by Mr. Ukil, the learned Government Pleader, appearing for the State and also the argument advanced by the learned Solicitor General in addition to his other argument that reasons were not required to be communicated. ( 10 ) LEARNED Solicitor General has drawn our attention to a three-Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Ahmad Ali Aktar v. Union of India, C. W. J. C. No. 477 of 1993 disposed of on 2/03/1993 and also to a Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in T. A. Abdul Nazar v. State of Kerala, O. P. No. 17028 of 1992-B decided on 19/01/1993. ( 11 ) WE have not, and this we say with respect, been able to derive much assistance from the Patna decision on the question before us. The decision is no doubt in favour of the respondents but the reasons are not clearly discernible. The Kerala decision is also very much in favour of the respondents where a similar Notification under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 in respect of one "islamic Sevak Sangha", brought into immediate operation pending confirmation thereof under S. 4 of the Act, was upheld. The relevant Notification in the Kerala case was also couched in similar frame and fashion wherein only one set of reasons specified both for declaring the association unlawful under S. 3 (1) of the Act and also for bringing the same into immediate operation under S. 3 (3) of the Act without stating the reasons again separately for bringing the same into immediate operation. We respectfully agree with the Kerala decision. ( 12 ) MR. Chatterjee has, however, strenuously urged that the fundamental right under Art. 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution of an association or union must not be interfered with by such a unilateral fiat of the Central Government before its legality is tested by or before a Judicial authority. As already noted, Mr. Chatterjee has not, at this stage before us, challenged the legality or propriety of the Notification declaring JEIH as unlawful since the main writ petition challenging the said Notification is awaiting disposal in the trial Court. In view of such stand taken by Mr. Chatterjee for the present, we also do not express any opinion whatsoever as to the merits of the writ petition and leave all these questions open for proper decision by the trial Court. At this stage, therefore, for the purpose of this appeal before us, we have nothing before us to hold that the Notification declaring JEIH as unlawful or otherwise is illegal or invalid. Once it is held, though only for the purpose of the present appeal, that the security and the integrity of India are threatened or questioned, no individual fundamental right may be allowed to show its head and may have to duck for the time being. All that I know, that is the attitude which the English Courts have consistently taken whenever the security or safety of their country was in jeopardy. All that I know, that is the attitude which the English Courts have consistently taken whenever the security or safety of their country was in jeopardy. We, however, hasten to put it on record that nothing stated by us herein shall be construed as any expression on our part on the merits of the writ petition and we make it further clear that the petitioner shall be entitled to challenge the legality and propriety of the impugned Notification declaring JEIH as unlawful in the trial Court on all such grounds as may be available to it under the law. ( 13 ) FOR the reasons stated above, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order and we, therefore, dismiss the appeal and obviously without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.