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1993 DIGILAW 177 (HP)

KR. ALARK SINGH v. DURGA DEVI

1993-12-15

DEVINDER GUPTA

body1993
JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—This suit was instituted on 13th October, 1987, wherein the plaintiff has claimed number of reliefs including a decree for declaration of his title to the suit properties, for partition and for rendition of accounts. On 28th May, 1993, nine preliminary issues were framed and the case was posted for the parties evidence on the said issues. In the meanwhile, some of the defendants applied for framing issues on merits also and for rejection of plaint as disclosing no cause of action. On 19th August, 1993, when the case was taken up for consideration on the applications, learned Counsel appearing for defendants No. 1 to 4, by making reference to two decisions of the Supreme Court in Revathinnal Balagopalaverma v. His Highness Sri Padmanabhadasavarma (since deceased) and others, 1991 (5) JT 301 and in His Highness Maharaja Pratap Singh v Her Highness Maharani Sarojani Devi and others; Civil Appeal No 5857 of 1983, decided on 17th August, 1993 prayed that the effect of the said judgments on the maintainability of the suit be decided first, since according to them the basic and primary reliefs were liable to be rejected. The case was thereafter posted for hearing arguments to examine the effect of the two judgments on the maintainability of the suit. Arguments were heard on 9th September, 1993. The averments made in the plaint may now be noticed in detail. 2. It is the plaintiffs case that Maharaja Amar Parkash, the Ruler of erstwhile princely State of Sirmur was the holder of an impartible estate till his death, which took in the year 1933, when in accordance with the rule of primogeniture his son Maharaja Rajinder Parkash succeeded him as a ruler and inherited all the properties. With the emergence of independent India in 1947, paramountcy lapsed and the Sirmur State acceded to dominion of India on Instructment of Accession being executed by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash transferring the authority and power of governance and administration of Sirmur State to the dominion of India. Prior to the accession, Maharaja Rajinder Parkash was the absolute owner of the property under the custom of impartibility and primogeniture since he held the property as a Ruler of the State. 3. Prior to the accession, Maharaja Rajinder Parkash was the absolute owner of the property under the custom of impartibility and primogeniture since he held the property as a Ruler of the State. 3. On the merger of the State in dominion of India in 1°48, the properties held by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash as a Ruler were divided in two categories being the State properties and private properties. The details submitted by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash were accepted by the Government of India and the properties mentioned therein were declared to be the personal properties of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash. AH those properties, which were declared to be the personal properties of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash formed the corpus of undivided Hindu family, which he held for and on behalf of the members of the joint family and on his death, which took place in 1964, the same reverted back to the members of joint Hindu family, where after each member of the family including the plaintiffs father and now the plaintiff himself is in constructive and physical possession thereof. 4. It is further alleged that succession in the dynesty of Sirmur State Rulers had always been governed under the rule of primogeniture and as a consequence the estate inherited by the succeeding Raj is remained impartible to the exclusion of all other members of the family till the custom of impartibility and primogeniture was abolished by Hindu Succession Act, 1956 Under the scheme and custom of impartibility the estate inherited by the succeeding Rajas of Sirmur State could not be broken and only one person, namely, the Ruler enjoyed the same to the exclusion of the other members of the family, who were allowed, in lieu of maintenance only Jagirs. After giving the pedigree, the plaintiff has further alleged that vast moveable and immoveable property held by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash firstly as a Ruler and then, after merger of the State in dominion of India, on acceptance of the same as his personal properties, on the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash, devolved upon the surviving members of the coparcenary Immediately prior to the death, the coparcenary constituted of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash himself, his younger brother Major Birender Singh (the plaintiffs father) and Rajmata Madalsa Devi (the widowed mother of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash). They acquired one share each and on the death, share of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash was inherited in equal shares by his four heirs, namely, his widow Durga Devi, defendant No. 1, the two daughters Smt Nalini Devi, defendant No. 2 and Padmini Devi, defendant No. 3 and mother Rajmata Madalsa Devi. 5. It is the plaintiffs case that Rajmata Madalsa Devi during her life time executed a Will on 22nd February, 1965, bequeathing her move-able and immoveable properties in favour of Major Birender Singh, the plaintiffs father and her own daughter Maharani Prem Lata Dzvi in equal shares. Rajmata Madalsa Devi died in 1973. Maharani Prem Lata, being her daughter, inherited her estate through succession. 6. It is also alleged that properties held by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash are located in District Sirmur within the State of Himachal Pradesh and also some agriculture lands at Dehradun (UP ), succession to which is governed and regulated under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Part of the agricultural lands at Dehradun has since been acquired by the Government for public purpose and with respect to the amount of compensation, Civil Suit has been preferred by the plaintiff seeking declaration to the entitlement of the compensation and for Bhumidari rights. It is alleged that some alienations have been made by defendants No. 1 to 4 at Dehradun, after filing of the suit Transferees have not been impleaded as defendants. The plaintiff has sought to reserve his right to include and bring the property situate at Dehradun under the Control and jurisdiction of this Court with the leave of the Court as and when found proper and expedient. It is alleged that some properties at Nahan have also been alienated and the transferees have been impleaded as defendants to the suit, in order to enable them to protect their respective rights and to get their lands adjusted at the time of partition. 7. Further allegations in the plaint are that after the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash in 1964, properties situate at Nahan and Dehradun were being managed by the Secretary House-hold and Manager, but in the year 1978-79, defendant No. 3 entered the Royal Palace of Nahan and gradually tightened her control over the palace. 7. Further allegations in the plaint are that after the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash in 1964, properties situate at Nahan and Dehradun were being managed by the Secretary House-hold and Manager, but in the year 1978-79, defendant No. 3 entered the Royal Palace of Nahan and gradually tightened her control over the palace. Being the married daughter, defendant No. 3 has no right of residence in the parental dwelling house either at Nahan or at Dehradun It is also alleged that after the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash, defendants No. 1 to 4 have been receiving rents and profits of the properties. The father of the plaintiff was kept in complete darkness as regards the profits and after death of the plaintiffs father, which took place on 18th January, 1982, plaintiff has also been kept in complete darkness. 8. In the aforementioned background, the plaintiff has claimed a decree for declaration of his title to the properties left by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash and has also claimed decree for declaration for his entitlement to the entire amount of compensation awarded under the land acquisition proceedings, declaring the entries in revenue records to be illegal and also setting up a Will dated 22nd February, 1965 to half of the estate of Rajmata Madalsa Devi and consequently decree for partition of various properties situate in Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh has been claimed alongwith a decree for rendition of accounts. 9. Suit has been contested by the defendants. Defendants No 1, 2 and 4 have filed a joint written statement. Defendant No. 3 has filed a separate written statement. Separate written statements have been filed by some of the other defendants, namely, defendants No. 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30, 34, 35, 43 and 47. 10. The defence of defendants No. i to 4 is almost same and similar. It is alleged that Maharaja Amar Parkash died in 1933, who was the Ruler of Sirmur and was survived by his son Maharaja Rajinder Parkash. 10. The defence of defendants No. i to 4 is almost same and similar. It is alleged that Maharaja Amar Parkash died in 1933, who was the Ruler of Sirmur and was survived by his son Maharaja Rajinder Parkash. At the time of merger of State with the Union of India, the properties of the State of Sirmur merged with Union of India and thereafter as per terms and conditions of covanent of the merger agreement, Maharaja Rajinder Parkash remained absolute and exclusive4 owner of the suit properties, Such properties were thereafter held and dealt by him as his exclusive properties. Neither the plaintiff, nor any of the defendants raised any objection to the same, Rao Raja Birender Singh, the father of the plaintiff had been appointed as General Attorney by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash and several transfers and alienations were made by him as an attorney of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash, who also made gifts out of the said properties to Rao Raja Birender Singh and his wife, sisters and others, The plaintiffs father also purchased property from Maharaja Rajinder Parkash. \s such, the plaintiff is estopped from pleading that the suit properties and other properties held by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash were not his sole and absolute properties It is alleged that on the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash the suit properties and all other properties held by him were succeeded by his mother Rajmata Madalsa Devi, his two widows Maharani Durga Kumari and Maharani Indira and the two daughters Smt Nalini Devi and Smt. Padmini Devi. 11. Pedigree table, as stated by the plaintiff has not been disputed, but the correct relationship stated therein is in dispute. As per the defendants, Maharaja Amar Parkash was succeeded by his son Rajinder Parkash. He also left behind his widow Rajmata Madalsa Devi and one daughter Smt. Prem Lata Devi. Maharaja Rajinder Parkash was survived by his two widows Maharani Durga Devi and Indira Devi, two daughters Smt Nalini Devi and Smt Padmini Devi. Defendant No 4 KJdey Parkash is an adopted son by Maharani Durga Devi, whose adoption took place after the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash on 2lst February, 1965 through deed dated 23rd February, 1965 registered on z6th February, 1965 in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Lucknow. 12. Defendant No 4 KJdey Parkash is an adopted son by Maharani Durga Devi, whose adoption took place after the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash on 2lst February, 1965 through deed dated 23rd February, 1965 registered on z6th February, 1965 in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Lucknow. 12. It is claimed by the defendants that Smt. Gupti Devi was not the wife of Amar Parkash, as alleged by the plaintiff, but was a concubine, who gave birth to a son, namely, Rao Raja Birender Singh the plaintiffs father, and two daughters’ namely, Priya Kumari and Yukta Kumari. Plaintiff Alark Singh and Mandhata Singh (now deceased) are the two sons of Rao Raja Birender Singh Being a son of concubine, Rao Raja Birender Singh, which in royal family of Sirmur and some other States is termed as Sartora son could not get and did not get any right of inheritance under the law and usage or custom in the family of Rulers of Sirmur. 13. Defendants have denied the existence of any joint Hindu family much Jess with Rao Raja Birender Singh, the plaintiffs father. A specific plea taken is that Maharaja Rajinder Singh was the sole and exclusive owner of the properties, which have rightly been inherited by his widows, two daughters and mother. 14. As regards the Will, alleged to have been executed by Rajmata Madalsa Devi, it is alleged that the same is an act of forgery, Neither the father of the plaintiff, nor Smt. Prem Lata Devi inherited any property on the basis of the Will. The Will has been the subject-matter of probate proceedings filed by Rao Raja Birender Singh at Dehradun, which proceedings abated on his death The alleged Will has also remained the subject-matter of a few Civil Suits, filed by the plaintiff, as well as by Smt Prem Lata Devi, which have also failed. Otherwise also, it is alleged that Rajmata Madalsa Devi had no legal rights to execute the Will, atleast with regard to Bhumidbari Land of Dehradun, as per the Land Laws of the State of Uttar Pradesh. It is alleged that Rajmata Madalsa Devi got only property to the extent of l/4th by way of inheritance on the death of his son Maharaja Rajinder Parkash and on her death, the same was inherited by defendants No. 1 to 3 and Smt. Prem Lata, in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act. 15. It is alleged that Rajmata Madalsa Devi got only property to the extent of l/4th by way of inheritance on the death of his son Maharaja Rajinder Parkash and on her death, the same was inherited by defendants No. 1 to 3 and Smt. Prem Lata, in accordance with the Hindu Succession Act. 15. As regards the status of plaintiff or his father, it is alleged that even the President of India did not recognise the father of the plaintiff as a member of royal family or a successor of Maharaja His father was, however, given maintenance allowance of Rs, 1,500 by the President of India, not on account of any recognition of his being lawful successor of royal family, but because of the fact that before merger, the plaintiffs father got Khara forest in village Ganguwala Jamniwala on the basis of purchase per Sanad. 16. There are number of legal and preliminary objections raised as also there is contest on other points, but those averments in the written statement are not being taken note of at this stage. 17. The other defendants, who have filed their written statements have supported that part of the plaintiffs case, which is based upon the setting up of a Will of Rajmata Madalsa Devi dated 22nd February, 1965. 18. Defendant No. 6, in addition, has set up a Will, alleged to have been executed by Smt. Prem Lata on 13th December, 1985 and defendants No. 5, 7, 9 and 10 have also separately set up a Will dated 13th June, 1986, alleged to have been executed by Smt. Prem Lata. Defendants No. 11 to 47 are the transferees and in fact no relief has been claimed in the suit against them Mandhatta Singh was impleaded originally as defendant No. 489 but on his death, which took place in 1991, his name was deleted and later on Maharaja Virender Singh was substituted as defendant No. 48 being the step son of Smt. Prem Lata, whose death took place on 26th November, 1986. 19. 19. The narration of the aforementioned facts makes it clear that the plaintiff is basing his claim primarily by raising up a plea that the properties in the hand of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash came to him by way of inheritance from his father Maharaja Amar Parkash as ancestral properties and though on the merger of the State with the Union of India, the same were declared to be his personal properties, he took the same as a member of the joint Hindu family. During the period, Maharaja Rajinder Parkash remained the Ruler of Sirmur State, the property was the subject to the custom of impartibility and primogeniture, which custom was abolished by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Rights of the other members of the joint Hindu family remained eclipsed during the continuance of the custom of impartiality and primogeniture, which revived on the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash in 1964 and thus on the death, the property became the property of joint Hindu family comprising late Maharaja Bajinder Parkash, his brother Rao Raja Birender Singh, his widowed mother Rajmata Madalsa Devi. 20. In Revathinnal Balagopala Varmas case (supra), the Supreme Court has had an occasion to deal with the nature of properties held by the Rulers and the effect of merger agreements executed on independence of the country. It was held that the doctrine of the Hindu Law that property inherited by a son from his father would be ancestral property in his hands cannot be made applicable in cases of Rulers where all the properties held by a Monarch or Ruler devolved by the rule of primogeniture. On the devolution of the properties from one Monarch to his successor, the successor would take the same as an absolute Monarch and not as a son by way of inheritance. This succession need not necessarily be lineal primogeniture. On the devolution of the properties from one Monarch to his successor, the successor would take the same as an absolute Monarch and not as a son by way of inheritance. This succession need not necessarily be lineal primogeniture. It was held that on succession by a sovereign ruler, the property cannot be claimed to be a joint family property, since the estate in the hand of one ruler would be a sovereign estate and its chief a sovereign ruler The basis for holding so was that being a sovereign ruler, he would acquire the properties in exercise of sovereign rights Neither the family, nor any member of the family could dream of putting up a claim, so long as he is a ruler that as the properties had been acquired by a member of the family, they belong to family and it would not be correct to say that they have such a right and that the right remains dormant so long as the Ruler is a sovereign and will revive on the ruler ceasing to a sovereign. 21. The plaintiff in the instant case has practically based his entire case on the assumption that the properties were held by the Rulers of Sirmur as ancestral properties and the last Ruler, namely, Maharaja Rajinder Parkash got it by way of succession from his father, Maharaja Amar Parkash. On that assumption, it has been claimed that the same belong to the joint Hindu family since during the continuance of the ruler-ship, the right of the other members of the joint family remained dormant and the ruler on ceasing to be a sovereign on the independence of the country, the rights of the other members of the joint Hindu family stood revived. The entire basis of such a claim cannot be made a subject matter of an issue in view of what has been held in Revathinnal Balagopala Varma’s case (supra). The entire basis of such a claim cannot be made a subject matter of an issue in view of what has been held in Revathinnal Balagopala Varma’s case (supra). In the said decision, following observations made by Bhagwati, J (as he then was) in D. S. Meramwala Bhayala v Ra Shri Amarba Jethsurbhai, (1968) ILR 9 Guj 966, were quoted with approval; "There is, therefore, no doubt that the Khari Bagasara Estate was a sovereign Estate and the Chief of the Khari-Bagasara Estate for the time being was a sovereign Ruler within his Own territories subject to the paramouatcy of the British Grown prior to 15th August, 1947 and completely independent after that date. If the Khari-Bagasara Estate was a sovereign Estate, it is diffioult to see how the ordinary incidents of ancestral co-parcenary property could be applied to that Estate. The characteristic feature of the ancestral co-parcenary property is that members of the family acquire an interest in the property by birth or adoption and by virtue of such interest they can claim four rights : (1) the right of partition ; (2) the right to restrain alienations by the head of the family except for necessity ; (3) the right of maintenance ; and (4) the right of survivorship. It is obvious from the nature of a sovereign Estate that there can be no interest by birth or adoption in such Estate and these rights which are the necessary consequence of community of interest cannot exist. The Chief of a sovereiga Estate would bold the Estate by virtue of his sovereign power and not by virtue of municipal law. He would not be subject to municipal law, he would in fact be the fountain head of municipal law. The municipal law cannot determine or control the scope and extent of his interest in the estate or impose any limitations on his powevers in relation to the Estate. As a sovereign ruler he would be the full and complete owner of the Estate entitled to do what he likes with the Estate. During his lifetime no one else can claim an interest in the Estate. Such an interest would be inconsistent with his sovereignty. As a sovereign ruler he would be the full and complete owner of the Estate entitled to do what he likes with the Estate. During his lifetime no one else can claim an interest in the Estate. Such an interest would be inconsistent with his sovereignty. To grant that the sons acquire an interest by birth or adoption in the Estate which Is a consequence arising under the municipal law would be to make the Chief who is the sovereign Ruler of the Estate subject to the municipal law. Besides, if the sons acquire an interest in the Estate by birth or adoption, they would be entitled to claim the lights enumerated above but these rights cannot exist in a sovereign Estate. None of these rights can be enforced against the Chief by a remedy in the municipal Courts. The Chief being the sovereign Ruler, there can be no legal sanction for enforcement of these rights The remedy for enforcement of these rights would not be a remedy at law but resort would have to be taken to force for the Chief as the sovereign Ruler would not be subject to municipal law and his actions would not be controlled by the municipal Courts, Now it is impossible to conceive of a legal right which has no legal remedy. If a claim is not legally enforceable, it would loot constitute a legal right and, therefore, by the very nature of a sovereign Estate, the sons cannot have these rights and if these rights cannot exist in the sons, it must follow as a necessary corollary that the sons do not acquire an interest in the Estate by birth or adoption............... ...Now it was not disputed on behalf of Meramwala that if prior to merger the Estate did not partake of the character of ancestral coparcenary property, the properties left with Bhayawala under the merger agreement would not be ancestral coparcenary properties : if Meramwala did not have any interest in the Estate prior to merger, be would have no interest in the properties which remained with Bhayavala under the merger agreement. It was not the case of Meramwala and it could not be the case since the merger agreement would be an act of State that as a result of the merger agreement any interest was acquired by him- in the properties held by Bhayavala. It was not the case of Meramwala and it could not be the case since the merger agreement would be an act of State that as a result of the merger agreement any interest was acquired by him- in the properties held by Bhayavala. Bhayavala was, therefore,, the fail owner of the properties held by him and was competent to dispose of the same by Will...... …….. The argument of Mr. I. M. Nanavati however was that the effect of applicability of the rule of primogeniture by the paramount power was that the rights of coparceners under the ordinary Hindu law were eclipsed : these rights were not destroyed but they remained dormant and on the lapse of paramountcy, the shadow of the eclipse being removed, the rights sprang into full force and effect. This argument is wholly unsustainable on principle.......... " 22. This ratio of the judgment in Revathinnal Balagopala Varmas ease (supra), can be gathered from para 69 of the report, which is to the following effect: The properties in suit having passed on from one sovereign to the other came to be ultimately held by respondent No 1 in that capacity. Neither any principle nor authority nor even any grant etc has been brought to our notice on the basis of which it could be held that in the properties of the State held by a sovereign an interest was created or came into being in favour of the family to which the sovereign belonged," 23. It is the plaintiffs case that Maharaja Amar Parkash was a sovereign and properties were held by him as a sovereign ruler of Sirmur and en his death by the rule of primogeniture the same were inherited by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash as a Sovereign Ruler of Sirmur. This being tbe case of the plaintiff, there is no manner of doubt that till sovereignty of Maharaja Amar Parkash or after his death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash ceased, they were entitled to treat and use the properties under their sovereignty, in any manner they liked and their Will in this regard was supreme. It is on the principle that a sovereign never dies and succession to the next Ruler takes place without there being hiatus, there could be no change in the legal status of the properties held by one Ruler and his successor. It is on the principle that a sovereign never dies and succession to the next Ruler takes place without there being hiatus, there could be no change in the legal status of the properties held by one Ruler and his successor. In Revathinnal Balagopala Varmas case (supra), it has also been held that one incidence of the property held by a sovereign was that there was really no distinction between the public or State properties on the one hand and the private properties of the sovereign on the other. The other incidence was that no one could be a co-owner with the sovereign in the properties held by him. 24. The judgment in His Highness Maharaja Pratap Singh v. Her Highness Maharani Sarojini Devi and others, Civil Appeal No. 5857 of 1983, decided on 17th August, 1993 by the Supreme Court of India, is later in point, in which reliance was placed upon the judgment in Revathinnal Balagopala Varma’s case (supra), and again the above quoted observations of Gujarat High Court in DS. Meramwala Bhayalas case (supra), were re-asserted and approved. In both the decisions terms of the merger agreement were also considered, under which some of the properties held by last ruler were declared by the Union of India to be the private properties of the last ruler. It was held that being the absolute Monarch or Sovereign, so long rulership remained, the ruler was the owner of all the properties in the State and there was no rulership after India became Republic on 26th January, 1950. The estate, which was impartible in its nature would continue to be governed by the ruler of primogeniture, which continued even after 1947-48 since under Article 372 of the Constitution of India, the law of succession relating to primogeniture continued until it was epealed. This was repealed on coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. On declaration of the properties by the Union of India to be personal property of the last ruler, ordinarily the incidents of succession would apply and there is no question of property being treated as ancestral in the hands of the person, who was declared to be the owner of the properties by the Union of India. 25. On declaration of the properties by the Union of India to be personal property of the last ruler, ordinarily the incidents of succession would apply and there is no question of property being treated as ancestral in the hands of the person, who was declared to be the owner of the properties by the Union of India. 25. In Revathinnal Balagopala Varmas case (supra), It has been held that if someone asserts that to a particular property held by a sovereign, the legal incidents of sovereignty do not apply, it will have to be pleaded and established by him that the said property was held by the sovereign not as sovereign but in some other capacity. In the instant case, the position is not so since plaintiffs case, as made out in the plaint, is that the property was firstly held by Maharaja Amar Parkash as a sovereign and when Maharaja Rajinder Prakash became the Ruler, he also held the same as a sovereign. 26. Thus, the plaintiffs suit based upon the premise that the properties, on being declared as personal properties of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash, were held by him as a member of joint Hindu family or that it was a coparcenary property, has to be held as not maintainable, in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court, which by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution is the law and binding on this Court. On that basis, the pleas which are contrary to the law declared by the apex Court in the two decisions, can neither be made subject matter of issues, nor taken to trial. The effect of the two decisions would be that the properties were held by Maharaja Rajinder Parkash as a sovereign till the merger of Sirmur State with the dominion of India and were not the joint family properties. After the merger, the same were accepted as the personal properties of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash. On the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash, which took place in 1.964, only his two widows Smt. Durga Devi and Smt. Indira Devi (latter of whom is already dead), his widowed mother Rajmata Madalsa Devi and two daughters Smt. Nalini Devi and Padmini Devi inherited the properties. On the death of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash, which took place in 1.964, only his two widows Smt. Durga Devi and Smt. Indira Devi (latter of whom is already dead), his widowed mother Rajmata Madalsa Devi and two daughters Smt. Nalini Devi and Padmini Devi inherited the properties. This being the basic and primary claim made by the plaintiff, in view of the two decisions of Supreme Court, cannot now be taken to trial, since the plaintiff cannot lay any claim to the estate of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash. Its effect now will have to be examined. 27. The plaint cannot be rejected in part Since the issues are required to be confined, as per provisions of Order 14, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to material questions of fact or law, namely, to points necessary for the proper trial and disposal of the case and the same should not be framed with respect to the points not so necessary, as such, no issue now need be framed on a point, which is perfectly clear. Resort will now have to be had to the provisions of Order 6, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which says that: "16. Striking out pleadings.—>The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading— (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court" 28. The rule enunciated in Rule 16 of Order 6 of the Code has been enacted to give effect to the principle that every party is entitled, ex-debito justitiae, to have the case against him presented in an intelligible form, so that he may not be embarrassed in meeting it. The rule also provides that a party may either apply to strike out or compel the amendment of the whole or any part of the opponents pleadings, which may be unnecessary or scandalous or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass and delay the fair trial of the action. The power under this rule may also be exercised suo motu by the Court by striking out or amending such parts in such a manner and on such terms as it thinks just. The power under this rule may also be exercised suo motu by the Court by striking out or amending such parts in such a manner and on such terms as it thinks just. The power, however, is discretionary one, which deserves to be exercised with great care and caution. 29. In view of the aforementioned proposition, the consequence would be to direct the plaintiff to strike out such of the pleadings, which are contrary to the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in so far as it pertains to his claim founded on the basis of joint Hindu family vis-a-vis or to the estate of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash and to confine the same only with respect to the case set up by him in para 11 of the plaint, only to the estate, as came by way of inheritance under the ordinary law or succession in the hands of Rajmata Madalsa Devi from Maharaja Rajinder Parkash. Continuing the proceedings as such with respect to the estate of Maharaja Rajinder Parkash is not only likely to prejudice the defendants but also unnecessarily embarrass and delay the fair trial of the suit. 30. Resultantly, the plaintiff is directed to seek amendment of the plaint by deleting his claim as aforementioned and confining the same only to the estate of Rajmata Madalsa De\if as claimed in para 11 of the plaint. The needful be done within a period of six weeks from today. List on 11th March, 1994 for further orders. Order accordingly. -