Judgement JUDGEMENT :- This Writ Appeal is filed against the order of the learned Judge in W.P. No. 264 of 1987. 2. The appellants have filed the said writ petition, challenging the validity of the land acquisition proceedings initiated u/S.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter refer­red to as 'the Act'). Notice u/S. 4(1) of the Act was published on 26-7-1978. The Declaration was published on 3-6-1980. Thereafter, it does not appear that any steps were taken by the Department to proceed with the acquisition. As a matter of fact, it is stated in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition as follows :­- "The petitioners were not given any notice regarding the subsequent proceedings under Ss. 9, 10 and 12 of the Act, and an Award appears to have been passed on 22-9-1986 behind the back of the petitioners. The entire proceedings are null and void and they are liable to be quashed." The acquisition proceedings were challenged on number of grounds. 3. The learned Judge, however, dismissed the writ petition, by order dated 15-9-1987, holding that the petitioners before him moved the Court belatedly, and that fact disentitled them from getting any relief from the Court. Aggrieved by that, the present writ appeal is filed. 4. Mr. M. Raghavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, submits that the dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of delay, placing reliance on a judgement of the Supreme Court in Hari Singh v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1984 SC 1020 , is not sustainable, as the judgement of the Supreme Court relates to acquisition pro­ceedings under emergency provisions of the Act, and when the aggrieved party moved the Court, possession was taken. Therefore, that, case of the Supreme Court is distinguishable. He also pointed out that the appellants were allowed to presume that after S. 6 Declara­tion, the Government was net serious about the acquisition, and that can be seen from the fact that the Award was said to have been passed only on 22-9-1986. According to the learned counsel, on coning to know of the passing of the Award, the petitioners, (appel­lants herein) moved the Court and, therefore, there was no delay on the part of the appellants. 5. According to the learned counsel, on coning to know of the passing of the Award, the petitioners, (appel­lants herein) moved the Court and, therefore, there was no delay on the part of the appellants. 5. No counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents either before the learned single Judge or in the above writ appeal, controverting the averments made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. 6. The delay between S.6 Declaration and the passing of the Award remains un­explained. When there is a delay of nearly six years on the part of the respondents in continuing the land acquisition proceedings, it is not open to the respondents to raise that point against the appellants. 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the appel­lants also submitted that the Notification under S. 4(1) of the Act is vague, and, even on that ground, the Notification is liable to be quashed. In support of that, he placed reliance on a Division bench judgement of this Court in L. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1991 TLNJ 144. The relevant portion of S. 4(1) Notification in the present case, regarding 'public purpose' reads as follows :­- ".....for the construction of houses under Neighbourhood Scheme, Salem." In the case reported in 1991 TLNJ 144 (supra), the S.4(1) Notification regarding 'public purpose' reads as follows :­- "For the creation of a new neighbourhood known as Kalaignar Karunanidhi Nagar Part II Schemes." That was held to be vague, and on that ground, the S. 4(1) Notification was quashed, following an earlier Division Bench judgement in The State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Mohammed Yousuf reported in 1990 (II) MLJ 149 . The learned counsel also brought to our notice a recent judgement of the Supreme Court on this point, namely, The Madhya Pradesh Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi reported in 1992 (3) JT SC 523 : (1992 AIR SCW 2988). 8. The learned Government Advocate, except arguing the point regarding delay, is not in a position to get over the Division Bench judgements of this Court (mentioned supra), and also the judgement of the Supreme Court (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellants regarding the vagueness of the Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. 9. 8. The learned Government Advocate, except arguing the point regarding delay, is not in a position to get over the Division Bench judgements of this Court (mentioned supra), and also the judgement of the Supreme Court (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the appellants regarding the vagueness of the Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. 9. As regards delay, we have explained that if at all there is any delay, it is only on the part of the respondents, and the appellants cannot be blamed for that, on the facts of this case. 10. One other point was also brought to our notice, namely, that most of the lands covered by the impugned Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act have been released from acquisition either by the Government themselves or by Orders of Court. The learned Government Advocate is not in a position to controvert this paint put forth by learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants. 11. For the reasons stated above, we allow the writ appeal, and set aside the order of the learned single Judge, and consequently quash the impugned Section 4(1) Noti­fication. No costs.