This revision is directed against the order dated 3.2.93 passed by Munsiff No, 2, Silchar, in Title Suit No. 178 of 1985 refusing to allow that petitioner to adduce evidence on the basis of the prayer made in Annexure 1 petition filed on behalf of the petitioner (defendant). 2. The case of the petitioner is that the opposite party instituted a suit (MS No. 178 of 1985) in the Court of the Second Munsiff, Silchar, against the petitioner and proforma opposite party No. 10 for eviction and for recovery of arrear of rent and compensation. 3 Assessment Register of Silchar Municipality for the year 1980-81 in connection with the suit premises, was filed by petitioner at the time of filing documents. However, the certified copy of the sale deed was filed only after recording of evidence of both sides. Thereafter, the suit was axed for argument. Meanwhile, Annexure 1 petition was filed on 3.2.93, stating, inter-alia, that the certified copy of the Municipal Assessment Register though filed in time, but through inadvertence the said document was not proved. Regarding certified copy of the sale deed, it was elated that the petitioner came to know about it after the closure of the evidence. The Munsiff by the impug­ned order dated 3.2 92 rejected the prayer holding that if such prayer was allowed it would only help the petitioner to fill up the iacuna. Accordingly, the prayer for further evidence was rejected. Hence the present petition. 4. Heard Mr. NM Lahiri, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M. Singh, learned counsel for the opposite party. Mr. Lahiri submits that the copy of Assessment Register was filed in time, but through inadvertence no evidence could be led with regard to the said document and the document was not proved in accordance with law. According to Mr. Lahiri the petitioner came to know about the sale doe ! at a later stage and therefore, it could not be filed. H" submits that the Munsiff failed to exercise his jurisdiction while passing the impugned order. He further submits that Order 18 Rule 17A empower a Court to allow any party to produce evidence at a later stage if conditions mentioned in the said Rule are fulfilled. at a later stage and therefore, it could not be filed. H" submits that the Munsiff failed to exercise his jurisdiction while passing the impugned order. He further submits that Order 18 Rule 17A empower a Court to allow any party to produce evidence at a later stage if conditions mentioned in the said Rule are fulfilled. Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by refusing to allow the petitioner to produce the said evidence even though the conditions necessary to invoke the power under the Rule exist. 5. Rule 17A has been introduced to permit production of additional evidence at a later stag;. Main object of this Rule is to further justice, so that for mere technical ground the parties should not suffer. Under the Rule, if the Court is satisfied that after exercise of due diligence any evidence was not within the knowledge of a party or could not be produced by him at a time when that party was leading his evidence it may permit that party to produce such evidence at a later stage. The existence of any of the two conditions in the said Rule 17A may confer the jurisdiction to a Court to allow tie party to produce evidence at a later stage. This is definitely not a case that the documents, i.e Assessment Register, was not within his know­ledge. This is a case where the petitioner wished to produce evidence, but could not produce at the time when he was leading his evidence. The ground mentioned in the petition is that through inadvertence the evidence could not be led in respect of the Assessment Register and the document could not be marked. 6. Mr. Singh, on the other hand, submits that this is not a fit case to invoke the power under Rule 17A of Order 18 inasmuch as, it is not a case that the petitioner had no knowledge about the existence of the Assessment Register and it could not be produced. Therefore, the conditions necessary for the purpose of invoking the power under Rule 17A of Order 18 being absent, the Court had no authority and jurisdiction to allow the petitioner to produce the evidence at a liter stage, i.e. after closure of the evidence and at the time wren the argument was to be heard. Besides, Mr. Therefore, the conditions necessary for the purpose of invoking the power under Rule 17A of Order 18 being absent, the Court had no authority and jurisdiction to allow the petitioner to produce the evidence at a liter stage, i.e. after closure of the evidence and at the time wren the argument was to be heard. Besides, Mr. Singh also submits that this petition for production of additional evidence ac a later stage is nothing but a ruse to delay the proceeding in view of the fact that the petitioner is the defendant and the delay in disposal of the suit would help him. Mr. Singh, however, does not seriously object in respect of the sale deed. 7. The point for consideration is whether under the facts and circum­stances of the case the petitioner should be allowed to prove the documents at later stage. 8. In this connection Mr. Lahiri has drawn my attention of a decision in Om Prakash vs. Sarupa, AIR 1981 P & H 157- On the other hand, Mr. Singh has placed reliance on a decision in Kanhaiya Lai Manchandiya vs. Lalchand Baddani, AIR 1988 Rajasthan 181. 9. In the case of Om Prakash (supra) the Punjab and Haryana High Court had the occasion to deal with a similar case. The point at issue in that case was execution of a Will. One of the attesting witnesses was dead and another witness who appeared in the Court was not examined by the counsel of the party on the point of attestation. After considering the provi­sions of Order 18 Rule 17 and 17A it WAS held that the Court can allow a party to examine the witness again on point of attestation of the Will as inadvertently questions were not put to him on this point in his earlier examination. A party could not be allowed to suffer for any omission or lapse on the part of his counsel, when it relates to requirement of any law. 10. In Kanhaiya Lai Manchandiya (supra) the Kajasthan High Court had the occasion to deal with a matter relating to production of documents at a later stage. In that case, it was held that word 'could not be produced' appearing in Rule 17A of Order 18 denotes non-production due to unavoid­able circumstances and not due to waiver to produce evidence. 10. In Kanhaiya Lai Manchandiya (supra) the Kajasthan High Court had the occasion to deal with a matter relating to production of documents at a later stage. In that case, it was held that word 'could not be produced' appearing in Rule 17A of Order 18 denotes non-production due to unavoid­able circumstances and not due to waiver to produce evidence. Therefore, once the parties submit that they are not leading any evidence and that they will argue the question of Court's jurisdiction to try the suit, they cannot later on pray to produce evidence invoking Rule 17A of Order 18. This case is not applicable in the pre sent case. 11. Rule 17A-has been inserted to permit production of additional evidence at a later stage which was not within the parties knowledge or which could not be produced when leading evidence. Prior to the introduction of this Rule additional evidence could be produced in appellate stage only under Order 41 Rule 27, if conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. Rule 17A thus minimizes the number of applications for additional evidence in the appellate Court. The very purpose of this Rule is to further the ends of justice and no parties should suffer for mere technical ground. The Munsiff, however, directed his attention to the past conduct of the petitioner and also the type of evidence to be led. In my opinion these are not relevant for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner can be allowed to lead further evidence as mentioned in the Annexure 1 petition. Only point is whether the petitioner comes within the meaning of 'could not be produced' at the time when he was leading his evidence. If the Court is satisfied that the petitioner is actually through inadvertence failed to lead the evidence he comes within the said expression. 12. In my opinion, this is not a case of wilful waiver of the petitioner to adduce evidence regarding Assessment Register. The petitioner in his petiti­on before the trial Court stated that through inadvertence the Municipal Assessment Register was not marked and brought on record. The word 'inadvertence' means inattentive or unintentional. The petitioner unintentio­nally failed to mark a document or lead evidence to that effect. The contents of the petition indicate that there was no wilful act for not leading the evidence and for marking the Assessment Register. The word 'inadvertence' means inattentive or unintentional. The petitioner unintentio­nally failed to mark a document or lead evidence to that effect. The contents of the petition indicate that there was no wilful act for not leading the evidence and for marking the Assessment Register. Munsiff has also not disbelieved the statements that document (Assessment Register) could not be produced through inadvertence. Mr. Singh is also not in a position to show anything in this regard. Therefore, I am of the view that the case of the petitioner comes within ambit of the expression "any evidence could not be produced by him at the time when -the party was leading his evidence" of Rule 17 A of Order 18 CPC. 13. Accordingly, I set aside the impugned order dated 3.2.93 and the petitioner is allowed to lead evidence in respect of the Assessment Register of Silchar Municipality for the year 1980-81 and the certified copy of the sale deed. However, if any evidence is led in that respect, the plaintiff shall have the right to cross examine. Besides, the petitioner shall pay a sum of Rs. 100/ -to the opposite party towards costs. The petition is disposed of with the above direction. 14. The parties shall appear before the Magistrate, Silchar on 27th September, 1993 for taking a date. The Munsiff shall make all endeavour to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of appearance of the parties.