JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners who are members of Municipal Board, Kotputli, filed the present writ petition for prohibition and prayed that the respondents No. 1 and 2 be restrained from cancelling or withdrawing the suspension order of the respondent No. 4, who is Chairman of the Municipal Board, Kotputli. 2. The relevant facts of the writ petition are that on receipt of a complaint of misconduct against the respondent No 4, the Government, after making enquiry, suspended him vide its order dated 19.4.1991. The relevant portion of the suspension order is as below : " pawfd Jh 'kadjyky lSuh] v/;{k] uxjikfydk dksViwryh ds fo:) jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e 1959 ( vf/kfu;e la[;k 38 lu~ 1959 ) dh /kkjk 63 esa tkWap dk;Zokgh izkjEHk gks pqdh gS vkSj pwWafd Jh 'kadjyky lSuh v/;{k uxjikfydk dksViwryh ds fo:) izFke n`"V;k vkjksi lgh ik;s x;s gSa vkSj pwWafd mDr Jh 'kadjyky lSuh ds uxjikfydk lSuh ds uxjikfydk dksViwryh ds v/;{k in ij cus jgus ls vc vkxs tkWap esa izfrdwy izHkko iMs+xkA vr% Jh 'kadjyky lSuh] v/;{k uxjikfydk] dksViwryh dh tkWap fopkjk/khu jgus vkSj mldk vfUre vkns'k ikfjr gksus rd jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e 1959 ( vf/kfu;e la[;k 38 lu~ 1959 ) dh /kkjk 63 dh mi/kkjk ( 4 ) }kjk iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, jkT; ljdkj ,rn~ }kjk Jh 'kadjyky lSuh v/;{k uxjikfydk dksViwryh dks v/;{k@lnL; in ls rRdkyhu izHkko ls fuyafcr djrh gSA " 3. The respondent No. 4, Shri Shanker Lal Saini, challenged the said order by filing Writ Petition No. 2270/1991, before this Court and this Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties, dismissed the Writ Petition, vide order dated 12.11.1992. Against the aforesaid order, the respondent No. 4 filed D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 638/1992, which was dismissed vide order dated 19.11.1992, marked Annexure 3. 4. Shri Sainij filed petition for Special Leave to Appeal before the Hon. Supreme Court and the Hon. Supreme Court has issued a notice on the same and also of the stay application. 5. There are 19 members of the Municipal Board, Kotputli, including the Chairman. This writ petition has been filed by eleven members with the allegations that after the imposition of President's rule in the State of Rajasthan, Secretary of Rajasthan Congress Committee approached H.E. the Governor of Rajasthan for withdrawal of the suspension orders of members/Chairman of Municipal Board who were suspended by the then Bhartiya Janata Party. This writ petition has been filed by eleven members with the allegations that after the imposition of President's rule in the State of Rajasthan, Secretary of Rajasthan Congress Committee approached H.E. the Governor of Rajasthan for withdrawal of the suspension orders of members/Chairman of Municipal Board who were suspended by the then Bhartiya Janata Party. A news; item was published in this connection in Dainik Nav Jyoti, dated 5.1.1993. The petitioners apprehended that taking undue advantage of the President's rule, in Rajasthan and without holding any final enquiry, the respondents No. 1 and 2 with extraneous consideration are going to withdraw the suspension order. They alleged that the respondents have no jurisdiction what-so-ever to withdraw the suspension order which is final until the final enquiry. 6. Notice of the writ petition was issued to the respondents to show cause as to why the writ be not admitted. The respondents have been served and they have filed separate replies to the writ petition. They have raised the following objections:- (1) that the suspension order is an administrative order and as such the Government has jurisdiction to withdraw the same; (2) that the Government has also jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act to withdraw the suspension order; (3) that the petitioners have no locus-standi to file writ petition. It deserves to be dismissed also on the ground of being politically motivated; (4) the writ petition is premature; (5) the allegations of malafide are vague. 7. The petitioners filed rejoinder to the replies submitted by the respondents. In their rejoinder, they mentioned that their apprehensions expressed in the writ petition were not baseless. The Government issued seventeen notifications on 21.1.1993, withdrawing the suspension orders of those members/Chairmen of Municipal Boards, whose names appear in the Dainik Nav Jyoti, dated 5.1.1993, except those against whom injunctions were issued by the Courts. In this connection, the petitioners also submitted copy of Rajasthan Rajpatra dated 22.1.1993, marked Annexure 5. 8. These notifications, by which the suspension orders were withdrawn by the Government have been challenged in some of the Writ Petitions. In all the Writ Petitions, similar questions of law have been involved and as such they were tagged and arguments were heard together. They are shown in the schedule annexed with this order. 9. 8. These notifications, by which the suspension orders were withdrawn by the Government have been challenged in some of the Writ Petitions. In all the Writ Petitions, similar questions of law have been involved and as such they were tagged and arguments were heard together. They are shown in the schedule annexed with this order. 9. Counsel for the petitioners argued that sub-section (4) of Section 63 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act (for short the Act') gives discretion to the Government to suspend or not to suspend a Member/Chairman of Municipal Board, who is found guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his duties or disgraceful conduct but if the Government has exercised its option and suspended the Chairman/Member of Municipal Board, it has no jurisdiction, what-so-ever to recall the suspension order, until the conclusion of enquiry and passing of final order by the Government in conformity with the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. The enquiry has to be conducted by a Judicial Officer of the rank of District Judge, who is to be appointed by the Government. They argued that the suspension order is final under sub-section (5) of Section 63 of the Act. The Government has revoked the suspension orders with extraneous considerations and as such they deserve to be quashed. In support of their submissions, counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on judgments reported in Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) and others, AIR 1987 S.C. 2186 H.C. Suman and another v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Co-operative Housing Building Society Ltd., New Delhi and others, AIR 1991 S.C. 2160 Km. Neelima Misra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal and others, AIR 1990 S.C. 1402 Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and another v. Sri Avinash Sharma, AIR 1970 S.C. 1576 State of Kerala and others v. K.G. Madhavan Pillai and others, AIR 1989 S.C. 49 Hanuman Prasad Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, RLR 1987 (II) 627 and Om Prakash v. State Of Rajasthan and another, AIR 1981 Rajasthan 165 . 10. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents argued that the suspension order is of administrative nature and as such the Government has every jurisdiction to with-draw the same. They also placed reliance on Section 23 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act. 10. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents argued that the suspension order is of administrative nature and as such the Government has every jurisdiction to with-draw the same. They also placed reliance on Section 23 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act. In support of their arguments, they placed reliance on the following Judgments : Mahadev Prasad Yadav v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., RLR 1990 (1) 157 Shyam Sunder Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., 1992 (2) WLC (Raj.) 533 Narain Dass v. Karam Chand, AIR 1986 Delhi 226 Sohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, RLW 1965, 166 Dr. Smt. Kuntesh Gupta v. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (supra), Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat and others, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 24 Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah, AIR 1986 S.C. 334 Bhura Lai v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1988 (1) R.L.R. 945 S.P. Gupta v. M. Tarkunde J.L. Karala and others, AIR 1982 S.C. 149 and Radhey Shyam Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Others, 1985 RLR 920 11. Counsel for the respondents further argued that the petitioners have no locus-standi to file the writ petition. In support of this argument, they placed reliance on S.P. Gupta v. M. Tarkunde (supra), Ramjilal v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1985 RLR 644 and Ramsharan v. State of Rajasthan and others, WLN (UC) 1981, 281 They also argued that the petitions are politically motivated and as such they deserve to be dismissed. In support of this argument, they placed reliance on Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar and others, (1991) 1 SCC 598 They argued that the allegations of malafide are vague. The allegations of malafide must be against a particular human person and not against juristic person. In support of this argument, counsel for the respondents placed reliance on S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 S.C. 72 Sunari Gram Sewa Sahakari Samiti and another v. State and Ors., RLR 1987 (1), 471 They further argued that the writ petition is premature and in support of this argument, they placed reliance on Dr. Purshottam Nagar v. State of Raj. and another, 1992 (1) WLC (Raj.) 296 . 12. In rejoinder, counsel for the petitioners argued that the judgments cited by counsel for the respondents are under the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, and not under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. Purshottam Nagar v. State of Raj. and another, 1992 (1) WLC (Raj.) 296 . 12. In rejoinder, counsel for the petitioners argued that the judgments cited by counsel for the respondents are under the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, and not under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. The provisions in both the Acts are different and as such the judgments are not applicable to the facts of present writ petitions. In the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, order of suspension is final until the conclusion of the final enquiry to be conducted by judicial officer and as such it cannot be said that the order passed by the Government is of administrative nature but is of quasi-judicial nature. The observations of this Court in Jan Mohd. v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1992 (2)WLC (Raj.) 463 that the manner in which a -,arpancn can oe suspendea under the Rajasthan Panchayat Act is pari-materia with the provisions of Section 63(4) read with Section 62(2), of the Act are obitor. In that case the petitioner Jan Mohammade challenged his suspension by the Government on the ground of arbitrariness, whereas in the present case, the question is as to whether the Government has any jurisdiction whatsoever for recalling the suspension order. The writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is wider and it is the duty of the Court to see that the rule of law is maintained. In support of this argument, counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa and others, AIR 1991 S.C. 1902 They further argued that a person who filed complaint against Chairman/Member of Municipal Board and also a sitting member of Municipal Board can file a writ petition. The petitioners are complainants and members of Municipal Board and it is their duty to see that the contesting respondent should remain suspended during the pendency of final enquiry. The petitioners are complainants and members of Municipal Board and it is their duty to see that the contesting respondent should remain suspended during the pendency of final enquiry. In support of this argument, they placed reliance on Munna and others v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1982 S.C. 806 G.D. Mehta v. The State of Rajasthan and others, WLN (UC) 1980, 301 Sumer Singh v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Rajasthan, Jaipur, RLW 1976, 117 Pyarelal v. State of Rajasthan, ILR 1970 (Rajasthan) 382 1984 (1) M.C. Cases 185 (Orissa) .They further argued that the judgment cited by the opposite party and reported in Ramji Lal's case (supra), is not on the point of maintainability of the writ petition but is on the point as to whether a complainant is a necessary or proper party in a writ filed by a suspended Sarpanch, challenging his suspension order and as such is not applicable to the present case. The other judgment reported in Ramsharan's case (supra) is also not relevant as the Sarpanch was already exonerated in final enquiry. In the judgment reported in Saktu Ram v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1988 P.&H. 211 the investigation was over. The Sarpanch was not found guilty of charges. Furthermore, the question was as to whether the complainant should be given notice before passing order of revocation of suspension order. They further argued that the suspension orders have been revoked on account of extraneous considerations and as such the writ petitions are maintainable. The authorities cited by the counsel for the respondents are distinguishable and are not on the point of malice in law. Section 23 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act is also not applicable in the present case. On this point, counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on H.C. Suman and another v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., New Delhi and others (supra), Temple of Shri Banketshwar Bakaji v. The Collector, Ajmer, RLW 1963, 608 Moh. Umar v. Ahmed, RLW 1965, 458 The Government has no inherent power to revoke the suspension order and on this point, counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on State of Kerala and others v. Mr. Umar v. Ahmed, RLW 1965, 458 The Government has no inherent power to revoke the suspension order and on this point, counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on State of Kerala and others v. Mr. K.G. Madhavan Pillai (supra), and also on Kanta Devi and another v. State of Rajasthan and others, AIR 1957 Rajasthan 134 They further argued that the judgments cited by counsel for the respondents and reported in Amri Shad Khan and another v. K. Hmingliana and others, AIR 1991 S.C. 1983 Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1985 S.C. 697 are under Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smugglers Activities Act. Section 11 of the. said Act gives power to the Government to revoke the orders passed by it and as such they are not relevant for the decision of these cases. Counsel for the parties further cited some other judgments. From the judgments cited by the counsel for the parties. I am of the view that there is no direct judgment on the point as to whether the Government has any power to revoke the suspension order under the Act before the conclusion of final enquiry, particularly when the suspension order has been upheld by this Court and as to whether the petitioners have any locus standi to file the writ petitions. The judgments of Full Bench, reported in Mahadev Prasad Yadav v. State of Rajasthan and others, 1990 (1) R.L.R. 157 is under the Rajasthan Panchayat Act. In my view the provisions of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act and the Rajasthan Municipalities Act are not pari-materia, on the points involved in these writ petitions. Under the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, the removal of Sarpanch or Panch is fmal and can be reviewed under Section 70-B of the said Act but under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, not only the order of removal of a member or a Chairman, but also an order of suspension is final and there is no provision under the Act for reviewing of that order.-As the points involved in these writ petitions are of far-reaching effect, I think it proper that they should be adjudicated by a larger bench. Under these circumstances, the files may be placed before Hon. the Chief Justice for constituting larger bench for deciding the above writ petition, alongwith writ petitions mentioned in the annexed schedule.Reference made to larger bench. *******