Judgment S.R. Singh, J. 1. This writ petition arises out of proceedings under section 9-A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act in respect of land comprising basic khatauni khata no. 156 area 86 bighas and 9 biswas situate in village Tudihar, Pargana Khairagarh, district Allahababad and is directed against' the concurrent judgments and orders dated 18-10-1979, 2-2-1980 and 28-8-1980 passed by Consolidation Officer, Koraon, Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation, Meja and the Joint Director of Consolidation, Allahabad respectively. 2. Relevant and material facts being necessary to appreciate the question involved in the case and raised at the Bar, may be unfolded as below : (A) Shiv Narain, the common ancestor of the petitioners and respondents no. 4 to 9 had six sons, namely, Ramdin, Sampati, Harchand, Krishna, Ram Chandra and Dhanuk. There is none in the branches of the last three amongst the sons of Shiv Narain. Ranndin had four sons Madha, Parmeshwar, Basudeo and Gokul. There is none in the branches of Madhav and Gokul. Chhote Lal respondent no. 9 (since dead and now represented by L.Rs Mohan Lal and Sone Lal) was the son of Parmeshwar. Hinch Lal, Jagannath and Hira Lal, the petitioners, are the sons of Basudeo. Sampat, the second son of Shiv Narain had a son Kunj Behari whose son is Chauharja Prasad, the 4th respondent. Harchand son of Shiv Narain had two sons Gomti and Jayanti. Raj Narain, Lalji, Ram Kishore and Ram Sukh (the respondents no. 5 to 8) are (he sons of Gomti, There is none in the branch of Jay anti; (B) The property in dispute was admittedly acquired by Shiv Narain and was recorded as his 'Maurusse' tenancy on 1282-F. In fact Shiv Narain was the tenant of land admeasuring 100 bighas and 15 biswas including the land comprising the khata in dispute. 5 to 8) are (he sons of Gomti, There is none in the branch of Jay anti; (B) The property in dispute was admittedly acquired by Shiv Narain and was recorded as his 'Maurusse' tenancy on 1282-F. In fact Shiv Narain was the tenant of land admeasuring 100 bighas and 15 biswas including the land comprising the khata in dispute. Ramdin son of Shiv Narain was recorded as occupancy tenant of 83 plots in 1308-F admeasuring 85 bighas and 5 biswas out of the 96 plots admeasuring 100 bighas and 15 biswas of the land of which Shiv Narain was recorded as occupancy tenant in 1282-F. Parmeshwar son of Ramdin and Jagannath, Hinch Lal and Hira Lal sons of Basudeo were recorded as hereiditary tenants in 1356-F of the same land; (C) Gomti son of Harchand instituted a suit under section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 against Basudeo and Parmeshwar sons of Ramdin, Jayanti son of Harchand and Chauharia son of Kunj Behari impleading 20 others who were the Zamindars. Gomti, the father of contesting respondents no. 5 to 8 claimed to be co-tenant of the land in dispute along with defendants no 1 to 4 in the said suit under section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The suit was contested by Parmeshwar and Basudeo, who filed joint written statement pleading therein that the common ancestor Shiv Narain had 100 bighas and 15 biswas of the land in his holding out of which a large area was 'parti'. It was alleged by them that some 40 years ago Harachand the father of Gomti separated from the family after taking 10 bighas of land which was of good quality leaving the remaining land with the remaining sons of Shiv Narain. The suit was dismissed by the Revenue Officer vide judgment and decree dated 14-2-1944 with the following finding : "Harchand the father of the plaintiff separated from the family about 40 or 41 years ago taking plots nos. 382, 386, 387, 388, 389 and 514 as his share of the holding of Shiv Narain, his father. Later on he appears to have acquired some more land which are included in the khata of his son Gomti. He took only 9 bighas and 110 biswas less than his proper share, because these plots consisted of a good quality of land". Later on he appears to have acquired some more land which are included in the khata of his son Gomti. He took only 9 bighas and 110 biswas less than his proper share, because these plots consisted of a good quality of land". (D) It was also held by the Revenue Officer that the plaintiff was not in possession of any portion of the suit land. The matter was, however, taken up in appeal and during the pendency of the appeal an agreement signed by Gomti, Parmeshwar and Jagannath was entered into to refer the matter to arbitration. By the 'arbitration agreement' dated 8-6-1944 they voluntarily appointed Ram Sunder anfli Ram Kumar sons Chhatradhari, Bindeshwari son of Sadhu and Ram Partial son of Shiv Jatan as Punches and Brij Kishore Lal son of Kamta Prasad for settlement of their dispute. The relevant portion of the 'arbitration agreement' is quoted below : "........PANCH VA SARPANCH HAM ARE MUKADMAt COMMISSIONARY ME DAYAR HAI PAIROKARI KARE WAH FANSLA KAR DAYEE WAH HAM LOGON KO MANZUR HAI IS WASTE KARARNAMA LIKHA DIHAI WAETA PER RAM AWE..." The arbitrators gave an award the same day i.e. 8-6-1944. The award reads as below : Nishani Angutha Jagannath Sd- Parmesh Ram. "Hum Panchan ko dono Pharakccn ne Panoh apnl Zamin ke ghagrhe ke phaisley ke liye mukarrar kiya hal jiska ekrarnama bhi kiya hai, lihaza hum Panchan Sab sun Samajh kar ek raay bo kar Phaisla karte hain ki jo aaroji ka Dawa Dafa 59 me Gomti ne kiya hai us mein uska Tihawa htssa hat- Appeal ki Gomti Palravi na karen wah khariz ho Maal Guzari ka htsaab Cbukta wa Bebah ho gaya hai Gamti apna naam kagaz mein Charwa ley, Mukadmein ka kharcha apna apna bardasta karen. Phaisla sunaya gaya. Sd-Ram Kumar, Sd-Ram Sunder Sd-Bindesbwari, Sd- Ram Partal Sd- Brij Kishore. Dated 8-6-44 (E) In 1955 an application was moved by Gomti under section 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act in the Court of Tehsildar. Meja, Allahabad. There in that case a compromise application was filed on 24-1-1956. The compromise application was jointly signed by Gomti, Parmeshwar, Jagannath, Hinch Lal and Hira Lal. Dated 8-6-44 (E) In 1955 an application was moved by Gomti under section 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act in the Court of Tehsildar. Meja, Allahabad. There in that case a compromise application was filed on 24-1-1956. The compromise application was jointly signed by Gomti, Parmeshwar, Jagannath, Hinch Lal and Hira Lal. The contents: of the compromise application being relevant for the purposes of discussion of the submission made at the Bar, are quoted below (Mukadma haza me gujaris hai ke arajiyat sehat talab paida Karwa Shiv Narain maris ala ka hai Aur ferikan unhe ke waris hai. Arajiyat sehat talab me se Aaraji number 610-3 bigha 18 biswa par tanaha kabza dakhal Parmeshwar wa Jagannath ke bai, (Gomti Sayal ka nehi hai). Aur na is number se Gomti se koi taluk kai. Bakia numbaron me se 29 bigha 3 biswa par alag ajrua batoara khangi kabja wa dakhal Gomti Sayal ka hai aur kisi ka nahi hai. Lihaja sulahnama dakhll kar ke umidwar hai ke Gomti Sayal ka nam bhi Parmeshwar wagaira ke sath darj kiya jaje Farikon ko manjoor hai. (F) On the basis of the aforesaid application filed under section 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, Tehsildar appears to have passed an order on 30-3-1956 on the basis whereof the name of Gomti was entered in the revenue papers along with Parmeshwar, Jagannath, Hira Lal and Hinch Lal ; (G) On 30-5-1956 the petitioner Hira Lal filed a suit under section 229-B of the VP ZA and LR Act for a declaration of his rights challenging the correctness of the revenue entry in favour of the respondents no. 5 to 8. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. The decree of the trial court was maintained by the Additional Commissioner. But the suit abated under section 5 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act at the second appellate stage before the Board of Revenue due to commencement of consolidation operation in the village as a result of Notification issued under section 4(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act; (H) On the publication of statement of principles two sets of objections were filed; one by Chauharja Prasad son of Kunj Behari claiming 1/3rd share in the khata in dispute and the other by Chhote Lal, Jagannath, Hinch Lal and Hira Lal challenging the right, title and interest of the respondents no. 5 to 8 in the land in dispute on the same very ground on which their predecessors had contested the suit filed by Gomti under section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. They also opposed the claim of Chauharja Prasad on the ground that he had become 'Sadhu' and abandoned his right, title and interest in the property; (I) The respondents no. 5 to 8 fled a written statement contesting the objections filed against them by the petitioners and respondent no. 9 claiming 1/3rd share in the land in dispute on the ground that it was ancestral. The Consolidation Officer allowed the objection filed by Chauharja Prasad and dismissed the one filed by the petitioners and respondent no. 9 and upheld the claim of the respondents nos. 5 to 8 in the land in dispute. The petitioners as also the respondent Chhote Lal went up in appeal separately. Both the appeals were dismissed by Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation vide order dated 2-2-1980. Chhote Lal respondent no. 9 preferred no revision and acquiesced to the order passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation Petitioners went up in revision which was dismissed by the Joint Director of Consolidation vide order dated 28-8-1980. Aggrieved the petitioners have come to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution However, during the course of argument, the petitioners' learned counsel accepted the impugned judgments in so far as these are in favour of respondent Chauharja Prasad and advanced no argument as against him. I have heard Sri R.N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 3. Sri R.N. Singh urged that the judgment and decree dated 12-2-1944 would operate as res-judicata and that neither the arbitration award dated 8-6-1944 nor the order dated 3-3-1956 passed by the Tehsildar on the basis of compromise dated 24-1-1956 in proceeding under Section 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901, could obliterate the binding efficacy of the judgment and decree dated 14-2-1944 passed in respect of the land in dispute in the suit under section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. According to Sri R.N. Singh arbitration award dated 8-6-1944 purport and operates to create and declare right title and interest in immovable property of the value exceeding one hundred rupees and as such proceeds the argument, it was compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act and being unregistered it was inadmissible in evidence and the consolidation authorities erred in law in placing reliance upon it being inadmissible in evidence. Learned counsel for the petitioners further urged that the document, viz arbitration award dated 8-6-1944 is a waste paper due to the reasons of the fact that it was never made the rule of the Court and the fact that the arbitration agreement was not signed by Hinch Lal and Hira Lal. As regards the compromise dated 24-1-1956 on the basis whereof the order dated 3-3-1956 was passed by the Tehsildar, the learned counsel urged that the compromise application too was inadmissible in evidence as it was compulsorily registrable within the meaning of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act in that it operates to extinguish the petitioner's interest in 29 bighas and 3 bigwas of the land and created interest therein in favour of Gomti. the father of the contesting respondents. It was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the compromise and the admission made therein as to as central nature of the land in dispute were irrelevant and inadmissible in title proceeding under section 9-A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents refuted the above submissions and urged that the impugned judgments do not call for any interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. I shall first deal with the question as to admissibility, effect and validity of the award dated 8-6-1944. Section 2(a) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 defines "arbitration agreement" to mean a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not Section 2(b) of the said Act defines 'award' to mean an arbitration award. It is a settled law that to constitute an arbitration agreement in writing it is not necessary that it should be signed by the parties. It is sufficient if the terms are reduced to writing and the agreement of the parties thereto is established. It is a settled law that to constitute an arbitration agreement in writing it is not necessary that it should be signed by the parties. It is sufficient if the terms are reduced to writing and the agreement of the parties thereto is established. For authority on the point one may refer to Jugal Kishore v. Gool Bai, AIR 1955 SC 812 and Vanarasi Das v Cane Commissioner, U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1417 . On the facts found in the present case it cannot be said that Hinch Lal and Hira Lal were not patties to the arbitration agreement. The fact that the arbitration agreement was not signed by them would not vitiate the arbitration agreement which was admittedly signed by their elder brother Jagannath. Acting on the authority of the arbitration agreement the arbitrators gave award on 8-6-1944 which was never challenged by Hira Lal and Hinch Lal. Contrary to it they appeared before the tehsildar and admitted the claim of Gomti in the proceedings for correction of papers under section 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. The name of Gomti was entered in the revenue papers pursuant to the order of the Tehsildar dated 3-3-1956 and even thereafter Hinch Lal and Hira Lal remain quiet for a long time and it was only on 30-5-1968 that one of them, viz Hira Lal instituted a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. ZA and LR Act for declaration of his right, challenging the right, title and interest of the contesting respondents Raj Narain and others. It was on the basis of these facts that the joint Director of Consolidation and in my opinion rightly, came to the conclusion that Hinch Lal and Hira Lal did have the knowledge of the arbitration agreement and therefore, they would be deemed to have given their consent/agreement to the arbitration agreement through their brother Jagannath. The petitioners cannot be allowed to wriggle out of the arbitration agreement and the award dated 8-6-1944 on the ground that the arbitration agreement was not specifically signed by Hinch Lal and Hira Lal. The view taken by the Joint Director of Consolidation in this regard does not, in my opinion, suffer from any illegality or perversity. 5. The petitioners cannot be allowed to wriggle out of the arbitration agreement and the award dated 8-6-1944 on the ground that the arbitration agreement was not specifically signed by Hinch Lal and Hira Lal. The view taken by the Joint Director of Consolidation in this regard does not, in my opinion, suffer from any illegality or perversity. 5. Coining now to the question that the award was not made the rules of the Court and therefore, it is a waste paper, as urged by Sri R. N Singh I am of the opinion that this point too is concluded by the authorities of the Supreme Court as also of this Court. The award is in fact a decision of the arbitrator who on consideration of the respective contentions of the parties forms an opinion and puts the same in the form of a decision which is called award 6. In Bhajahari Saha Banikya v. Behari Lal Basak, (1909) ILR 33 Cal. 881 at page 898 it has been held as under : "The award is. in fact, a final adjudication of court of the parties' own choice, and until imp-ached upon sufficient grounds in an appropriate proceeding an award, which in on the face of it regular, is c inclusive upon the merits of the controversy submitted, unless possibly the parties have intended that the award shall not be final and conclusive......in realty, an award possesses all the elements of vitality even though it has not been formally enforced and it may be relied upon in a litigation between the parties relating to the same subject matter." Quoting with approval the aforesaid passage in its unreported decision in M/s. Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. v Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1962 (SC) decided on 11-10-1942 the Supreme Court has observed as under : "The true legal position in regard to the effect of an award is not in dispute It is well settled that as a general rule, all claims which are the subject-matter of a reference to arbitration merge in the award which is pronounced in the proceedings before the arbitrator and that after an award has been pronounced, the rights and liabilities of the parties in respect of the said claims can be determined only on the basis of the said award. After an award is pronounced, no action can be stated on the original claim which had been the subject-matter of the reference." Commenting upon the observation made by Mookerjee, J. in the case of Bhajahari Saha Banikya (supra), the: Supreme Court in its decision referred to above has observed that the conclusion arrived at by Mookerjee, J. "is based upon elementary principle that, as between the parties and their privies, an award is entitled to that respect which is due to judgment of a court of last resort." Relying upon the said decision in the case of Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. (Supra the Supreme Court [has held in Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar, AIR. 1970 SC 833, para 13 : "if the award is final and binding on the parties it can hardly be said that it is a waste paper unless it is made a rule of the Court." It plainly purports to or affects property within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. 7. In Kedar Nath v. Ambika Prasad and others a Division Bench of this Court has held as under ; "An arbitration award even though not made a rule of the court can be set up as defence to a suit, for to Hold otherwise, as has been seen, would be to treat the award as a mere waste paper, which is not the correct view to take." 8. In the face of the above authorities the argument of Sri R.N. Singh that the award having not been made a rule of the court was waste paper, cannot be countenanced. Coming now to the question as to whether the award was compulsorily registrable within the meaning of section 17 of the Registration Act, it would be useful to quote the section in so far as it is relevant for the purposes of the present case: "17. Documents of which registration is compulsory :- (1) The following documents shall be registered........................ ......namely : (a) ...................... Documents of which registration is compulsory :- (1) The following documents shall be registered........................ ......namely : (a) ...................... (b) other non testamentary instruments which purport to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in a present or in future, any right title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovavie property ; X X X X X X X X X X X X (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of section (1) applies to : X X X X (vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceedings ;" X X X X 9. The expression "of the value of one hundred rupees and upward*" occuring in clauses (b) and (e) of sub-section (1) stands omitted in relation to Uttar Pradesh by virtue of U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 w.e.f 1st January, 1977. In clause (vi) of sub section (2) the expression, "except a decree or order........suit or proceedings" was substituted for the words "and any award" by Central Amendment Act of 1929. 10. As regards the submission of Sri R.N. Singh as to the registrability and admissibility of the award dated 8-6-1944 under section 17(1)(b) and 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, I have the feeling that notwithstanding the substitution of the words "and any award" by the expression "except the suit or proceeding" from exemption clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of section 17 of the Act by section 10(1)(b) of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act XXI of 1929, it may be said that an award being a decision of a court of parties' own choice nothing in clauses (b) and (e) of sub-section (1) may apply to it In the case of Satish Kumar (supra) the Supreme Court has observed, though it refrained itself from expressing a concluded opinion, that a decision of the arbitrator under section 16(2) of the Arbitration Act "may not be registrable" under section 17 of the Registration Act. The words "and any award" may have been found superfluous by the legislature Further there does not appear to be any distinction between a decision in the shape of an award and a decision under section 16(2) of the Arbitration Act. The words "and any award" may have been found superfluous by the legislature Further there does not appear to be any distinction between a decision in the shape of an award and a decision under section 16(2) of the Arbitration Act. In none of the decisions cited at the Bar the question was examined from the aforesaid point of view. But nevertheless it has been propounded by the Supreme Court and various High Courts that if the award creates or declares or extinguishes any right, title or interest in the immovable property of the value exceeding Rs. 100/- it requires registration under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. 1908 and further that in absence of registration it would not affect any immovable property comprised therein and shall not be received in evidence as a transaction affecting such property as contemplated by section 49 of the said Act. I feel bound by these pronouncements. However, It is also settled that if an award does not create or of its own force declane any interest in any immovable property then it would not come with the mischief sections 17 and 49 of the Registration Act and further that if the award is in the nature of a declaration of an existing fact then also it does not purport to create or declare by virtue of the award itself any right, title or interest In immovable property within the meaning of section 17(1)(b) of the Act. Further more, if an award comes within the purview of section 17(1)(b) and yet it is not registered, it may be received in evidence for collateral purposes See Usman Ali v. Sagarmal. AIR 1965 SC 1798 ; M. Ghelamayya v. M. Venkataratam. AIR 1972 SC 1121 ; Kashi Natsa v Narsingsa, AIR 1961 SC 1077 and Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1970 SC 833 . In the light of the above: authorities it may be examined as to whether the award dated 8-6-1944 comes within the purview of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. AIR 1972 SC 1121 ; Kashi Natsa v Narsingsa, AIR 1961 SC 1077 and Satish Kumar v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1970 SC 833 . In the light of the above: authorities it may be examined as to whether the award dated 8-6-1944 comes within the purview of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act. The expression "JO ARAJI KA DAWA DAFA 59 ME GOMTI NE KIYA HAI USME USKA TIHAWA HISSA HAI " occurring in the award dated 8-6-1944 may not amount to erection of right, title or interest in the immovable property but, in my opinion, it certainly purports or operates to declare right, title and interest of Gomti in the land which was the subject matter of the suit under Section 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. It was,, therefore, compulsorily registrable, as it is nobody's case that the value of the property was below Rs. 100/- and therefore in absence of registration it was inadmissible in evidence for any purpose affecting right, title or interest in the property in dispute, as contemplated by Section 49 of the Registration Act in the case of M. Chalamayya (supra) the award which was up for consideration before the Supreme Court contained recital to the effect that the arbitrators had themselves effected partition between 26-5-1952 and 30-5-1952 i.e. before the delivery of award in question in that case and It was in this back ground that the Supreme Court held that the partition of immovable properties having already been effected in about middle of 1952 and the parties having been in possession of tie land etc. which had been allotted to their shares since then, the recital in the award was no more than a mere reference to an existing fact. It was for this reason that the Supreme Court held in the above case that the award did not purport to create or declare of its own force, any right, title or interest in immovable property. In K.Y. Kabari v. N.B. Kabari, AIR 1961 SC 1077 also the division recorded by arbitrators in their award was already made by them. In the instant case, as noticed above, award dated 8-6-1944 its own force declared right, title and interest in favour of Gomti in immovable property. It is not a narration of transaction which took place in the time past. It cannot be regarded as a memorandum of a concluded transaction. In the instant case, as noticed above, award dated 8-6-1944 its own force declared right, title and interest in favour of Gomti in immovable property. It is not a narration of transaction which took place in the time past. It cannot be regarded as a memorandum of a concluded transaction. Accordingly I am of the view that the award was not receivable in evidence for the purposes specified in Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 but it was certainly admissible in evidence for the purposes of showing that the appeal against the decree dated 14-2-1944 was got dismissed as not pressed on the basis and in furtherance of the award which purpose, in my opinion, tantamount to a collateral transaction" within the meaning of the proviso to Section 49. In this view of the matter I am of the definite opinion that the award dated 8-6-1944 though not admissible in evidence as transaction affection immovable property was receivable in evidence for collateral purposes. As noticed above, I am further of the view that the appeal preferred against the decree dated 14-2-1944 having been dismissed as not pressed in pursuance and furtherance of the award, the judgment and decree dated 14-2-1944 would be deemed to have merged in the appellate order dismissing the appeal as not pressed. That being so the judgment dated 14-2-1944 lost its binding efficacy as res-judicate. 11. Coming now to the argument of Sri R.N. Singh as to the validity and relevancy of the compromise arrived at between the parties in proceeding for correction of papers under Section 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act before the concerned Tehsildar and its admissibility in evidence, it may be observed that the recital, "BAKIA NUMBRAN ME SE 29 BIGHAS 3 BISWAS PER AJARUE BANTWARE KHANGI SLAB/A VA DAKHAL GOMTI SHAYAL KA HAI AUR KSI KA NAHIN HAI", is nothing but recognition of an existing fact that is to say the fact of Gomti being In possession on the basis of family partition, a transaction which took place in the time past. The Question to be considered is as to whether the document, viz. compromise dated 24-1-1956 was registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, as urged by Sri R.N. Singh or it was not registrable being a, document of recognition of existing fact as urged by Sri Sankatha Rai. 12. The Question to be considered is as to whether the document, viz. compromise dated 24-1-1956 was registrable under Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, as urged by Sri R.N. Singh or it was not registrable being a, document of recognition of existing fact as urged by Sri Sankatha Rai. 12. A perusal of the judgment of the Joint Director of Consolidation goes to show that the compromise was taken by him as family settlement containing admission of the existing fact that the land in dispute except plot no. 610 area 3 bighas and 18 biswas was ancestral i.e. acquisition of Shiv Narain and that Gomti was in exclusive possession over an area of 29 bighas and 3 biswas on the basis of 'Bantwara Khangi' (private partition). In Tek Bahadur v Debi Singh, AIR 1966 SC 292 , the Supreme Court has laid down following proposition of law as to the conditions under which a family arrangement may require registration. The relevant observation made in para 12 of the report reads as below : "Family arrangement as such can be arrived at orally. Its terms may be recorded in writing as a memorandum of what had been agreed upon between the parties. The memorandum need not be prepared for the purpose of being used as a document on which future title of the parties be founded- It is usually prepared as a record of what had been agreed upon so that there be no hazy notions about it in future. It is only when the parties reduce the family arrangement in writing with the purpose of using that writing as proof of what they bad arranged and, where the arrangement is brought about by the: document as such, that the document would require registration as it is then that it would be a document of title declaring for future what rights in ghat properties the parties possess." 13. In Pullaiah v. Narasimhan, AIR 1966 SC 1836 it has been held by the Supreme Court that the family arrangement will need the registration only if it creates any interest in immovable property in present in favour of the parties mentioned therein and in case, however, no such interest is created, document will be valid despite it is unregistered and will not be hit by Section 17 of the Registration Act. 14. 14. In Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1976 SC 807 , Supreme Court has laid down following amongst other propositions of law as to the binding effect and essentials of family settlement : "It is well settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. IN such a case the memorandum itself does not cerate or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2)(sic) Section 7(1)(b) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, noli compulsorily registrable." It is clear from the language employed in the compromise application filed before the Tehsildar that family partition had already taken place before the petition was filed in the Court of Tehsildar for mutation of the name of Gomti, the father of the respondents no 5 to 8 in pursuance of the compromise Similar was the position in the case of Kala v Deputy Director of Consolidation (supra), wherein the compromise filed before the Assistant Collector 1st Class in a mutation proceeding was held to be family settlement admissible in evidence without registration Looked in the back ground of the case it is more than evident that the compromise petition was in the nature of memorandum of an earlier family arrangement which was reduced into writing and filed before the Mutation court for Its information for mutation correction of names in the revenue papers and therefore it was rightly used in evidence and the Consolidation Authorities, in my opinion, committed no error of law in relying upon the said document as a family arrangement final and binding on the parties even in absence of registration which, as discussed above, was not necessary. It may be observed that although the order dated 3-3-1956 passed by the Tehsildar has not been brought on the record of the writ petition but it was not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the application for correction of papers filed on behalf of Gomti under Section 33/39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act was decided in terms of compromise (Annexure-C.A.-8), and therefore the compromise became a part of the correction order dated 3-3-1956 and that being so the document viz compromise petition would be covered by exemption clause (vi) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act and this alone takes care of the objection raised by Sri R.N. Singh as to the admissibility of the document on the ground of non- registration. 15. The terms of the compromise, in the facts and circumstances of the case, were not proved to be unfair or unconscionable in any manner. The Consolidation authorities were justified in placing reliance upon the compromise which, in my opinion, was entered into between the parties evidencing a concluded transaction with a view to maintain peace and to bring about harmony in the family. This Court under Article 226 of the Constitution would not be justified in interfering with such a view concurrently taken by the Consolidation Authorities. 16. Sri R.N. Singh also tried to assail the impugned judgments of the Consolidation Authorities on the ground that the admission contained in the compromise petition filed before the Tehsildar being an admission made before the mutation court in correction of papers proceeding was not relevant and admissible in regular title proceeding giving rise to this writ petition. In support of his contention learned counsel placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in Bhure v. Peer Bux, 1973 AWR 279. The observation made by the Division Bench in the case of Bhure (supra) was, however, explained in a later Division Bench consisting of the same Honourable Judge (Hon. Satish Chandra, C.J. and Hon. Yashodanandan, J.) in Algoo v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1979 AWC 299 as below: "...For the petitioners, it was submitted that the consolidation courts. while deciding the question of title, ware not entitled to take into consideration the admission made In the compromise fifed before the Revenue Court in mutation proceedings In support, reliance was placed upon Bure v. Peer Bux, 1973 AWR 279. while deciding the question of title, ware not entitled to take into consideration the admission made In the compromise fifed before the Revenue Court in mutation proceedings In support, reliance was placed upon Bure v. Peer Bux, 1973 AWR 279. This case is not applicable In that case it was held ; 'Reliance was also placed upon an admission of the predecessors of the respondents in the mutation proceedings. It is well established that any consentor admission made in the mutation proceedings has no relevance is the regular title proceedings. Consequently, the alleged admission of Elahi Bux or Ali Bus is not admissible in the present title proceedings The Deputy Director was in error in spelling out an exclusive title in Bhure on the basis of these admissions". These observations are not applicable to a case where the compromise in mutation proceedings or an admission contained therein is sought to be utilised to show that a particular party was in possession at the time of the compromise or thereafter. The admission in the present case was with respect to the possession of the respondent. In mutation proceedings the court makes a direction as to mutation of names on the basis of possession. A finding given after contest or by consent of parties on the question of possession is within the jurisdiction of the court. Such a finding of admission would be relevant and material in subsequent title proceedings but on the question of possession at the time when tie compromise was entered into in mutation proceedings". The compromise petition contains an admission on the part of the petitioners to the effect that the land in dispute was acquired by common ancestor Shiv Narain and that Gomti, the father of the respondents no 5 too was in possession by way of family partition of an area of 29 bighas and 3 biswas out of the land in dispute It is settled that admission is the best evidence, as to the truth of the matters stated therein, against the parties making the admission and unless explained away or proved to be incorrect it is binding on the Dirties mailing the admission (See Narayan v. Gopal, AIR 1960 SC 100 and Ram Ji Deyawala and Sons (P) Ltd. v. Investment Import AIR 1981 SC 2001 . It may be observed that admissions duly proved are admissible in evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or mot and whether such party when appeared as witness was confronted with statements in case it made a statement contrary to these admissions (See Bharat Singh v. Bhagirathi, AIR 1966 SC 405 . In the instant case admission made by the Petitioners in the compromise petition filed before the Tehildar has not been proved to be incorrect nor has it been explained away It is true that an admission is not conclusive as to the truth of the matters stated therein but if the Consolidation Authorities have chosen to place reliance upon the admission made by the petitioners in the compromise petition, this Court ought not to interfere with the finding arrived at by the Consolidation Authorities on the basis of such evidence, for it too well settled that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is in the supervisory and not an appellate capacity. This court in a certiorari jurisdiction cannot reappraise the evidence and substitute the conclusion arrived at by the Consolidation Authorities by its own conclusion such a course is not permissible in view of a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court on the point. All that the High Court can do in a certiorari jurisdiction is to demolish the order of an inferior court or tribunal which it considers to be without jurisdiction or pulpably erroneous or perverse. The present is not a case warranting interference by this Court in its certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Consolidation Authorities have considered the entire evidence on record including oral evidence and the conduct of the parties evidenced by transaction leading to arbitration award and the order of the Tehsildar for correction of papers dated 3-3-1956. 17. In the light of the above discussion writ the petition looks merits and is accordingly dismissed with costs on parties. 18. The interim order stands discharged. Petition dismissed.