Judgment :- Srinivasan, J. This appeal arises out of an usual Hindu Law Suit, if we can use that expression, the meaning thereby a litigation initiated by the minor children of a Hindu father challenging the alienations effected by him on grounds of illegality and immorality. The unsuccessful plaintiffs in the court below are the appellants. The 5th plaintiff, is the with the 1st defendant. Plaintiffs 1,2 and 4 are the sons and the third plaintiffs is the daughter of the 5th plaintiff and the first defendant. At the time when the suit was filed, plaintiffs 1 to 4 were minors. Plaintiffs 1 to 3 have attained majority since then and have been now declared as major. The 4th plaintiffis nearing completion of 18 years. 2. The first defendant got items 1 to 19 in a family partition under Ex.A-1, dated 8. 1974. He was directed by the deed of partition to discharge debts to the tune of Rs.19,240,90. The first defendant got item 20 as heir to his sister Asupathi Ammal who got it under settlement deed dated 27. 1958 (Ex.B-33). The first defendant alienated almost all the properties between 15. 1975 and 6. 1979. The present suit was filed on 18. 1979. In the plaint, it was alleged that the first defendant was leading an immoral and wayward life and he was addicted to drink, gambling and other bad habits. It was stated that he was not attending to the family affairs and has squandered major portions of the family properties. It was also alleged that the properties was sold for inadequate consideration and the sale proceeds were utilised for illegal and immoral purposes of the 1st defendant. On that basis, the plaintiffs claimed 3/4th share in the suit properties besides provision for the maintenance of 3rd and 5th plaintiffs. 3. The first defendant remained ex parte as usual. The other defendants excepting the 9th defendant contested the suit. They have filed written statement challenging the plaint averments that the properties were joint family properties. The defendants contended that they were exclusive properties of the first defendant and he was not guilty of any of the bad habits alleged in plaint. It was also pleaded that the alienations were for adequate consideration’ and for binding necessities. They have filed written statement challenging the plaint averments that the properties were joint family properties. The defendants contended that they were exclusive properties of the first defendant and he was not guilty of any of the bad habits alleged in plaint. It was also pleaded that the alienations were for adequate consideration’ and for binding necessities. In short, the plea of the defendants is that the suit for partition is unsustainable and all the alienations are binding on the plaintiffs. A further plea was raised that the suit was not maintainable without a prayer for setting aside the alienation. Yet another plea was that the suit was not properly valued and adequate Court-fee has not been paid. .4. The trial court held that items 1 to 19 were joint family properties, but alienations were all for necessity and the proceeds went in discharge of antecedent debts as well as ancestral joint family debts. It was found that there was absolutely no evidence to prove .that the first defendant was addicted to bad habits. The trial court also found that item 20 belonged to the 1st defendant exclusively and the alienation of the said item was also for necessity. The trial court further held that the valuation of the suit was proper and adequate court-fees had been paid. The suit was dismissed with costs. 5. In the present appeal, the main contention of learned senior counsel for the appellants is that even in the written statements, it is admitted that the entire consideration was not utilised by the alienees directly for discharging the alleged debts and a major part of it was paid by them in cash to the 1st defendant. According to learned counsel, that shows that the 1st defendant had utilised the money for his own purposes and the evidence on record makes out that he was addicted to bad habits. Learned counsel contends that none of the alienations is binding on the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs should be given a share in the properties as prayed for by them. .6. Before taking upon the question of the binding nature of the alienations, we would discuss the maintainability of the suit without a prayer for setting aside the alienations as well as the valuation of the suit. .6. Before taking upon the question of the binding nature of the alienations, we would discuss the maintainability of the suit without a prayer for setting aside the alienations as well as the valuation of the suit. The sale deeds under Exs.B-22, B-1, B-6, B-10 and B-23 in the chronological order were executed by the first defendant for himself and as guardian of the minor children. In fact, in one of the documents, he has showed the minor daughter also as a party and he executed the sale deed as a guardian for her. There are five other documents under Exs.B-20, B-25, B-30, B-31 and B-27 which are executed by the 1st defendant alone. In so far as the documents in which the minor children are made parties, they are bound in law to pray for setting aside the same. Without such prayer, the suit is not sustainable in relation to those documents. The plaintiffs have also not paid the correct Court-fee on the plaint. They have chosen to affix the Court-fee under Sec.37(2) of the Court-fees Act. The trial court has erroneously thought that the plaintiffs are in joint possession and the Court-fee paid is adequate. Nowhere in the plaint, the plaintiffs allege that they are in joint possession with the defendants. There is no allegation in the plaint that the alienees under the various documents did not take possession. In fact, there is an allegation in the plaint that the plaintiffs were driven out of the family house. Some of the letters produced on the said of the plaintiffs show that the 5th plaintiff was living away from the 1st defendant with their children. Thus, there is ample evidence to show that the plaintiffs are not in joint possession. Even if the allegations on the plaint are taken without considering the evidence on record, it is clear that the plaintiffs cannot take shelter under Sec.37(2) of the Court-fees Act. They ought to have paid Court-fee under Sec.37(1) of the Act. They should have also prayed for setting aside the alienations. The law is well settled by a Full Bench of this Court in C.R.Ramaswami Ayyangar v. C.S.Rangachariar, I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 259:32 M.L.J. 477. 7. They ought to have paid Court-fee under Sec.37(1) of the Act. They should have also prayed for setting aside the alienations. The law is well settled by a Full Bench of this Court in C.R.Ramaswami Ayyangar v. C.S.Rangachariar, I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 259:32 M.L.J. 477. 7. Before proceeding to refer to the evidence on record on the question of illegality and immorality, it will be advantageous to quote a passage from the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in a similar case in Santhanavenugopala Krishnan v. K.V.Venugopal, (1976)2 M.L.J. 134 . The Division Bench observed: "When a minor institutes an action challenging the alienation made by his father or his ancestors on the ground that the debts were avyavharika in nature and that there was no legal necessity which would compel the manager, though he may be a father, to sell or alienate otherwise the properties it is for him to establish at least reasonably, that the circumstances and the position of the family were such that no occasion could have arisen for such a borrowing and that there was no necessity, - all, to alienate the properties at any particular or material point of time. The mere ipso dixit of the plaintiffs, as soon as he becomes a major basing his information on hearsay and gathering some witnesses who would parrot-like repeat what he wants them to say would not improve the position. Antecedent debt has a special signification. If the debts are incurred for paying off debts already in existence, then it will be normally understood as an occasion in which an antecedent debt is being discharged. It is, therefore, essential that in such connections wherein alienations are made so as to pay off antecedent debts in the sense of debts which are recited in a registered and old documents as existing debts of the family, the minor should be in a position to bring home to the court that there was no occasion or there could have been no occasion for the father-manager or any other manager of the joint family to involve himself in such entrepreneurship. For this purpose, he must be in a position to prove what would be the income from the joint family properties and after meeting the generality of expenses connected with the family, there could have been available surplus the existence of which cannot prompt a respectable person to borrow unnecessarily or to mortgage unnecessarily the family properties so as to ultimately burden them. The Supreme Court has laid down in uncamy terms that proof of such available surplus of a reasonable inference or acceptable materials that there is a possibility of such in available surplus, should be established so as to compel court of law to set aside an ancient or an old alienation on that ground that the recitals in the documents which created such alienations have to be ignored lightly and contemporaneously brushed aside as not binding on the challenging minor coparceners. Further in cases like this, it would be a practical impossibility for the alienee who is brought to the threshold of the court on the facts adversed by the minor challenging coparcener to prove that the consideration which passed/under one or other alienations made by the father-manager or the manager was rightfully or properly utilised by their vendors. It would be unreasonable to expect such meticulous proof of appropriation and treatment of such consideration nearly 15 or 20 years after the date of such alienation. We may also in passing refer to the decided cases making another general observation in cases like the one under consideration. It is the common feature in such cases that the father who is responsible for the litigation, who though’ is living with the minor, keeps himself safely outside the witness-box. He can easily be presumed to be a person who is encouraging this litigation as a sutradari. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the hand of the father is always there in this litigation and he just brings into the witness box his brother’s sons, minor children and others so as to gamble in litigation, by challenging his own alienations through them. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the hand of the father is always there in this litigation and he just brings into the witness box his brother’s sons, minor children and others so as to gamble in litigation, by challenging his own alienations through them. It is this conduct of the parents which is condemned in the following lines in Masit-Ullah v. Damodar Prasad 51 M.L.J. 792 The learned Law Lords state that: "The only sum that was left unaccounted for was Rs.2,000 odd, as found by the Subordinate Judge, Janki Prased, the plaintiffs father, admittedly received the whole consideration, and was the man who used the largest part of the money for the discharge, of the ancestral debts. He could have told in his evidence how the sum of Rs.2,000 was applied. There is no evidence that it was used for immoral or unauthorised purposes. His testimony was therefore most material in the case......Efforts were made to get him into the witness box, but he studiously avoided appearing in court." We shall now state the general principle which apply under such circumstances as was spoken to by the Privy Council and the other decision of the Supreme Court as well. In Jagannath v. Shri Nath, 66 M.L.J. 321. An old father alienated certain family properties and the sale deed was attested by the eldest members of the family. In a suit brought by the minors challenging such alienations, the Privy Council said that the attestors who were the eldest members of the family and who were intimately connected with it were in a better position than anyone else to say whether the money was applied for the necessary purposes of the family. They had allowed their children to figure as plaintiffs and got themselves impleaded as defendants. The suit was a collusive suit and the conduct of the elders afforded ample corroboration of the other evidence that the same was effected for necessary family purposes." A Division Bench of the Oudh High Court in Sant Baksh v. Lachman Prasad, I.L.R 1946 Oudh. They had allowed their children to figure as plaintiffs and got themselves impleaded as defendants. The suit was a collusive suit and the conduct of the elders afforded ample corroboration of the other evidence that the same was effected for necessary family purposes." A Division Bench of the Oudh High Court in Sant Baksh v. Lachman Prasad, I.L.R 1946 Oudh. 92, observed that: "Where the father executes a sale-deed by which he alienates joint family property to satisfy his previous liabilities and his son, on attaining majority, files a suit to set aside the sale deed on the ground that it was executed without any legal necessity in pleading the father as defendant and the father does not come forward to give evidence whether all or any of the debts borrowed by him were not for legal necessity, it must be held that the suit is a collusive suit filed at the instance of the father and the failure of the father to come into the witness box and to state the real facts raises a presumption against the plaintiff that the money must have been needed for legal necessity." (The italics is ours.) Finally, the Supreme Court in Doha Amrit Lal Nagji v. Doshi Jayantilal Jethalal, (1960)3 S.C.R. 842 , stated that: "Where ancestral property has been alienated either under a conveyance executed by the father in consideration of an antecedent debt, or in order to raise money to pay off an antecedent debt, or under a sale in execution of a decree for the father’s debt, the sons who challenge the allegation have to prove not only that the antecedent debts were immoral but also that the purchasers had notice that they were so tainted. In this respect no valid distinction can be made between mortgage and a purchase and the above principle will apply to a mortgage created by the father." Again the Supreme Court in Radha Krishnadas v. Kalluram, (1963)1 S.C.R 648 , stated that: "Where an alienation, by way of sale of the family property made by a Hindu father is challenged by his sons on the ground of want of legal necessity then it is now well established that what the alienee is required to establish his legal necessity for the transaction and that it is not necessary for him to show that every bit of the consideration which he advanced was actually applied for meeting family necessity. The reason is that the alienee can rarely have the means of controlling and directing the action application of the money paid or advanced by him unless he enters into the management, himself." It is, therefore, fairly clear that the challenges made by a minor in the matter of alienation whom or borrowing made by their elders including their father, cannot lightly be accepted by Courts unless the facts in each of those cases do satisfy the norms laid down by the various decisions cited above. "In the light of the above, it is for consideration, in the instant case whether the minors have proved that the debt challenged by them or the alienation questioned were in connection with antecedent debts which were immoral and whether the purchasers had notice of the inherent avyavaharike nature of such debts." 8. In the present case, there is no acceptable evidence on record to prove the alleged bad habits of the 1st defendant. P.W.1 is the 5th plaintiff, the wife of the 1st defendant. In her evidence, she says vaguely that the 1st defendant used to gamble and drink. She adds that the 1st defendant sold the properties and used the proceeds for drinking. 9. She refers to an incident, when according to her, she was beaten by the 1st defendant and she gave a complaint to the police. The copy of the F.I.R. has been marked as Ex.A-19. That complaint was made only in July, 1979, a month prior to the filing of the suit. It refers to an incident said to have taken place on 17. 1979. She has stated that she was taken to a private hospital and treated. The copy of the F.I.R. has been marked as Ex.A-19. That complaint was made only in July, 1979, a month prior to the filing of the suit. It refers to an incident said to have taken place on 17. 1979. She has stated that she was taken to a private hospital and treated. She also has stated that she was treated in Mayuram Hospital thereafter. In support of her case that she was treated in Mayuram Government Hospital, Exs. A-7 and A-8 have been produced. Ex. A-7 is a certificate issued by the Government Hospital, Mayuram on 9. 1981. That is after the institution of the suit. According to the said certificate, she was an inpatient in the hospital from 20.7.1979 to 27. 1979 and she was treated for multiple injuries. Ex. A-8 is the case sheet dated 27. 1979. One is not able to gather anything from Ex.A-8. Even assuming that she suffered from multiple injuries inJuly, 1979 and was in hospital, that by itself does not show that the 1st defendant was addicted to drink or bad habits. The incident, even according to the plaintiff, took place only in July, 1979 and all the alienations questioned in these proceedings were effected prior to that date. P.W.I claims that the yield from the family land would be 300 kalams after deducting the expenditure and the family would require 100 kalams for its needs. But, in the cross-examination, she has disclosed her ignorance on the aspect of the matter. She has stated that in 1977, paddy did not come to the house from the fields. According to her evidence when the family was joint the paddy did not come to the house and she adds that paddy which was realised was not sufficient for the entire family. She does not know as to where the lands are situated. She does not know about any of the alienations. She says that her husband used to play cards in her house, but she does not remember the persons with whom he used to play. She does not know anything about the debts. No doubt, she alleges that defendants 2 to 8 knew about the bad habits of the 1st defendant. Her evidence being interested without any support from any independent evidence cannot be accepted. She does not know anything about the debts. No doubt, she alleges that defendants 2 to 8 knew about the bad habits of the 1st defendant. Her evidence being interested without any support from any independent evidence cannot be accepted. She has produced some documents to show that there was estrangement between her and her husband in 1976 and 1977. The evidence adduced by the plaintiffs themselves makes out that they were living together and even according to her in 1979 a child was born. No doubt, that child is not made a party of the suit. 10. P.W.2 is a person who was living previously in Nangoor. He speaks only about the yield from the lands. According to him, kuruvai crop yield would be 20 kalams per mah and samba crop yield would be 15 kalams per mah. In the cross-examination, he pleads ignorance to several of the questions put by counsel. He does not say anything about the bad habits of the 1st defendant. .11. P.W.3 is the father of the 5th plaintiff. He produced Exs.A-9 to A-18 and makes a sweeping statement that those documents will disclose the reason for alienations effected by the 1st defendant. We have perused the documents and we do not find any reason given therein. They are all letters, some written by the 5th plaintiffs and some by others. In fact, some of the letters are not addressed to P.W.3. It is not known how he has produced the same. None of the letters refers to the bad habits of the 1st defendant. His oral evidence is of no use. He does not know personally whether the 1st defendant was addicted to bad habits. In fact, he says in cross-examination that even in 1972-73, the 1st defendant was drinking, and also having concubines. That is not the allegation made in the plaint or in the evidence by the 5th plaintiff. 12. P.W.4 is a relative of the 1st defendant. He claims to be an ognetic relation. According to him, the 5th plaintiff made a complaint to him that her husband had not behaved properly and he advised him. He says that when the 5th plaintiff came to her father’s house, he took her to her husband’s house and left her there. Even in the chief-examination, he says that he does not know personally about the relatives of the first defendant. He says that when the 5th plaintiff came to her father’s house, he took her to her husband’s house and left her there. Even in the chief-examination, he says that he does not know personally about the relatives of the first defendant. If his claim that he is a relative of the 1st defendant is true, he must be knowing about the other relatives also. He does not know anything about the bad habits of the 1st defendant personally and he was only told about the same by P.W.I. Thus, his evidence is worthless. 13. The entire evidence adduced in the side of the plaintiff does not make out a case that the 1st defendant was addicted to drinks or any other bad habit. 14. We have already referred to the fact that in the family partition the first defendant was mulcted with a liability of Rs. 19,240.95. Soon after the partition, he started alienating the properties to discharge the debt, the first of the alienations is Ex.B-22 on 15. 1975. An extent of 351/2 cents of nanja lands shown as item 5 in the plaint ‘A’ Schedule was sold to the 3rd defendant for a sum of Rs.5,000. The recital in the document is that the amount was utilised for discharge of family debts. In the written statement, the third defendant-has stated that the amount was utilised to discharge the crop loan and sundry debts. The 3rd defendant’s brother has given evidence as D.W.4. He has spoken about the representation made by the 1st defendant. He has also stated that the 1st defendant was in debts and the entire sale consideration went in discharge of debts. There is no reason to disbelieve him. .15. Under Ex.B-1, dated 25. 1975, portions of items 1 to 3 makinga total of 1 acre were sold to the second defendant by the 1st defendant for himself and as guardian of the minor sons who are plaintiffs 1 and 2. The total consideration is Rs. 10,650: A sum of Rs.7,108.95 was paid directly by the purchaser under Exs.B-2 to B-5 in discharge of prior debts. A sum of Rs.2,500 was paid for payment of kist for Fasli 1384. A sum of Rs.8880. was paid to the Sub Registrar for discharge of sundry debts. The 2nd defendant has given evidence as D.W.I in support of his case. We see no reason to disbelieve him. A sum of Rs.2,500 was paid for payment of kist for Fasli 1384. A sum of Rs.8880. was paid to the Sub Registrar for discharge of sundry debts. The 2nd defendant has given evidence as D.W.I in support of his case. We see no reason to disbelieve him. Learned counsel’s contention that under this alienation, only a sum of Rs.7,108.95 went in discharge of debts and the remaining amount was paid in cash to the 1st defendant cannot be accepted. The recitals in the documents are very clear and the 2nd defendant’s evidence is also unshakable. Even if cash has been paid to the 1st defendant, that is also only for the purpose of discharging the debts. 16. Under Ex.B-6, dated 19. 1975, item 17 of an extent of 5 cents was sold to the 4th defendant by the first defendant for himself and as a guardian of the minor plaintiffs 1 to 3. There was a promissory note dated 7. 1974 marked as Ex.B-7 in favour of one Ramanathan. The was discharged and the endorsement that it was discharged on 19. 1975 is marked as Ex.B-8. The total consideration is Rs.2,500. A sum of Rs.855 went in discharge of Ex.B-7 and the remaining amount was paid in cash for discharging family debts. The brother of the 4th defendant has given evidence as D.W.2. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination so as to discredit his evidence. 17. On 12. 1975, the first defendant sold under Ex.B-20 items 13 and 14 of an extent of 25 cents to the 5th defendant. The consideration of Rs.1,800 is for discharge of family debts and for agricultural expenses. There was a promissory note dated 15. 1974 in Ex.B-21 in favour of one Ganeshan, the father of the purchaser. It was discharged by the said sale. The father of the 5th defendant was originally impleaded as a party. But, after the filing of the written statement, he was substituted by the present 5th defendant his son. The father has given evidence as D.W.3. There is nothing on record to discredit the same. 18. Under Ex.B-10, dated 4. 1976, the first defendant for himself and as guardian of plaintiffs 1 and 2 sold the remaining portions of items 1 to 3 an extent of 1 acre 4 cents to the 4th defendant for a sum of Rs. 12,168. There is nothing on record to discredit the same. 18. Under Ex.B-10, dated 4. 1976, the first defendant for himself and as guardian of plaintiffs 1 and 2 sold the remaining portions of items 1 to 3 an extent of 1 acre 4 cents to the 4th defendant for a sum of Rs. 12,168. There was an agreement before the sale under Ex.B-9, dated 23. 1976. A list of debts is attached to Ex.B-9. There are 10 items of debts. The total comes to Rs.12,051. All these debts were discharged by the sale consideration. Relevant documents have been marked as Exs. B-11 to B-19. No part of the consideration has been paid in cash to the 1st defendant. The brother of the 4th defendant has given evidence as D.W.2. There is nothing on record which would make us disbelieve his version. 19 Ex.B-23, dated 210. 1976 is the sale deed in which the 1st defendant for himself and as guardian of plaintiffs 1, 2 and 4 sold item 18, a punja land of an extent of 71/2 cents to the 6th defendant for Rs.4,000. The name of the 4th plaintiff is given as Sivakumaran in that document whereas the plaint describes him as Kumaran. A sum of Rs.1,500 went in discharge of a pro-note dated 211. 1974 marked as Ex.B-17. The endorsement of discharge is marked as Ex.B-24, dated 210. 1976. The balance amount of Rs.2,500 was paid before the Sub Registrar to the 1st defendant for discharge of debts and maintenance of the family. The brother of the purchaser has given evidence as D.W.5. His evidence is acceptable. 20. In Ex.B-25, dated 16. 1977. Items 15 and 16 punja lands of an extent of 47 cents were sold to the 6th defendant by the 1st defendant for a sum of Rs.3,000. Out of the said amount, a sum of Rs.500 was paid to the village Co-operative Agricultural Credit Society, Thiruvali under Ex.B-26, on 26. 1977. The balance is for discharge of sundry family debts. The brother of the purchaser has given evidence as D.W.5. We see no reason to disbelieve him. 21. Ex.B-30, dated 24. 1978 is a sale deed of items 6 to 12ofan extent of 69 cents of nanja lands which were sold to the 7th defendant by the 1st defendant for a sum of Rs.5,175. The brother of the purchaser has given evidence as D.W.5. We see no reason to disbelieve him. 21. Ex.B-30, dated 24. 1978 is a sale deed of items 6 to 12ofan extent of 69 cents of nanja lands which were sold to the 7th defendant by the 1st defendant for a sum of Rs.5,175. The recital is that the entire amount had been received on several occasions in driblets by the vendor for discharge of sundry debts and also repairing the family house. The purchaser has given evidence as D.W.7. The repair of the family house has also been spoken by D.W.9, the brother of the 1st defendant. We do not find any reason to disbelieve the evidence of D.Ws.7 and 9. 22. Under Ex.B-31 dated 18. 1978, the 1st defendant has sold item 20 of an extent of 331/2 cents to the 10th defendant. This property was settled on 27. 1958 under Ex.B-33 to Asupathi Ammal by her grandfather Vaithiyalinga Mudaliar. On her death, it devolved on the first defendant and his brother. The first defendant has sold his share under Ex.B-31 for a sum of Rs.4,000. This property is not one of the joint family properties and the plaintiffs cannot claim any share therein nor can they attack the alienation under Ex.B-31. Even otherwise, the document recites that it is for discharge of debts incurred by the 1st defendant including a decree debt. The decree was obtained by the brother D.W.9 in O.S.No.204 of 1978 on the file of the District Munsif, Sirkali. The said decree amount was paid to D.W.9 by the purchaser under Ex.B-32, dated 18. 1978. The purchaser has given evidence as D.W.8 and the brother of the 1st defendant has given evidence as D.W.9. The evidence of both of them is acceptable. 23. The last of the alienations challenged in this suit was on 6. 1979 under Ex.B-37 by the first defendant to the 8th defendant. An extent of 2 cents out of a total extent of 10 cents was sold under the document. It is item 19 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule. It also comprises a cattle shed. The consideration of Rs.4,000 is for family expenses, agricultural expenses and children’s educational expenses. There was a promissory note dated 1. 1975 marked as Ex.B-28, executed in favour of the purchaser by the 1st defendant for a sum of Rs.3,500. It is item 19 of the plaint ‘A’ schedule. It also comprises a cattle shed. The consideration of Rs.4,000 is for family expenses, agricultural expenses and children’s educational expenses. There was a promissory note dated 1. 1975 marked as Ex.B-28, executed in favour of the purchaser by the 1st defendant for a sum of Rs.3,500. Even in that promissory note, it is recited that the amount is borrowed for the purpose of family expenses, maintenance of children and to attend to the wife’s illness. The promissory note is of the year 1975. It is certainly an antecedent debt. There was an endorsement on 1. 1978 evidencing the payment of Rs. 1,200 towards the loan. That is marked as Ex.B-29. In discharge of the said debt, Ex.B-27 has been executed and it is binding on the plaintiffs. The husband of the purchaser has given evidence as D.W.6, D.W.9 also corroborates the evidence. We see no reason to disbelieve them. 24. Thus, the analysis of the entire evidence shows that the alienations were effected only for the purpose of discharge in antecedent debts incurred by the 1st defendant and ancestral family debts. The plaintiffs have failed to prove that the debts were incurred for illegal and immoral purposes. The alienations are binding on the plaintiffs. 25. The conclusion arrived at by the court below as regards the alienations is correct and we affirm the same. There is no merit in the appeal and it is dismissed. Having regard to the fact that the plaintiffs 1 to 4 were minors at the time of the institution of the suit, we think that there should be no order as to costs.