JUDGMENT A.R. Tiwari, J. Infecundity and infelicity in two Courts below have impleaded the plaintiffs to prefer this appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (For short 'the Code'), claiming subversion of the impugned decree and urging eviction on the grounds specified in section 12(1)(f) and (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act'), 2. The appeal is thus, directed against the judgment and decree, rendered by the Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Indore on 2.4.85 in C.R.A. No. 3-A/84, in affirmance of the judgment and decree passed by the Second Civil Judge class I1nd Indore on 27.10.80 in C.O,S. No.4-N73. 3. Admission was secured on the under-noted substantial question of law – "Whether on the fads and in the circumstances of the case, the Court below erred in law in holding that the plaintiffs had failed to make out a case for eviction on the ground specified in sections 12(1)(f) 'and (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act.?" 4. Adumbrated in brief, the facts are that the suit-House No. 144, Jawahar Marg, Indore was owned by Abdul Rashid. He was recorded as an owner in the records of the Municipal Corporation, Indore. Vide sale-deed dated 2.7.68 marked as Ex. pm-A, Abdul Rashid sold this house to Amarnath and Brij Kumar. The respondent -defendant executed a rent-note dated 27.9.71 marked as Ex. P/2-C evidencing that he became the tenant of these purchasers effective from 26.9.71. The accommodation consisting of one shop and room behind it was taken on monthly rent of Rs. 101/- from the aforesaid purchasers for the non-residential purposes i.e. for tailoring shop. After purchase, the house was mutated in the name of Amarnath and Brij Kumar as per the document marked as Ex.P/9-A. Later, the landlord of the respondent - tenant transferred this house to the appellants by a registered sale-deed, marked as Ex. P/7-A, on 18.11.71. This sale -deed contains a recital that the tenant had been asked to accept the purchasers as his new landlord. A notice marked as Ex. P/2 was forwarded by the appellant to the respondent on 10.7.72 on 19.1.73 the appellant filed the suit against the respondent for eviction on the grounds specified in section 12(1)(a), 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f) of the Act and also claimed from 18.11.71 the rent and mesne-profits. at the rate of Rs. 101/- per month. A notice marked as Ex. P/2 was forwarded by the appellant to the respondent on 10.7.72 on 19.1.73 the appellant filed the suit against the respondent for eviction on the grounds specified in section 12(1)(a), 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f) of the Act and also claimed from 18.11.71 the rent and mesne-profits. at the rate of Rs. 101/- per month. The respondent-tenant denied the contentions and disclaimed the title of the appellant the ground that the aforesaid Amamath and Brij Kumar themselves had no such title to convey it. It was caegorically asserted that the real owner was Smt. Munavvar Begum, the mother of the respondent and she had intended that the respondent shall be the owner of this house. It was pleaded that Abdul Rashid was not the real owner and he was the Benamidar for Munavvar Begum and the respondent. It was, therefore, asserted that the respondent was in occupation of the house as owners thereof. The derivative title of appellants was denied on the ground that sellers, who were accepted as landlords-owners on execution of rent-note, themselves had no title. The grounds of eviction were also disputed. The mother of the respondent Smt. Munavvar Begum filed an application under O.32, R.15 of the Code in the trial Court un 20.2.72 for appointing her as guardian- ad-litem of the defendant-respondent on the ground that the respondent-her son-was mentally infirm due to deafness and dumbness and was thus, incapable of protection his interest. After recording of evidence on this aspect, the trial Court rejected this plea, and held that the respondent was capable of forming rational judgment and knew the difference between good and bad, and as such was capable of protecting his interests. This order of the trial Court was challenged in this Court in Civil Revision No, 478/74. The revision was, however, dismissed by order dated 6.3.75 and the order of the trial Court was uphold. 5. It is seen that the trial Court framed a number of issues. Some of the issues inter alia on translation in English Language, are unreduced hereunder:- 1. Whether the respondent was tenant in the disputed accommodation of Amarnath and Brij Kumar. ? 2. Whether the respondent was or unsound mind at the time of executing the rent-note dated 27.9.71 ? 3. Whether Abdul Rashid had the right to alienate the suit- accommodation to Brij Kumar and Amarnath 4. Whether the respondent was tenant in the disputed accommodation of Amarnath and Brij Kumar. ? 2. Whether the respondent was or unsound mind at the time of executing the rent-note dated 27.9.71 ? 3. Whether Abdul Rashid had the right to alienate the suit- accommodation to Brij Kumar and Amarnath 4. Whether Brij Kumar and Amarnath sold the suit house to the appellant un 18.11.71 ? On scrutiny of evidential material, the allow said issues were answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondents However, the suit to the extent of eviction was dismissed by the trial Court. The trial Court, However, partly decreed the suit and ordered the respondent to pay rent to the appellant the at the rate of Rs. 101/- p.m. from 18-11-71. 6. Both the parties felt aggrieved by this judgment and decree. The respondent preferred cross objection under Or. 41, R.22 of the Code against that part of the decree by which he was ordered to pay the rent on the linchpin of the unfavourable finding on issues Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 as noted above. The Lower Appellate Curt, However, dismissed the appeal as also the cross objection. The respondent, thereafter opted to be inactive against this decree as he neither filed any independent appeal nor cross-objections in this second Appeal against that part of the decree which was adverse to him. 7. It may be stated that the respondent continued to deposit the monthly rent in the trial Court. 8. I have heard Shri S.D, Sanghi, learned Senior counsel with Shri N.K. Sanghi for the appellants Shri R.G. Waghmare, learned Senior counsel with Shri Ravi Waghmare, for the respondent and have also perused the records of the Courts below. 9. Shri Sanghi has submitted that the Courts below misdirected themselves in declining to pass the decree of eviction atleast under sections 12 (1) (e) and 12 (1) (f) of the Act. He vehemently urged that the decree Exvoto would have been the inbred consequence on the basis of the proved facts, He therefore, the correct that the conclusion reached or inference drawn without following the correct principles of law, was liable to be disturbed. Shri Waghware on the other hand, submitted that the Courts below erroneously hade the relationship of the landlord and tenant as established and prayed for the dislodgement of the same. Shri Waghware on the other hand, submitted that the Courts below erroneously hade the relationship of the landlord and tenant as established and prayed for the dislodgement of the same. He, however, very fairly and frankly conceded the decree of eviction was inevitable and inescapable in case adverse conclusions were not held liable to be demolished and sis lodged. 10. The live issue thus, is whether conclusion about relationship of landlord and tenant was capable of being incinerated ad this stage and in this manner? 11. Shri Waghmare strencoustly took me through ocular and documentary evidence, with poignant punctuation of attendant circumstances, prodigious in number, in an urge to demonstrate the debility in conclusions affection the respondent. To cagelogue, he pressed into service for my consideration following aspects specifically and contended that this is how the suit was liable to fail in toto --- (a) The tenancy is not cogently and convincingly established. Ex. P/2-C indicated the presence of two attesting witnesses, but none of them was examined. The statement of DW-3 Munavvar Begum in para 5 that Abdul Jabbar (respondent) was inducted as a tenant by Amarnath (transfer) is not sufficient to conclude about the existence of tenancy. The statement of Amarnath (PW-2) is equally insufficient inconsequential. (b) The respondent was shown to be deaf and dumb and was thus, incapable of understanding the true nature of the transaction. He was not mentally fit to execute the rent-note. As such, no liability as tenant can be fastened on the respondent. (c) The conclusion about the tenancy is thus, erroneous and vitiated and deserves to be demolished. XXX XXX XXX 12. On bestowal of my anxious consideration, I find that conclusion arc not subvertible. The weird of the exercise is thus, one of the futility and wherret of law fittingly falls due to feiters fixed by the undernoted factors operations as insurmountable clog against such submissions. (a) The decree fixing the liability of payment of rent, was not assailed after upholding of the decree by the lower Appellate Court and thus it attained finality and operates as res- judicata'. In sum, nothing survived to lift the lambrequin thereafter. Retrojection was forbidden. (b) Even otherwise, adverse conclusion are findings of fact unamenable for interference under section 100 of the Code. (c) Moreover, impugned conclusions, adverse to respondent, on scrutiny, arc found to be neither infirm, nor perverse. In sum, nothing survived to lift the lambrequin thereafter. Retrojection was forbidden. (b) Even otherwise, adverse conclusion are findings of fact unamenable for interference under section 100 of the Code. (c) Moreover, impugned conclusions, adverse to respondent, on scrutiny, arc found to be neither infirm, nor perverse. The same arc thus, confirmed. 13. It is apt to notice even the provision of O.41, Rule 22(1) of the Code. It provides as under - "22. Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred separate appeal. – (1) Any respondent, though he may not only support the decree (but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour, and may also take any cross-objection) to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal, provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow. (Explanation. -- A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in .respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, not with standing that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent.) XXX XXX XXX Admittedly no objection was filed. Yet in order to do justice to the labour of learned counsel, I scrutinised the submissions in some detail and find that findings as summarised herein-after are legal, valid and tenable in law: 14. The stage is now set to indicate the facts as found proved by the Courts below on proper evaluation of evidence. It is noticed that both the Courts below have concurrently concluded as under :- (i) Abdul Rashid was the sole owner and possessed full rights to alienate the house. (ii) Amarna th and Brij Kumar acquired the suit accommodation by valid transfer effected by Abdul Rashid. (iii) The respondent executed rent-note and thus accepted Amarnath and the Brij Kumar as his landlords in fit mental condition. (ii) Amarna th and Brij Kumar acquired the suit accommodation by valid transfer effected by Abdul Rashid. (iii) The respondent executed rent-note and thus accepted Amarnath and the Brij Kumar as his landlords in fit mental condition. (iv) Amarnath and Brij Kumar later sold the house to the appellants plaintiffs on 18.11.71. (v) Consequently, the defence plea was rejectable and the respondent is the tenant of the appellants on a monthly rent of Rs.101/- p.m. fur nonresidential purposes. These conclusions of facts, supportable from evidence and sustainable in law, are held to be unimpeachable. I now proceed to examine the consequence, that should ensue un these facts, and limits of interference in such matters. 15. This Court, placing reliance on AIR 1973 SC 885 (Mandanlal Puri v. Sain Duss Berry) and on 1975 JLJ l (SC) (Mauulal v. Radhelal) indicated in 1991 JLJ 477 (Cyan Chand and others v. Balkishan and others), the scope of interfered under section 100 of the Code. The consideration is held to be permissible: (1) In cases -- Where material evidence was not considered. (2) In cases -- Where view was not the view which a reasonable man will take. (3) In cases -- Where correct principles of law were not applied in reaching the conclusion. 16. I shall keep these points in mind in appreciating the controversy. I proceed to examine first the ground specified in section 12(1)(c) of the Act. It reads as under :- 12. Restriction on eviction of tenant. – (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following ground only namely :- (c) that the tenant or any person residing with him, has created a nuisance or has done any act which is incunsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the accommodation (or) which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord therein . 17. 17. The Divisional Bench of this Court held in AIR 1988 MP 225 = 1988 JLJ 693 (Balveersingh v. Kishalal) as under :- "In the result, we conclude that, in a case where there is a 'disclaimer' as explained herein above, mere 'disclaimer' is sufficient to constitute an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord in the accommodation constituting a ground for his eviction under S. 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, without further proof that the 'disclaimer' is likely to arrect his interest adversely and substantially. " XXX XXX XXX It is, thus, clear that mere 'disclaimer' is enough to attract the liability of ejectment under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act. 18. Two things stare in the face. One -- the plea or benami nature is impermissible in view of the impact of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act (45 of 1988), as clarified in AIR 1989 SC 1247 (Mithilesh Kumari and another v. Prem Behalri Khare). It was thus futile to contend that Abdul Rashid was benamidar and that title resided in the respondent To -- the title of the transferors, in whose favour the rent note was executed as proved, was not liable to be disputed at all, as forbidden by law and this act clearly constituted the actionable ‘disclaimer' and suffered inhibition by reason of doctrine of estoppel in terms of section 116 of the Evidence Act. The respondent thus emphatically, though not elvishly, did the "act which is inconsistent" with the "tenancy of the accommodating" in terms of rent-note and which affected "adversely and substantially the interest" of the appellants therein in terms of section 12.(1)(c) of the Act. 19. The law as to estoppel, as envisaged by section 116 of the Evidence Act, is a Statutory assimilation of equitable principles. This Court, on identical fact-situation, decided in 1976 MPWN 27 (Jagannuth v.Hustimaf) that in such cases the lessee was precluded from denying the title of transferor and thus derivative title of the transferee. It is held that- "The tenant-defendant in appeal contended that the suit house belonged to the Bohra Jamat anu the executants of the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent had no authority to convey title to the suit-house. This contention cannot be accepted. It is held that- "The tenant-defendant in appeal contended that the suit house belonged to the Bohra Jamat anu the executants of the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent had no authority to convey title to the suit-house. This contention cannot be accepted. The defendant-appellant taken on lease the house in question from and had executed a rent-note in favour of His Holiness Maulana Taher Saifuddin of Bohra Panchayat. The defendant is, therefore, estopped from contending that His Holiness had no authority to convey title to the suit house" XXX XXX XXX The implication was that if respondent could not have denied the title of his erstwhile landlords by virtue of inhibitions imposed by law, he could not question the title of appellant either without peril of evection. Further the Apex Court in AIR 1988 SC 1413 (Tej Bhan MAdan v. II Additional District lodge & others) succinctly illumined the path and held that- ''There can be a denial of the title of his landlord without the tenant renouncing his character as such where, for instance, he sets up a plea of justertili. The stance of the appellant against the third respondent's title was not on the ground of any infirmity or defect in the flow of title form Gopinath, but on the ground that the latter's vendor Mainavati herself had no title. The derivative title or the third -respondent is not denied on any ground other than on the one that the vendor, Gopinath to whom appellant had attorned had himself no title the implication of which is that if appellant could not have denied Gopinath's title by virtue of the inhibitions of the attornment, he could not question third-respondent's title either. Appellant did himself no service by this stand. It must. accordingly, be held on both the aspects contended by Shri Asthana that what appellant did, indeed, amounted to a denial of title and that appellant was predated from doing so on the general principles of estoppel between landlord and tenant. The principle, in its basic foundations, means no more than that under certain circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to approbate and reprobate." XXX XXX XXX 20. As the facts are not in dispute, orders on application filed under O. 41, Rule 27 of the Court moved by the appellants pressing consideration of reply Ex. P/14 to the notice Ex. P/12 are wholly unnecessary. As the facts are not in dispute, orders on application filed under O. 41, Rule 27 of the Court moved by the appellants pressing consideration of reply Ex. P/14 to the notice Ex. P/12 are wholly unnecessary. Evidently, the learned Lower Appellate Court grossly erred in ignoring the law and in sating that the denial was or derivative title simpliciter. In so doing, it was overlooked that the denial was of the title of transferors - landlords and it was thus, a complete renouncement of the status and character as a tenant by setting up the hostile title in self. This was apparently irremissibly and legally untenable as agreed the by the respondent as well. Para 9 of the impugned judgment may itself be reproduced-- " In the written statement defendant tenant has stated that Abdul Rashid his brother was not owner of the suit house and sale EX.P/8-A by him was void. Subsequent sale to the plaintiffs vide EX.P/7-A is also void. Plaintiffs are purchasers from Brij Kumar Amarnath. Defendant. has taken inducted into the tenancy by Brij Kumar, Amarnath Vide rent note Ex.P/2C therefore. plaintiffs title is derivative. In such a case defendant tenant had a right to challenge the title obtained by the plaintiff and to assert that no tenancy has been created. Therefore, by such a denial no ground of eviction u/s 12 (1) (c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act accrued in favour of the appellant and finding recorded by the Civil Judge is correct." 21. The concurrent findings of fad, irreversible and isochromatic as they are, when understood in the context of law, clinic the issue and thrasonically tilt the balance irretrievably in favour of the appellants. In these circumstances of the proved facts and position of law as applicable the denial of decree on the ground of section 12(1)(c) of the Act is obviously contrary to law. it is clear that the corrected principles of law were not applied. In this view of the position. I find that the oppugnation is teasingly teemless and it manifestly monographs the malignity. It is thus, not a case of impeccable or bonafide protest but is designed to anaesthetize the relationship qua erstwhile landlords This insignia of renunciation status as a tenant is impeachable. The dispute on domestic front cannot give licence for such a conduct towards third parties. I find that the oppugnation is teasingly teemless and it manifestly monographs the malignity. It is thus, not a case of impeccable or bonafide protest but is designed to anaesthetize the relationship qua erstwhile landlords This insignia of renunciation status as a tenant is impeachable. The dispute on domestic front cannot give licence for such a conduct towards third parties. Law claims its victim Justice is to be done according to law. 22. Ex. consequenti, it is held that the appellant have succeeded in making out the case of eviction on the ground specified in section 12(1) (C) of the Act. To this extent, the in1'crence drawn on proved facts is debilitated and deciduous and is liable to be reversed as being vitiated due to non-application correct principles of law as observed above. 23. This brings me to the scrutiny of the ground specified in :-- "it could 12(1)(f) of the Act. It is noticed from the impugned judgment (Para 10) that the claim was nagatived on the following fulcrum- a) The particulars of the need are not disclosed in the quit notice. b) The appellants are engaged in the business of motor body building. c) The appellants possessed no experience of the business as asserted. This is now the need, as set up and unfolded in evidence, was not held to be genuine and bonafide. 24. In 1983 MPRCJ 84 N (Smt. Ratnamela Devi v. Kalpananath), it was observed that – "It could not be disputed that if the plaintiff wanted to start a business, the law docs not require that he must prove that he has experience of that business, as it is clear that it is not provided that a person is not expected to start a business which he has not done earlier. It is apparent that the appellant could not acquire that experience of running the business before she could get the accommodation for starting the business and, therefore, and inference drawn from this fact that the requirement is not genuine, is not correct as it is not relevant for coming to the conclusion about genuine requirement." 25. It is, thus, luculent, that approach of the Courts below was contrary to law and inference was thus, consequently vitiated. The considerations were exfacie irrelevant. The law did not insist on disclosure of particulars in quit notice. The plaintiffs are three in number. It is, thus, luculent, that approach of the Courts below was contrary to law and inference was thus, consequently vitiated. The considerations were exfacie irrelevant. The law did not insist on disclosure of particulars in quit notice. The plaintiffs are three in number. It is not a case of whimsical or fanciful desire but proved case of felt-need. The respondent was unable to point out any infirmity in the statement of PW-3 Ibrahim. In fact the respondent offered no acceptable evidence in rebuttal. It was not urged that any expertise was needed for such a need. It rested on solid, subvention of proved facts. It emerges that truthful tale was truthfully told but was disbelieved on untenable points. 26. It is thus established that the view taken by the Courts below was not tenable in law. The approach, or say assumption, was infirm and led to manifest illegality and perversity. On proved facts and on correct application of law, it can be observed that the accommodation is required by the appellants bona fide for the purpose of starting business and there is no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of their own in their occupation at Indore for this purpose. 27. In sum, the ground was negatived in a slip shed manner on surmises and conjectures. The view was such which no Court, acting reasoi1ably and Judiciously, could have taken. It thus, merits reversal. It is not a case of mere assertion or desire. The respondent has not even deposed in Court in rebuttal of this contention. In the circumstances, the claim of eviction under section 12(1)(f) of the Act is also held to be established. 28. On analysis, grounds of eviction are thus, found to be established. Yet a word more. The position of law is well settled. The perversity, needs to be spurned in all forms. In the instant case, I have, in order to do justice between the parties, simply applied the correct principles of law to the proved facts. Lord Denning spoke about the role of a Judge as under -- "My root belief is that proper role of a judge, is to do justice between the parties before him. In the instant case, I have, in order to do justice between the parties, simply applied the correct principles of law to the proved facts. Lord Denning spoke about the role of a Judge as under -- "My root belief is that proper role of a judge, is to do justice between the parties before him. If there is any rule of law which impairs the doing of justice, then it is the province of the Judge to do all he legitimated can to avoid that rule or even to change it so as to do justice in the instant case before him." 29. Justice is thus the ultimate goal and law is only means to reach it. This is how law has always to be seen on talking terms with justice. The defence thus, found to be meretricious and apocryphal. The law requires that all concerned should act 'Collspirito' and 'con dilligenza' to ensure that legal justice does n0t become teasing illusion and promise of unreality. Final justice should not become futile promise. 30. In the result, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are hereby set aside. The suit of eviction is decreed on the grounds specified in section 12(1)(c) and 12(1)(f) of the Act with directions as under – (a) The respondent-defendant shall deliver the vacant possession or the suit-accommodation to the appellants-plaintiffs on or before 30.6.1993. (b) The respondent-defendant shall pay arrears of rent mesne-profits at the rate or Rs. 101/- p.m. from 18.11.71 to 17.3.93 subject to adjustment of such amount as may be deposited or paid in this behalf during the life of this litigation. (c) The respondent-defendant shall pay mesne-profits at the rate of Rs. 101/- p.m. from 18.3.93 till delivery of possession: 31. The compensation terms of section 12 (6)(b) of the Act is not payable because the decree is passed on the ground of section 12( 1)( c) of the Act as well. 32. This appeal thus, succeeds and is allowed in terms indicated above. 33. In the facts and circumstances of the case, resting on domestic tussel, I make no order as to costs and leave the parties to bear their own costs, as incurred, throughout. Let a decree be drawn up accordingly. 34. The record of the Courts below shall be returned.