D. P. MOHAPATRA, J. ( 1 ) THESE three cases are closely interlinked. The order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate, Bhubaneswar on 29-l2-1992 in which he disposed of Criminal Misc. Case Nos. 250, 251 and 252 of 1991, has been challenged in all the revision petitions. The opposite parties in all the cases are the same. In such circumstances with consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the three cases were heard together and they are being disposed of by this judgment. ( 2 ) SINCE the relevant facts and the contention raised in all the cases are similar for the sake of convenience facts are stated with reference to Criminal Revision No. 120 of 1993. In the said case the petitioner Padmanav Nath was the first party in the proceeding under S. 145, Criminal P. C. (Cr. P. C.) registered as Criminal Misc. Case No. 250 of 1991. Opposite party No. 2 Raghunath Sahu was cited as the second party in the proceeding and opposite party No. 1 Harish Chandra Buxi Patra was impleaded as co-second party on the application filed by him. On the report lodged by the first party with the local police, alleging apprehension of the breach of peace in respect of Ac 0. 115 decimals of land in plot No. 1629/2639 in Khata No. 302 at Nilakantha Nagar in Bhubaneswar town, a proceeding under S. 144, Cr. P. C. was initiated which was subsequently converted to one under S. 145, Cr. P. C. ( 3 ) THE gist of the case of the first party was that he has been in possession of the case land since about 36 years and had constructed a thatched house on it since 1953. In 1988 when the General Administration Department of the State Government threatened to demolish the structure, he filed the writ petition, O. J. C. No. 1873 of 1988 in the High Court, which was disposed of with the observation that the petitioner shall not be evicted from the land unless otherwise evicted. Thereafter when opposite party No. 2 threatened to demolish the structure in the case land on 12-4-91, he filed the petition on which the proceeding under S. 144, Cr. P. C. was initiated which was subsequently converted to one under S. 145, Cr. P. C. by order D/- 20-4-91. Thereafter when opposite party No. 2 threatened to demolish the structure in the case land on 12-4-91, he filed the petition on which the proceeding under S. 144, Cr. P. C. was initiated which was subsequently converted to one under S. 145, Cr. P. C. by order D/- 20-4-91. During pendency of the proceeding Sri Harish Chandra Buxi Patra intervened in the case stating that the case land has been leased out in his favour by the State Government in the General Administration Department and possession has been delivered to him. He was permitted to intervene in the case and to contest the claim of possession of the land by the first party. The gist of his case was that the opposite party No. 2, Raghunath Sahu was erroneously impleaded as second party in the proceeding on the misconception that he was a supporter of Harish Chandra Buxi Patra. The land in question belongs to General Administration Department and the said land bearing Plot No. 1629, Khata No. l176 area Ac 0,370 decimals in mouza Nilakanthnagar, Unit 17 was transferred to the intervenor under registered lease deed No. 2065 D/- 26-3-91 and since then he (intervenor) has been in possession by constructing a boundary wall on all sides except the western side. He has also constructed a thatched house towards the south-west corner of the land. At the time of delivery of possession the land was vacant and neither the first party nor any other person was in possession of it. ( 4 ) ON perusal of the order of the learned Magistrate, it appears that the contest was between the first party and the intervenor. Both the parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. On behalf of the first party (petitioner) two witnesses were examined, i. e. , Satrughana Nath and Laxmidhar Rout. The intervenor (opposite party No. 1) examined himself and Amar Prasad Mishra in support of his case. It is relevant to note here that the first party-petitioner did not examine himself as witness in support of his case. Certain documents were also filed on behalf of the parties. ( 5 ) BY the order D/ - 29-12-92 the learned Magistrate on assessing the oral and documentary evidence in the case held that the intervenor-opposite party No. 1 was in possession of the case land on the date of preliminary order. Certain documents were also filed on behalf of the parties. ( 5 ) BY the order D/ - 29-12-92 the learned Magistrate on assessing the oral and documentary evidence in the case held that the intervenor-opposite party No. 1 was in possession of the case land on the date of preliminary order. ( 6 ) THE thrust of the arguments of Sri Barik appearing for the petitioner was that in a proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. it is not open to the Magistrate to permit a third party to intervene in the proceeding and therefore Harish Chandra Buxi Patra should not have been permitted to intervene in the case to contest the claim of the first party. Sri Barik contended that this error has vitiated the proceeding and therefore the final order declaring possession of the intervenor over the case land is unsustainable. Sri Barik also contended that the learned Magistrate did not appreciate the evidence produced by the petitioner properly. ( 7 ) I will take up the legal contention raised by Sri Barik first: The relevant portion of the preliminary order passed on 26-4-91 is quoted hereunder :"a petition purportedly under S. 144 (2) of the Cr. P. C. which was moved by the Advocate for the petitioner, was forwarded to the I. I. C. , Kharvelartagar P. S. for enquiry and report vide this Court D. R. No. 99 / 19-4-9l for enquiry and report. The police has enquired into the matter and submitted his report vide No. 754/ dt. 20-4-91. Perused the said report. It appears from the said report that the disputed land located in Nilakanthanagar was identified by the petitioner but on the other hand the second party member who is the supporter of the lease holder Sri Harish Chandra Buxi Patra, the Minister Forest and Enviornment has already encroached a portion of land comprising about 60' x 90' on western side of the land of the petitioner and already taken over possession by constructing the boundary wall which have been demarcated by the R. I. G. A. Department on the strength of the lease granted to Sri Buxi Patra. As there is apprehension to breach of the peace the police has prayed for an order under S. 145, Cr. As there is apprehension to breach of the peace the police has prayed for an order under S. 145, Cr. P. C. On perusal of the police report, I am satisfied that there is apprehension to breach of the peace, which cannot be otherwise prevented than passing an order under S. 145, Cr. P. C. ( 8 ) FROM the preliminary order it is clear that the police report on the basis of which the proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. was initiated clearly stated that the intervenor Harish Chandra Buxi Patra was the lessee of the area 60'x 90'which was a part of the case land. It is also clear from the order that opposite party No. 2, Raghunath Sahu was cited as second party in the proceeding as a supporter of Harish Chandra Buxi Patra. In this factual backdrop it is to be seen whether the learned Magistrate committed any serious illegality or infirmity in permitting Harish Chandra Patra to intervene in and to contest the case. ( 9 ) SRI Barik placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of sukanti Jena v. Bijaya Kumar Champati, reported in 1991 (1) OLR 228 in which it was held that impleadment of third party is not permissible in a proceeding under Ss. 144 or 145, Cr. P. C. which is confined only to two parties, between whom there is dispute with regard to possession. The decision in that case was rendered solely relying on an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Raghunath Rout v. Kalia Gouda, reported in ILR (1976) Cuttack 598. This position is clear from the observation in the judgment quoted hereunder :". . . . . . . . . . . . Facts of the case need not be gone into and learned counsel on both sides agree that the sole question for decision in the case is whether in a proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. , a third party can be impleaded even though he is able to show that he has some interest in the property involved in the dispute. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Raghunath Rout v. Kalia Gouda, ILR 1976 Cut 598 has urged that such impleadment is not permissible in a proceeding under Ss. 144 or 145, Cr. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying on a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Raghunath Rout v. Kalia Gouda, ILR 1976 Cut 598 has urged that such impleadment is not permissible in a proceeding under Ss. 144 or 145, Cr. P. C. which is confirned only to two parties, between whom there is dispute with regard to possession. On a perusal of the aforesaid leading decision in the matter, I find that it supports the contention of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the parties has failed to place any authority in support of his contention that a third party can be impleaded in a proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P. C. "in the case of Raghunath Rout v. Kalia Gouda (supra) a Division Bench of this Court considering the question whether a person unnamed in the preliminary order can apply to be impleaded in the case held, inter alia, that a person interested who is not a person concerned in the dispute in the sense of being engaged therein, cannot subsequently apply after an enquiry has started to be brought into category of a person concerned in the dispute. If he was a person concerned in the dispute from the very beginning but failed to appear before the Magistrate within the time fixed by the notice, he would obviously be bound by the order having lost all chance of pleading his case. This Court further held that if the Magistrate in his preliminary order has designated some named persons and others generally without naming them, as parties and has directed issuance of notice, requiring all of them both named and unnamed persons to file written statements and affidavits, there will be no legal difficulty for anybody to seek to be impleaded and participate in the enquiry and to claim a declaration of possession in his favour. The discussion in the judgment relevant for the present purpose is extracted hereunder :". . . . . . . . . . THE Magistrate's, jurisdiction is limited to find out as to who of the parties concerned is in actual possession on the date of the preliminary order and to maintain that possession irrespective of title. The discussion in the judgment relevant for the present purpose is extracted hereunder :". . . . . . . . . . THE Magistrate's, jurisdiction is limited to find out as to who of the parties concerned is in actual possession on the date of the preliminary order and to maintain that possession irrespective of title. As is indicated by sub-section (5) his jurisdiction ceases as soon as the dispute likely to cause breach of peace ceases to exist and from that moment his jurisdiction to proceed further in the matter forthwith ends. Thus the jurisdiction commences when the Magistrate is first satisfied that (a) there is a dispute which is likely to cause breach of peace, (b) and that dispute concerns land and its possession and (c) that there are parties known or unknown concerned in that dispute and continues so long such dispute continues. Such satisfaction must be reached from Police report or other information which includes an application by a party before him before preliminary order is made. There is no scope at that stage for the Magistrate to enquire to find out if there are persons other than those appearing from police report or other information who are concerned in such dispute likely to cause breach of peace concerning the land. The word 'concerned' has been used in subsection (1), while the word 'interested' has been used in sub-section (5 ). The two words, therefore are not intended to carry the same import and have been obviously used in different senses in two different sub-sections. The 'word 'concerned' in sub-section (i) would mean 'engaged' in the dispute likely to cause breach of peace, while the expression 'person interested'in sub-section (5) would mean a person who may be interested in the dispute without being a potential trouble maker or who may be interested in the land without engaging himself in the dispute and is certainly a person other than the 'person concerned in such dispute' who has been required to attend. Such a'person interested' cannot be required by the Magistrate to attend his Court, file his written statement and affidavit and therefore cannot apply to be impleaded to participate in the enquiry under sub-section (4) to establish his possession. Such a'person interested' cannot be required by the Magistrate to attend his Court, file his written statement and affidavit and therefore cannot apply to be impleaded to participate in the enquiry under sub-section (4) to establish his possession. The obvious reason is that the Magistrate is not called upon under S. 145 Criminal P. C. to adjudicate upon abstract disputes unrelated to likelihood of breach of peace. Thus the legislature has advisedly kept a distinction between 'party so interested' in S. 145 (5), Criminal P. C. If that were not so, this distinction would be meaningless and the desired effect of that sub-section in depriving any other person interested 'from right of intervention in the proceeding would be lost, because the only 'right conferred on such' other person interested' under sub-section (5) is to show that no such dispute aforesaid exists or existed. A person interested who is not a person concerned in the dispute in the sense of being engaged therein cannot subsequently apply after an enquiry has started to be brought into the category of a person concerned in the dispute. If he was a person concerned in the dispute from the very beginning but failed to appear before the Magistrate within the time fixed by the notice, he would obviously be bound by the 145 order having lost all chance of pleading his case. The Magistrate while making his preliminary order decides who are to be impleaded as parties concerned in the dispute and then directs issue of notice to them. If he decides that a particular individual or a particular class of people are parties to the dispute likely to cause breach of peace, he so indicates it in the preliminary order, directs a copy of it to be served upon such person or persons and at least one copy of it to be published by affixture to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. The obvious purpose of sub-section (3) is not to confer a right of intervention on any person who is to come in but it merely regulates the issue and service of process generally and is not intended to serve the purpose of a general citation. The obvious purpose of sub-section (3) is not to confer a right of intervention on any person who is to come in but it merely regulates the issue and service of process generally and is not intended to serve the purpose of a general citation. The obvious object of publishing a copy of the notice at some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute is merely to obviate the possibility of direct summons being suppressed by manipulation or fraud or collusion of interested parties. Where, however, the preliminary order has indicated the parties concerned to be specified persons as well as others who may wish to come in, like A. B. and others v. C. D. and others, then any other person interested may intervene. That right he gets not by anything in sub-section (3) but by reason of a direct requirement incorporated in the preliminary order by the Magistrate. "this question was also considered in the case of Pradip Kumar Mangaraj ;. Pravat Chandra Ghosh, reported in 1990 (I) OLR 193 in which this Court considering the facts and circumstances of the case in the light of S. 145 (4), Cr. P. C. set aside the order allowing the third party to be impleaded as party in the proceeding. This Court observed that when a party has joint interest in lands with others and his share is not separated, he can sell his interest in the lands in question provided he holds the lands as tenant-in-common. The Court further held that in the facts and circumstances of the case the third party purchaser could not be said to have stepped into possession of the lands in question on account of the sale, as the share of the vendor was to be determined and no specific demarcated lands have been sold to them. This Court further held that in the proceeding under S. 145, Cr. P,c. a person who has right to possess cannot be considered, only persons, who are in actual physical possession of the lands or in other words who have their foot on the soil can successfully make a claim. ( 10 ) THE position is well settled that in passing an order under S. 145 (6), Cr. P,c. a person who has right to possess cannot be considered, only persons, who are in actual physical possession of the lands or in other words who have their foot on the soil can successfully make a claim. ( 10 ) THE position is well settled that in passing an order under S. 145 (6), Cr. P. C. the Magistrate does not purport to decide a party's title or right to possession of the land but expressly reserves that question to be decided in due course of law. The foundation of his jurisdiction is an apprehension of breach of the peace, and, with that object he makes a temporary order irrespective of the rights of the parties, which will have to be agitated and disposed of in the manner provided by law. The life of the said order is co-terminous with the passing of a decree by a Civil Court and the moment a Civil Court makes an order of eviction, it displaces the order of the Criminal Court. The orders are thus merely police orders and decide no question of title Bhinka v. Charan Singh. ( 11 ) IN view of the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Raghunath Rout v. Kalia Gouda (supra), it has also to be taken an accepted position that in a proceeding under S. 145 of Cr. P. C, only the parties concerned in the dispute are required to attend the Court and contest the case. But sub-section (5) of S. 145 provides that nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend or any other person interested from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed, and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his order passed under sub-section (1) of S. 145, Cr. P. C. Further, if in any order passed by the Magistrate under S. 145 (1) Cr. P. C. several persons are named or there is indication that in addition to the person named in the order there are others concerned in the dispute then it will be open to the person who is not named in the order to be impleaded in the case and contest it. P. C. several persons are named or there is indication that in addition to the person named in the order there are others concerned in the dispute then it will be open to the person who is not named in the order to be impleaded in the case and contest it. ( 12 ) TESTED on the touch-stone of the aforementioned principles, there is little scope for doubt that Harish Chandra Buxi Patra was not only named in the order dated 26-4-91 passed under Section 145 (1), but it is also clear that after execution of lease in his favour, possession of it had been delivered to him and he had constructed a boundary wall on all sides of the land (except the western side) and that the second party (opposite party No. 2) Raghu Nath Sahu was a supporter of his. Therefore, applying the ratio in Raghunath Rout's case (supra), Harish Chandra Buxi Patra is a person not merely interested in the land, but a person concerned with the dispute. In that view of the matter the learned Magistrate cannot he faulted for having permitted him to intervene in and contest the case. The contention raised by Sri Barik on this score is devoid of merit. ( 13 ) THE other contention raised by Sri Barik is that the evidence on record has not been properly assessed and appreciated by the learned Magistrate. I have carefully perused the order which is a fairly lengthy one. I find that the learned Magistrate has discussed in detail the oral and documentary evidence led by both the parties and has given cogent reasons for the findings recorded by him. The learned Magistrate on proper assessment of the evidence on record held, inter alia, that plot No. 1629 pertaining to Gabik Plot No. 46 is one plot with an area of Ac 0. 370 decimals and it has no fraction plot and there is no note of illegal possession in respect of it, that the petitioner-first party failed to establish that he had encroached upon the case land at any, point of time, particularly in June 1988 when unauthorised occupants of Nilakanthanagar were evicted and settled in Dumuduma village. Relying on the recent revenue records, documents, the learned Magistrate accepted the position that plot No. 1620/2639 and 1629 / 2639 do not exist and the only plot. Relying on the recent revenue records, documents, the learned Magistrate accepted the position that plot No. 1620/2639 and 1629 / 2639 do not exist and the only plot. i. e. Plot No. 1629 with an area of Ac 0. 370 decimals in Khata No. 1175 was duly recorded in favour of General Administration Department. No specific error in assessment of the evidence was brought to my notice by Sri Barik. Coming to the observation made by this Court in writ petitions filed by the petitioners in O. J. C. Nos. 1971, 1972 and 1973 of 1988, this Court left it open for the Estate Officer to consider if petitioners had occupied portions of the plot as alleged and if so satisf_ed then he will consider their request for allotment of alternative sites at Dumduma in accordance with the scheme of the Government. ( 14 ) ON careful consideration of the matter I do not find any serious illegality or infirmity in assessment of the evidence on record and in the findings recorded by the learned Magistrate. Therefore the contention of Sri Barik on this score also has to be negatived. ( 15 ) ON the foregoing discussions, the revision petitions being devoid of merit are dismissed. Petitions dismissed. .