R. K. ABICHANDANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner challenges the decision of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dt. 1/09/1983 in Revision Application No. TEN/ba/1344/82 and 1389/82 dismissing the Revision Application, which was preferred against the order of the Dy. Collector, Anand dt. 28-6-82 and allowing the Revision Application preferred by the landlord against he said order, which he had remanded the matter and holding that there was no need for the Dy. Collector to remand the matter because the purpose of the lease was of growing fruits in the land in question which attracted the provisions of s. 43a (1) (B) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act. 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ( 2 ) THE land in question admeasuring 1 acre and 12 gunthas of survey no. 350 is situated in village Valssan if Taluka: Anand, District: Kheda. The petitioner made an application under section 70 (b) of the act on 4-9-81 to the Tenancy Mamlatdar, Anand contending that there was a tenancy agreement between the landlord and the father of the petitioner in the year 1948 pursuant to which the land was being cultivated by the petitioners father and after his death, by the petitioner. It was contended that the petitioner was cultivating the land as a tenant on crop share basis since many years. The Mamlatdar and ALT by his order dt. 20-3-93 found that the petitioner had failed to prove his claim of tenancy and therefore, ordered his application to be filed. The appeal filed by the petitioner before the Dy. Collector setting aside the order of the Mamlatdar, remanded the matter by his order dt. 28-6-82. The order of remand made by the Dy. Collector was challenged by both parties before the Tribunal invoking its revisional jurisdiction. The Tribunal constructing the lease deed dt. 27-5-48 held that it was a lease for growing fruits bearing trees as well as for cultivation of crops. Finding that the purpose of the original lease was of growing Guava trees, the Tribunal resorted to the provision of S. 43a (1) (b) and relying upon the decision of this court in Shantilal Ratanji v. Mangubhai, reported in 10glr 500 held that any subsequent use for cultivation of the land which was originally granted for the purpose for growing fruits was wholly immaterial. It was held that in view of he settled legal position, there was no need for remanding the matter of the Mamlatdar as was done by the Dy. Collector. ( 3 ) FROM the material on record, it appears that in his application under section 70 (b) of the act, the petitioner had claimed to be a tenant of the disputed land. It was averred by him that he was cultivating the land on crop share basis after the death of his father, who earlier in the year 1948 was leased out the land under a lease agreement. According to the petitioner, he was cultivating the land since many years. It appears that for the first time before the Dy. Collector (Appeals), a contention was raised on behalf of the respondent landlord that Section 43a of the act was applicable to the present case. The question whether section 43a of the act was applicable was not raised before the Mamlatdar of the landlord. If the question as to the applicability of section 43a was raised before the Mamlatdar, then the petitioner would have led evidence to show that the original contract was departed from or that the purpose was revise. It could have been demonstrated before the Mamlatdar that the landlord had allowed cultivation of the land on crop share basis as was contended by the petitioner in his application. The Dy. Collector, realising this aspect, had directed that the matter be remanded since the question regarding applicability of section 43a was raised for the first time before that appellate forum. The Tribunal seems to have proceeded on the footing that once, if in the original lease, a certain purpose was indicated, it can never be changed thereafter. The Tribunal has overlooked the aspect that the original purpose can always be revised and the landlord may allow the tenant to cultivate the land for agricultural purpose, though originally the lease was for the purpose of growing fruit trees. Under section 43a (1) (b), it is inter alia provided that the provisions enumerated therein shall not apply to lease of land granted for growing of fruits. Under section 43a (1) (b), it is inter alia provided that the provisions enumerated therein shall not apply to lease of land granted for growing of fruits. Section 43a (1) (b) reads as follows:43a (1) The provisions of section 4b,8,9,9a,9b,9c,10,10a,14,16,17,17a, 17b,18,27,31 to 31d (both inclusive 32 to 32r (both inclusive) 43,63,63a,64 and 65 shall not apply to: (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) lease of land granted to any bodies or persons other than those mentioned in clause (a) for the cultivation of sugarcane or the growing of fruits or flowers or for the breeding of livestock. (c) xxx xxx xxxthis court in Shantilals case, while constructing the provisions of section 43a91) (b), has held that purpose of granting lease is a material factor of determining whether his exemption is attracted or not. The court found that the revenue tribunal in that case, had concentrated on these of the use and not on the purpose for which the lease was granted. It was held that if the object underlying section 43a was kept in mind, it was clear that the legislature contemplated a fixed factor being taking in account, namely the purpose for which the lease was granted. The subsequent use, if any for any other purpose would be wholly immaterial. The court held that even if the tenant changed the original user by cultivating some part, the purpose of letting would not change and therefore, the exemption would still be attracted if the land were found to have been let for the purpose of fruit growing. It will thus, be seen that this court in the case only laid down that the mere change of the original use by the tenant will not amount to change of the purpose of letting the land. Thus, if the landlord had leased the land only for the purpose of fruit growing, then the mere fact that the tenant may later on put it to other use will not change the purpose of the lease. This construction put on the provision of section 43a (1) (b) cannot be read so as to mean that the purpose of the lease cannot be changed or revises. It may well happen that the landlord who may have leased the land for the purpose of the lease by allowing other cultivation. The parties to the lease may mutually vary the terms of the lease. It may well happen that the landlord who may have leased the land for the purpose of the lease by allowing other cultivation. The parties to the lease may mutually vary the terms of the lease. Thus, though a tenant cannot unilaterally change the purpose of the lease by mere changing the use, the landlord can always allow the tenant to cultivate the land for other agricultural purpose after it was originally leased out for the purpose of fruit growing. Such revision of the purpose for which the land was originally let or the enlargement of the purpose can even be gathered from the conduct of the parties. All these facts have to be ascertained by the fact finding authority, when it is pleaded that the purpose of the lease was enlarged and that the land which was originally leased for fruit growing was allowed by the landlord to be cultivated by the tenant on crop share basis. The Tribunal has, therefore, not properly constructed the decision of the court in Shantilals case and has erroneously applied the same for coming to the conclusion that the remand order made by the Dy. Collector for ascertaining true facts on the new plea raised by the landlord under section 43a (1), was not necessary to be made. The Tribunal has clearly erred in exercise of its jurisdiction in interfering with the order of remand which was thoroughly justified in view of the fact that the respondent landlords have raised their plea under section 43a (1) (b) for the first time before the Dy. Collector and the petitioner had no opportunity to lead evidence before the Mamlatdar to show as to whether the original purpose was revised and whether the petitioner was allowed by the landlord to cultivate the land on crop share basis as was pleaded by the petitioner in his application under section 70 (b) of the act. In this view of the matter, the impugned decision of the Tribunal dated 1/09/1983 in Revision Application no. TEN/ba/1344/82, 1389/82 is hereby set aside and the order dt. 28-6-82 made by the Dy. Collector, Anand in Tenancy appeal no. 64/82 stands restored. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .