Honble N.L. TIBREWAL, J.—The plaintiff-Firm, a holder of Mining Lease of mineral sand-stone, has filed the present revision petition U/s. 115, CPC against the order dated December 22, 1990 of Additional District Judge, Dholpur, whereby the application filed by it under Order XXIII Rule, 3, C.P.C was dismissed. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the matter, a narration of necessary facts is given. The plaintiff filed a civil suit for declaration and permanent injunction on October 29, 1980 against the State of Rajasthan and other officers of Mining Department, the non-petitioners in the present revision petition. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the Firm was entitled to get third renewal of the existing mining lease for 10 years from 1.05.1980 to 30.04.1990, and also permanent injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing it from the lease area of 77.36 sq. miles situated at Bareli, Tehsil Baseri, District Dholpur. 3. As per the plaintiffs case, the Firm was granted mining lease of Sand-stone mineral by the erstwhile Dholpur State for the whole of Dholpur State. Subsequently, the mining lease area was reduced to 96. 7 Sq. miles by the State of Rajasthan in the year 1955 and it was further reduced to 77.36 Sq. miles. According to the plaintiff, the Firm was having this area in its possession when the suit was filed and a patta was also executed between the parties for a period of 10 years from 1.5.1970 to 30.41980. This was second renewal of the mining lease. For the third renewal of the lease, the plaintiff submitted an application on October 25, 1970 to the Assistant Mining Engineer, Bari as required under Rule 8 (2) of the Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1977 (for short Mining Rules), this application was not decided before the expiry of the lease period, as such the lease period stood extended for further six months upto October 31, 1980. The plaintiff filed the suit for the reliefs as its application for the grant of third renewal of the lease was not decided by the defendants. 4. The defendants, in their joint statement, denied the averments made in the plaint, and pleaded inter-alia the circumstances and the unsatisfactory past performance of the plaintiff disentitling it to get the renewal of the mining lease. 4. The defendants, in their joint statement, denied the averments made in the plaint, and pleaded inter-alia the circumstances and the unsatisfactory past performance of the plaintiff disentitling it to get the renewal of the mining lease. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to get the renewal of mining lease for more than the prescribed area as per the Mining Rules. Various other legal objections were also taken. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, issues were framed by the trial Court on 22.2.1985. 5. On 5.05.1990, the plaintiff moved an application in the trial court purporting under O. XXIII, R. 3, C.P.C. with a prayer to record the compromise entered, into between the parties and to pass a decree in terms thereof. In the application, the plaintiff referred certain documents on the basis of which it was pleaded that there was a final agreement or a concluded contract between the parties. This application was vehemently opposed by the respondents on several grounds and the fact of a concluded agreement/ contract between the parties was, also denied. It was then pleaded that unless the terms of a compromise were embodied in an agreement in writing and signed by the parties, it could not be given effect to under the provisions of O. XXIII, R. 3, CPC. It was further stated that for a valid and lawful agreement, it should be in accordance with the provisions of the Mines & Mineral (Regulations of Development) Act, 1957, and the Mineral Rules of 1977 and that a formal deed under Art. 299(1) of the Constitution was also obligatory. 6. The learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments of the parties, dismissed the aforesaid application of the plaintiff, vide impugned order dated 22-12-1990. 7. Mr. B.L. Sharma learned counsel, appearing for the plaintiff-petitioner, in his usual perseverance contended that by a series of correspondence between the parties, there was a final agreement or a concluded contract whereby the entire controversy in the suit has been settled. Counsel argued, that once there is a concluded agreement between the parries and it is found genuine and lawful, the same has to be acted upon and in terms thereof, the suit has to be disposed of. The Court has no option but to record such agreement. Counsel argued, that once there is a concluded agreement between the parries and it is found genuine and lawful, the same has to be acted upon and in terms thereof, the suit has to be disposed of. The Court has no option but to record such agreement. On the question whether there was a concluded agreement or not, the learned counsel took me through several order-sheets from the file of the trial court and the letters which were exchanged between the parties. According to the learned counsel, the finding of the trial court that there was no concluded agreement between the parties was perverse and the same was based on mis-reading of documents. It was also urged that the Court erred in drawing an inference from various, order-sheets, that there was no, concluded agreement between the parties and that the plaintiff firm also did not accept at the relevant time that there was a concluded agreement on 27-2-1988. 8. Mr. B.P. Agarwal, learned Advocate General appearing for the non-petitioners on the other hand, stoutly controverted the above contentions. It was submitted by him that the application filed by the plaintiff under O. XXIII R.3 CPC on 5-5-1990 was wholly misconceived as there was neither a conclu-ded agreement on compromise between the parties, nor terms of the compromise were embodied in an agreement in writing and signed by the parties. It was contended that an agreement or a compromise cannot be acted upon under O. XXIII R. 3, C.P.C. unless it is in writing arid signed by the parties, Mr. Agarwal also contended that ihe suit was for the renewal of third term of the lease and this period has expired on 30-4-1990 as per the plaintiffs own, case, as such the suit has become infructuous, but still the plaintiff is operating the entire area of the Mining Lease under the garb of the stay order from the Court. It was then contended that on contract could be enforced against the State unless it was executed in the manner provided under Article 299(1) of the Constitution. According to Mr. Agarwal, simply because a contract is made by the State with a view to settle a legal dispute to which it is a party, it cannot be said, that such a contract is outside the purview of Article 299(1) and a compro-mise decree can be passed without its compliance. According to Mr. Agarwal, simply because a contract is made by the State with a view to settle a legal dispute to which it is a party, it cannot be said, that such a contract is outside the purview of Article 299(1) and a compro-mise decree can be passed without its compliance. It was submitted that com-pliance of Article 299(l) of the Constitution is mandatory even in a case of a compromise in a suit. Lastly, it was submitted that under the existing mining, rules, the plaintiff could be granted or renewed a mining lease for an area of 10 sq. kms. in maximum and the same has been granted to the plaintiff vide order No. F. 6(128) Khan (Gr. II/78) dated April 24, 1990. After this order no cause of action survived for the continuation of the suit. 9. I have given my careful consideration to the above submissions. I minutely perused the impugned order under challenge. The entire record of the case and the various documents, referred to have been minutely perused by me. 10. The first and the foremost question which arises for consideration in the revision is as regards to the construction of O. XXIII R.3, C.P.C. The question is whether a settlement of a compromise arrived at between the parties, should be reduced in writing and signed by the parties before giving effect to it under O. XXIII R. 3, C.P.C. The words in writing and signed by the parties, were added to O. XXIII R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Amendment Act of 1976. The statement of objects and reasons for the amendment were given in these terms: "Cl. 77-Sub,-cl. (iii). It is provided that an agreement or compromise under R. 3 should be in writing and signed by the parties. This is with a view to avoiding the setting up of oral agreements or compromises to delay the progress of the suit. The words lawful agreement or compromise in R. 3 have given rise to a conflict in the matter of interpretation. One view is that agreements which are voidable under S. 19A of the Contract Act are not excluded. While this stand is taken by the High Courts of Allahabad, Calcutta, Madras and Kerala, a contrary view has been expressed by the High Courts of Bombay and Nagpur. One view is that agreements which are voidable under S. 19A of the Contract Act are not excluded. While this stand is taken by the High Courts of Allahabad, Calcutta, Madras and Kerala, a contrary view has been expressed by the High Courts of Bombay and Nagpur. An Explanation has, therefore, been added to the rule to clarify the position. A proviso has been added to clarify that no adjournment should ordinarily be granted where a decision is necessary as to whether an adjustment or satisfaction has or has not been arrived at. In view of the words so far as it relates to the suit in R. 3, a question arises whether a decree which refers to the terms of a compromise in respect of matters beyond the scope of the suit is executable or whether the terms of the decree relating to the matters outside the suit can be enforced only by a separate suit. The amendment seeks to clarify the position." The amended provision contained in O. XXIII R. 3 of the Code provides:- "Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit. Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation:-An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." 11. Explanation:-An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." 11. The statement of objects and reasons indicates that the above amendment in O. XXIII R. 3, C.P.C. was intended to clarify that a compromise has to be in writing and signed by the parties to avoid delay which might arise from the uncertainties of oral agreement. The amendment has also clarified that the terms of a compromise are permitted to include all matters relating to the parties to the suit even if such matters fall outside the subject matter of the suit. The legislature has, thus, sought to attain a certainty and clarity to avoid delay in the progress of the suit on setting up of oral agreements and compromises. Prior to the amendment in the year 1976, an agreement compromising the suit could be in writing or oral and the Court was required to inquire whether or not such compromise had been effected. The whole object of the amendment by adding the words in writing and signed by the parties is to prevent false and frivolous pleas in a suit of having been adjusted wholly or in part by an agreement or compromise, with a view to protract or delay the proceedings. 12. In Gurpreet Singh vs. Chatur Bhuj Goel (1), their Lordships of the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the effect of adding the words "in writing and signed by the parties" to O. XXIII R. 3 C.P.C. by the Amendment Act of 1976. In that case, at the appellate stage, a statement was made by the appellants father, which was also endorsed by his counsel, by which an offer was given for the final settlement of the dispute on the terms and conditions expressed in the statement. The offer was accepted by the respondent and the offer and acceptance were made part of the proceedings of the Court. However, compromise was not reduced in writing and signed by the parties. Taking an advantage of this fact, the respondent resiled from the compromise on the next date. The offer was accepted by the respondent and the offer and acceptance were made part of the proceedings of the Court. However, compromise was not reduced in writing and signed by the parties. Taking an advantage of this fact, the respondent resiled from the compromise on the next date. The question, therefore arose for consideration as to whether the requirement, that the compromise should be in writing and signed by the parties was applicable even in a matter where the offer and acceptance were made by the parties orally in the court and the same were made a part of the proceedings. An argument was advanced before the Supreme Court that the words in writing and signed by the parties applied to an adjustment or settlement of the claim in a suit arrived at outside the Court only, meaning thereby where the parties made a statements in Court about the settlement of a claim on certain terms and the statements so made, formed part of the proceedings there was no legal requirement to have the agreement in writing embodying the terms of the compromise. But, this contention was rejected by the Court observing:- "Under R. 3 as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement between them. To constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in a decree. When the parties enter into a compromise during the hearing of a suit or appeal, there is no reason why the requirement that the compromise should be reduced in writing in the form of an instrument signed by the parties should be dispensed with. The court must therefore insist upon the parties to reduce the term into writing." 13. A contrary view taken by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Manohar Lal vs. Surjau Singh (2) was over-ruled in the above judgment. 14. Mr. B.L. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the basis of the decisions in Mohan Rai v. Jai Kishan (3), Union Bank of India v. Byaram Pestonji Gariwala & Ors. (4) and Byaram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & Ors. 14. Mr. B.L. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the basis of the decisions in Mohan Rai v. Jai Kishan (3), Union Bank of India v. Byaram Pestonji Gariwala & Ors. (4) and Byaram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India & Ors. (5), tried to convince that the words in writing and signed by the parties should be given liberal construction by the court so as to include a concluded agreement between the parties through correspondence even though the terms of the compromise were not embodied in an agreement in writing and signed by the parties. The argument on its face appears to be plausible but that is of no avail. Prior to the amendment in O. XXIII R. 3, C.P.C., an agreement compromising the suit could be oral or in writing and necessarily the Court was required to inquire whether such compromise was effected or not. As stated earlier the whole object of the amendment by adding the words in writing and signed by the parties is to avoid delay in the progress of the suit which may arise by the uncertainties of agreements which are not reduced in writing and signed by the parties. If the above arguments of Mr. Sharma is accepted, the very purpose of the amendment shall stand defeated. In the decisions relied upon by Mr. Sharma, while interpreting the words in writing and signed by the parties, it was held that the counsel representing the parties was competent to sign a compromise as a party can always act by his duly authorised representative. This view was taken on considering the traditional recognized role of a counsel in the common law system and the provisions contained in O. III R. 1 C.P.C. None of the aforesaid decisions supports the arguments of Mr. Sharma that the correspondence of the parties making out a concluded agreement could be given effect under O. XXIII R. 3, C.P.C. even though the terms of a compromise were not reduced in writing and signed by the parties. 15. Sharma that the correspondence of the parties making out a concluded agreement could be given effect under O. XXIII R. 3, C.P.C. even though the terms of a compromise were not reduced in writing and signed by the parties. 15. After having held that the so called agreement/settlement could not be given effect to under O. XXIII, R. 3, C.P.C. in the absence of its being reduced in writing and signed by parties, other questions raised by the learned counsel for the parties though are not necessary to be decided by me, but lengthy arguments were heard by me on those questions so I would like to deal them in brief. 16. Mr. Agarwals contention is that there was no concluded agreement/ settlement between the parties and the parties never intended to act upon the various correspondence, taking them as a completed contract. The trial Court, on considering all the facts and circumstances, has recorded a finding that there was no concluded agreement/settlement between the parties. Mr. Agarwal, learned Advocate General, reiterated those circumstances and facts in the course of his arguments in support of the above contention. 17. After considering all the circumstances and the correspondence exchanged between the parties, I am in full agreement with the trial court that on " facts also there was no concluded agreement/settlement between the parties and even the plaintiff did not take the correspondence to be a concluded agreement. The reasons are given in brief. 18. The suit was filed by the plaintiff on 29-10-1980 and the relief related to the third renewal of the mining lease for 10 years from 1-5-1980 to 30-4-1990. Issues were framed by the Court on 22-2-1985. Thereafter, there were negotiations between the parties to explore the possibility of a compromise as revealed from the various order-sheets. However, no compromise was arrived at and on 22-11-1985, the learned counsel for the defendants informed the court that no compromise had taken place between the parties. Hence, the court fixed 4-2-1986 for recording the plaintiffs evidence. Then, statement of PW 1 Inder-jeet was recorded on 22-7-1986. Statement of PW 2 Hukam Chand was recorded on 26-8-1986. On 4-9-1987 the statements of PW 3 Sant Kumar and PW 4 Kuldeep Singh were recorded and the plaintiffs counsel sought one more opportunity to produce the remaining witnesses. Hence, the court fixed 4-2-1986 for recording the plaintiffs evidence. Then, statement of PW 1 Inder-jeet was recorded on 22-7-1986. Statement of PW 2 Hukam Chand was recorded on 26-8-1986. On 4-9-1987 the statements of PW 3 Sant Kumar and PW 4 Kuldeep Singh were recorded and the plaintiffs counsel sought one more opportunity to produce the remaining witnesses. On the next date i.e. 7-10-1987, the statement of PW 5 Richpal Singh was recorded and the plaintiff closed its evidence reserving a right of evidence in rebuttal on issues No. 5 to 7. On 5-1-1988, the statement of DW 1 Babu Lal was recorded and the counsel for the parties sought along adjournment as they expected a compromise in the suit, hence, the next date was given 7-11-1988. Thereafter, the case was adjour-ned from time to time for recording the remaining evidence of the defendants. Lastly, on 6-11-1989 the statement of DW 3 Krishan Chand Goyal was recorded and the defendants closed their evidence. On this date an application under O. 39 R. 1 &2 read with S. 151, C.P.C. was moved by the plaintiff and time was also sought to lead evidence in rebuttal. Time was granted by the Court. Then, on 2-11-1989 an opportunity was given to the plaintiff to produce the evidence in rebuttal. On 6-2-1990, the statement of Sant Kumar was recorded in rebuttal. Again, after several adjournments in the case, the plaintiff moved an application on 28-4-1990 seeking an amendment in the plaint to incorporate the relief relating to the 4th and 5th renewal of the mining lease. However, this application was rejected by the trial court on 30-4-1990. While rejecting the application, the court had observed that the cause of action in the suit related to the third renewal of the mining lease from 1-5-1980 to 30-4-1990 and it has ended after the order of the State Government dated 24-4-1990. The order of the State Govt. dated 24-4-1990 was produced by the defendants in the court which shows that from 1-5-1980 to 30-4-1990 the State Government has granted third renewal of the mining lease for 10 Sq. Kms. on the terms and conditions laid down in the order. The order of the State Govt. dated 24-4-1990 was produced by the defendants in the court which shows that from 1-5-1980 to 30-4-1990 the State Government has granted third renewal of the mining lease for 10 Sq. Kms. on the terms and conditions laid down in the order. On 3.05.1990 an application was also moved by State Government stating that relief sought in the suit related to the period 1-5-1980 to 30-4-1990 and the said period has already expired, as such, the suit has become infructuous on this ground and on the ground of the order of State Government dated 24-4-1990 renewing the licence for the said period. It is noteworthy to mention that on 30-4-1990, while rejecting the plaintiffs application for the amendment of the plaint, the trial Court also observed that several opportunities were already given to the plaintiff to lead evidence in rebuttal and a last opportunity was being given to him. On 3.05.1990, which was fixed in the case, the trial court closed the right of the plaintiff to lead further evidence in rebuttal and the case was fixed on 5.5.1990 for final arguments. On this date, as stated earlier, the plaintiff moved the application under O. XXIII R. 3, C.P.C. 19. The above proceedings in the trial Court abundantly demonstrated that at no point of time it was the plaintiffs case that there was a concluded agreement between the parties on the basis of the letter dated 20.11.1987 by the Deputy Secretary (Mines) to the plaintiff and the letter of the plaintiff to the Deputy Secretary dated 27.2.1988. As stated earlier, had there been a concluded agreement or contract between the parties or the parties had accepted that there was a settlement on the subject matter of the suit by the above two letters, then the above proceedings in the trial court would not have taken place and the plaintiff would have requested the court on 27.2.1988 or just thereafter to record the compromise under O. XXIII R.3, C.P.C. The very fact that the plaintiff did not make any such request to the trial court till 5.5.1990 when the case was fixed for hearing final arguments, and the nature of the proceedings in the trial court which had taken place from 20.11.1987 to 5.51990 leave no doubt that the parties never accepted that there was a concluded agreement/settlement between the parties. This aspect of the matter was rightly considered by the trial Court when it held that there was no concluded agreement between the parties. 20. I have also considered the letters which were exchanged between the parties. Letter dated 20.11.1987 was written by Deputy Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan to the plaintiff firm detailing out the line of action identified in the meeting dated 5.10.1987 and the plaintiff was asked to communicate its written and clear consent within 15 days about accepting all the conditions mentioned in the letter so that further necessary action could be taken in the matter. One of the terms was that M/s. Dholpur Stone Company will withdraw all pending litigations relating to the lease in various courts of law, including the present civil suit pending in the court of Additional District & Sessions Judge, Dholpur. The above letter was replied by the plaintiff on December 14, 1987. This letter was accompanied with five plans alongwith five description reports. Curiously, in the plans the plaintiff also, included the matter relating to 4th & 5th renewal of the mining lease. On January 30, 1988, the Deputy Secretary again wrote to the petitioner firm requesting it "please communicate your written and clear consent accepting all the conditions mentioned in the letter dated 20-11-1987 and submit proof of withdrawal of the pending cases within a week and the further action in the matter." On 27.02.1988, a partner of the petitioner firm wrote a letter to Deputy Secretary which reads as under: "We thank you for your letter No. F. 6 (128) Khan/Gr. III/78 dated 30-1-88 received by us on 22-2-88. We are grateful that you have kindly considered our letter dated 14-12-87. In lieu of your having accepted paragraph No. 1 of our letter written with reference to paragraph No. 7 of your letter dated 29-11-87, we agree to the rest of the conditions. We look forward to an early settlement and eagerly await your letter renewing our lease so that pending cases are withdrawn from the court immediately." 21. After having considered these letters, I am of the view that these letters were only negotiations between the parties but there was never a concluded agreement/settlement. No final decision was taken at any point of time by the defendants on the so called settlement/compromise. After having considered these letters, I am of the view that these letters were only negotiations between the parties but there was never a concluded agreement/settlement. No final decision was taken at any point of time by the defendants on the so called settlement/compromise. It appears that negotiations did not materialise in a settlement between the parties and the plaintiff also did not withdraw the suit, as such, the proceedings in the suit were allowed to be continued by the parties. Thus, on facts also, it is held that there was no concluded agreement/compromise between the parties and the plaintiff also never accepted that there was a concluded agreement on the basis of the correspondence. 22. A connected legal question raised by Mr. Agarwal appearing for the defendants may also be considered. The argument is that in the absence of execution of a contract as required under Article 299 (1) of the Constitution, the same could not be given effect under O. XXIII R. 3, C.P.C. for a compromise decree. Article 299(1) of the Constitution provides as under: "299 (1)-A11 contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or a State shall be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor.........of the State, as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurance of property made in the exercise of that power, shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor.........by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise." 23. In the Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fisherman Co-operative Society Ltd. vs. Sipahi Singh (6) it was laid down: "It is now well settled that the provisions of Art. 299 of the Constitution which are mandatory in character require that a contract made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State must satisfy three conditions viz. (i) it must be expressed to be made by the President or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be; (ii) it must be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor, as the case may be and (iii) its execution must be by such person and in such manner as the President or Governor may direct or authorise. Failure to comply with these conditions nullifies the contract and renders it void and unenforceable." 24. Failure to comply with these conditions nullifies the contract and renders it void and unenforceable." 24. This principle was again reiterated in Mulamchan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (7) in the following way:- "There is no question of estoppel or ratification in a case where there is contravention of the provisions of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution. The reason is that the provisions of S. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act and the corresponding provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution have not been enacted for the sake of mere form but they have been enacted for safeguarding the Government against unauthorised contracts. The provisions are embodied in S. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, and Art. 299(1) of the Constitution on the ground of public policy on the ground of protection of general public and these formalities cannot be waived or dispensed with." 25. The same principle was re-affirmed by the latter decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M/s. Hanuman Oil Mills Ltd. (8) and State of Punjab v. M/s. Om Prakash Baldev Krishan (9). 26. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in State of Bihar v. Ramgarh Farms and Industries Ltd. (10) considered the validity of a compromise entered into by the Government Pleader on behalf of the Government. The Division Bench in that stated at page 204:- "On general principle that there is no reason why an agreement made by a State for the adjustment of a suit under O. 23 R.3, should not be regarded as a contract within the meaning of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution. The executive power of the State extends to the marking of contracts for any purpose. Article 299 (1) says that all contracts made in exercise of the executive power of the State shall be expressed to be made by the Governor. All contracts certainly include a contract for the adjustment of a suit. It is needless to point out that the word agreement under 0.23 R.3 has been used in the sense contract. A State cannot enter into a contract except through some human agency. Some responsible officer usually acts as the agent of the State, In the matter of an adjustment of a suit the Government Pleader generally acts on behalf of the State. A State cannot enter into a contract except through some human agency. Some responsible officer usually acts as the agent of the State, In the matter of an adjustment of a suit the Government Pleader generally acts on behalf of the State. If a contract made by an officer on behalf of the State requires to be made in the manner laid down in Art. 299 (1), there is no reason why a contract for the adjustment of a suit made by the Government Pleader should not be executed in that manner." 27. Similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court in Durga Singh v. State of HP. (11); wherein it was held:- "In the light of these authorities we are clearly of the view that the compromise decree passed in Civil Suit No. 21/1 of 65 of the Senior Subordinate Judges Court, Mahasu is not valid and binding on the Government. An adjustment of the suit under O. 23, R. 3, CPC can only be by a "lawful agreement or compromise" and after the amendment of the CPC in 1976 should also be in writing and signed by the parties. In the present case the compromise was prior to the CPC Amendment Act 1976 and need not necessarily be in writing. It should, however, be lawful, if the Court is to pass a decree in terms thereof. A compromise decree has no greater validity than the agreement or compromise on which it is based and since there was no agreement in terms of Art. 299 (l) of the Constitution, there was no valid compromise and the decree passed on the basis of the statement of the* Government Pleader accepted by the defendant is valid and cannot be enforced in law." 28. A decree in accordance with the agreement or compromise is to be passed if the Court is satisfied that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise. Therefore, the Court is bound to inquire whether the agreement or compromise was lawful or not before it could be given effect under O. XXIII R.3. If an agreement is opposed to public policy, the Court certainly will not record such agreement and pass a decree. If an agreement is void on the face of it, no decree will be passed in accordance with such agreement. If an agreement is opposed to public policy, the Court certainly will not record such agreement and pass a decree. If an agreement is void on the face of it, no decree will be passed in accordance with such agreement. The validity of an agreement contemplated by O. XXIII R. 3 mast be tested by applying the relevant provisions of the Indian Contract Act and other rules of substantive law governing contracts. Article 299(1) of the Constitution makes a special provisions in relation to contracts made in exercise of the executive power of the Union or State. If such contract contravenes the provisions of Art. 299(1), it is necessarily void and no decree can be passed by the Court. The preposition of law canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not correct that the provisions of Article 299(1) have no application in relation to a suit pending in a court as it could not be said that a contract was made in exercise of its executive power. This argument was rejected by the Calcutta High Court in State of Bihars case (supra) by observing:- "The State as a litigant retains intact all its executive powers and a contract made in exercise of its executive power may or may not be for the purpose of settling a pending litigation to which the Court is a party. Simply because as a contract is made by the State with a view to settling a legal dispute to which it is a party it cannot be said that such a contract is outside the purview of Art. 299 (1). 29. In M/s. Tiwari Jhumarlal Swarooplal V. State of Rajasthan (12), a Division Bench of this Court has observed: "Apart from the agreement between the parties and the rules a formal deed of lease is obligatory in view of the provisions of Art. 299 of the Constitution which provides that all contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the State shall be expressed to be made by the Governor and that all such contracts shall be executed on behalf of the Governor by such persons and in such manner as may direct or authorise. That these provisions are of mandatory nature and must be complied with for a valid contract, stands concluded by a judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 113 ." 30. Mr. Sharma appearing for the petitioner, then, contended that the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution did not apply in the present case as it applied to the contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or a State, but the contract in the instant case was in exercise of the statutory powers. This argument in my view is wholly misconceived. All minerals are the State property and a citizen has no vested or indefeasible right to obtain a lease or a renewal to quarry the minerals. A renewal of a mining lease is not obtained automatically for the mere asking. Rule 17 of the Mining Rules provides that an applicant has to satisfy the Government about his past performance. The conditions laid down in Rule 17 have to be fulfilled in addition to the criteria applicable at that time. An application for the renewal of a mining lease is, in essence, an application for grant of a lease for a fresh period (See: State of Tamilnadu v. Ms Hind Stone etc. (13). The following observations of the Supreme Court in the above judgment are relevant - "The submission was that it was not open to the Government to keep applications for the grant of leases and applications for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them on the basis of R. 8 C notwithstanding the fact that the applications had been made long prior to the date on which Rule 8-C came into force. While it is true that such applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of making of the application. No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested right to have an application for the grant of renewal of a lease dealt with a particular way, by applying particular provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in anyone, an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is a long delay since the making of the application. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that applications for the grant or renewal of leases made long prior to the date of G.O. Ms. No. 1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8 C did not exist." 31. Then, Rule 19 of the Mineral Rules provides the necessity of execution of a lease deed even in case of renewal as required under Article 299(1) of the Constitution. 32. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner-plain-tiff is devoid of force that no execution of a contract was required under Article 299(1) of the Constitution in case of a mining lease. 33. The object of Article 299(1) of the Constitution is that the State should not be saddled with liability for unauthorised contract and with that object provided that the contracts must show on their face that they are made on behalf of the State i.e. by the Head of the State and executed on his behalf and in the manner prescribed by the person authorised. The provision is enacted in public interest. It is in the interest of the public that the question whether a binding contract has been made between the State and a private individual should not be left open to dispute and litigation; and that is why a provision has been made that the contract must be in writing and must be on its face show that it was executed for and on behalf of the head of the State and in the manner prescribed. The whole object of the legislature in confirming powers upon the head of the State would be defeated if in a case of an ambiguous contracts, disputes are permitted to be raised whether the contract was intended to be made for and on behalf of the State or on behalf of the person making the contract. This consideration by itself would be sufficient to imply a prohibition against a contract being effectively made otherwise than in the manner prescribed. Therefore, I have no objection in rejecting the argument raised by Mr. Sharma that the provisions of Article 299 (1) of the Constitution were not attracted in a case of contract relating to the renewal of a mining lease. 34. From the order of the State Government dated 24-4-1990, it is clear that the renewal of the mining lease for 10 Sq. Kms. has been sanctioned by the State Government for the period which is in dispute in the suit. The period for which the suit was filed has also expired and, therefore, the reliefs claimed in the suit have become irrelevant. The suit is ordinarily tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed on the date of the institution. It is true that the Court can look into subsequent events when the relief claimed originally has become inappropriate. But this question is not relevant at this stage before me. The facts show that an application moved by the plaintiff to amend the plaint to incorporate the relief for the 4th and 5th renewal was rejected by the trial court and I am not to decide in this revision petition as to whether that order was validly made or not. But, the fact remains that the reliefs claimed in the suit having become irrelevant, no relief can be granted in favour of the plaintiff in the suit as it stands. The plaintiff has enjoyed the operation of the mines under the stay order of the trial Court even there was no renewal of the mining lease in his favour. But, the fact remains that the reliefs claimed in the suit having become irrelevant, no relief can be granted in favour of the plaintiff in the suit as it stands. The plaintiff has enjoyed the operation of the mines under the stay order of the trial Court even there was no renewal of the mining lease in his favour. After the renewal order dated 24-4-1990, the injunction order passed by the trial Court on 24-4-1986 no more survives which was in the following terms: "I, therefore, accept applicants application and hereby prohibit present non-applicants from interfering in possession and in working of mines of applicants in 77.36 Square miles area, during the pendency of civil suit No. 9/81 in the court; with this further direction that if Government of Rajasthan will decide the application of applicant for third renewal submitted on 25-10-79 in the manner indicated in this order; this injunction order shall stand vacated after a period of 30 days from the date of service of decision of Government on applicant; notwithstanding the fact that civil suit No. 9/81 remains undecided till then." 35. The whole interest of the plaintiff appears to be to continue the litigation so that it may carry on the mining operation in the garb of the injunction order. The application under O. XXIII R.3, C.P.C. was also a step in this direction to delay the final verdict in the suit. 36. Before parting with, I would like to express that the validity of the order dated 24-4-1990 issued by the State Government granting third renewal of the mining lease for the period 1-5-1980 to 30-4-1990 for 10 Square kms. is not directly in issue before me, though, it was argued by Mr. Agarwal that in view of the express provisions contained in Rule 17 of the Mining Rules, a mining lease or renewal of a mining lease cannot exceed 10 Sq. Kms. in maximum. Reliance is also placed on an unreported decision of this Court rendered by a learned Single Judge in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 270/1991 Kistoor Chand Singhal v. The State of Rajasthan decided on September 9, 1992 But, this aspect need not be examined by me in view of the finding given by me. 37. The net result of the above discussions is that this revision petition is without merit, and consequently it is dismissed with costs-quantified Rs. 5,000/-.