Judgment This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 7th May, 1968 passed in Title Appeal No. 682 of 1966 by the learned Sub Judge, 3rd Court Alipore, affirming the judgment and decree dated 20th April, 1966 passed by the learned Munsif, 4th Court Sealdah in Title Suit No. 79 of 1963. 2. The plaintiff's case in brief is that he is the owner to the extent of 8 annas of the suit property, that the entire land originally belonged to Biren Oraon and that the plaintiff purchased half of it in Khas and got delivery of possession and that he has peen in possession all along since then, that the defendant filed Title Suit No. 302 of 1960 in the Court of the Second Munsif at Sealdah against him for a declaration of his title in 0.03 decimal of land in possession of the plaintiff. The said suit was subsequently numbered as Title Suit No. 140 of 1962 after its transfer to the court of the Additional Munsif. The further case of the plaintiff is that the defendant proposed to the plaintiff on 7.1.63 that he would have an adjournment of the suit and would withdraw the suit and got his signature on two papers, that he signed in good faith and without coming into the terms as he cannot read or write Bengali or English, that he learnt afterwards from his own people that the defendant on false representation and fraud got a petition of compromise signed by him, that the said compromise was not intended by him and cannot stand. 3. The defendant contested the suit denying all the material allegations brought by the plaintiff. 4. The learned Munsif by his judgment and decree dated 20.4.1966 dismissed the suit on contest with cost. 5. Being aggrieved thereby the plaintiff came up before the learned Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court Alipore in Title Appeal No. 682 of 1966. The learned Subordinate Judge by his impugned judgment and decree dated 7th May, 1968 dismissed the appeal and has confirmed the judgment and decree of the learned trial court. 6. 5. Being aggrieved thereby the plaintiff came up before the learned Subordinate Judge, 3rd Court Alipore in Title Appeal No. 682 of 1966. The learned Subordinate Judge by his impugned judgment and decree dated 7th May, 1968 dismissed the appeal and has confirmed the judgment and decree of the learned trial court. 6. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellant has submitted before me that both the Courts below have not properly evaluated the evidence on record and has urged me to re-appreciate the evidence to see for myself as to how wrong inferences have been made by the courts below regarding the documentary evidence. He has further submitted that on the self-same subject there was another suit which came up to this Court in Second Appeal No. 1599 of 1972 which was disposed of on 10th August, 1975. The appellant obtained a certified copy of that judgment and on 27-11-1979 filed a petition in this Second Appeal under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. to accept the same as additional evidence. The order book discloses that on 26-2-80 the appellant was directed to prepare a supplementary paper book incorporating the application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. However, there was no order indicating that the said application was allowed. In the interest of justice the same application is now allowed to regularise the matter and the judgment in question is admitted in evidence. It may be mentioned that subsequently the said judgment has been reported in 1978 C.H.N. 825, Smt. Etwari Oraon and another vs. Shri Amal Chandra Basu and another. The facts of the reported case are that the plaintiffs-appellants instituted the suit for a declaration of their title to the suit land alleging inter alia that the purchase of the land in suit belonging to the aboriginals of Oraon tribes by a kobala dated July 2, 1957 by the defendant was void being in contravention of the provisions of Chapter VIIA of the Bengal Tenancy Act' as no permission of the Collector had been obtained although by a notification dated October 29, 1957, published in the gazette on November 7, 1957 it was declared that Oraons of Barrackpore Sub-Division were aboriginals and the provision of Chapter VIIA of the Bengal Tenancy Act were applicable to them. In the defence a contention was raised that the impugned transaction was not hit by the said notification. The trial court decreed that suit. The lower appellate court allowed an application for amendment of the written statement to the effect that the land in suit was governed by the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act and not by the Bengal Tenancy Act. The learned lower appellate court remanded the case with certain directions. The plaintiff then came up before this Court against the said judgment of the lower appellate court. It was inter alia contended that the Court should not have allowed the defendant to introduce a new case by the amendment of the written statement and that the additional evidence should not have been allowed to be introduced. 7. The learned Judge of this Court decided that the said appeal has inter alia held that under section 49G(b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act the notification in that case had retrospective operation for the period of one year. The transfers made beyond one year before the date of the publication of the notification are saved even though these transfers were made without the permission of the Collector. However, the present transfer being dated 7th July, 1957 and the Notification being dated 7th November, 1957, the transfer was within one year from the date of the Notification and as such, such a transfer without permission of the Collector cannot be treated to be valid. 8. On the basis of this reported decision the learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that Oraon community living in the Barrackpore Sub-Division of District 24 Parganas has been declared by the State Government as the aboriginals of the area and therefore Chapter VIIA of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not apply to the Oraon community in the matter of sale, transfer etc. of land belonging to them and they cannot alienate them to a person other than an aboriginals, without the permission of the District Collector. In view of this reported decision I accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant of this point. On this score alone this Second Appeal succeeds and the judgment and decree of both the courts below are liable to be set aside. 9. In view of this reported decision I accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant of this point. On this score alone this Second Appeal succeeds and the judgment and decree of both the courts below are liable to be set aside. 9. However, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant, I want to scan the evidence on record as regards some of the findings of the courts below. The principal issue was, did the plaintiff and the defendant compromise in Title Suit No. 140 of 1962 in the court of the Additional Munsif a Sealdah by a solenama and, if so, was the solenama obtained by undue influence, misrepresentation or fraud? The trial court found that the compromise was effected without fraud. While holding this view, the learned Munsif also discussed the question of the title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property and observed that Exhibit 1 the record of right and Exhibit 2 copy of the plaint in a rent suit would not confer any title upon the plaintiff. The learned Munsif relied upon Ext. A, B and C filed by the defendant Ext. A is the receipt whereby the plaintiff received Rs.400/-. Ext. B is the Inland letter written by the plaintiff's son to the landlord (D.W.I.). Ext. C is the solenama. While concurring with the findings of the learned Munsif the learned lower appellate court replied upon Ext. D which is the registered kobala whereby the defendant allegedly bought 3 cottahs of land at a consideration of Rs.3,000/- in the name of the plaintiff. The learned Subordinate Judge has observed that the defendant had performed his part of the contract. According to him this performance on the part of the defendant fortifies the defendant's story by a further agreement to purchase a plot of land in favour of the plaintiff in lieu of the land which was allegedly transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant and that the joint petition of compromise, Ext. A was acted upon. The courts below have held that Exts. 1 and 2 do not indicate that the plaintiff had title to the suit land. Ext. 1 is a certified copy of the record of rights of khatian No. 51 of mouza Rahara. A was acted upon. The courts below have held that Exts. 1 and 2 do not indicate that the plaintiff had title to the suit land. Ext. 1 is a certified copy of the record of rights of khatian No. 51 of mouza Rahara. In it the plaintiff has been shown as 'Basat Praja' (occupancy raiyat) under the Estate Holder Sisir Kumar Banerjee (D.W.I.), son of late Surendra Kumar Banerjee., Ext. 2 is the certified copy of the plaint in rent suit No. 362 of 1955 in the court of the Second Munsif, Sealdah. This was filed by Smt. Sarojini Devi, wife of late Surendra Kumar Banerjee. The said Sarojini Devi was the executrix of her late husband's estate. That rent suit was filed against three persons including Karu Oraon who is the appellant before me. 10. These three persons were occupying the land of dag No. 888 of khatian No. 51 of revisional settlement of 1932. Ext. 3 is the certified copy of assessment register of Khardah Municipality where the plaintiff's name has been mutated. The trial court has observed that the landlord (D.W.I.) had not admitted the document to be true. The document referred to is the certified copy of the plaint in rent suit No. 362 of 1955. I have perused the evidence of D.W.I. He has inter alia stated, "we do not know if we filed rent suit against Karu for the said land". That does not mean that Ext. 2 is false. There is nothing to say that Ext. 2 is not true. It is clear from the document that Karu Oraon along with two others had long been possessing the suit land. The trial court has observed that Exts. 1 and 2 cannot confer any title but in my considered opinion Exts. 1, 2 and 3 will go a long way in proving the possessory title of the plaintiff and such title is valid against all except the real owner of the estate. In this regard the learned Counsel for the appellant has cited a decision reported in 1973 C.L.J. 139, in Amarendra Nath Bhattacharjee vs. Amiya Nath Pyne. In this reported case it has been observed that a possessory title is heritable and assignable, it is valid and enforceable against all except the owner. In this regard the learned Counsel for the appellant has cited a decision reported in 1973 C.L.J. 139, in Amarendra Nath Bhattacharjee vs. Amiya Nath Pyne. In this reported case it has been observed that a possessory title is heritable and assignable, it is valid and enforceable against all except the owner. As such it is not wholly true that the plaintiff had or has no title in respect of the suit premises. He has the possessory title and it is valid against all persons except the owner of the estate. 11. Both the courts below had relied upon Ext. B and Ext. C and came to a finding that the son of the plaintiff requested the landlord to effect a compromise and that accordingly the compromise petition was filed and the suit was compromised for which the plaintiff also received an amount of Rs.400/-. As submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellant I have gone through Ext. B. By this letter the plaintiff's son has entreated the landlord to end the matter through his intervention so that they may get rid of harassment. In this letter he speaks of a grave conspiracy to deprive them of their land. Read superficially this letter will give an idea that he wanted compromise. But when read deeply it is clear that he has not intended to effect a compromise only to part company with their land. The writer of this letter also speaks of the conspiracy on the part of the opposite parties who were trying to manipulate the municipal records so that they could not claim any right and title in the suit land. As such I am unable to accept the findings of both the courts below as regards Ext. B. Now coming to the compromise petition and also the receipt of money thereto I find that the suit was decreed on compromise on 9-1-63. However, the amount of Rs.400/- was received on 7-1-63 but the compromise petition inter alia reads as follows :- "(1) The suit shall be decreed without cost. (2) The defendant shall vacate the property in dispute within 2 months and deliver up vacant possession of the property to the plaintiff. (3) The defendant shall be entitled to get Rs.400/- as cost of removal of his personal effects immediately on delivery of vacant possession of the structures to the plaintiff. (2) The defendant shall vacate the property in dispute within 2 months and deliver up vacant possession of the property to the plaintiff. (3) The defendant shall be entitled to get Rs.400/- as cost of removal of his personal effects immediately on delivery of vacant possession of the structures to the plaintiff. If the defendant fails to give vacant possession within the specified period the plaintiff shall take possession through Court." 12. Thus in terms of the compromise the delivery of possession was to be given after two months from the date of compromise and the defendant Karu Oraon (plaintiff in the instant suit) was to receive Rs.400/- on delivery of vacant possession. 13. As such it is difficult to reconcile the contents of the compromise petition with the fact of receiving Rs.400/- on 7-1-62. So it is very doubtful whether Karu Oraon at all received Rs.400/- under Ext. A. Then comes the question of Ext. D which is a registered sale deed executed by Smt. Kadubala Dassi and Tulsi Chand Bagdi, wife and son respectively of late Akshay Kumar Bagdi, in favour of Karu Oraon for a consideration of Rs.3000/-. The Ext. 4 which is the copy of plaint in title suit No. 94 of 1966 in the court of 4th Munsif Sealdah which was served on Karu Oraon along with the summons, shows that the defendant Amal Chandra Basu filed the said suit for a declaration that he was the bonafide purchaser of the deed property and that Karu Oraon was a benamdar of the plaintiff. So how can we say that the defendant Amal Chandra Basu has performed his part of the contract? The contention of the defendant is that as per terms of compromise there was a further agreement to buy another plot of land for the plaintiff in consequence whereof the land under Ext. D was purchased, cannot be sustained. 14. In the result the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of both the courts below are set aside and the suit is decreed with cost. Appeal allowed.