Mr. P. K. Bahri,j. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of anadditional District Judge dated 21/09/1991 by which he had recalledthe previous order made on the basis of the statements made by the partiesin Court. ( 2 ) FACTS, in brief, are that Sri Chand Gupta, respondent No. 1, hadbrought a suit for injunction against the appellant taking the plea that he isthe tenant in the premises in question and the appellant is threatening toraise unauthorised constructions which would effect his demised premises. Atemporary injunction was granted by the Lower Court and appeal wasbrought against that order which came up for hearing before Shri V. S. Aggarwal, Additional District Judge. ( 3 ) ON 16/07/1988, a joint statement of Shri J. K. Seth, Advocatefor the appellant and Shri J. K. Jain, Advocate for the respondents, Sri Chandgupta, Chand Narain Pandey and Narinder Singh and of Sri Chand, respondent No. 1, and Krishan Mohan Singh, appellant, was recorded which isto the following effect : "the matter has been settled. In shop No. 1402, Bazar Guliandariba Kalan, Delhi, the tenants are Sh. Naresh Chand andjaswant Singh, sons of Shri Chand Gupta. The landlord is Krishan Mohan Singh. The landlord has no objection if the father of thetenants mentioned above in the said shop uses the said shop as alicensee of the tenants. However, the landlord does not permitany other relative of the tenants including their any other brotherto use the property and if the same is used by any other person orbrothers of the tenants, the landlord will have the right to seekeviction on any of the grounds contemplated under the Delhi Rentcontrol Act, 1958. The appeals be allowed and the plaintiffs Sri Chand Gupta, S. Narinder Singh and Chand Narain Pandey withdraw their suits. In case of Chand Narain Pandey, it is not disputed that Angan Lalwas also a tenant with Chhotey Lal. Angan Lal has died and histenancy rights could be inherited by the heirs. So far as the case of S. Narinder Singh is concerned, his fatherdarshan Singh was the tenant and his heirs have inherited the rightsof tenancy. " ( 4 ) THESE statements were signed by the appellant and Sri Chandgupta and also their respective Counsel. Sh. J. K. Seth and Sh. J. K. Jain. So far as the case of S. Narinder Singh is concerned, his fatherdarshan Singh was the tenant and his heirs have inherited the rightsof tenancy. " ( 4 ) THESE statements were signed by the appellant and Sri Chandgupta and also their respective Counsel. Sh. J. K. Seth and Sh. J. K. Jain. On the basis of the said statements, the order dated July 19, 1988 was madeand appeal was disposed of. There were two other appeals which were alsodecided alongwith this order with which we are not concerned. ( 5 ) SRI Chand Gupta had moved a petition before the Additionaldistrict Judge for recalling the order taking various pleas and by theimpugned order, the said petition of Sri Chand Gupta was accepted. ( 6 ) THE learned Additional District Judge, in the impugned order, hasprimarily based his order on the judgment delivered by the Supreme Courtin the case of Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Gael, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 400 and has held that there must be a separate instrument of agreement dulysigned by the parties before the same could be acted upon under Order 23rule 3 C. P. C. ( 7 ) THE Order 23, Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code lays down that where it is proved tothe satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part byany lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, thecourt shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. However, if an agreementor compromise is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872the same will not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule. ( 8 ) THE short question which arises for decision is whether the statements which are made by the parties and recorded in the Court s proceedingsand are signed by the parties could meet with the requirements of Order 23. Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code which contemplate an agreement or compromise in writingsigned by the parties. ( 9 ) IN the case of Gurpreet Singh (supra), the statements were madeand recorded in the judicial proceedings but were not signed by the parties. Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code which contemplate an agreement or compromise in writingsigned by the parties. ( 9 ) IN the case of Gurpreet Singh (supra), the statements were madeand recorded in the judicial proceedings but were not signed by the parties. The question which arose for decision before the Supreme Court was whethersuch statements meet with the requirement of Order, 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code Thesupreme Court, in para 10, had held that to constitute an adjustment, theagreement or compromise must itself be capable of being embodied in adecree. When the parties enter into a compromise during the hearing of asuit or appeal, there is no reason why the requirement that the compromiseshould be reduced in writing in the form of an instrument signed by theparties should be dispensed with. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent Shri Chand Gupta,was vehemently argued that the Supreme Court had clearly laid down thatthere should he an instrument signed by the parties, as required by Order 23, Rule 3 C. P. C. , only then the compromise could be given effect to by thecourt. The word instrument has not been interpreted by the Supremecourt in this judgment. The Supreme Court has also not laid down that aninstrument of compromise should be a separate instrument from the proceedings being recorded in the Court. ( 11 ) THE word instrument has been defined in the Words and Phrases,volume 21 A to mean a document or writing which gives formal expressionto legal act or agreement for the purpose of creating, curing, modifying orterminating a right; a writing executed and delivered as the evidence of anact or agreement. It is also mentioned at page 520 of that book that term"instrument" is most frequently used to denote something reduced to writingas a means of evidence, but it may include, not only written instruments andwritings, but also engraved and printed instruments. At page 523, it wasmentioned that the word "instrument" in a legal sense is defined to be awriting as the means of giving formal expression to some act; a writingexpressive of some act, contract, process or proceedings, as a deed, contract,writ, etc. In The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Reprint, Edition 1987, the term instrument is stated to be used for a deed, writ or otherlegal proceedings or matter reduced to writing. In The Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Reprint, Edition 1987, the term instrument is stated to be used for a deed, writ or otherlegal proceedings or matter reduced to writing. ( 12 ) IT is, hence, evident that the word "instrument" by itself wouldnot mean that a separate instrument should be executed. The proceedingsrecorded in Court which are signed by the parties can be also termed as aninstrument in wtiting. The Supreme Court was dealing with a case where thestatements made in the judicial proceedings were not signed by the partiesand thus, on the basis of it, the said statements could not constitute a compromise made in writing but where the statements have been made in Courtproceedings and have been duly signed by the parties and their Counselthere is no reason why such a writing should not be termed as an instrumentas was visualised by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. ( 13 ) THE learned District Judge was wrong ininterpreting the saidjudgment in coming to the conclusion that there must be a separate instrument in writing effecting the compromise apart from the proceedingsrecorded by the Court wherein statements are recorded and are signed by theparties. ( 14 ) A similar question arose for decision before Punjab and Haryana High Court in case of Raksha Rani v. Ramlal, AIR 1987 Punjab and Haryana 60 and similar interpretation was given. I respectfully agree withthe said judgment given by Division Bench of that Court. ( 15 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent, Sri Chand Gupta, hasplaced reliance on Budha Lal v. Sri Ram Chand, AIR, 1992 Allahabad 360 in support of his contention that there should be a separate written compromise apart from the proceedings in the Court so that it meets with therequirements of Order 23, Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code I have gone through this judgmentand find that this is on a different aspect. In the said case, no agreement orcompromise in writing and duty signed by the parties has been producedbefore the Court. The statements were recorded by the Court and weresigned by the parties, but in those statements, the terms agreed upon betweenthe parties were not mentioned. Only a reference was made that a compromise in writing has been duly signed and executed by the parties whichcompromise was not produced before the Court. The statements were recorded by the Court and weresigned by the parties, but in those statements, the terms agreed upon betweenthe parties were not mentioned. Only a reference was made that a compromise in writing has been duly signed and executed by the parties whichcompromise was not produced before the Court. In that situation, the Courtheld that the same did not meet with the requirement of Order 23, Rule 3cpc. This judgment is based on different facts and is of no help in takingthe case of the respondent any further. ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent, Sri Chand Gupta, also madereference to M. C. D. v. Hira Lal, 1981 Rajdhani Law Reporter page 16. This judgment is at all not applicable to the points in issue before this Court. In the said case. the suit had been dismissed on merits by the Court andlater on an application under Order 23, Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code was made seeking towithdraw the suit. The High Court held that once the suit had been dismissedon merits there could arise no occasion for allowing the suit to be withdrawn by taking resort to the provisions of Order 23. Rule I Civil Procedure Code That isnot the case here. ( 17 ) IN the latest judgment given by Supreme Court in By Ram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India, JT 1991 (4) SC 15, the Supremecourt has now held that even the compromise can be signed by the Counseland it need not be signed by the parties. ( 18 ) IN view of the above discussion, I hold that the statements whichwere recorded by the Court and which were duly signed by the parties andtheir Counsel constitute a written instrument of compromise, as contemplatedby Order 23. Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code So, the judgment of the Additional District Judgeis to be set aside on this score. ( 19 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued thatno proper instructions had been given by Sri Chand Gupta to his Counsel formaking the statement in Court and he also did not understand the contentsof the statement recorded by the Court. An affidavit of Sh. J. K, Jain,advocate has been filed wherein, surprisingly enough. Mr. ( 19 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued thatno proper instructions had been given by Sri Chand Gupta to his Counsel formaking the statement in Court and he also did not understand the contentsof the statement recorded by the Court. An affidavit of Sh. J. K, Jain,advocate has been filed wherein, surprisingly enough. Mr. Jain had madereference to the facts that Sri Chand Gupta was not appearing in the Courtproceedings earlier and had not given any prior instructions to him that hewould like to withdraw the suit, but it is not understood why Sri Chandgupta could not give the instructions to Counsel on the day he appearedbefore the Appellate Court and where was the occasion to give any instruction to the Counsel when the statement had been recorded and had beensigned not only by Sh. J. K. Jain, Advocate but also by Sri Chand Gupta. Itis not possible to give any countenance to the plea of Sri Chand Gupta thathe never understood the implications of the statement being recorded in thecourt proceedings in the presence of his Counsel which he signed and whichwere also signed by his Counsel Sh. J. K. Jain, Advocate. ( 20 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent has also argued that thecompromise has not been signed by Jaswant Singh and thus as all the partieshave not signed the compromise, the same could not be given effect to. Thereis no merit in this contention. No adverse order was being made on thebasis of the compromise against Jaswant Singh, so even if Jaswant Singh. who was not contesting the matter, had not signed the compromise, it wouldnot mean that the compromise cannot be enforced between the contestingparties. ( 21 ) ANOTHER contention raised by learned Counsel for the respondentis that Sri Chand Gupta. in the plaint, had set up the case that he was atenant in the shop, but by virtue of this compromise, his tenancy rights havebeen given a go by and thus, the compromise if illegal. In replication, Srichand Gupta bad taken the plea that he had taken this tenancy in the nameof his minor sons and that is the fact which had been recorded in the compromise statement. It cannot be said that the compromise arrived at in anymanner suffers from any illegality. In replication, Srichand Gupta bad taken the plea that he had taken this tenancy in the nameof his minor sons and that is the fact which had been recorded in the compromise statement. It cannot be said that the compromise arrived at in anymanner suffers from any illegality. ( 22 ) IN view of the above discussion, I allow the appeal and set asidethe impugned order and restore the order made by Sh. V. S. Aggarwal,additional District Judge on 16/07/1988. Parties are, however, left to beartheir own costs.