JUDGMENT In face of these rival claims and contentions, which undoubtedly requires detailed enquiry the very fact that plaintiff-appellant is claiming a declaratory decree of her title, goes to show that it yet to be enquired into and declared and before that if she claims any interim relief she has to make out a strong prima facie case. Looking to the nature of the relief she is claiming, it is not protecting her possession which she even does not claim, the interim relief claimed by her essentially relates to lawful title to the property. It is significant to note that while claiming a declaration of title and 1/2 share in the suit property the appellant does not claim the relief of possession. The permanent injunction sought in the suit is to restrain the defendants from alienating or grants favouring the suit property, in any manner. Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act governs the grant of perpetual injunctions. The conditions prerequisite to the applicability of this section are as under "(1) There must be legal right to express or implied in favour of the applicant; (2) such a right must be violated or there should be a threatened invasion; (3) such a right should be an existing one; (4) The case should be fit for the exercise of Courts' discretion. Where the inconvenience is likely to result from granting injunction is greater than that which is likely to arise from withholding it, the injunction should not be granted; (5) it should not fall within the sphere of the restraining provisions contained in or referred to, in section 41 of the Specific Relief Act" A subsisting legal obligation in favour of the plaintiff is a condition precedent, for grant of permanent injunction. Such legal obligation existing in favour of the plaintiff, and breach thereof by the defendants, if any, or as alleged by the plaintiff, is itself a matter of inquiry. Shri Jain, learned counsel for the appellant banking upon an observation made by the trial Court to the effect that the plaintiff has a prima facie case, argued that temporary injunction as prayed should have been granted by the trial Court. Shri Gupta on the other hand contended that even this observation as made by the trial Court in face of the overwhelming documentary material, placed on record by the respondents, was erroneous and wholly unwarranted. Shri Gupta on the other hand contended that even this observation as made by the trial Court in face of the overwhelming documentary material, placed on record by the respondents, was erroneous and wholly unwarranted. Taking ex facie the observation as made by the trial Court it remains to be seen how far it helps the appellant in claiming the interim injunction, she has prayed for. As already noted above, she does not want to perfect her possession, but, wants to restrain the defendants from selling or disturbing of the property. What is the subsiding legal obligation in her favour for this purpose? Merely because such an interim order would not cause any hardship to the opposite party is hardly a ground for granting an interim injunction, which cannot otherwise be granted under the following conditions are satisfied. "It should be noted that grant of injunction is discretionary with the Court. Section 36 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 expressly lays down that "Preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the Court by injunction," "temporary or perpetual." Therefore, the Court will grant temporary injunction if the following conditions are satisfied. (1) The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case. He is not required to make out a clear title but he must establish that there is a substantial question to he investigated and that matters should be preserved in status quo until the injunction is finally disposed of. (ii) An irreparable injury, would result if the injunction were refused and that there is no other remedy open to the applicant by which he could protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury. (iii) The conduct of the plaintiff has not "been blameworthy. (iv) The balance of convenience requires that the injunction should be granted. While it is true that ancillary reliefs such as protecting of possession, during pendency of suit can he granted, hut restrain the defendant from alienating the property, which is nothing short of alienating his title, the plaintiff must make out subsisting legal obligation in her favour, and breach of such obligation, viewed in the light of the observations as regards prima facie case made by the trial to take on its face value, without going into the question of its being erroneous does not help the appellant. So far as the appellants apprehension of multiplicity of litigations in case of alienation of property if the respondents are not restrained, the doctrine of lis pendens takes full care of the situation. She has yet to establish her own title to the property at the trial. The trial Court has refused interim injunction, essentially a decretionary relief on proper exercise of such discretion vesting in it. Appeal Dismissed.