JUDGMENT R.N. Sahay, J. This is an appeal on behalf of Smt. Lalmani Devi widow of late Bachha Singh from the award of the accident claims Tribunal, Dhanbad, dated 30.9.1986 by which the appellant claim for compensation under Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act has been dismissed as not maintainable. 2. According to the claim petition, late Bachha Singh, husband of the appellant was aged 21 years, when he met with a fatal accident on 27.2.1976. The deceased, at the time of the accident, was working as apprentice in Pathardih Colliery of Hindustan Steel Limited and he also used to drive auto-rickshaw of one Nandu Singh, owner of Auto Rickshaw no. BHR 2099. & the Manager of the Pathardih washery. The monthly income of the deceased was Rs. 600/- rupees. According to the case of the appellant, the deceased was plying the auto-rickshaw when it collided with a truck resulting in his death. The case relating to the accident was registered with Jharia Police Station vide Jharia P.S. Case no. 43 (2) 76 under sections 279/304 A of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The post mortem report of the deceased disclosed the following injuries :– i. Stitched wound 2" with 4 stiches on the chin. ii. Abrasion fore-head 1" x 1/2. iii. Abrasion fore-head 1 1/2”x 1/2". iv. Abrasion 3"x1/2" on the upper post of Rt. buttock. v. Abrasion 1"x 1/4" on the back of Rt. shoulder. vi. Abrasion 1"x 1/4" OD the back. vii. Abrasion 2"x 1/2" on the front of Rt. knee. viii. On opening the chest there was fracture of ribs 3rd to 9th on right side and 3rd to 8th of left side with laceration of both lungs. Both the chest caity was full of blood. 4. The deceased before his death was examined by Dr. D.C. Vora M. S. F. R. C. S. (Eng) at Dhanbad Nursing Home. The auto-rickshaw bearing no. BHR 2099 was insured with National Insurance Company Ltd, Bokaro, respondent no.2. The appellant claimed Rs. 50000/- as compensation. 5. The owner of the vehicle in his written statement has stated that the vehicle was fully insured with the National Insurance Company Ltd. The certificate of the Insurance was issued by the Bokaro Branch of the Insurance Company being Certificate No.465/10087/76. The insurance was valid upto 19.2.1977. The appellant claimed Rs. 50000/- as compensation. 5. The owner of the vehicle in his written statement has stated that the vehicle was fully insured with the National Insurance Company Ltd. The certificate of the Insurance was issued by the Bokaro Branch of the Insurance Company being Certificate No.465/10087/76. The insurance was valid upto 19.2.1977. The National Insurance Company in its written statement denied its liability on the plea that the vehicle was not insured on the alleged date of accident. The Insurance Company also denied that the age of the deceased was 22 years and his income was Rs. 600/-. 6. The learned Additional Claims Tribunal found that on 27.2.1977 at 9 p.m. the deceased Bachha Singh was plying auto-rickshaw. When he reached near the Bania Ahir, there occurred an accident and he eventually succumbed to the injuries sustained by him. This part of the case finds support from the evidence of Chandrika Prasad (P.W.1) Md. Alauddin (P.W.2) Claimant Lalmani Debi (P.W.3), Rajendra Prasad Singh (P.W.4) and Munni Lal Singh (P.W.5). The post mortem report (Ext. 4) is also supported by the evidence of the witnesses. 7. The learned Tribunal, however, dismissed the claim of the appellant on the ground that no good evidence had been adduced to show as to how the deceased had suffered the injuries. According to the evidence of the witnesses while the deceased was driving the auto rickshaw a truck came from behind and overtook the auto rickshaw. In this process, one log loaded on the truck fell on the auto rickshaw as a result of which Bachha Singh sustained injuries. The truck, however, disappeared and no trace of it could be found out. The claimant was not an eye-witness. She has given a different version of the accident. The Tribunal, therefore, held that there is no clear and cogent evidence to show that how the accident took place and the deceased sustained injuries. The learned Tribunal took into consideration the contents of the F.I.R. lodged by Nandu Singh, the brother of the deceased on which a case was registered against unknown tempo driver. According to the F.I.R. (Ext, 3/A), the deceased had sustained injuries when he fell down from auto rickshaw because the road near Bania Ahir bad subsided. The learned Tribunal took into consideration the contents of the F.I.R. lodged by Nandu Singh, the brother of the deceased on which a case was registered against unknown tempo driver. According to the F.I.R. (Ext, 3/A), the deceased had sustained injuries when he fell down from auto rickshaw because the road near Bania Ahir bad subsided. The learned claims Tribunal further held that the owner and deriver of the truck from which the log fell on the deceased was a necessary party and in their absence, the claim case could not proceed. 8. The question for consideration is as to whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the claim after having found that the deceased had sustained injury while driving the auto rickshaw no. BHR 2099. This fact has also not denied either by the owner or by the Insurance Company. 9. In my opinion, the order of the Claims Tribunal dismissing the claim is unsustainable in view of the categorical finding of the tribunal that the deceased have received fatal injury in course of driving of the auto rickshaw in-question. It was not important to find out exactly as to what manner the accident occurred. The Tribunal also failed to take into account the fact that in the written statement, the accident was not denied either by the owner or the Insurance Company. 10. Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Section 65 of the M. V. Act, 1988) provides for adjudicating upon claim for compensation in respect of accident involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicle or damages of any property of third person so arising or both. The word 'arising out of motor vehicle' has been subject matter of interpretation by several courts including the Supreme Court. 11. In Pushparani Chopra Vs. Anokha Singh reported in AIR 1975 A. C. J. 396, it was held by the Delhi High Court that the word ‘use’ has been used in a wide sense and covers employments of the Motor Vehicle on the public places including its driving, parking, keeping, stationary repairing leaving unattended on road or for any purpose. Even when a motor vehicle is parked on a high way without parking light or reflectors resulting in instance of accident will have arisen out of the use of the Motor Vehicles'. In Swaran Vrs. Even when a motor vehicle is parked on a high way without parking light or reflectors resulting in instance of accident will have arisen out of the use of the Motor Vehicles'. In Swaran Vrs. Nanhe Khe reported in 1987 1 ACJ 354, it was held that where the claimant jumped out of the truck when it turned turtle and sustained injuries due to jumping out of the truck and not due to the accident itself, the injuries arose out of use of motor vehicles. In Mangilal Kali Vs. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation reported in 1988 M.P. 109, the deceased was climbing the ladder affixed to the pole to check his luggage kept on the top of the bus when the ladder gave way and he fell down and died. It was held that the accident arose out of the use of the bus. 12. In Sibajee Dayanee Party Vs. Smt. Bachala Uttam reported in AIR 1991 SC 1769 , the Supreme Court was considering a case, the facts of which were peculiar. There was a collusion between a petrol tanker and a truck, as a result of which, the petrol tanker went off the road and fell on its left side at a distance of 20 feet of high way. An explosion took place in the petrol tanker resulting in fire. A number of person who had assembled pear the petrol tanker sustained burn injury and a few of them succumbed to the injury. The claim tribunal rejected the claim of the claimants on the ground that the explosion and fire took place about four hours after the accident and had no, connection whatsoever with the accident. The High Court, on appeal, held that though the tanker was not in use on the highway, it was lying turtle on its side made no difference and thereby covered by the expression used in Section 92A of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the view of the High Court and held that the explosion and fire resulting in the injury was due to the accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. 13. In the instant case, the owner of the truck responsible for the accident was not impleaded and could not be impleaded in the claim case as the truck escaped after the accident and number of the truck could not be noted. 13. In the instant case, the owner of the truck responsible for the accident was not impleaded and could not be impleaded in the claim case as the truck escaped after the accident and number of the truck could not be noted. The question is that the appellant is disentitled to claim any compensation at all. 14. The accident had occurred on 27.2.1976 but the claim case was filed in 1977. The appellant in order to claim compensation under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act had to prove that the accident occurred on account of rash and negligence act of the driver of the truck. 15. During the pendency of the claim case section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act came into force on 1.10.92. This provision was intended to provide social justice by giving compensation without proof of fault or negligence of the driver or the owner of the vehicles. It is beneficial piece of legislation meant to give effective relief to the victim of traffic accident or to his legal representatives in case of death. This provision is clearly departure from the usual common law of principle that the claim would be negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the motor vehicle before claiming, any compensation on the death or permanent disablement caused on account of motor vehicle accident. The claim cannot be defeated on account of wrongful act, negligence or default of the victim. The right to claim compensation under section 92A is without prejudice to the right of claiming higher compensation on the basis of the wrongful act or negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the vehicle. 16. In Gujarat S.R.T.C Vs. Ramabhai Prabhatbhai reported in AIR 1987 SC 1690 , the Supreme Court has observed :– "In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents there has been a continuous agitation throughout the world, to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault. In order to meet the above social demand on the recommendation of the Indian Law Commission, Chapter VIIIA was introduced in the Act Sections 92A to 92E of the Act are to be found in Chapter VII-A." The Bombay High Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. In order to meet the above social demand on the recommendation of the Indian Law Commission, Chapter VIIIA was introduced in the Act Sections 92A to 92E of the Act are to be found in Chapter VII-A." The Bombay High Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shantabai S. Shuma, 1987 (1) ACJ 198 (Bom) and Kerala High Court in Vilasini and others Vs. Kerala State Road Transport Corpn. 1988 (ii) ACJ 755 and in Vimla Devi and others Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Patna High Court in 1990 ACJ 696 and Andhra Pradesh High Court in 1990 ACJ 746 have held Section 92A to be retrospective. 17. The High Court of Kerala in Vilasini and others Vs. Kerala State Road Transport Corpn. 1988 ACJ 755 (DB) held that Section 92 (A) of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939 has retrospective application and the said provision was applicable to pending cases relating to accident which took place prior to its coming into force. The Kerala High Court followed a decision of the Bombay High Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shantabai S. Shuma & ors. 1987 ACJ 198 which has held that the legislative intendment was to give a quick relief to the victimes of motor vehicle accidents or to their families on the principle of no fault and that in that sense, the Amendment Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to give benefits to all victims who were involved in the accident due to no fault basis and to remove the mischief that people suffered the accident had to face, being sometime unable to prove the negligence or rashness of the driver or the owner of the vehicle and therefore unable to get compensation. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Phulwati 1986 MP 187 it was observed that Section 92 (A) "become live and generates sufficient power in court to help the helpless, the moment it is found by a court or tribunal on material available to it that one or more than one vehicle/motor vehicles is/are involved in an accident. The liability to be discharged under section 92 (A) indefeasible, peremptory and total and also inexorable. 18. A Full Bench of the M.P. High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nafis Bagum AIR 1991 MP 302 has held that Section 92(A) was prospective and not retrospective. The liability to be discharged under section 92 (A) indefeasible, peremptory and total and also inexorable. 18. A Full Bench of the M.P. High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Nafis Bagum AIR 1991 MP 302 has held that Section 92(A) was prospective and not retrospective. S.K. Jha, C.J. agreeing with D.M. Dharmadhikari, J. observed in his separate judgment :– "I entirely concur in the judgment and Order of my learned brother Dharmadhikari J. In deference, however, to the erudite scholarship of the learned Judges of the High Courts exhibited in their divergence of views, I feel obliged to say a few words of my own in support of the Order of my learned brother. To my mind, the point referred to this Full Bench is a rather simple one. The question of any retrospectivity attaching to the provisions of S. 92–A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (The Principal Act) becomes a simble one if I highlight one aspect of the matter. As has already been noticed in the leading judgment in the case S. 92–A which forms part of Chapter VII-A, was inserted in the statute book by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (here in after to be referred to as the Amending Act), 1982 (No. 47 of 1982). It received the President's assent on 31.8.1982 and was published in the Gazette of India (Extraordinary), dated 1.9.1982. It may be noticed in S. 1(2) of the Amending Act that “it shall come into corce on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act," (Underlining is mine for the sake of emphasis). Therefore the legislative intent is clearly reflected in the express language used by the Parliament. For various provisions of the Amending Act, different dates may be appointed, For instance, S. 69–B was inserted in the Principal Act by S. 8 of the Amending Act and it was notified to come into effect from 10-12-1982. So also S. 70 (I) of the Principal Act was amended by Sec. 9 of the Amending Act with effect from 10-12-92. It is not necessary to multiply the different dates for the different provisions. So also S. 70 (I) of the Principal Act was amended by Sec. 9 of the Amending Act with effect from 10-12-92. It is not necessary to multiply the different dates for the different provisions. Suffice it to say that S. 92–A of the Principal Act was brought for the first time in the statute book by the Amending Act by inserting a new chapter altogether, namely, Chapter VIIA. The whole of Chapter VII–A of the Principal Act was made effective from 1.10.82. The legislative intent is clear from the express language. There is no scope for any legal dynamism or idea of progressive social welfare involved in determining the date from which S. 92-A is to take effect. One has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no scope for equity or the progressive nature of the legislative amendment coming into play. There is no scope for reading into the Amending Act something about which it is unamiguous and unequivocal. Nothing is to be implied. One has only to look fairly at the language used." 19. The learned single judge of the same High Court in Bhagwan Das vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 1991 Mp 235 held that though Section 92-A is not retrospective still this section does not become total irrelevant. Its enactment is a positive indication of the legislative intent that incase of death the compensation to be awarded shall be not less than Rs. 15,000/-. Learned Judge after considering the decision of the various High Court on this question held as follows:- "Human life is invaluable. Any effort at assessing its-loss in terms of money is an exercise nearing an impossibility. In C.K. Subramonia Iyar V.T. Kunhikuttan Nair AIR 1970 SC 376 their Lords hips observed :– "There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. In C.K. Subramonia Iyar V.T. Kunhikuttan Nair AIR 1970 SC 376 their Lords hips observed :– "There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of tile deceased or of the beneficiaries which ever is shorter is an important factor Since the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case, in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life, In assessing damages the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the child attains majority." Section 110-B of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, enacted the concept of "just compensation". The Court must only award a just or fair compensation, yet not full compensation and can never achieve a result which is perfect. Traditionally the damages have been divided into 'General 'and' Special' damages: the 'General damages' being those which the law presumes to flow from the event. Though an attempt is always made to plead and prove the factors affecting determination of quantum of compensation, ordinarily the Court has to arrive at a just figure of general damages. Much is left to the judicial experience of the Judges, the measure being vague and uncertain depending on vast variety of factors it being impossible to frame and well defined rules for judging the pecuniary value of loss. In R.L. Gupta's Case, ( 1990 (1) SCC 356 ) (Supra) though the date of accident is not mentioned in the report, the compensation as originally assessed at Rs. 8000/- for the death of two persons was enhanced by their Lordships to Rs. 20, 000/-each for the two in the absence of any specific evidence, keeping in view the quantum in "no-fault liability" now provided by the statute prospectively. 8000/- for the death of two persons was enhanced by their Lordships to Rs. 20, 000/-each for the two in the absence of any specific evidence, keeping in view the quantum in "no-fault liability" now provided by the statute prospectively. The consistent view of this Court as noticeable from Shamsher Khan V. M. P. E. B.; 1987 Jab LJ 721. Devji V. Anwar Khar AIR 1989 Madh Pra 101 and Karuram V. Om Prakash, AIR 1989 Madh pra 105 has been that without regard to the fact that the provisions of Section 92-A may not be retrospective in operation, it would serve as a legislative guideline for determining the compensation in cases of fatal accidents which would not be less than Rs. 15,000/-. These decisions and also the similarly taken Bombay View in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. V. Shantabai, AIR 1987 Bom 52' Kerala view in Villasini V. K. S. R. T. C.: AIR 1989 Kerala 95 have all been noticed, expressing full agreement there with, by this Court recently in Sardar Ishwarsingh V. Himachal Puri, AIR 1990 Madh Pra 282 (Para 4). I am of the opinion that without regard to the age of the deceased and in the absence of adequate evidence being available on record, the minimum compensation awardable in case of death ought to be Rs. 15,000/- not because Section 92. A is retrospective in operation but because this court should pay heed to the legislative guideline manifested in S. 92-A in the wake of call for social justice to the representatives of the victims in road accidents. " 20. The Full Bench of M.P. High Court held Section 92-A to be prospective because sub-section 2 of Section 1 of the Amendment Act which introduced Section 92-A provides that the amendments were to come into force on such date as notified by the Central Govt. Official Gazette and while notification published in the Govt. of India Gazette dated 15.9.82, different dates were notified for enforcement of the several sections. This objection is answered by the Kerala High Court in Villasini's case (Supra) as follows :– "It was argued that section 92-A is a completely new provision of law and that if the intention of the legislation was to give retrospective effect nothing prevented the legislature from expressly providing for such retrospective operation. This objection is answered by the Kerala High Court in Villasini's case (Supra) as follows :– "It was argued that section 92-A is a completely new provision of law and that if the intention of the legislation was to give retrospective effect nothing prevented the legislature from expressly providing for such retrospective operation. This argument appears to us to be attractive but on a deeper consideration of the purpose for which the law was enacted and the mischief and evil that were sought to be removed by the enactment, we are not inclined to accept this argument so vehemently urged by the learned counsel for the respondent. No doubt this argument found favour with a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ram Mani Gupta's case, 1985 ACJ 476 (Allahabad) and also by a single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court reported in Yashoda Kumari v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur 1984 ACJ 716 (Rajasthan). With great respect we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court and Rajasthan High Court in the above-said decisions. We are inclined to accept the view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company's case 1987 ACJ 198 (Bombay)." The Full Bench decision (Supra) ignores the pertinent fact that if the amendment comes into force during the pendency of the claim case instituted prior to the enforcement, the claimant is entitled to the benefit of Section 92-A of the Act. It is not the case here that claim petition was disposed of prior to the coming into force of Section 92-A. 21. This question was again fully considered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in T. Shrinivasulu Reddy v. C. Govardana Naidu, AIR 1990 AP 289 (DB). Amareswari J. after considering the amendment Act and the decision or the Supreme Court (AIR 1954 SC 1511, AIR 1985 SC 111 , AIR 1963 SC 553 and AIR 1989 SC 1247 ) held:- "Applying the ratio of the aforementioned Supreme Court case, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act applies even to pending proceedings. This provision is a social welfare legislation and dispenses with the proof of negligence on the part of the owner of the driver of the vehicle and imposes a no fault liability. This provision is a social welfare legislation and dispenses with the proof of negligence on the part of the owner of the driver of the vehicle and imposes a no fault liability. We accordingly hold that all actions for compensation pending on the day when the provision irrespective of the fact whether the accident took place prior or subsequent thereto. Since the law dispenses with the proof of negligence, it can be done in any pending proceeding irrespective of the date of accident. The words "the owner or the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation" occurring in Section 92A (1) and the words "claimants shall not be required to plead and establish that the death of permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner" are prospective and shall apply to pending and future claims. A single Judge of the Bombay High Court has taken a similar view in Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co Ltd v. Shantabai S. Shuma (1987) 1 ACJ 198 (AIR 1987 Bom 52). The learned Judge held that Section 92A applies to all pending cases irrespective of the date on which the accident occurred and the fact that the Amendment Act postulates that the amendments will come into force on the date notified in the Government Gazette would be of no consequence. The learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the following judgments including two decisions of single Judge of this Court. In Ratni Devi Shyam Suka v. B. Venkata Rami Reddy 1988 ACJ 142 (Andh Pra) our learned brother Rama Rao, J. took the view that the provision has no retrospective operation as the liability was not visualized by the owner and the Insurance Company and that the Insurance policy is a product of a contract between the parties founded on the basis of situations and circumstances existing at the time when the contract was entered into. We are unable to subscribe to this view. If the reasoning given by the learned Judge is accepted, then the provision cannot be applied even to a case where the accident occurred subsequent to the Amended Act, on the ground that the contract of insurance was earlier to the date when the provision came into force. Let us give a practical illustration. If the reasoning given by the learned Judge is accepted, then the provision cannot be applied even to a case where the accident occurred subsequent to the Amended Act, on the ground that the contract of insurance was earlier to the date when the provision came into force. Let us give a practical illustration. The amended provision came into force on 1.10.1982. The accident took place subsequent to the amendment. But the policy of insurance was taken prior to 1-10-1982. Can it be said that at the time when the policy was taken which is the result of a contract between the parties this liability was not visualised and, therefore, this provision does not apply to contracts entered into prior to the date when the provision came into force surely not. Even according to the learned Judge this provision applies to all cases where accidents occurred subsequent to the date when the provision came into force even though the policy might have been taken earlier. Therefore, it is not a qusseion whether the liability visualised when the premium was fixed. It is the nature and intendment of the provision that should be looked into.” 22. I respectfully agree with the view taken by the Kerala High Court and Andhra Pradhesh High Court and I am unable to follow full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradhesh High Court. 23. Shri Iqbal, learned counsel for the Insurance Company submitted that as the appellant had preferred claim under section 92A, no relief can be granted to the appellant under the said provision. This contention has no force. 24. In Mahila Ramdhi v. Nand Kumar reported in AIR 1988 MP 98 it was held by Dr. T.N. Singh J. as follows :– "Where a claim petition is made for liability on the basis of fault and no claim under Section 92A is specifically made, it is still the duty of the Claims Tribunal if finds that the owner or driver of the vehicle was not at fault to consider the question of granting compensation on the basis of no fault liability." I, therefore, hold that the appellant is entitled to compensation under Section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 25. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and the appellant is awarded compensation of Rs. 25. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and the appellant is awarded compensation of Rs. 15, 000/- She shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum from the date of filing of the claim application. I further direct that tile Insurance Company, respondent shall pay the compensation awarded with interest within two months from today. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed in part