JUDGMENT 1. - This contempt petition has been under Section 12, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter to be called "the Act") against the respondents for disobeying the order of this Court dated September 9, 1987 passed in S B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 126/87. Parties requested that the preliminary objections raised against this application by the respondents be first decided vide order dated January 16, 1991 and various subsequent orders. Relevant facts necessary for deciding them may be summarised thus. 2. On November 3,1984, Maharana Bhagwat Singhji of Mewar (Udaipur) died leaving behind his widow Rajmata Sushila Kumari (petitioner No. 2), two sons, namely, Maharana Mahendra Singh (petitioner No. 1) and Maharaja Arvind Singh (respondent No. 1) and a daughter (not a party in this case). Disputes arose in between them over the properties left by him. Civil and criminal cases were filed in various courts id Udaipur. In Criminal Revision Petitions No. 456/84, 14/85 and 15/85 and Misc. Criminal Revisions No. 120/86, 121/86 and 142/86, arising out of proceedings launched under Section 145, Cr.P.C., 1973 and in Civil Revision Petitions No. 427/86 and 430/86, arising out of partition suit, this court passed orders that the possession of the disputed properties be handed over to the party from whom it was taken when their possession was taken by the S.H.O., Ghantaghar (Udaipur) (Receiver) (Respondent No. 4). In Civil Misc. Appeal No. 126/87 in between the parties similar order was passed on September 8, 1987 which is the subject matter of this contempt petition. It has been averred in the contempt petition that on December 9,1988, the petitioner No. 1 came to know that the possession of the disputed properties had been delivered to the respondent No. 1 on December 8, 1988 by the respondent No. 4 in utter disregard of the repeated orders of this Court, on December 20, 1988, he obtained a copy of the letter dated December 7, 1988, sent by Shri S.C. Pagoria Special Secretary, Home Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur (respondent No. 2) to the District Magistrate and Collector, Udaipur Shri Atul Kumar Garg (respondent No. 3) directing that the possession of the disputed properties be delivered to the respondent No. 1. They have further averred in it that they were in possession of the disputed properties when their possession was taken by the Receiver (respondent No. 4) as is clear from the record and thus die respondents have wilfully and contemptuously contravened the specific orders particularly tire order dated September 9, 1987 of this Court by handing over the possession of the disputed properties to the respondent No. 1 and also by not getting inventories prepared in presence of the parties or their representatives and under their signatures. 3. The respondent No. 1 filed his interim reply, paper No. A11/1-4, raising preliminary objections that the court has issued notice to the respondents to show cause as to why contempt proceedings be not initiated against them in pursuance of its order dated May 9, 1990, long after die expiry of one year from die alleged contempt as according to Section 20 of die Act contempt proceedings can be initiated within a period of one year from the date of its commission. Second interim reply, paper No. A14/1-7, was filed on September 10,1990 taking further preliminary objections that direction was given to the respondent No. 4 only, there is no question of committing contempt of any order by him, Inspector Shri Himmat Singh was the S.H.O., Ghantaghar (Udaipur who delivered the possession of the disputed properties to him has not been made a party in die contempt application and as such contempt petition is not maintainable without his being a party in it. 4. Subsequently, Sri S.R. Bhansali Law Secretary, Government of Rajasthan, Sri M l. Khan, Additional Advocate General and Himmat Singh were impleaded as the respondents No. 5, 6 and 7 respectively in the said contempt petition. The other respondents have also taken the preliminary objection that the contempt proceedings arc time barred. 5. In support of die preliminary objections, Mr. 4. Subsequently, Sri S.R. Bhansali Law Secretary, Government of Rajasthan, Sri M l. Khan, Additional Advocate General and Himmat Singh were impleaded as the respondents No. 5, 6 and 7 respectively in the said contempt petition. The other respondents have also taken the preliminary objection that the contempt proceedings arc time barred. 5. In support of die preliminary objections, Mr. G. Ramaswamy, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, contended that the petitioners' case is dial the respondents committed contempt on December 8, 1988, the court passed order on May 9, 1990 for issuing notice to die respondents to show cause as to why contempt proceedings be not initiated against them, notices were accordingly issued, Section 20 of the Act mandates that no court shall initiate any proceeding of contempt after die expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed and as such the contempt proceedings are time barred. He relied upon Bardakanta v. Misra, C.J., AIR 1974 SC 2255 , Purushottam Dass Goel v. B.S. Dhillon, AIR 1978 SC 1014 , State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Jamnadas Gangadas & Company, 1984 Cr.L.J. 605 , State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Ghoghad, 1978 R.L.W. 186 , Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad, AIR 1980 Guj. 194 , State of Rajasthan v. M/s Gulam Abbas Kamruddin, 1989 RLR 186 , Raj. State Board for Prevention of Water Pollution v. M/s. Sherawa Textiles Industries, 1985 RLR 183 , Gulab Singh v. The Principal, Sri Ramji Das, AIR 1975 All. 366 , Hari Nandan Agrawal v. S.N. Pandita, AIR 1975 All. 48 , Dinesh Chandra Sharrna v. B.K. Banerjee, 1988 All. LJ 1279 , Advocate General A. P. v.A.V. Koteswara Rao, 1984 Cr. LJ 1171 , State of Maharashtra v. J. V. Patil,1974 (78) BLR 116 , Golcha Advertising Agency v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 Mah. LJ 216 , State of Bihar v. Ambika Rao, 1991 Cr.L.J. 82. He further contended that Section 5, Limitation Act is not applicable to these proceedings and placed reliance on Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad (supra), Dinesh Kumar Sharma v. B.K. Banerjee (supra), Harphool Singh v. Ranbir Singh, 1980 All. LJ 1028 , Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha v. U.B. Dhande, 1984 (2) Civil LJ 465 and Shri Anwari Basavaraj Patil v. Shri Siddaramaiah, JT 1993 (1) SC 328. LJ 1028 , Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha v. U.B. Dhande, 1984 (2) Civil LJ 465 and Shri Anwari Basavaraj Patil v. Shri Siddaramaiah, JT 1993 (1) SC 328. He also contended that die alleged act of contempt took place on the delivery of possession of die disputed properties to die respondent No. 1 and the disobedience of the order dated September 8, 1987 did not continue thereafter. He relied upon State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, AIR 1973 SC 908 , Balakrishna Savalram v. Shri Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, AIR 1959 SC 798 , Mahipal Bahadur Singh v. State, 1986 Cr.L.J. 1851 , State v. A.H. Bhiwandiwalla, AIR 1955 Bom. 161 , Emperor v. Karsandas Govindji Ved, AIR 1942 Bom. 326 , Abid Ali Khan v. State, AIR 1951 Nag. 327 , Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad (supra), Waryam Singh v. State, 1982 Cr.L.J. 137 (NOC) Rajah v. M.S.P. Rajesh, 1980 KLT 802 , Chandra Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Registrar of Companies, 1990 (69) Company Cases 117 , K. Ch. Pandu Ranga Rao v. Secretary, Agriculture, 1985 Cr.LJ 176 , Mandsaur Electric Supply Co. v. Madhya Pradesh Government Electric, 1981 MPLJ 297 , Bai Manchha v. Sardar Sajjadananshin Saiyad Mahamad, AIR 1963 Guj. 168 and Khair Mohd. Khan v. Mt. Jannat, AIR 1940 Lahore 359. He lastly contended that the Act punishes contemner and not the abettor as the order dated September 8, 1987 issued direction to the respondent No. 7 only and not to any other respondent. He relied upon Ramswaroop v. State, 1989 Cr.L.J. 2431. 6. Mr. G.L. Sanghi, learned Counsel for non-petitioner No. 2, contended that his client wrote letter on December 7, 1988 to the District Magistrate and Collector, Udaipur (respondent No. 3), according to the petitioners themselves contempt stood committed on this date and the possession of tire disputed properties was handed over by the respondent No. 4 to the respondent No. 1 on December 8. 1988 and as such the contempt proceedings are time barred. 7. In reply to the aforesaid preliminary objections, Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned Counsel for die petitioners, contended thus. In this case, contempt relates to two matters. Firstly, handing over the possession of the disputed properties to the respondent No. 1. Secondly, not preparing inventory of the articles in triplicate in presence of the parties or their authorised representative and under their signatures. Ram Jethmalani, learned Counsel for die petitioners, contended thus. In this case, contempt relates to two matters. Firstly, handing over the possession of the disputed properties to the respondent No. 1. Secondly, not preparing inventory of the articles in triplicate in presence of the parties or their authorised representative and under their signatures. The S.H.O., Ghantaghar (Udaipur) (respondent No. 4), being Receiver of the disputed properties, was an officer of the court and he was to seek directions from the court and not from the Government. Section 20 of the Act is repugnant to the provisions of Article 215 of the Constitution of India which does not provide any period of limitation for punishing contemners. He relied upon Sukhdev Singh v. Hon'ble C.J., AIR 1954 SC 186 , Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Ram Niwas, AIR 1989 Cal. 375 and M/s. A.W. Kowdi v. R.V. Laxmidevamma, ILR 1990 Karnataka 4355 (FB). Civil contempt's are in the nature of execution, its primary function is coercive and there is an element of public interest in it also. He placed reliance on Boris' Law of Contempt, 2nd Edition, page 394 para 2. In the cases relied upon by the respondents, Sukhdev Singh v. Hon'ble C.J. (supra), has not been taken into consideration. The jurisdiction conferred on a High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India to punish for contempt of itself is a special one, it does not arise or is derived from the Act, legislature cannot take it award and can confer it afresh by virtue of its own authority. Reliance was placed on State of U.P. v. M/s. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., JT 1991(3) 268 , Mohd. Ikram Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1625 , Shitaldas v. Deohans, AIR 1970 Raj. 170 , Habir Singh v. Ali Hasan, AIR 1966 All. 161 , D P. Mishra v. Kamal Narayan Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1477 , Manjit Singh v. Darshan Singh, 1984 Cr.L.J. 301 (P&H) (FB) , United States of America v. Benton & Co., 345 F.Suppl. 1102 (1972) , Maharani Rajroop Koer v. Syed Abdul Hossein, (1880) L.R. I.A. 240 , Sir Seth Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh, (1933) LR 60 , Frank Ross & Co. 1102 (1972) , Maharani Rajroop Koer v. Syed Abdul Hossein, (1880) L.R. I.A. 240 , Sir Seth Hukum Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh, (1933) LR 60 , Frank Ross & Co. v. Haralal Harendralal Roy Estate Ltd., 1983 Tax L.R. 2544 , M/s. Ganpat Rajkumar v. Kaluram, AIR 1989 SC 2285 , N. Senapathi v. Sri Ambal Mills, AIR 1966 Mad. 53 , Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Lundayya Gurushiddaiah Hire math, 1991 Co. Cases (Vol. 71) 403 and Balakrishna Savalram v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan (supra), R.L. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1972 SC 858 and S.N. Nagaraja Rao v. Chikkachennappa, 1981 Cr.L.R. 843 (Kar.). Section 20 of the Act contemplates many kinds of proceedings. Proceedings of contempt stood initiated as soon as the papers were placed before the Registrar. Order dated May 9, 1990 of the Court leaves no manner of doubt that (lie court duly applied its mind while passing it. Rights of the parties are not allowed to suffer on account of a wrong committed by the court or its staff. Any other interpretation of Section 20 of the Act will put private parties to loss. Sections 4 to 24 and Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to the contempt proceedings. Matters involving great fraud should not be allowed to suffer on mere technicalities. 8. Mr. Jay Savla, learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that it is a case of continuing offence and the contempt is continuing till the petitioners are not put in possession of the disputed properties and inventories of the articles are not prepared in presence of the parties under their signatures. He placed reliance on State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (supra) and State v. A.H. Bhiwandiwalla (supra). 9. In reply to the aforesaid contentions, it has been contended by Shri Rajendra Mehta, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 that there is no question of continuing disobedience/contempt, in this case contempt stood committed, according to the contempt petition, as soon as the respondent No. 7 delivered possession of the disputed properties to the respondent No. 1 and inventory was prepared by him in violation of the order dated September 8, 1987. He relied upon Abid Ali Khan v. Secretary of State (supra). He relied upon Abid Ali Khan v. Secretary of State (supra). He further contended that there was no provision similar to Section 20 of the Act in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 which was in force when the Constitution of India came into force and also in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 when judgment reported in Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh, C.J. (supra) was delivered and Section 20 of the Act has not taken away the jurisdiction of the High Courts to punish the contemners and it has simply been held in it that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not applicable to contempt proceedings. He also contended that for die purpose of limitation the date of presentation of the contempt petition is not relevant but the date of initiation of contempt proceedings is relevant. He relied upon State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Jamnadas Gangadas & Co. (supra). In R.L. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was not under consideration, it has been held that Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 laying down maximum punishment simply put a restriction on the existing jurisdiction, it did not confer any new jurisdiction and as such Section 70, I.P.C. imposing limitation in the way of recovery of fine was no impediment. 10. It is the admitted case of the parties that the order dated September 8, 1987 passed in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No. 126/87 - Mahendra Singh v. Arvind Singh & ors. is the subject matter of the contempt petition. It would be best to quote here its operative portions. They run as under:- "The result of the entire discussion is that the S.H.O., Ghantaghar (Receiver) is directed to hand over the possession of the disputed properties to the persons from whom he has taken over the possession of those properties at the time when he was appointed as Receiver. If any difficulty arises, he can bring that fact to the notice of this Court by placing proper facts before it and seeks directions of this Court in that regard and not from the court of learned Additional District Judge. If any difficulty arises, he can bring that fact to the notice of this Court by placing proper facts before it and seeks directions of this Court in that regard and not from the court of learned Additional District Judge. He is further directed to prepare an inventory of the articles which he is supposed to have taken in possession at the time of his appointment as Receiver and which will be released by him in favour of the persons from whom he took over their possession at the time of his appointment as Receiver. The inventory of all such articles lying in these properties be prepared in presence of the parties; or their representatives and signatures of all the parties concerned must be obtained on all the three copies of this inventory. The original copy be filed in the court of learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Udaipur; die other copy should be sent to this Court for its record and the third copy be kept by him as an evidence of handing over of die possession of property as well as articles lying therein to the parties concerned." 11. As already stated above, the contempt petition was filed under Section 12 of die Act on March 18, 1989. Office pointed out several defects and they were removed as late as on April 11,1990. Thereafter, die case was listed in the court for die first time on May 9, 1990. On this date the petitioner No. 1 was present in person. His counsel was not present. After hearing him, order was passed. Its relevant portion runs as under:- "Issue Notice to the Respondents to Show Cause Why Contempt Proceedings Be Not Initiated Against Them, Returnable Within Three Weeks." 12. In view of die aforesaid contentions of die learned Counsel for die parties, the following questions emerge for deciding die aforesaid preliminary objections:- 1. Whether Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is ultra vires of Article 215, Constitution of India ? 2. Whether die contempt proceedings have not so far initiated within the meaning of Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ? 3. Whether die act of disobedience still continues or it was complete on December 8, 1988 ? 4. Whether the petitioners are entitled to get die benefits of die provisions of Section 5. Limitation Act ? Question No. 1. 13. 3. Whether die act of disobedience still continues or it was complete on December 8, 1988 ? 4. Whether the petitioners are entitled to get die benefits of die provisions of Section 5. Limitation Act ? Question No. 1. 13. The contentions of the learned Counsel for die petitioners have been that Article 215, Constitution of India does not provide any limitation for die initiation of contempt proceedings, Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides limitation of one year, the jurisdiction of the High Court for initiating contempt proceedings is thus curtailed, and as such the provisions of Section 20 of the Act are ultra vires of the Constitution of India. 14. Article 245(1), Constitution of India runs as under:- "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the legislature of State may make law for die whole or any part of die State." Article 246 provides dial Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List (Union List) and List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 14 of List III is 'Contempt of Court but not including contempt of the Supreme Court'. Entry 77 of List I stales, 'Constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of die Supreme Court (including contempt of such court) and the fees taken therein; persons entitled to practice before die Supreme Court.'The words 'subject to' (appearing in Article 245(1) means that Parliament may make laws consistent with the provisions of the Constitution but not in conflict thereof. In other words, it may make laws which may be supplementary and not derogatory to the provisions of die Constitution. In other words, it may make laws which may be supplementary and not derogatory to the provisions of die Constitution. It is only where there are clear and unequivocal words in the statute which go to show that die legislature has travelled outside die limitation laid down in die Constitution that die courts will pronounce die statute to be ultra vires It has been held in Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 406 : AIR 1991 SC 2176 that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not impugned upon die power of the Supreme Court under Article 123 of the Constitution, similar to Article 215, Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh, C.J. (supra) and R.L. Kapur v. Stale of Tamil Nadu (supra) have duly been considered in it. Articles 132(1) and 134(1)(c) of die Constitution do not speak about limitation for moving an application under these Articles but Article 132, Limitation Act imposes limitation of sixty days. Similarly, Article 136, Constitution of India does not provide any limitation for moving special leave petition but Article 133, Limitation Act, 1963 provides limitation of 60/90 days. The provisions of these Articles of the Limitation have not so far been declared ultra vires. It is well settled law that law of limitation is procedural law (A.S.K. Krishnappa v. I.S.V.V. Somayya, AIR 1964 SC 227 and Dhipathumma v. Shankernarayana, AIR 1967 SC 241 . Constitution of India permits passing of such laws under the aforesaid entries. The procedural restrictions regarding quantum of punishment contained in Section 12 and limitation contained in Section 20 are not ultra vires of Article 215 of the Constitution of India. This question was examined by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Jamnadas Gangadas & Co. (supra). In die end of para No. 7, it has been observed as follows:- "It was rightly not disputed before us that the period of limitation is a matter relating to procedure and not to regulate the exercise of power. (supra). In die end of para No. 7, it has been observed as follows:- "It was rightly not disputed before us that the period of limitation is a matter relating to procedure and not to regulate the exercise of power. The power to punish for contempt under Article 215 is not taken away but that power is required to be exercised within the time prescribed under Section 20 of the Act and as such even if applications are considered under Article 215 of the Constitution, still, for the purpose of limitation they will be governed by Section 20 of the Act and in this view of die matter also the applications for taking actions of die contempt were barred by limitation." 15. It has been.observed in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1625 as follows:- "The only curbs on the powers of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself are contained in die Contempt of Courts Act which limits the term for which a person can be imprisoned to six months' simple imprisonment." 16. This has been followed in Board of Revenue, U.P. v. Vinay Chand, AIR 1981 SC 723 . It runs as under:- "Articles 129 and 215 preserve all die powers of die Supreme Court and the High Court respectively, as a Court of Record which include the power to punish the contempt of itself. As pointed out by this Court in Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. The State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1625 , there are no curbs on the powers of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself except those contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. Articles 129 and 215 do not define as to what constitutes contempt of court. Parliament has, by virtue of die aforesaid Entries in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule, power to define and limit the powers of the courts in punishing contempt of court and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. Indeed, this is what is stated in the Preamble of the Act of 1971." 17. Great reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for die petitioners on Sukhdev Singh v. Hon'ble C.J. Sri Teja Singh (supra), Tala Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Ram Niwas (supra) and M/s. A.W. Kowdi v. R.V. Laxmidevamma (supra). Indeed, this is what is stated in the Preamble of the Act of 1971." 17. Great reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for die petitioners on Sukhdev Singh v. Hon'ble C.J. Sri Teja Singh (supra), Tala Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Ram Niwas (supra) and M/s. A.W. Kowdi v. R.V. Laxmidevamma (supra). In Sukhdev Singh v. Hon'ble C.J. Sri Teja Singh (supra), the question involved was whether contempt proceedings could be transferred from one High Court to another High Court under die Code of Criminal Procedure and in this context observations in connection with Article 215 were made. It is also not in dispute dial the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has not conferred any new jurisdiction on High Courts but has only recognised such jurisdiction and sanction by Article 215 of the Constitution of India. As already observed above, this jurisdiction can be regulated by an act of Parliament it, entries No. 77 of List I and 14 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India were not considered. Limitation for initiation of contempt proceedings was provided for die first time in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and there was no such provision in the earlier Acts of 1926 and 1952. As such there was no question of consideration of the curbing of powers of the High Court by the provisions of limitation in the case reported in Sukhdev Singh v. Hon'ble C.J. Sri Teja Singh (supra). In State of U.P. v. M/s. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (supra) cited by the petitioners, it has been observed as follows:- "Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law ? Here again the English Courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule 1 of sub silentio. A decision passed sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind' (Salmond 12th Edition). It has been explained as rule 1 of sub silentio. A decision passed sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the Court or present to its mind' (Salmond 12th Edition). In Lancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. (1941 IKB 675) , the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur ( 1989(1) SCC 101 ). The Bench held that precedents sub silentio and without argument are of no moment'. The Courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not expressed and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi. In Sharma Rao v. State of Pondicherry (AIR 1967 SC 1680) it was observed, it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles laid down therein. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law." It is in accordance with the maxim "Interest Re-publical ut sit Finis Utium" - the interest of the State requires that there should be end of litigation. Lapse of time affords basis for the presumption that the alleged claims have no foundation in fact or in any event abandoned. In Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Ram Niwas (supra), the provisions of Article 215 were not considered and grant stress was laid on the conspicuous absence of provisions for High Courts similar to the provisions contained in Article 141(2) for the Supreme Court. In Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Ram Niwas (supra), the provisions of Article 215 were not considered and grant stress was laid on the conspicuous absence of provisions for High Courts similar to the provisions contained in Article 141(2) for the Supreme Court. It has not necessary to provide similar provisions for High Courts as Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 was in force when the Constitution came into force and there were necessary provisions in it. There was no provision in the Act of 1926 for the Supreme Court as it was established on the coming into force of the Constitution of India. M/s. A.V. Kowdi Co. v. R.V. Laxmidevamma (supra), is based on Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Ram Niwas (supra). Even in this Full Bench case, it has been held that the period of limitation of one year prescribed under Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act is for the subordinate courts. 18. If the aforesaid arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners are accepted, entries 77 of List I and No. 14 of List III would become redundant and meaningless and the Act would become otiose. It cannot, therefore, be held that Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is ultra vires of Articles 215 of the Constitution of India. 19. There is yet another aspect of the matter. Admittedly, this point has not been taken in the contempt petition. Union of India has not been impleaded as a party. On any date of hearing, ranging over four years, the petitioners did not press for issuing notice to the learned Attorney General of India. The question is accordingly answered in negative.Question No. 2. 20. In Webster's Third New International Dictionary 'initiate' means to begin, or set going; or to make a beginning of; or to perform or to facilitate the first actions, steps or stages of. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 'initiate' means to begin, to commence; to enter upon; to introduce; to set going. Court initiates proceedings only after it applies its mind actually and directs issuance of notice to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of Court. 21. The expression 'initiate any proceedings' occurring in Section 20 of the Act was considered in Baradakanta v. Misra, C.J. (supra). Court initiates proceedings only after it applies its mind actually and directs issuance of notice to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of Court. 21. The expression 'initiate any proceedings' occurring in Section 20 of the Act was considered in Baradakanta v. Misra, C.J. (supra). Relevant portion of para 7 runs as follows - "The motion or reference is only for the purpose of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it is for the Court, on a consideration of such motion or reference to decide, in exercise of the discretion, whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. The Court may decline to take cognisance and to initiate a proceeding for contempt either because in its opinion no contempt prima facie appears to have been committed or because, even there is prima facie contempt, it is not a fit case in which action should be taken against the alleged contempt. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner, the court, though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo tnotu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in Section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court." 22. Rule 324, Rules for High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952 runs as under:- "324. Contempt of Court. - (1) Where an application for the taking of proceedings in Contempt of Court is presented before a Judge other than the Chief Justice he shall direct that it be laid before the Chief Justice for orders. And the Registrar shall, on receipt of a report against any person of contempt of Court, lay the papers before the Chief Justice for orders; (2) The provisions of sub-rule (1) shall not be applicable in cases where the contempt consists in disobedience of a judicial order of the High Court. And the Registrar shall, on receipt of a report against any person of contempt of Court, lay the papers before the Chief Justice for orders; (2) The provisions of sub-rule (1) shall not be applicable in cases where the contempt consists in disobedience of a judicial order of the High Court. In such cases, the Bench concerned may pass appropriate orders and the application or report need not be laid before the Chief Justice for orders. (3) Where an order has been made directing that notice be issued to any person to show cause why he should not be punished for Contempt of Court, a date shall be fixed for hearing and notice thereof in the prescribed form given to the person concerned as also to the Government Advocate. The notice shall contain a substance of the allegations made against; such person and require him to appear unless otherwise ordered in person before the Court at the time and on the date specified therein to show cause why he should not be punished for Contempt of Court." It provides that whenever an application is moved for taking of proceedings in contempt of court it is placed before the concerned Bench for passing appropriate order. Mere filing of contempt petition does not save limitation. Only after an order is made directing that notice be issued to any person to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court, initiation of proceedings of contempt then takes place and not prior to it. The same view has been taken by different Division Benches of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. M/s. Jamnadas Gangadas & Co. (supra), State of Rajasthan v. M.R. Mitruka, 1978 R.L.W. 224 and State of Rajasthan v. Manohar Ghoghad (supra). It has been observed in State of Rajasthan v. Gulam Abbas Kamruddin, 1984 RLR 136 at pages 139 and 140 paras 25 and 27 as follows:- "It is pertinent to notice here that the notice to be given is for showing cause why the non-petitioners should not be punished for contempt of Court. This notice is to contain the allegations made against the person and further the notice to show cause is for punishment for contempt. Mr. This notice is to contain the allegations made against the person and further the notice to show cause is for punishment for contempt. Mr. Hastimal's submission that generally when the Court apply; its mind and issue notice it must be treated as initiation of proceedings is plausible and it appears to be correct but for the use of the words "why the contempt proceedings be not initiated against them" in the order dated 13.4.1982. If these words would not have been there, there would have been no objection in accepting the contention of Mr. Hastimal. 27. The only inference which can be drawn from the above order is that the learned Judge wanted to apply his mind in respect of the initiation of the proceedings after hearing the non-petitioners. In other words, after hearing the non-petitioners an order can be passed that proceedings are initiated and he must show cause why he should not be punished or equally an order can be passed that it is not proper and fit for initiation of contempt proceedings. That being so, it is not possible to draw the inference that even though the order dated 13.4.1982 in terms restricted notice for showing as to why the contempt proceedings should not be initiated yet it should be assumed that the learned Judge as against his order, initialled proceedings. I am not prepared; to interpret the order against the express words used in it. If the words why the contempt proceedings be not taken would have been there, there would have been some ground or reason for interpreting or in drawing an inference as to what was the intention of the learned Judge whether he wanted to issue notice for final hearing or showing cause before initiation. In that situation probably there could be either of the two directions, then the inference may have been possible. However, after an unequivocal language has been used by the Hon'ble Judge it is not open to this Court to draw an inference against it." Similar view has been taken in Smt. Bano v. Ram Autar Gautam and Ors., 1987 Cr.L.J. 647 (All.) , Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad (supra), Dinesh Chandra Sharrna v. B.K. Banerjee (supra) and Naresh Singh v. Uma Shankar Bajpai, 1988 All.L.J. 114. 23. 23. As already observed above, the petitioner No. 1 was only present when the contempt petition was taken up for hearing by the court on May 9, 1990 and his counsel was not present. It appears that the petitioner No. 1 was not able to convince the court about the wilful disobedience of the order dated September 8, 1987 by the respondents and as such the court passed the said order and did not pass order in terms of the above quoted Rule 324. It is clear from the order dated May 9, 1990, quoted in para 11 supra and tire notices issued to the respondents that contempt proceedings have not so far been initiated. They are still at the show cause stage for the initiation of proceedings (first stage) and not for punishing contemners (second stage). The hurdle of said limitation comes in the way of crossing of these proceedings from the first stage to the second stage. Now order for the initiation of proceedings for contempt cannot be passed as it is prohibited by Section 20 of the Act. Similar view has been taken in Hari Narain Agrawal v. S.N. Pandita (supra), State of Maharashtra v. J.V. Patil (supra), Golcha Advertising Agertcy: v. State of Maharashtra (supra), N. Venkatarammanappa v. D.K. Naikar, AIR 1978 Kar. 57 and Rajah v. M.S.P. Rajesh (supra). 24. There is no question of petitioners suffering on account of wrong committed by the Court. As already observed above the contempt petition was filed on March 18, 1989, office pointed out nine defects in it vide report dated June 13, 1989, on August 10, 1989, the learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. A.K. Acharya Advocate took four weeks time to remove the defects and they were removed as late as on April 11, 1990. The alleged contempt took place on December 8, 1988. Thus the defects were removed after more than fourteen months of the commission of the alleged contempt on December 8, 1988. Moreover, the petitioners have no right to have the respondents punished for contempt. Their duty was to bring the facts to the notice of the court and as such they cannot be allowed to say that they should not suffer for the mistake of the court. The question is accordingly answered in affirmative.Question No. 3. 25. Moreover, the petitioners have no right to have the respondents punished for contempt. Their duty was to bring the facts to the notice of the court and as such they cannot be allowed to say that they should not suffer for the mistake of the court. The question is accordingly answered in affirmative.Question No. 3. 25. Para 2 (opening) (page 2), 3(h) (page 10), 3(j) (pages 10-11), 3(n) (2nd para) (page 13), 3(o) (page 13) and 3(p) (page 13) of the contempt petition run as under:- "2. The petitioners are constrained to approach this Hon'ble Court on account of certain illegal and criminal acts committed by the Respondents in blatant violation and utter contempt of the orders of this Hon'ble Court. The facts in brief which have culminated in the said acts of contempt arc as follows:- 3(h) The petitioner respectfully submits that the said letter dated 7th December, 1988 issued by Respondent No. 2 and the collusive actions of the respective Nos. 2-4 in handing over possession to Respondent No. 1 of the said properties is in total breach and violation of the order dated 8.9.1987 of this Hon'ble Court, as is clearly established hereunder:- (i) The said order has unequivocally held that possession of the said properties has to be handed over to the petitioner No. 1 or to his representative only; (ii) The petitioner no. 1 was admittedly in possession of the said properties when the same was taken from him as is established by the nothings of respondent No. 4. 3(j) Even the course of events leading to the handing over of the possession established that the same was premeditated, mala fide and could not have been achieved without fraudulent collusion between the Respondents. On 5th December, 1988, an Application was filed by respondent No. 4 seeking to withdraw his earlier application dated 16.12.1987 for directions. On 7th December, 1988 respondent No. 2 issued the aforesaid letter for possession to be handed over to Respondent No. 1. On 8th December, 1988, despite the pendency of both the applications, the possession in fact is handed over by the respondents to Respondent No. 1. On 7th December, 1988 respondent No. 2 issued the aforesaid letter for possession to be handed over to Respondent No. 1. On 8th December, 1988, despite the pendency of both the applications, the possession in fact is handed over by the respondents to Respondent No. 1. 3(n) x x x It is therefore submitted that the aforesaid sanction of the Respondent is an illegal conspiracy and concerted bid to loot and plunder all the invaluable articles lying in Shambhu Niwas Palace and the said properties even at the risk of committing gross and direct violation of the orders of this Hon'ble Court. 3(o) It is submitted that the handing over of possession whilst the two applications dated 16.12.1987 and 5.12.1988 respectively are pending speaks of malafide. Moreover allowing Respondent No. 1 to take a unilateral inventory itself speaks of the criminal and illegal intent of the Respondents. 3(p) It is submitted that the Respondents have wilfully and contumaciously contravened the specific orders of this Hon'ble Court and are in collusion and therefore, in violation of the orders, an appropriate action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, ought to be taken against the said Respondents." 26. The aforesaid averments made in the contempt petition leave no manner of doubt that the alleged acts of disobedience were committed on December 8, 1988. There is no averment in it that any act of disobedience continued after Decembers, 1988. Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. If the alleged wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. In the instant case, the alleged contempt was committed once and for all on December 8, 1988 and there is no question of its being committed again and again. In respect of continuing offence, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in State of Bihar v. Devkaran, AIR 1973 SC 908 at page 909 para 5, as follows:- Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from die one which is committed once and for all. In respect of continuing offence, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed in State of Bihar v. Devkaran, AIR 1973 SC 908 at page 909 para 5, as follows:- Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from die one which is committed once and for all. 11 is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues (until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore constitutes a fresh offence everytime or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all." 27. It has been observed in Balakrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan and Ors. (supra) para 31, as follows:- "Section 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong dial it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If die wrongful act causes an injury which is complete there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If however, wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between die injury caused by die wrongful act and what may be described as die effect of the said injury. If however, wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between die injury caused by die wrongful act and what may be described as die effect of the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as continuing wrongs that Section 23 can be invoked Where the wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the resulting injury to he right is complete at the date of the ouster and so there would be no scope for the application of Section 23 in such a case." 28. Great reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on Manjeet Singh v. Darshan Singh (supra). It was a case of criminal contempt wherein action can be taken on a motion under Section 15 of the Act. Written consent is a condition precedent for taking proceedings under this Section. Instant case relates to a civil contempt and not with a criminal contempt. The petitioners may be having continuing right but this will not extend the period of limitation for the initiation of the contempt proceedings. Contempt arises on the disobedience Manjeet Singh v. Darshan Singh (supra) has rightly been dissented in State of Bihar v. Ambika Roy, 1991 Cr.L.J. 82. 29. By order dated September 8,1987, quoted in para 10 (supra), tire S.H.O., Ghantaghar (respondent No. 4) was directed to hand over the possession of the disputed properties to the persons from whom he has taken over possession of the properties at the time when he was appointed as a Receiver. According to the contempt petition the disobedience of this order took place as soon as he handed over the possession to Die respondent No. 1. There was no question of its continuance thereafter. Much reliance has been placed on Kaji Najmunissa Begum v. Yusuf Khan, AIR 1989 SC 2285 and Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Lundayya Gurushiddaiah (supra) by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of his arguments. In first case the possession was not handed over by the tenant to the landlord despite his written undertaking to do so and continued in its possession even after the expiry of the stipulated period. In first case the possession was not handed over by the tenant to the landlord despite his written undertaking to do so and continued in its possession even after the expiry of the stipulated period. In the second case, the officers and employees of the Company did not vacate company's quarters which were in their occupation after the expiry of six months of their retirement. As such failure to give possession was held to be a continuing offence. In the instant case, the S H.O., Ghantaghar (respondent No. 4) did not continue his possession over the disputed properties and he handed over their possession to whom he considered to be entitled. Admittedly, the order dated September 8, 1987 did not prohibit him from delivering the possession of the disputed properties to the respondent No. 1. Similarly, the respondent No. 4 was directed to prepare an inventory of articles which he was supposed to have taken at the time of his appointment as the Receiver and which were released by him in favour of the respondent No. 1. It is not in dispute that inventory was prepared vide para 3(1) (page 12) of the contempt petition. It has been averred in the contempt petition that the respondents permitted the respondent No. 1 to prepare the inventory and this was in direct violation and contempt of the aforesaid order. This act of disobedience also stood committed on December 8, 1988 and it did not also continue there after. This question is decided against the petitioners.Question No. 4. 30. It is correct that Section 29(2), Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for die purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Section 29(2), Limitation Act speaks of suits, appeal and application and Section 5, Limitation Act speaks; of appeal and application. Section 29(2), Limitation Act speaks of suits, appeal and application and Section 5, Limitation Act speaks; of appeal and application. Section 20, Contempt of Courts Act provides limitation for initiation of contempt proceedings and not for any application, reference or motion for initiating contempt proceedings. Sections 29(2) and 5, Limitation Act have no reference of 'initiating of any proceedings'. As such the provisions of Section 5, Limitation Act are not attracted in the proceedings of contempt It has been observed in Shilal Das & Anr. v. Deohans, AIR 1970 Raj. 170 para 8 , cited by the petitioners, as follows:- "Next it was contend that Section 5 of Hie Limitation Act is applicable by virtue of Section 78 of the Insolvency Act. The latter section applies Sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act to "applications" and "appeals" under the Insolvency Act. In all decided cases a distinction has been drawn between a "petition" and an "application" under the Insolvency Act. Under Section 9 the creditor files a "petition" for adjudication and under Section 10 the debtor files a petition for adjudication. Under Section 32 the word "application" has been used. So Section 5 of the Limitation Act is also not applicable to a petition under Section 9." As a matter of fact Section 20 of the Act imposes a condition that no proceedings of contempt shall be initiated after the expiry of period of one year from the date on which contempt is alleged to have been committed. It speaks initiation of proceedings and not institution of proceedings. Institution of proceedings and initiation of proceedings are not identical or similar. They are different. Proceeding is instituted by a litigant and it is initiated by a Court. 31. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The Contempt of Courts Act does not admit of application of any provision of the Limitation Act. The words "expressly excluded" occurring in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act do not mean that there must necessarily be express reference in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act and the operation of which is sought to be excluded. The words "expressly excluded" occurring in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act do not mean that there must necessarily be express reference in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act and the operation of which is sought to be excluded. On an examination of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it is clear that the Act is self contained and the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded and as such benefits conferred by Limitation Act cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971. Reference of Anwari Basavraj Patil v. Shri Siddaramaiah , (supra), Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel Ahmedabad (supra) and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha v. U.B. Dhande (supra) and H.N. Yadav v. L.N. Mishra, AIR 1974 SC 480 may be made here. In Harbir Singh v. Ali Hasan, AIR 1966 All. 161 relied upon by the petitioner it has been held dial die Code of Criminal Procedure, 1808 was not a self contained Code in die matter of limitation. Similarly in V.C. Shukla v. Khub Chand, AIR 1964 SC 1099 and D.P. Mishra v. Kamal Narain Sharma (supra), relied upon by the petitioners, Representation of the People Act, 1951 was held not self contained Act and so the Limitation Act was held applicable. 32. According to the arguments of die learned Counsel for the petitioners, die provisions of Section 20 of die Act providing limitation for the initiation of proceedings of contempt are ultra vires of Article 215 of the Constitution of India. It is not understandable as to how the provisions of Limitation Act can be invoked by him when it also provides a period of limitation under its Article 137. 33. The facts of Maharani Raj Roop Kaur v. Syed Abdul Hussain (supra), Hukarn Chand v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh (supra), Frank Ross and Co. Ltd. v. H. H. Roy Estate Ltd. (supra) and United States v. Benton & Co. (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners are quite different and distinguishable. In the first case, obstruction in die water course continued. In the second case, one sect of Jains continued to obstruct another sect of Jains in the worship of certain shrines and the plaintiffs were not completely ousted from worshipping the shrines. (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners are quite different and distinguishable. In the first case, obstruction in die water course continued. In the second case, one sect of Jains continued to obstruct another sect of Jains in the worship of certain shrines and the plaintiffs were not completely ousted from worshipping the shrines. The third case is similar to M/s. Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram (supra) and the tenant continued in illegal possession after the expiry of the lease. In the fourth case it has been held that continuous offence consists of several acts. In the instant case, there was only one act t committed on December 8,1988. The question No. 4 is also decided in negative. 34. In the written arguments, the petitioners have also submitted that the respondents were directed by this Court on January 11, 1988 to maintain status quo and this order was also disobeyed by the respondent No. 7 by delivering die possession of the disputed properties to the respondent No. 1 and by the respondent No. 1 by taking their possession. This case has not been put forward in the contempt petition. According to the petitioners, the order dated January 11, 1988 also stood wilfully disobeyed on December 8,1988. For the aforesaid reasons, contempt proceedings cannot be initiated in respect of the disobedience of this Order also, being time barred. 35. It is correct that it has been held in Shamkant v. Smt. Dayanabai, 1989 Cr.L.J. 2431 (Bom.) that aiding and abetting is not punishable under the Act and in N. Senapathi v. Sri Ambal Mills (supra) it has been held that though a person not a party in the case may be held guilty of contempt if he disobeys order of the Court. In view of the aforesaid answers of the questions it is not necessary to decide whether aiding or abetting is punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or not. Its adjudication at this stage may also require discussion of the case on merits. In view of the aforesaid answers to the questions, the Contempt Petition deserved to be dismissed. 36. Accordingly, the contempt petition is dismissed, No order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******