JUDGMENT : S.C. Mohapatra, J. - Members of 2nd party are petitioners tin this revision against notice to show cause and to furnish interim bond as required u/s 107, Cr PC. 2. In the notice dated 3-11-1983, learned Magistrate observed as follows; "Whereas it appears 1rom the report submitted by the O.I.C. Town P. S. that the members of second party are in hostile term due to family dispute. The members of second party have formed an unlawful combination and trying to harass the first party in various ways and threatening to assault. Or 23-8-1988 the second party Chhabi Mekap abused and threatened Arta Patri to assault. On 25-8-1988 at 7.40 p. m. Chhabi Mekap suddenly attacked Arta Patri at Raghaba Das Math near Southern gate when Arta Patri was returning to his house from the temple. I am satisfied from the above report that there is apprehension of imminent breach of peace and disturbance of public tranquillity within the local limits of jurisdiction of this Court and actions u/s TOT, CrPC is necessary against the members of second party........................" 3. Order of the teamed Magistrate on basis of which aforesaid notice was issued, was assailed before learned Sessions Judge who dismissed the same. Learned Sessions Judge observed : "On perusal of the notice u/s 111, CrPC, it is seen that substance of information received has been set forth there in. lt cannot be faulted on that score. There is also no allegation that due to want of particulars of the overt facts in the action, the petitioner have been prejudiced." 4. It is to be remembered that an order u/s 111, Cr PC directing rssue of notice to a delinquent and notice on that basis is intended to give sufficient notice of accusation made against that person. (See Sanatan Baliarsing and Others Vs. State and Another, ). This order can be on basis of a police report. (See Munshi Ghafur Khan and Others Vs. Sk. Saratullah and Others, ). Mere notice by itself does not cause any prejudice to the delinquent as he can show cause and satisfy the Magistrate that either there is no apprehension of any breach of peace or that he has no connection with the same. But before rssue of notice Magistrate is to apply his judicial mind about a prima facie view that there is apprehension of breach of peace. But before rssue of notice Magistrate is to apply his judicial mind about a prima facie view that there is apprehension of breach of peace. Legislature in its wisdom has left it to the Magistrate to maintain law and order for which this power has been vested. Where the Magistrate has applied his judicial mind and has issued notice, higher Courts ought not to interfere with the same merely because they would take a different view of the matter. Even a police report may in some circumstances be sufficient to be based for issuing notice. It would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case depending upon the nature of the police report. But the notice itself should state the acts complained of in such details as will put the delinquent in adequate notice of what case he may have to meet. Where the notice is vague and wrongful acts alleged against the delinquent are not at all stated, the proceeding is to be quashed as the delinquent would be prejudiced inasmuch as he would not be able to show any cause. (See 24 (1958) CLT 123 Lokanath Das and Ors. v. State). 5. When, however, the Magistrate proposes that an interim bond is to be executed, the enquiry must have commenced. Without enquiry being commenced, the same affects the liberty of the delinquent and is not supportable as has been held in the decision reported in Madhu Limaye Vs. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and Others, ). When this Court took different views about the meaning of enquiry. Full Bench in the decision reported in ILR (1980) 2 Cut. 51 (Sona Khan and Ors. v. State) resolved the confusion by clarifying that the language of the repealed Criminal Procedure 'pending the completion of enquiry' has been changed in I973 Code by expressing after commencement and before completion of the enquiry. Thus an interim bond can be called for only after the commencement of the enquiry and before its completion. Without commencement of enquiry, an interim bond can be made. Inquiry does not commence as soon as the delinquent appears and the notice u/s 112 is read over to him. Bare allegation cannot form the foundation of order for a bond. The allegations have to be tested. It may be that in a particular case, oral evidence may not be necessary to test the truth or otherwise of the allegations. Inquiry does not commence as soon as the delinquent appears and the notice u/s 112 is read over to him. Bare allegation cannot form the foundation of order for a bond. The allegations have to be tested. It may be that in a particular case, oral evidence may not be necessary to test the truth or otherwise of the allegations. Affidavit may be enough. There may be documentary evidence which might substitute oral evidence which necessitates examination of witnesses. Parties may agree that allegations are true and therefore, there may not be necessary of looking for evidence. Situations arising in daily life cannot be catalogued and discretion must be left to the Magistrate to deal with particular situation as may arise before him in different cases, but the mandate of the law is that inquiry must commence and the Magistrate must proceed to ascertain the truth of the allegation by application of his judicial mind and look for materials which would substitute allegations into facts. The enquiry contemplated is an acceptable judicial process by which allegations can be converted into facts. What that process would be, should be left to the discretion of the Magistrate with reference to the facts of each case but he must adopt an acceptable judicial method for testing the allegation and recording findings of fact with reference to the acceptability or otherwise of such allegations. 6. This principle laid down by the Full Bench has been applied to facts and circumstances of a case and subsequent decisions have been rendered. A decision being on the facts and circumstances of each case is not a precedent by extracting a line here and there to build up a case. They only give guidance how in the past principles have been applied to the facts and circumstances of that case. 7. In the present case, there is no direction in the notice to execute interim bond. Requirement of Section 111, Cr PC have only been satisfied by stating : "Accordingly, I, Sri R. C. Patnaik, OAS, SDM, Purr, do hereby require and direct the members of second party to appear in the Court on 28-11-1988 and show cause as to why they should not execute bonds for Rs. Requirement of Section 111, Cr PC have only been satisfied by stating : "Accordingly, I, Sri R. C. Patnaik, OAS, SDM, Purr, do hereby require and direct the members of second party to appear in the Court on 28-11-1988 and show cause as to why they should not execute bonds for Rs. 1,000/- with one surety for the like amount each to keep peace in the locality for a period of one year." When no interim bond has been called upon to be executed, question whether an enquiry has commenced does not arise for consideration. 8. However, the notice extracted earlier indicates that the substances of allegations are only against Chhabi Mekap. There may be application of judicial mind of the learned Magistrate in respect of Chhabi Mekap only but it cannot be said there was application of mind against other petitioners. Other petitioners can have no opportunity to show cause against their furnishing bond or security with no allegation against them. Learned Sessions Judge has misread the notice to observe that substance of information received have been set forth. I am of the view that there is no allegation set forth against petitioners other than Chhabi and proceeding against them is to be quashed. 9. As regards Chhabi, the position is different. Substance of allegations have been set forth and normally he should show cause as per the notice. But the proceeding has remained pending for more than two years. Object of legislature is that once the enquiry commences, it should be completed within six months. A proceeding should not remain pending for a long time without commencement of enquiry. Where there is no overt act for more than two years for giving rise to apprehension of breach of peace, such proceeding would serve no purpose in being concluded. As has been held by Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and another etc. etc.,,speedy trial is a fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution. Same would be the position in case of speedy enquiry. This Court had only stayed execution of bond. There was no stay of the commencement or conclusion of the enquiry. 10. Mr. R.S. Nayak and another etc. etc.,,speedy trial is a fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution. Same would be the position in case of speedy enquiry. This Court had only stayed execution of bond. There was no stay of the commencement or conclusion of the enquiry. 10. Mr. Mohapatra relied upon a decision reported in (1991) CLT 601 (Khetra Dalbehera and 88 others v. Udayanath Majhi and 149 others), where it was observed : "In the present case at hand, more than three years have elapsed in the meantime since the preliminary order was passed directing initiation of the proceeding. A retrospect of the peculiar circumstances in which the proceeding was initiated will show that, no doubt, at one stage the flood-gates of bad-blood, mistrust and ill-will were wide open on account of factional rivalry between the two groups. It is not known whether the same situation still continues in the village. The healing hands of time might have been able to bring amity in the meantime between the two groups and a cordial and inviting atmosphere of good will and friendship might have prevailed in the village. To allow the proceeding to continue after lapse of three years and more may again re-generate a bad-feeling and retrograde the situation and might give scope to the parties to take themselves to further violence with renewed vigour for a fresh clash." 11. This observation was relied upon by Mr. Mohapatra to submit that the alleged incident being in the latter part of 1988, a long period having elapsed in the meantime, the proceeding should be dropped as was directed in the said decision. In the aforesaid decision, both parties had entered appearance and after hearing learned counsel for both parties, this Court was satisfied that the booming hands of time might have been mighty in the meantime. In the present case, opposite parties have not entered appearance. Accordingly, I have no chance to hear them to come to such a contusion. However, I would direct the learned Magistrate to take into consideration this aspect of the matter to consider whether in the changed circumstances on account of passage of time, proceeding should continue against petitioner No. 3. 12. With the aforesaid observation, this application is allowed to the extent indicated above. Final Result : Allowed