JUDGMENT J. N. Bhatt, J. - The Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation ("GIDC" for short) has questioned the legality and validity of the judgments of the Trial Court making the awards of the arbitrator, Rule of the Court, in all this group of eight appeals, by invoking the aids of the provisions of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 ("the Act" for short hereinafter). 2. A few material facts leading to the rise of this group of appeals may be stated, at this stage. The appellant, GIDC, had filed civil suits against the respondent-contractor, M/s. S. R. Parmar and Company, a proprietary concern, at Ahmedabad ("the Contractor" for short). In the course of the proceedings of the suits filed by the GIDC, and arbitration agreement, Ex. 35, between the parties was entered into, and the Trial Court passed order with regard to the reference of the dispute between the parties to the Arbitrator Mr. B. P. Patel, in all the four suits filed in the Trial Court. 3. The Arbitrator, after hearing the parties and consideration the evidence, filed awards in the aforesaid four civil suits, in the Trial Court. 4. Pursuant to the filing of the awards made by the Arbitrator in the aforesaid suits, the notices were issued to the parties. The GIDC challenged the said awards of the Arbitrator, by filing separate petitions, on the ground that the said awards were neither legal nor valid and since the Arbitrator had not allowed the full claims considering the counter-claims preferred by the Contractor, which was wrong and otherwise also, the awards are vague and imperfect, as they were not reasoned awards. Thus, the GIDC filed four Miscellaneous Civil Petitions against the said four awards filed by the Arbitrator. 5. Having examined the facts and circumstances, the Trial Court reached to the conclusion that there was no cause attracting the provisions of Section 30 of the Act to set aside the awards and, therefore, the four petitions challenging the awards came to be dismissed and the four petitions filing awards by the Arbitrator came to be allowed. Thus, the Trial Court was pleased to decree in terms of the said awards, in all the four petitions, filed by the Arbitrator. Thus, the Trial Court was pleased to decree in terms of the said awards, in all the four petitions, filed by the Arbitrator. Being dissatisfied, the GIDC has came up before this court, challenging the legality and validity of the said eight orders passed by the Trial Court in the aforesaid eight petitions, by filing eight separate appeals, under Section 39 of the Act. 6. Since common questions are raised between common parties against awards declared by common Arbitrator, all eight appeals are being disposed of by his common judgment. 7. Factual Matrix Before we examine the common contentions raised in these appeals, relevant and material facts may be mentioned. Firstly, it may be mentioned that the Contractor and the GIDC had entered into an agreement for the work of the construction of Industrial Sheds, at Naroda industrial Area, at Ahmedabad. There were some disputes between the GIDC and the Contractor and the GIDC had filed the aforesaid suits, and during the pendency of the suits, the Arbitration Agreement was made between the parties in all the suits. Further materials particulars and dates giving birth to the present eight appeals are enumerated in a tabulated form, which are no longer in controversy and which are relevant and having material bearing on the points contemplated and canvassed before us in this group of appeals and which shall be referred to, as and when required at an appropriate stage hereinafter, for the adjudication of the aspects and questions raised before us. 8. The following aspects are no longer in controversy : ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- S. No. Particulars Date ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. Arbitration Agreement was signed in all the matters 1.5.1980 2. Arbitrator entered the reference 20.5.1980 3. GIDC submitted its claims 14.8.1980 4. Contractor filed counter-claims 3.10.1980 5. Awards were passed in all the matters 29.6.1994 6. Time was extended in all the matters by court upto 30.6.1984 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. Contention No. I Learned Counsel, Mr. A. H. Mehta, for the appellant-GIDC, has raised a contention that no written statement and counter-claim was filed by the contractor in the suits and, therefore, the filing of the same before the Arbitrator should not have been considered by the Arbitrator and, therefore, the awards are bad in law. Contention No. I Learned Counsel, Mr. A. H. Mehta, for the appellant-GIDC, has raised a contention that no written statement and counter-claim was filed by the contractor in the suits and, therefore, the filing of the same before the Arbitrator should not have been considered by the Arbitrator and, therefore, the awards are bad in law. In so far as this contention is concerned, it will not detain us any longer, as in that, it may be mentioned that though the written statement and counter-claims were not made in the suits, by the Contractor, a specific clause was incorporated in the Arbitration Agreement, whereby, the Contractor was permitted to file the written statement and the counter-claim arising out of the suit contracts before the Arbitrator and the same were required to be decided by the Arbitrator, as part of the reference. In view of the aforesaid specific and unambiguous clause incorporated in the Arbitration Agreement in each matter, the first contention of the learned counsel, Mr. Mehta, is quite devoid of any substance. Therefore, it ought to be rejected. 10. Contention No. II The second contention raised by Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the GIDC is that the awards are given by the Arbitrator in all the matters, beyond the period of time prescribed in the Arbitration Agreement and, therefore, the awards are without jurisdiction. This submission is also found, totally, meritless, in view of the facts emerging from the record of the present case. Learned counsel, Mr. M. G. Nagarkar, for the respondents, has pointed out that, in all the matters, the Trial Court went on extending the time for making the award by the Arbitrator. In view of the provisions of Section 28 of the Act, the court is competent to enlarge the time for making the award. It is always competent for the court under Section 28 of the Act to consider as to whether the time for making the award should be enlarged or not. Therefore, the court could, if it thinks fit, whether the time for making the award is expired or not and whether the award has been made or not, enlarge time from time to time, for making the award. There is no dispute about the fact that the award came to be made on 29th June, 1984. Therefore, the court could, if it thinks fit, whether the time for making the award is expired or not and whether the award has been made or not, enlarge time from time to time, for making the award. There is no dispute about the fact that the award came to be made on 29th June, 1984. The Trial Court had enlarged time for making the award by the Arbitrator, in all the matters, up to 30th June, 1984, by exercising its powers under Section 28 of the Act, and, therefore, it is crystal clear that the awards came to be made by the Arbitrator in all the cases, within the time enlarged by the Trial Court. Consequently, the second contention also must be rejected. 11. Contention No. III The third contention advanced on behalf of the GIDC is with regard to the nature of awards passed by the Arbitrator in all the matters. In that, it was, seriously, contended that all the awards are without reasons and they are non-speaking awards and, hence, they should be considered as illegal. The legal proposition on this score is very well explained and enunciated by the Apex Court. The absence of reasons in the awards could not be said to be sufficient for setting aside the awards made by the Arbitrator. The awards are not liable to be quashed merely on that ground. The Arbitrator, as such, is not obliged to enumerate the reasons unless so specifically stipulated in the Arbitration Agreement. Having perused and examined the Arbitration Agreement, in all the matters in question, we do not find any clause or provision, whereby, such an agreement to state the reasons by the Arbitrator was made by the parties. The proposition of law on this point is very well settled by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in a decision rendered in Raipur Development Authority v. M/s. Chokhamal Contractors (AIR 1990 SC 1428). Considering this question, the Constitution Bench held that the award is not liable to be quashed merely on the ground of absence of reasons. It is very clear from the aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench that, where the Arbitration Agreement itself stipulated reasons for the award, the Arbitrator is under a legal obligation to give reasons and not otherwise. Considering this question, the Constitution Bench held that the award is not liable to be quashed merely on the ground of absence of reasons. It is very clear from the aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench that, where the Arbitration Agreement itself stipulated reasons for the award, the Arbitrator is under a legal obligation to give reasons and not otherwise. In the cases on hand, no such stipulation was ever made and, therefore, it was not incumbent upon the Arbitrator to assign reasons while making the awards. Apart from that legal aspect, factually, we failed to persuade ourselves to hold that the impugned awards are non-speaking. Therefore, the contention that the awards are bad in law and illegal, as non-speaking awards, is required to be rejected. 12. Contention No. IV Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the GIDC that the Arbitrator was not competent and justified in awarding interest from the year 1974 to the date of decree or payment, whichever event occurred earlier. The question of grant of interest by the Arbitrator is considered by the Trial Court. The Trial Court has, rightly, reached the conclusion that the Arbitrator has power to award interest. The Arbitration Agreement, admittedly, does not prohibit the grant of interest. It is also an admitted fact that the demand for interest was made by the Contractor in all the matters, in claim statements before the Arbitrator and 18 per cent rate of interest was demanded. Of course, the Arbitrator has awarded interest only at the rate of 12 per cent against claim of 18 per cent. Thus, demand was made and the Arbitration Agreement did not contain negative provision. When the agreement between the parties does not prohibit the grant of interest and whereupon a contractor makes a claim for interest and that dispute is referred to the Arbitrator, the Arbitrator is empowered to award interest pendente lite. The Apex Court in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of India v. G. C. Roy ( AIR 1992 SC 732 ), ("Roy's case", henceforth), held overruling the decision of the Supreme Court in Executive Engineer, Irrigation, Galimala v. Abnaduta, Jena ( AIR 1988 SC 1520 ) ("Jena's case", henceforth), in so far it related to the power of an Arbitrator to award interest pendente lite. In Jena's case, the Apex Court held that the Arbitrator to whom the reference is made without the intervention of the court, does not have jurisdiction to award interest 'pendente lite'. It was a decision given by three Judge Bench. The correctness of the ratio propounded in 'Jena's case' was assailed before the Supreme Court, in 'Roy's case'. In Roy's case, the Supreme Court held that the Arbitrator is empowered to award interest pendente lite, where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and the same is referred to the Arbitrator. The two conditions enunciated in Roy's case by the Apex Court, are satisfied in all the cases on hand. The Supreme Court, overruling the ratio of Jena's case, reached to the conclusion that the Arbitrator has power to award interest pendente lite. Therefore, there is no manner of doubt about the power and competency of the arbitrator to award the interest, even pendente lite. 13. However, it is contended on behalf of the GIDC that the said decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Roy's case will not be attracted in the cases on hand, as the decision in Jena's case was overruled, prospectively, and not retrospectively. In this connection, our attention is invited to the material portion of paragraph 47 of Roy's case. No doubt it is true that the Apex Court made it clear that the decision in Roy's case shall not entitle any party nor shall it empower any court to reopen proceedings which have already become final. It is also further clarified in the said paragraph that the law declared therein shall apply only to pending proceedings. 14. Relying on the aforesaid observation of the Supreme Court, it is contended that the ratio of Roy's case will not be attracted in this group of appeals, as the awards became final when the awards were made by the Arbitrator and the awards were made by the Arbitrator in all the matters, on 29.6.1984, and the decision in Roy's case will be applicable only to the pending proceedings on the date of the pronouncement of its decision, that is, on 12.12.1991. This submission, prima facie, may appear to be subtle, but not sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the relevant legal settings. 15. This submission, prima facie, may appear to be subtle, but not sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the relevant legal settings. 15. The contention that prior to the date of the law declared in Roy's case, the ratio propounded in Jena's case held the field and, therefore, the date from which the ratio of Roy's case will be applicable under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, would be 12.12.1991. Thus, it is vehemently, contended that the finality is achieved when the award is made by the Arbitrator irrespective of the pendency of the petition before the Trial Court or the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Court sitting in an appeal over the award. Therefore, it is contended further that, in view of the limited scope prescribed in Section 30 of the Act, for setting aside the awards of the Arbitrator, it must be held that the petition before the Trial Court, under Section 17 of the Act, for making the judgment in terms of the award or under Section 33 or an appeal under Section 39 of the Act, is not a continuity or pendency of the proceedings of arbitration and therefore, the ration of Roy's case does not apply. 16. This submission is required to be examined by this court in the light of the relevant legal settings. We are, therefore, called upon to examine and adjudicate upon an interesting question as to whether the pendency of the petition under Section 17 of the Act, for making the judgment in terms of the award, or under Section 30 or 33 for setting aside the award, or an appeal under Section 39, challenging the making of the award, as Rule of Court, is a continuation of the Arbitration proceedings or not. In order to examine the merits of this contention, it may, firstly, be noted that the Arbitration Act applies to all the arbitrations in view of the specific provision under Section 47 of the Act. 17. Section 21 of the Act provides that, where, in any suit, all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between them in the suit shall be referred to arbitration, they may, at any time before judgment is pronounced, apply in writing to the court for an order of reference, during the pendency of the suit. 17. Section 21 of the Act provides that, where, in any suit, all the parties interested agree that any matter in difference between them in the suit shall be referred to arbitration, they may, at any time before judgment is pronounced, apply in writing to the court for an order of reference, during the pendency of the suit. The court is competent to pass an order of reference under Section 23 of the Act. Section 25 of the Act provides that the provisions of the other chapters of the Act shall apply to the arbitration ordered under Section 21 of the Act. 18. In view of the scheme of the Act and the relevant legal setting, we are of the opinion that, it cannot be contended that the pendency of a petition before the Trial Court either under Section 17 or under Section 30 of the Act for setting aside the award or an appeal challenging the judgment of making award of Arbitrator a Rule of Court under Section 39 of the Act is not a continuation of the arbitration proceedings. 19. It may be stated that Section 41 of the Act prescribed procedure and power of the Court. It is very clear from the said provision that subject to the provisions of the Act and of the Rules made thereunder, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC" for short) shall apply to all proceedings before the court and to all appeals under this Act, and that the court shall have, for the purpose of, and in relation to arbitration proceedings, the same power of making orders in respect of any of the matters set out in the Second Schedule, as it has for the purpose of, and in relation to proceedings before the court. The orders made by the Trial Court under Section 30 are appealable under Section 39 of the Act. It may also be mentioned that Section 31 of the Act prescribes jurisdiction of the courts for making an award Rule of court. Not only that, there is also a provision in Section 32 of the Act, which prescribes a bar to suits contesting arbitration agreement or award. It may also be mentioned that Section 31 of the Act prescribes jurisdiction of the courts for making an award Rule of court. Not only that, there is also a provision in Section 32 of the Act, which prescribes a bar to suits contesting arbitration agreement or award. It cannot be contended that the jurisdiction of the court under Section 30 or 33 of the Act for setting aside is circumscribes only in case of misconduct or invalidity of the award under Section 35 of the Act. Clause (c) of Section 30 also provides that an award can be set aside by the Court, if the court is satisfied that the award is improperly procured or is otherwise invalid. 20. Thus, it cannot be contended that the jurisdictional sweep of the courts under Sections 17, 30 or 39 of the Act is circumscribed so much so that it has only to consider the misconduct or the invalidity under Section 35 of the Act. Clause (c), of Section 30 also prescribes that the award can be set aside it an award has been improperly procured is otherwise invalid. Therefore, the contention that the powers of the court under Sections 30 and 39 of the Act are so much so circumscribed that the courts have no jurisdiction to examine the validity of the award on factual aspect and, therefore, proceedings pending thereunder cannot be said to be continuation of Arbitration, is neither logical nor legal. 21. Considering the scheme of the relevant provisions of Sections 31, 32, 33, 39, 41 and 47 of the Act, we are of the clear opinion that the pendency of the proceedings challenging the judgment and decree making the award Rule of Court could be said to be pending proceedings in respect of the award of Arbitrator. In other words, the award declared by the Arbitrator shall be final only, if not challenged further in the higher forums prescribed under the law. 22. As long as the challenge against the validity or the legality, therefore, remains to be examined in any proceedings, it can, safely, be concluded that the award of the Arbitrator is not final and the proceedings are still pending. Therefore, even while considering the doctrine of prospective overruling, it can, indubitably, be concluded that, the Arbitrator's awards challenged in the appeals are, undoubtedly, not final. Therefore, even while considering the doctrine of prospective overruling, it can, indubitably, be concluded that, the Arbitrator's awards challenged in the appeals are, undoubtedly, not final. Therefore, the contention, that in view of the doctrine of prospective overruling in Roy's case, the awards made by the Arbitrator are final and, therefore, they cannot be reopened, merits only rejection strightway. 23. It is also contended on behalf of the Contractor, by learned counsel, Mr. Nagarkar that while invoking the doctrine of prospective overuling, one cannot rely upon the overruled judgment to see aside the orders, but one can rely upon it to protect the order or otherwise, not to set aside the order. As observed hereinbefore, in Roy's case, a Constitution Bench of five Judges overruled Jena's case and held that the ratio of Roy's case will be applicable prospectively. It, therefore, becomes clear from the Roy's case wherefrom pendente lite interest was not granted by the Arbitrator prior to 12.12.1991 (the date on which the Apex Court pronounced Roy's case), and which proceedings became final, a party or court cannot reopen the proceedings and set aside the award order of the court. Roy's case cannot be construed to mean that, whenever pendente lite interest is granted by Arbitrator prior to 12.12.1991 and even if proceedings became final, in that case, it would be open to the court to set aside that award or order. In other words, wherefrom it is granted, it cannot be revoked, and wherefrom it is not granted, it cannot be granted thereafter, having examined the relevant legal settings, we find ourselves in agreement with the said submission raised on behalf of the Contractor, by the learned counsel, Mr. Nagarkar. 24. In Roy's case, the Supreme Court has enumerated relvant principles emerging in such a situation. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide a question whether an arbitrator had the power to award interest pendente lite, and if so, on what principle. In the said case before the Supreme Court, in a factual scenario, it was an admitted fact that the Arbitration Agreement did not provide for grant of such interest nor did it prohibit such a grant. In other words, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the agreement was silent as to the award of interest. In the said case before the Supreme Court, in a factual scenario, it was an admitted fact that the Arbitration Agreement did not provide for grant of such interest nor did it prohibit such a grant. In other words, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where the agreement was silent as to the award of interest. It would be quite proper and expedient at this juncture to highlight the principles on which the interest could be awarded in the Roy's case. The Supreme Court observed that on conspectus of several decisions examined the following principles have emerged : (i) A person deprived of the use of money to which he is legitimately entitled has a right to be compensated for the deprivation, call it by any name. It may be called interest, compensation or damages. This basic consideration is as valid for the period the dispute is pending before the Arbitrator as it is for the period prior to the Arbitrator entering upon the reference. This is the principle of Section 34, C.P.C., and there is no reason or principle to hold otherwise in the case of arbitrator. (ii) An arbitrator is an alternative form for resolution of disputes arising between the parties. If so, he must have the power to decide all the disputes or differences arising between the parties. If the arbitrator has no power to award interest pendente lite, the party claiming it would have to approach the court for that purpose, even though he may have obtained satisfaction in respect of other claims from the arbitrator. This would lead to multiplicity of proceedings. (iii) An arbitrator is the creature of agreement. It is open to the parties to confer upon him such powers and prescribe such procedure for him to follow, as they think fit, so long as they are not opposed to law. The proviso to Section 41 and Section 3 of Arbitration Act illustrate this Point). All the same, the agreement must be in conformity with law. The Arbitrator must also act and make his award in accordance with the general law of the land and the agreement. (iv) Over the years, the English and Indian Courts have acted an the assumption that, where the agreement does not and a party to the reference makes claim for interest, the arbitrator must have the power to award interest pendent lite. (iv) Over the years, the English and Indian Courts have acted an the assumption that, where the agreement does not and a party to the reference makes claim for interest, the arbitrator must have the power to award interest pendent lite. Thawardas ( AIR 1955 SC 468 ), has not been followed in the later decisions of this court. It has been explained and distinguished on the basis that in that case there was no claim for interest but only a claim for unliquidated damages. It has been said repeatedly that observations in the said judgment were not intended to lay down any such absolute or universal rule as they appear to, on first impression. Until Jena's case (supra), almost all the courts in the country had upheld the power of the arbitration to award interest pendente lite. Continuity and certainty is a highly desirable feature of law. (v) Interest pendent lite is not a matter of substantive law, like interest for the period anterior to reference (pre-reference period). For doing complete justice between the parties, such power has always been inferred. 25. Obviously, the question of award of interest by the Arbitrator may arise in respect of three different periods or situations which could be enumerated as follows : (1) For the period commencing from the date of dispute till the date the arbitrator enters upon the reference. (2) For the period commencing from the date of the Arbitrator's entering upon reference till the date of making the award, and (3) For the period commencing from the date of making of the award till the date the award is made the rule of the court or till the date of realisation, whichever is earlier. No doubt, in Jena's case, two questions had arisen for the consideration of the court, as follows : (1) The power of the arbitrator to award interest for the period prior to his entering upon the reference. (2) The power of the arbitrator to award interest for the period the dispute remained pending before him pendente lite. 26. In three Judge Bench decision rendered in Jena's case, the Supreme Court held that the arbitrator to whom the reference is made without the intervention of the court does not have jurisdiction to award interest pendente lite. (2) The power of the arbitrator to award interest for the period the dispute remained pending before him pendente lite. 26. In three Judge Bench decision rendered in Jena's case, the Supreme Court held that the arbitrator to whom the reference is made without the intervention of the court does not have jurisdiction to award interest pendente lite. The ratio of the said decision was challenged and re-considered by the Apex Court in Roy's case and after consideration, the Supreme Court overruled Jena's case, holding that the decision, in Jena's case, in so far as it runs counter to the above principles relating to the grant of interest, did not lay down correct law. 27. It may also be mentioned, at this juncture, that the Arbitrator has awarded interest for the period of three different categories mentioned hereinabove, like pre-reference, pending-reference, and post-reference. The interest is awarded at the rate of 12 per cent per annum under all the three categories. It is not in dispute that the rate of interest is awarded under the category of pre-reference period like that from 30.9.1974 to 20.5.1980 and during the pending-reference period i.e. 20.5.1980 to 29.8.1994 and under the category of post-reference period, the interest is awarded from 30.6.1984 to the date of decree (18-12-1985) or the date of payment whichever is earlier. 28. In so far as the grant of interest for the period under the first category like that of pre-reference and the third category like that of post-reference is concerned, there is no serious controversy. The main controversy revolves round as to whether the Contractor could claim interest pendente lite or for the period under second category or not. The proposition of law on this score is very well enunciated and settled in Roy's case. Therefore, it is very clear from the ratio of Roy's case that when the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute has been referred to the Arbitrator for adjudication, he shall have power to award interest pendente lite. Therefore, the contention that the Contractor was not entitled to interest and the Arbitrator was not competent to grant interest pendente lite is, totally, without any substance and it is required to be rejected. 29. Therefore, the contention that the Contractor was not entitled to interest and the Arbitrator was not competent to grant interest pendente lite is, totally, without any substance and it is required to be rejected. 29. We may also mention that the award or any order of the Arbitrator cannot be said to be final till the challenge against it is pending before any forum prescribed under the relevant provisions of law. But it is natural that the award or order could be said to be final only when the same is not challenged any further by the party who is entitled to challenge it or when the decision is given by the last court and there is no possibility of taking it any further. A matter may become final at any stage either before the first forum or any other intermediate forum, if the concerned party chooses not to challenge it in the superior court. Obviously, when the challenge continues right up to the last court, the decision of the last court can be regarded as final order or award, as the cast may be. The serious contention raised by Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the GIDC, that the award of the Arbitrator should be regarded as final is, neither acceptable nor tenable. The award of the Arbitrator could be challenged in the Civil Court and the order of the Civil Court could be challenged before the Appellate Court and, thereafter, if challenged by resorting to the provisions under the Constitution or any other appropriate provision, the decision of the Arbitrator will not be final, until the matter is disposed of by the last court. If it is pending, it can never be said to be final. Any decision which is subject to scrutiny by the Civil Court or Appellate Court or any Higher Forum can never be regarded as final. The award of the Arbitrator could be challenged under Sections 30 or 33 or also before the Appellate Forum under Section 39. Therefore, the awards passed by the Arbitrator, in the present group of eight appeals, could not be said to be final on 12.12.1991, as the appeals, which are in continuation of the original proceedings commenced before the Arbitrator, would continue till the disposal of the appeals. Therefore, the awards passed by the Arbitrator, in the present group of eight appeals, could not be said to be final on 12.12.1991, as the appeals, which are in continuation of the original proceedings commenced before the Arbitrator, would continue till the disposal of the appeals. In other words, the arbitration proceedings in all these matters could not be said to be concluded one or final, but they were pending, as the appeals were yet to be adjudicated upon the date of the pronouncement of the decision of the Apex Court in Roy's case on 12.12.1991 and, therefore, the awards of the Arbitrator under challenge could not be said to be final. On the contrary, the proceedings are pending on the relevant date like that of 12.12.1991. Therefore, the ratio propounded by the Apex Court in Roy's case will be fully attracted. 30. Pursuant to the interim order passed by the court, the GIDC has deposited 50 per cent of the amount decreed together with interest and cost and 50 per cent of the amount of award, in all the four matters, is required to be paid to the Contractor. Therefore, it is hereby clarified that the interim order passed by this court shall, obviously, stand vacated and we direct the appellant-GIDC pay the remaining amount of 50 per cent with costs and interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum till the realisation. The Bank Guarantee fox, the withdrawal of 50 per cent of the amount of decree, given by the Contractor, pursuant to the order passed by this court. shall be released forthwith. 31. Having regard to the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the present case and while viewed in the light of the provisions of the relevant law, we are of the clear opinion that this group of eight appeals, at the instance of GIDC, assumes no any survival value and, therefore, all the eight appeals are required to be dismissed with cost. Accordingly, all these eight appeals shall stand dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.